The “Battle of Pattaya” as protesters are calling the incident is a humiliating incident for the young Thai government — and it is a far more consequential incident than the overrunning of the international airport in Bangkok in November by the yellow-shirt group because of the security threat to world leaders, including Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, South Korean President Lee Myung Bak and Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd. Abhisit assured world leaders that security would be more than sufficient in Pattaya after early warning signs to the contrary.

While he rivals of the Red Shirts, the yellow-clad People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD) allegdly backed by the Thai Queen, is  prepairing to launch a counter-protest. Now international opprobrium and domestic pressures mean that Abhisit will have to make a choice — either to launch a security crackdown on the protesters and expedite prosecutions of their organizers, or to let his government fall in disgrace. There is also a question about whether the government will be able to capture or strike a deal with Thaksin (currently in exile) or whether Thaksin will continue to pull the strings of his proxy movement from afar to the detriment of Thai stability. All signs until now imply that Abhisit’s government has the tacit support of the military, which has so far resisted the temptation to intervene like it did in the 2006 coup against Thaksin. But today will force an end to the indecision that has created a cycle of mass protest and political instability in Thailand.

Thailand declared a state of emergency in the city hosting a summit of Asian leaders and canceled the event for security reasons today after more than 1,000 anti-government protesters stormed the venue.

Already on April 10 protesters broke through the light police cordon surrounding a luxury hotel in Pattaya, Thailand , where government leaders from 15 countries gathered for a summit of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) over the weekend.

Ironically, the tactic of massive protests that helped bring Thai Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva into power is now giving his own government trouble. While the government remains stable, the protesters’ interference with the ASEAN summit has embarrassed the country and raised questions about the Thai government’s ability to maintain law and order.

Thailand’s domestic politics are always topsy-turvy, but the current bout of unrest is more significant because it has raised security concerns for some of the world’s most powerful leaders.

The troubles in Thailand began with a coup against former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra in 2006 — since then the country has been split in two. Thaksin is wanted for corruption charges in Thailand and currently in exile, possibly in Cambodia (but seems to be based in Dubai), but he continues to pull many strings within the country, hoping to unfreeze his assets in Thai banks. Though his power is waning, he is evidently still capable of raising massive rallies through the National United Front of Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD), also known as the Red Shirts.

2008 was a year of wide scale protests by the yellow-wearing royalist group, the People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD), culminating in a siege of the international airport that hurt the Thai tourist industry and humiliated its pro-Thaksin leadership. In December 2008, the pro-Thaksin civilian government was disbanded by court order, paving the way for the rival Democrat Party to set up a government (with the tacit support of the military and monarchy). The new government is headed by Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, whose first few months in office have been relatively smooth. He has traveled all over the world (including to the recent G-20 financial summit in London) to clear Thailand’s reputation after the ruckus in 2008.

Now the same “people’s power” tactic of massive protests that brought Abhisit into office is undermining his own government. The Red Shirt protesters have overrun Bangkok and descended upon Pattaya in advance of the ASEAN summit. On April 8, about 50 miscreants attacked Abhisit’s motorcade and broke the back window of his car, an astounding breach of security. Today they overran the police barricade to besiege the hotel where some of the world’s most powerful leaders have gathered, including Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao, Japanese Prime Minister Taro Aso, South Korean President Lee Myung Bak and Australian Prime Minister Kevin Rudd.

Conclusion And Broader Implications

Fundamentally Thaksin is operating from a position of fundamental weakness, nevertheless the situation deserves watching.

The immediate context of the ongoing political upheaval is the 2006 military coup that ousted then-Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, a policeman and telecommunications mogul who created a political machine based in the rural provinces that could have re-elected him repeatedly. Despite Thakin’s exile, pro-Thaksin political proxies were re-elected to head the civilian government after the coup. Wide scale anti-Thaksin protests and shifting alliances among the country’s political elite brought down three governments from 2006-2008 before a court order enabled a new Democrat-led (anti-Thaksin) government to sit in December 2008. Now Thaksin is acting as puppet master behind the Red Shirts “revolutionary” movement, urging them to topple the Democrats and threatening to return to Thailand to lead marches in the capital.

Yet this context is not the whole story. Social and political unrest is woven into Thailand’s very nature — the country has seen 19 coups and numerous attempted coups since its transformation to a constitutional monarchy in 1932. The cyclical instability arises from geopolitical factors that have historically determined Thailand’s behavior and will continue to do so.

Geopolitics is rooted in geography. Thailand forms the heart of the jungle-covered Southeast Asian peninsula, wedged between Myanmar (formerly known as Burma) to the west, Laos and Cambodia to the east, and Malaysia to the South. Most versions of Thai history consider the ethnic Thai people to have been latecomers to the region; harried successively by Chinese and Mongol armies from the north, the Thai were forced to carve out their plot between the Burmese and Khmer (Cambodian) empires, and to vie with Malay and Chinese traders.

