Case
Study: Singapore's neo-Confusianism. Plus a short overview of the geostrategic dynamic
Bush will encounter during his travels to East Asia.
Historically, East Asia
has revolved around two poles. On one side is China -- a massive land power
that once exerted direct influence over much of the region and, under Mongol
leadership, up to the very gates of Europe . On the other side is Japan -- a
maritime power that is protected by an oceanic buffer, but with limited
resources and space. Much as European history has been dominated and shaped by
the power struggles between Continental powers and Britain, Asian history has
been shaped by and expressed through the struggle between China and Japan.
By the 1930s, Japan
had become the dominant power in the region. Japanese forces occupied Manchuria
and subjugated eastern China before embarking on an attempt to create a
"Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere." But with the Japanese
defeat in World War II, the United States began to emerge as the dominant power
in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan was occupied and, thereafter, constrained by
its demilitarization and its pacifist constitution.
Over time, Tokyo
learned to exploit this unnatural state of affairs for its own benefit. During
the Cold War, Washington needed Japan to act as a cork on Soviet naval power in
the Pacific, and as a forward staging ground for any potential East Asian
contingency. But it was the United States that had designed the Japanese
Constitution, which forbade collective self-defense or the possession of an
offensive military. Because of this, U.S. forces were based in Japan , and
Japan 's national security became a core of U.S. strategic interests. Washington
provided for Japan 's defense, and Japan used the money and energies normally
associated with national defense and securing of national interests to build a
massive economic machine instead.
As it was expanding
to become the world's second-largest economy -- a title that is still far from
being challenged -- Japan also built (with Washington 's encouragement) a
technologically advanced and well-armed "Self-Defense Force."
However, it never was required to contribute anything but money to international
or U.S.-led peacekeeping or military operations.
The end of the Cold
War terminated this comfortable arrangement, however.
In the late 1980s,
China was not seen by the United States as a major military threat -- at least
not on the scale of the former Soviet Union . Japan and other East Asian allies
became less important to U.S. strategic thinking. Although the legacies of the
Cold War structure were not readily abandoned -- and North Korea provided a
convenient reason to avoid any significant change -- Washington 's strategic
need to ensure Japan 's economic and national security diminished. Japan 's
rise as an economic power in the late 1980s gave rise to a fear in the United
States that the island nation once again would come to dominate the Asia-Pacific
region, that American schoolchildren would need to learn Japanese, and Japan
would overtake the United States economically.
These fears, coupled
with the collapse of the Soviet bloc (and of the Soviet Union itself) triggered
a shift in U.S.-Japanese relations. The natural order of competition (fierce at
times) between the world's largest and second-largest economies was restored.
Due to concerns about North Korea and, later, a rising China, the security
relationship has remained largely intact, but economic security issues have
grown more contentious -- most recently with the spat between Tokyo and
Washington over Japan's energy relations with Iran. In this case, a fundamental
interest of Japan (having a secure and diverse supply of energy) and a fundamental
interest of the United States (constraining Iran in order to stem nuclear
proliferation and to better manage the security situation in Iraq ) came into
conflict.
That said, shared
concerns such as the rise of China in the mid- to late-1990s and North Korea 's
periodic outbursts have helped to reduce the potential for direct
confrontations in U.S.-Japanese relations. As Washington 's attention and
resources turned to the Middle East and South Asia following the 9/11 attacks,
its allies in the Asia-Pacific region -- particularly Japan and Australia --
took on greater responsibilities for ensuring regional security. This process
was already under way before 9/11 -- Canberra 's intervention in East Timor
being a case in point -- but accelerated after the attacks, and particularly as
the United States became more deeply engaged in Iraq .
During the past
decade, most notably under the administration of Prime Minister Junichiro
Koizumi, Japan began to take a more serious look at its own fundamental
interests and taking steps to ensure them. These steps ranged from developing
and practicing combined operations to deploying forces to Iraq , as well as
openly discussing and preparing for a change in the Japanese Constitution --
and its restrictions on the military. Today, under Prime Minister Shinzo Abe,
the Japanese leadership is continuing efforts to abolish the half-century-old
psychological taboo concerning military capabilities. The Defense Agency is
rising to a Cabinet-level position, and there is an open debate about the
potential for Japan to eventually develop nuclear weapons.
For Japan , the core
national imperative is protection of supply routes. Japan is an island nation
that lacks sufficient arable land and natural resources. This reality has been
central to Japan 's political development: Successive waves of imperialism
emerged as Japan sought to gain and control access to resources and materials.
Because it is a maritime nation with minimal strategic depth, Japan's natural
security concerns are less about securing its actual borders than about
ensuring that no one can reach its borders -- or cut its vital supply lines.
This is why, despite economic linkages with the United States and beyond, Tokyo
considered it necessary to attack Pearl Harbor, a seat of U.S. naval power, in
1941. The United States was the only naval power capable of challenging Japan
's control of the seas in the Pacific theater.
Currently, Japan sees
its greatest risks in the area running along the Chinese coast through the
South China Sea and the Strait of Malacca, through the Indian Ocean to the
Middle East . This is the route that energy supplies -- so fundamental to the
Japanese economy and national strength -- travel. Tokyo cannot allow any other
state to threaten its energy lifeline. Therefore, we expect to see Japan
expanding security arrangements with Taiwan , Singapore and India -- all key
states along the route -- and developing additional naval power, including
light aircraft carriers (which Tokyo euphemistically refers to as
"helicopter destroyers").
