By Eric Vandenbroeck
10 Dec. 2003
Historical
Background of Myanmar
The dispute about the Rohingya's
Today Buddhist Arakanese
and Burmese Nationalists will claim that Rohingya are foreigners to
Myanmar/Burma and without exception infiltrated from Bangladesh while using the
derogatory term 'Bengalis'. This whereby pro-Rohingya activists and scholars
will point to Francis Hamilton who referred to a so-called Rooinga
which is argued to be proven they are the same as those who currently call
themselves Rohingya.
In 1937 the British
administratively separated what became Burma from India, and Arakan was incorporated into this new crown colony. Herein
lie the seeds of discord as there are some Muslim residents with longstanding
roots in the territory that became Burma spanning several generations and more
recent migrants, providing a pretext to sow doubts about the bona fides of all
Muslims and thereby deny citizenship rights and protections to the Rohingya
community.
Thus the history of
the Rohingya is contested whereby factual information is difficult to come by.
Two studies so far that provide the best information are by Moshe Yegar (an Israeli diplomat posted in Burma in the 1960s)
“The Muslims of Burma,” The Crescent in the East: Islam in Asia Major, Raphael
Israeli, London, 1982 (an earlier version of this book was also published in
Burmese in Yangon.) And Moshe Yegar, “Burmese,”
Muslim Peoples: A World Ethnographic Survey, Richard V. Weekes (ed.) Westport,
1984.
As I have detailed elsewhere it was not the abolition
of the old monarchy by the British in the late 19th century that forebode the
disaster that came after independence in 1962. Rather, Myanmar’s inability to
become a functioning national entity is the fact that the country, with its
present borders, is a colonial creation bringing together peoples and ethnic
groups with little in common, and even centuries of conflicts with the Burman
kings that predate British rule.
Neither is the Bamar nationalist disdain for what currently is called the
Rohingya new phenomena. It is not also without relevance that the earliest
nationalist movement towards independence grew out of the General Council of
Burmese Associations and the nationalist Burma Independence Army recruited
during World War II was almost totally Burman and Buddhist.
This followed policy
implementation and legislation of religious protection laws, which declare
Buddhism’s superiority in Myanmar and to segregate as well as discriminate
against non-Buddhists in the conduct of their daily lives.1
In 1992 and 93 there
were also several appeals by the UN in the course of which it was "in
principle, that the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
would be allowed to establish a presence in Rakhine state in Myanmar to assist
and coordinate the voluntary repatriation of the residents of Rakhine state at
present in camps in Bangladesh." (See addendum underneath)
From the old to a new
Arakan
The Rakhine region in
Myanmar extends some six hundred kilometers along the eastern coast of the Bay
of Bengal. It is separated from the rest of Myanmar by a mountain range that
for centuries impeded permanent conquest of that country but permitted
occasional inroads and contacts between Bengal (present-day Bangladesh) and
Myanmar. The northern part of Rakhine, the Mayu
region, was a route of contact between Myanmar and eastern Bengal. These
geographical factors largely account for the distinct character and development
of the Rakhine region—both generally and in terms of its Muslim population,
which was a separate kingdom until conquered by the Burmese in 1784. From the fourteenth
to the eighteenth centuries, the history of Rakhine was closely linked to that
of Muslim Bengal. Rakhine came under British administration in 1826, joined the
Union of Burma in 1948, and was constituted as the Rakhine “state” in 1974.
Kingdom
of Arakan (1531-1666)
When Rakhine was
occupied by the British during the first Anglo–Burmese war of 1824–26,
large-scale Indian immigration, encouraged by the British, began immediately.
Many of the new immigrants came from Bengal. Each year, during the plowing and
harvesting seasons, some twenty thousand Bengali migrants crossed the border to
find temporary work in the rice fields of Rakhine. Some returned, but many
remained. Intermarriage between these Bengali Muslims and local Rohingya women
became common. This immigration led to tension between Muslims and Buddhists in
Rakhine, which escalated when the British retreated and the Japanese advanced into
the territory in 1942. Thousands of Muslims (their exact number is unknown)
were expelled from regions under Japanese control, mostly in south Rakhine
where Buddhists constituted the majority. Those expelled fled to eastern Bengal
or to northern Rakhine, seeking refuge in territories still under British
military rule.
For their part,
Muslims conducted retaliatory raids from British-controlled territories against
their Buddhist neighbors. These acts of reciprocal violence caused the Buddhist
population of Rakhine to flee from the north just as Muslims had been compelled
to leave the south. As a result, Rakhine was in effect divided into Buddhist
and Muslim areas.