The Kingdom of Siam, as Thailand was called, took shape around the 12th to 13th centuries, near the fertile mouth of the Chao Phraya River which empties into the Gulf of Thailand. The Siamese were well-positioned to grow rice and sell it to merchants for export to hungry foreign markets. They quickly expanded their territory outward to give themselves strategic depth. Moving northward they gained dominance over the fertile river valleys of the Chao Phraya and its tributaries, all the way up to the mountainous north where they contended with a rival ethnic Thai center of power based in Chiang Mai. To the northeast they forced the collapse of the Khmer empire and seized the Khorat Plateau, which had (and still has) a large population for much-needed labor. Along the mountainous western border, and south into the Malay peninsula, the Siamese fought off the Burmese and the Malay.

Despite boundary shifts over the centuries, modern Thailand retains the outline of Siam. The buffer zones in the north, northeast and south were necessary to fend off invasion, and were for the most part effective. The Burmese conquered Siam twice, but never held it — the Cambodians were a permanent thorn in the side, but never a master. Only once, in the late 19th century at the height of the European colonial era, did Thailand lose control of its buffers. French incursions from French Indochina (Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos) and British incursions from Burma and Malaysia reduced the kingdom to its core around the Chao Phraya Delta. But just as it was about to yield to colonial possessors, as most of Asia had done by then, the rise of Germany back in Europe distracted the French and the British. The Thai have long been proud to be one of the few countries in the region to have escaped European domination.

Thus Thailand has always been anxious to secure its defensible positions in the north, northeast and south; its survival depends on it. Unfortunately, these regions have never been easy for Bangkok to control. On the eastern Khorat Plateau, Bangkok’s hold was always loose due to Cambodian and Vietnamese influence. In the south, the predominantly Muslim inhabitants have periodically resisted Bangkok’s authority — a Muslim insurgency continues to rage in the south today.

But the most difficult region for Bangkok to rein in was the north, with its capital Chiang Mai. Chiang Mai and Siam were ancient enemies, and Siam only fully won administrative control over the city in the late 1800s. The northern hills not only provided business opportunities such as logging, but also cover for those rebelling against the central power, including a communist insurgency and a separatist movement by ethnic minorities. Significantly the mountains also enabled a massive and lucrative opium trade that generated organized criminal networks and corruption that pervaded provincial governments, the business elite and even the national military.

This is the background from which the current unrest emerges. The current Democrat-led government is firmly rooted in Bangkok. The military, monarchy, civil bureaucracy and urban middle class are for the most part aligned with the government. They claim to be devoted to traditional Thai values of nation, religion and monarchy and to revere King Bhumibol Adulyadej — hence the royalist, yellow-wearing protest movement that toppled the government last year, and hence the military’s unwillingness to act on that government’s orders to put the movement down.

The current opposition movement is rooted in the north and northeast. The majority of the population and a wealthy network of provincial big business and agriculture based in these regions support the pro-rural policies of Thaksin, who is a native son of Chiang Mai. Thaksin’s side is associated with entrepreneurs and international capitalist commerce, which is anathema to the military and monarchy. Thaksin is also said to have a strong following, and much influence, among the national police force, since he served as a policeman. The “Red Shirt” protesters receive direction from Thaksin through mass video conference calls.

Ultimately, then, Thailand’s endless cycles of political tumult are configured by the tensions between Bangkok and the provinces as they compete for power. The lines are not always simple, and political opportunism reigns supreme. Nevertheless, the urban-versus-rural split is the primary force driving confrontations between the various factions. Throughout the 20th century, the military — generally with moral support from the monarch — was the only force capable of attempting to maintain a balance of power in the country. Yet divisions within the military, and between the national police and military, have persisted because of the country’s underlying power struggle; hence the 19 coups.

In the current situation, the military and police operations in Bangkok may stabilize the city temporarily. King Bhumibol could intercede and inspire the rival parties to retreat, restoring a semblance of calm. Thaksin is unlikely to come back to power because the military is staunchly against him, but he may manage to cut a deal with the government to save his skin or possibly create enough of a stir to put his proxies back in power.

At the moment,  sources in Bangkok report that the military has deployed tanks throughout the city, though the government and military have both made public statements asserting that the government is in control of the situation and has ordered the military to assist police in re-establishing law and order in Thailand. A contingent of police armed with tear gas is on its way to Government House, where protesters have laid siege since March 26. DTV, which promotes the protest movement, has gone off and back on the air.

The military deployment in Bangkok marks a shift in how the government is dealing with protesters. Previously amid unrest in the capital, army chiefs reiterated their intention not to get involved with the domestic politics after fallout from the 2006 military coup that ousted former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra. Throughout 2008, the military refused to step in to enforce the orders of the former government made of up Thaksin loyalists during the mass protests by the royalist yellow-wearing People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD). But the military is far more supportive of the current Democrat-led government.

Moreover, in recent weeks the military’s views have changed, as Thaksin and the Red Shirts have criticized the Thai monarch’s private council of advisers, many of whom are military chiefs. These criticisms have come dangerously close to criticism of the king himself, and this in a country where such criticism is the highest offense. Military officials have now decided to act in support of Abhisit, as well as to pre-empt any further actions against the monarchy.