As Japan reassesses
its strategic concerns in a region with less direct U.S. involvement, China too
has developed along its own path. As a land power, China 's first concern is
its neighbors. Tibet, Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia are all key factors in China
's desire to maintain strategic depth and build buffers against potential
invaders.
On the international
front, China 's concerns since the Communist victory in 1949 have matched those
of Chinese empires for millennia: protection of the borders and the dominance
of a central, unopposed leadership. The concerns over its borders and
territorial security led to skirmishes with India , Russia and Vietnam , and to
Chinese involvement in the Korean War. More recently, however, China has taken
a different approach -- engaging its neighbors to formalize borders and
offering economic trade and interaction as a way to mitigate potential security
threats.
Now, with its land
borders largely under control, China once again is looking eastward, to the
sea.
Unlike Japan with its
limited resources and space, China has not traditionally been an expansionist
power (aside from the aforementioned Tibet , Xinjiang and Inner Mongolia ). The
Chinese have access to plenty of resources within their territory or from just
across the border. But with economic modernization has come a rapidly
increasing need for additional energy supplies. This is driving China 's more
active foreign policy -- the search for access to, and security of, energy and
certain raw materials. And that, in turn, is moving Chinese and Japanese
interests toward confrontation. For instance, there have been very vocal
disagreements over access to energy deposits in the waters between the two
nations, as each seeks supplies close to home.
Now, without the
external dynamic imposed by the United States , the long-standing rivalry
between mainland China and maritime Japan once again is becoming the driving
force in Asia . For many countries, particularly those in Southeast Asia , this
translates to a low-key struggle for influence through economic and political
means. But on the Korean Peninsula -- which is the traditional invasion route
between China and Japan -- the struggle is expressed differently.
Consider the North
Korean nuclear issue. Neither China , which has relations with Pyongyang , nor
Japan , with its Cold War alliance with South Korea , views that as a Korean
issue. Rather, Beijing sees North Korea as a means of maintaining a buffer
between China and potential challengers, and uses the issue as a way to
counterbalance U.S. influence and Japanese interests. Japan sees the issue as
one of national security, but also as part of the broader competition shaping
up with China .
Meanwhile, the two
Koreas have become more closely aligned -- often to the chagrin of their
erstwhile sponsors, Beijing and Washington -- in the post-Cold War system.
Though they are pursuing different paths, both Koreas see their futures as
being shaped by the resurging competition between China and Japan.
Korea long has been
the "minnow between two whales," stuck between China and Japan , and
historically has pursued two paths to preserve its independence -- attempted
isolation or reliance on one big power to fend off another. Neither strategy has
worked very well.
Both Koreas ,
independently but in parallel, are now pursuing more robust domestic defense
capabilities and eyeing eventual reunification on mutual terms. To end their
dependence on third parties for security, the only path that Pyongyang and Seoul
see is to join together -- creating a nation of some 70 million or more that
combines South Korea 's technological strengths with North Korea 's resources
and labor. Such a unified state remains a distant goal, but the vision drives
much of the strategic thinking in both Pyongyang and Seoul -- and causes
confusion in the six-party talks, as Pyongyang bucks Chinese influence when
possible and Seoul counters U.S. goals.
This is the dynamic
that Bush will encounter during his travels to East Asia. The fundamental
forces are local, the Cold War paradigm is finally being shed and the United
States -- though still influential -- is no longer the drive. It is a return to
the Asia of the past, shaped by natural geopolitical forces and competitions.
North Korea's
leadership is very happy to come to the table to engage in sideline bilateral
talks with Washington about the lifting of banking sanctions. This is Pyongyang
's reason for coming back to the table. North Korea has no plan to discuss,
much less accept, any concrete steps to dismantle its nuclear program.
Pyongyang plans a two-tier approach to the resumption of dialogue. On the
tactical level, there are the basic issues of procedure, the question of the
banking sanctions, and one issue of semantics -- whether North Korea will be
called a nuclear state or not. Pyongyang wants this new epithet, Washington
does not. But as with any wording issue, there is likely to be a mutually
acceptable and utterly ambiguous compromise.
On the strategic
level, Pyongyang no longer intends to give up its nuclear program. North Korea
has tested a nuclear device. It may have been more of a fizzle than a bang, but
it cannot be undone. The North has crossed the line, and the response was a few
strong words, some vicious finger shaking and the imposition of selectively
enforced sanctions on luxury goods. Pyongyang has entered the big-boy
playground and has no plans to return to the kiddie-slide. What North Korea
wants now is the same as before -- a formal peace accord and ultimate
diplomatic recognition from the United States -- but with a new twist: the
acceptance of North Korea as a member of the "nuclear club."
This Washington is
not prepared to give. And so the talks will drag on, stall, and ultimately
fail. But so long as there are talks, or rumors of talks, Pyongyang and Beijing
gain leverage. And so long as Washington faces a seemingly intractable
situation in Iraq, it will have little room to maneuver in the North Korean
arena, being militarily incapable of a more forceful response and politically
unable to walk away from the negotiating table.
China and North Korea
appear to have bought themselves two more years.
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