Rakhine was the
westernmost point reached by the Japanese in their drive toward India during World
War II. Thus, at the beginning of 1942, it became the front line with the
British. By January 1945, most of the territory was again in British hands. It
is not clear whether London had made any commitments to the Muslims of Rakhine
regarding their status after the war, but their leaders claimed that the
British had promised to grant them a Muslim national area in parts of Rakhine.
Some Rohingya Muslim leaders went even further and supported the immediate
secession of the territory from Myanmar and its subsequent annexation by
Pakistan or India when these countries achieved independence in 1947.
Following British
victories, Muslims who had fled to Bengal during the war returned to their
villages accompanied by land-hungry immigrants from Bengal who settled in
northern Rakhine. Roving Muslim and Buddhist armed bands in the area engaged in
robbery and the smuggling of rice to Bengal. When it became clear that the
British would leave Myanmar, irredentist and separatist tendencies in northern
Rakhine grew stronger still. In July 1946 the Northern Arakan
Muslim League was founded.
After Myanmar
attained independence in January 1948, the new government allowed Buddhist
refugees to return to northern Rakhine and regain the homes and villages they
had been forced to cede to Rohingya Muslims several years earlier, and Muslims
were forced off the Buddhist-owned lands they had seized.
Muslim religious
leaders now began preaching jihad. Thus an armed rebellion group of Arakanese
Muslims (including the Rohingya), calling themselves "Mujahedin.T"
demanded the creation of an independent Muslim state on territory formerly the
party of Northern Arakan. Although the rebellion was
unsuccessful, it left in its wake an inherent distrust and hatred towards the
Arakanese Muslims, throughout the whole country.
As the Myanmar
government was engaged in combatting rebel movements in other parts of the
country, within a short time the Mujāhideen succeeded
in taking over a large part of northern Rakhine. The rebels, like many other
Rakhine Muslims who did not actively support the struggle, sought to establish
a Muslim political entity that would not necessarily secede from Myanmar but
would be separate from Buddhist northern Rakhine. Negotiations with the central
government in Yangon in 1948 and 1949 eventually broke down, and from 1951
onward, Myanmar forces waged large-scale annual offensives against the Rohingya
Mujāhideen. These culminated in Operation Monsoon in
November 1954, in which the rebels were finally subdued. At that time, Mujāhideen strongholds were captured, and a number of their
leaders killed. Others crossed the border and escaped to Bengal. From then on,
the military threat they posed lessened considerably, and in 1960, Prime
Minister U Nu appointed a commission of inquiry to assess all problems related
to the Rakhine question.
The Rohingya
Association of Ulama, speaking for the Muslims of Rakhine, demanded the
creation of an autonomous district in northern Rakhine with its own regional
council, which would be directly accountable to the central government in
Yangon. This demand was rejected, but on May 1, 1961, the Myanmar government
announced the establishment of the Mayu Frontier
Administration (MFA) in northern Rakhine, which was to be administered by army
officers. Although this was not the hoped-for autonomy, the Rohingya Muslim
leaders agreed to the arrangement.
In March 1962,
however, General Ne Win staged a military coup in Myanmar. The new government
retained the MFA but put an end to all political activity related to minority
demands, including those of the Rohingya, seeing them as a threat to national
unity.
What is in a name?
A second reason why
Rohingya's are part of a contested history is that of the name they chose to be
called by. This whereby it should be clear that according to international
human rights law the Rohingya have a right to self-identification.
In Burmese and
English sources, one can find various spellings, such as Rowannhyas,
Rawengya, Royankya, or Rohinjas, and Ruhangya. Moshe Yegar, used Rohinga in his
authoritative The Muslims of Burma. Prime Minister U Nu used the term in a
speech broadcast on September 25, 1954, when he pleaded for the political
support of moderate Rakhine Muslims in Buthidaung and
Maungdaw against the Mujahids and the Rakhine nationalists.
The variants tend to
show that the term had not been put into writing previously, but rather was in
oral use among people who pronounced it differently and still were unsure about
how to spell it. Although historical linguistics can explain its derivation
from Ra(k)khanga, a literary Pali term, nonscientific
etymologies have flourished, linking Rohingya to Arabic words and even
Arakanese expressions. Certainly, it was not an invention, but with its
adoption by a group of tightly knit nationalists, it was instantly impregnated
with the group’s political messages. Sultan Mahmud disagreed. He may have
shared the political objectives of the younger nationalist generation, but he
remained opposed to the choice of a distinctive yet divisive ethnonym to denote
the Arakan Muslim community.