A series of events that unfolded the past few hours  demonstrates that a  showdown that seemed inevitable after the April 11 cancellation of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) summit has indeed taken place. So far the major events include:

The military has joined police efforts to stabilize the capital, deploying tanks and trucks at 50 strategic locations and clearing intersections. Army official Sansern Kaewkamnerd said the army is acting under government direction in accordance with police to restore order. Soldiers and an armored carrier have arrived at the Foreign Ministry, and commandos have arrived at parliament, as well as other key locations.

The military has deployed around Chitralada Palace, the residence of Thai King Bhumibol Adulyadej, apparently to prevent protests from reaching the location. Authorities have long suspected the protest movement of harboring a secret desire to overthrow the revered monarchy. Two companies of policemen also have been deployed at the home of Gen. Prem Tinsulanond, the president of King Bhumibol’s Privy Council of appointed advisers.

About 1,000 police officers armed with tear gas have arrived at Government House in preparation for what appears to be an attempt by the government to clear the streets of protesters. Red Shirts and sympathetic taxi drivers and motorists have blocked intersections around the building, as well as other traffic junctures.

Protesters at the Interior Ministry “arrested” a security guard named Maj. Pakorn Sompas attached to Abhisit’s security detail and transported him to Government House. Another official, secretary-general Nipon Promphan, was injured.

Protesters surrounded and entered the Interior Ministry after Abhisit declared a state of emergency, mobbing his motorcade as it left the ministry. Abhisit was not in fact in his vehicle at the time, and in fact escaped the ministry. (A dummy evacuation was staged to deceive the protesters.) Gunshots were heard outside the ministry, and several policemen and protesters have been injured. Protesters have invaded and rioted inside the ministry building.

Red Shirt leader Jatuporn Promphan was allegedly freed by supporters after claiming to have been arrested by military forces. He called for his followers to attack the prime minister as well as Deputy Prime Minister Suthep Thaugsuban on sight, and to storm government sites and gather for the rally at Government House.Conclusion: In spite of the fact that the armed forces are moving in, the United Front for Democracy Against Dictatorship (UFDD), the so-called Red Shirts, continue to maintain a siege at Government House, cause traffic jams at intersections, steal vehicles, commit acts of arson and vandalism, and throw objects at security forces, Thai media reports. Protesters are allegedly stealing vehicles, including two natural gas carrying trucks, and driving them into police barricades, shopping outlets and other buildings. So far no deaths have been reported — but Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, claimed that 23 soldiers had been wounded, four of whom suffered bullet wounds. Casualties at a confrontation at the Din Daeng intersection allegedly reached up to 68 after police employed tear gas and fired guns in the air. Meanwhile 300 policemen are guarding the offices of the Democrat Party, which leads the ruling coalition in parliament, after reports that protesters might seek to ram vehicles into the compound. Police are also watching gasoline stations for possible attacks. All trains to the capital have been halted.

As events continue to unfold, a number of questions arise as to what is the next step and where events will lead.

Abhisit’s primary goal is to sweep the protesters out of the city, preferably before the end of the Songkran — or Thai New Year — holiday from April 13-15. In the government’s ideal situation the military and police would manage to free up road intersections jammed by protesters, drive the protesters away from Government House, and deter further demonstrations or surprise occupations, while keeping civilian casualties to a minimum. Much of the public could be swayed against the government if it perceives security forces as dealing too harshly with protesters. Therefore, the government’s goal is to keep things as close to bloodless as possible while still ending demonstrations. If Abhisit succeeds in restoring order without using brutal tactics, his government will have shown strength and bought itself some time to repair the damage to its credibility.

The problem is that the Red Shirts have shown no sign of cutting their rebellion short and their leadership is urging them to bolder acts at every turn. There has been a groundswell of support for the opposition, their numbers are strong and they have allies that can continue to create disturbances, such as taxi drivers and motorists who obstruct traffic and police officers who make allowances for them.

Rumors abound that protesters could try to surround the royal Chitralada Palace in hopes that King Bhumibol Adulyadej will intercede or allow them to seek sanctuary from the police and army. The Thai king rarely intervenes in politics other than to give general words of wisdom, but he has taken a more active role to calm political violence before, for instance in May 1992. He also endorsed the 2006 coup. A royal intercession would have symbolic power for many Thais and could help de-escalate the situation, but it is more likely that the monarch will wait until the noise has died down before he addresses the situation publicly.

Only former Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, the mastermind behind the current Red Shirt uproar, can call the Red Shirts off. Thaksin claims he is ready to return to the country from exile in order to lead his followers on a march in the capital. He is thought by his enemies to be planning a return to power. If the protesters succeed in causing a government dissolution, new elections could lead possibly lead to a ruling coalition made up of Thaksin’s political proxies. Pro-Thaksin forces are also seeking to strike a deal with the government, granting amnesty or concessions in return for an end to the demonstations. Thaksin has several motives that are purely self-interested as well: to have corruption charges against him lifted, to have his and his family’s financial assets in Thai banks unfrozen, and to receive security guarantees from the government for himself and his allies.


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