The Jam’iyyat ul-Ulama, based in Maungdaw adopted the name Rohing[y]a at an unspecified date, while five new
organizations including the term in their name were founded between 1956 and
1960 in Rangoon (United Rohinga Organization, Rohinga Youth Organization, Rohinga
Students Organization, Rohinga Labour
Organization, and Rohinga Rangoon University Students
Organization).2
The early development
of the Rohingyas as a movement of young educated Muslim nationalists was driven
by the political requirements of the day. When U Nu won the 1960 parliamentary
elections, he was prepared to grant Arakan statehood
within the Union. This led to “frantic activities” by the Muslims around Sultan
Mahmud and the Rohingya organizations.3 Sultan Mahmud’s Arakan
Muslim Organisation ultimately was ready to
compromise and accept the creation of an Arakan state
if the Muslims were given religious, cultural, economic, political, and
educational guarantees.4
Yet it was not the
Rohingyas, but rather the military putsch of March 2, 1962, that spoiled
Arakanese Buddhist expectations. The Arakan state did
not come into existence before 1974.
Rohingya leaders, by
asserting their name, are playing by the increasingly rigid rules of the game
in Myanmar. They have not created these rules, but the tragic irony is that
they have legitimized and encouraged the notion of national races which now
ideologically underlies their oppression. Trapped in Myanmar’s cage, it is
understandable they feel there is little else they can do to assert their
rights.
Their right of
self-identification is undeniable, but there is a certain fetishism of such
rights among pro-Rohingya activists. And the problem at root is not so much the
denial of their Rohingya identity as the prevalence of “national races” and
communalism in Myanmar.
Ethnic identities
were fluid and ever-changing in pre-colonial Myanmar. It was the British who
classified people in boxes, mainly on a linguistic basis, and often discouraged
interactions between them, thereby creating hard divisions where there was
virtually none until then.
Ethnic Bamar chauvinism, ethno-nationalist insurgencies, and
military dictatorships in the 20th century further hardened those divisions,
and the democratic transition launched in 2011 has arguably exacerbated the
problem as ultra-nationalist organizations have been freed to spread their
exclusionary notions of Myanmar nationhood and anti-Muslim propaganda.
In early 1975,
because of persecution by the local Buddhist population, thousands of Rohingya
Muslims from Rakhine were forced to flee their homes and cross the border into
Bangladesh (which had seceded from Pakistan and become an independent state in
December 1971). Some Rohingya activists sought allies among other non-Muslim
minority separatist groups that had been active in Myanmar since the end of
World War II. In May 1976, thirteen such organizations demanding autonomy for
their communities, including the Rohingya Patriotic Front, met to coordinate
their actions. In 1978, General Ne Win’s government stepped up its suppression
of minorities, including Muslims. In an attempt to stem the influx of illegal
immigrants from Bangladesh, the government launched a campaign called “Naga
Min” [Dragon King] to register and classify all residents in the regions and
determine whether they were citizens of Myanmar, legally domiciled foreigners,
or illegal aliens. The majority of the Rohingya were illiterate and few were
able to provide documents proving their citizenship. By August 1978, more than
a quarter of a million Muslims had fled to Bangladesh; many others hid in the
jungle.
In July 1979, the
governments of Myanmar and Bangladesh agreed to the repatriation of 200,000
refugees to Rakhine, but many refused to return. Muslim fears that the Myanmar
authorities were intent on ridding Rakhine of its Muslim population were
confirmed when the new Burmese Citizenship Law of October 15, 1982, turned the
Rohingya into de facto foreigners in their native country. According to the new
law, only descendants of indigenous people who were present in Myanmar before
1823 were eligible for citizenship. That choice of date was not an arbitrary
one. The first Anglo–Burmese war, which led to the British annexation of
Rakhine, erupted the following year. As a result of that conflict and
subsequent British conquests, immigrants arrived, particularly from the Indian
subcontinent and China. Naturalized descendants of ethnic groups who entered
Myanmar under British colonial rule constituted one of the categories regarded
by the Burmese army as security risks. The new law rendered naturalized
citizens ineligible to hold political posts, serve in the armed forces, or be appointed
directors of government institutions. The close cross-border contacts and
widespread integration between indigenous and immigrant Muslims that had gone
on uninterrupted before and during the period of British rule made it
especially difficult to decide who was of indigenous origin and who descended
from immigrants.
At the end of 1989,
the government began to settle Buddhists in Muslim areas of Rakhine by
displacing the local population. Muslims claimed that community leaders were
arrested, and others were conscripted by the Burmese army to work as forced
laborers in the construction of roads or camps, or as porters. The army was
accused of robbery, rape, murder, and the burning of mosques. In April 1991,
refugees who had been expelled or had escaped began to appear in Bangladesh. It
is estimated that by June 1992 some 210,000–280,000 had found refuge there. The
numbers were actually higher because many other refugees were dispersed among
the Bangladeshi population.
Under growing
international pressure, Myanmar indicated a willingness to permit refugees to
return. On April 28, 1992, the foreign ministers of Bangladesh and Myanmar
signed a repatriation agreement. The Myanmar government agreed to accept even
those refugees who had no proof of citizenship as long as they could prove that
they had previously lived in Myanmar (by providing the names of their villages
or village heads).
In November 1992, a
memorandum of understanding was signed between Myanmar and the UN High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), see addendum underneath, as well as other UN
bodies, which provided for the presence of those organizations in Rakhine. By
1993, only some fifty thousand refugees had returned. By the end of 1996, the
number had risen to 200,000. However, there were also reports of retaliation
carried out against refugees who had returned to Rakhine. It is estimated that
a few thousand fled back to Bangladesh.
At the beginning of
the 1990s, two militant Rohingya organizations emerged: the Arakan
Rohingya Islamic Front (ARIF) and the Rohingya Solidarity Organization (RSO).
Both were based in southeastern Bangladesh, where the government permitted them
to operate. According to some reports, they tried to recruit experienced
fighters from among veterans of the war in Afghanistan. It appears that the RSO
had developed connections with radical Muslim organizations in Bangladesh,
Pakistan, and (Qadhafi’s) Libya, and with al-Qa‘ida,
although details are difficult to confirm.
Representatives of
the movements attempted to mobilize material and moral assistance from Arab and
Muslim countries and international Islamic bodies, such as the Organization of
the Islamic Conference (OIC), and to convince Muslim countries that taking a
stand against Myanmar would be acting in the defense of Islam. However, the
international community, including Arab and other Muslim countries,
demonstrated little interest in the problem facing the Rohingya Muslims of
Rakhine. The Rohingya problem raised fears in the Bangladeshi government that
Rohingya refugee camps would become training grounds for extremists, that arms
would be smuggled in, and that pan-Islamic activities among the refugees might,
when combined with material aid from Islamic countries, foment militancy in
Bangladesh. Throughout this period, there seem to have been no significant
operations of any kind by Rohingya units, but only occasional skirmishes with
army patrols in jungle areas.5
A major problem has
been that the focus on the terminology used to describe the group has paralyzed
progress on addressing important human rights issues and achieving durable
solutions.
Many, though not all,
Rohingya were in practice recognized
as citizens under the 1947 Constitution and Union
Citizenship Act 1948, either by virtue of having resided in Burma for three
generations (Article 4(2) of the 1948 Act) or having applied to naturalize on
the basis of 5 years residence in Burma (Article 7 of the 1948 Act).
This lack of legal
status and identity is the cornerstone of the oppressive system targeting the
Rohingya. It is the consequence of the discriminatory and arbitrary use of laws
to target an ethnic group and deprive its members of the legal status they once
possessed.
For addendum see UN
document underneath.
1) For details about these developments
including the YMBA to Ba Maw see Haruhiro Fukui
(1985) Political Parties of Asia and the Pacific, Greenwood Press, pp. 133−134
and pp.153–154.)
2) Moshe Yegar notes that “as a matter of fact, the same group is
active in all of them” (Yegar, The Muslims of Burma
102). A contemporary observer of Burma Muslim affairs, Yegar
used only the spelling Rohinga.
3) Yegar, The Muslims of Burma, The Crescent in the East:
Islam in Asia Major, Raphael Israeli (London, 1982) p. 103.
4) Mohammad Yunus, A History of Arakan Past
and Present (Chittagong, Bangladesh: Magenta Colour,
1994), 71.
5) Yegar, “Burmese,” Muslim Peoples: A World Ethnographic
Survey, Richard V. Weekes (ed.) (Westport, 1984), pp. 187–90; Yegar, “The Muslims of Burma,” pp. 123–29.
Addendum:
For updates click homepage here