It is known that in
Singapore the imposition of unity and conformity has been supervised closely by
a leadership imbued with a strong sense of its own unique capacity to create a
well-ordered political, social and economic structure resting on a high degree
of harmony and consensus. In fact Singapore 's authoritarian governance has
been both concealed and justified by its Confucianization
of politics.
Lee Kuan Yew, who laid the foundations of a system his son now
controls as Singapore's third Prime Minister, is the author of the
appropriation of Confucius, seeking to defend illiberalism by grounding it in
an appeal to ancient and ineffable Chinese traditions. Nonetheless, when
seeking to wrest sovereignty from British colonial control, Lee had recourse to
universal civil and political rights, such as the freedom to organize and to
hold peaceful protests. And he aptly warned: 'repression is a habit that
grows’. And so it has grown in Singapore, where the defense of universal human
rights has been reversed, replaced by a questionable and politically convenient
invocation of 'local' values. Elections in Singapore are tightly controlled to
minimize opportunities for genuine competition. Individuals who run against
People's Action Party (PAP) candidates, and electorates that actually vote them
into parliament, suffer the consequences at the hands of a government with very
little tolerance for such behavior. The ruling party punishes electoral
districts that do not toe the line while opposition politicians are harassed
and intimidated relentlessly. The Internal Security Act - with its provisions
for indefinite detention without trial has sometimes been used against
political opponents. But the civil law has proved just as useful, with PAP
figures successfully prosecuting defamation cases and bankrupting opponents in
previous years. (Francis T. Seow, The Media Enthralled:
Singapore Revisited, 1998, p. 208).
Also aspects of
public and private life are controlled through education, health, housing,
employment, pensions and the regulation of associational life. Not
surprisingly, the government rejects the concept of 'civil society' in the
sense that this names a social space free of government regulation or
surveillance. In its place we find a concept of 'civic society' emphasizing
duties and obligations to the community rather than, 'individual rights'.
Explanation of the differences between 'civic' and 'civil' in formal discourses
in Singapore are phrased in terms of communitarian versus individualistic
values and practices. Civic values are of course those depicted as
communitarian in nature, emphasizing 'self-help, social responsibility and
public courtesy' and working for the 'larger good of society'. Civil values,
which include individual rights such as free speech, are depicted as far less
worthy and representative only of 'special interests'. (“Civic or Civil Society”
in Straights Times, 9 May 1998, p. 48).
Singapore 's
political system has deployed culture in general, and Confucianism in
particular, as a political tactic against the legitimacy of political
opposition. This must be understood against the background of rapid economic
change in Singapore since full independence in 1965, and the social and
political consequences of such change. In the early post-independence period,
modernization was vigorously promoted and 'traditional cultural values' were
regarded as inhibiting the attitudes needed to create an economically robust
state. After just a decade and a half, however, the PAP perceived that it could
well fall victim to its own success, for modernization very often meant
political liberalization as well. Attention therefore shifted to readjusting
official ideology and, with it, the cultural/political orientation of the
population so as to achieve modernization sans liberalization.
A major turning point
came when the PAP's share of the popular vote started to decline. By the late
1970s Prime Minister Lee began to express public concern about too much
'Westernization'. This included the development of a more open, critical public
political culture manifest in the electorate's growing willingness to listen to
a variety of alternative ideas about politics and government, and to vote for
opposition candidates. Particular attention was given to the 'problem' of the
Singaporean Chinese, with Lee Kuan Yew expressing
concern about the corrosive effects that Western influences were having on this
population group. (Martin Lu, Confucianism: Its Relevance to Modern Society,
Singapore, Federal Publications, 1983, pp. 71,85).
Singaporean Chinese,
viewed as especially vulnerable to the insidious effects of Western culture, therefore
became a priority for re-education. Since they also constituted around three
quarters of the population, with Malays, Indians and other smaller groups
making up the remainder, they happened to be politically the most significant.
Thus traditional Confucian ethics were recruited to bring the ethnic Chinese
firmly back under the ideational control of the government. In as far as
Confucianism is Chinese, Singaporean Chinese could be expected to feel a
'natural' affinity with it. This project was difficult to promote, however,
partly because Singaporean Chinese had never had any particular familiarity
with Confucian teachings. Nonetheless, the stereotypical equation of
Confucianism with Chineseness worked well, if
measured by the degree of tacit acceptance with which it was met. In 1983 the
Institute of East Asian Philosophies (lEAP) was
founded for the purpose of advancing the understanding of Confucian philosophy
so that it could be reinterpreted to meet the needs of contemporary society.
(Joseph B. Tamney, 'Confucianism and Democracy' Asian
Profile, 19 (5), 1991: 400).
Elements of harmony,
consensus and society before self - the very essence of what was later to
become the core of 'Asian values' were emphasized as culturally authentic and
explicitly contrasted with the dissent and individualism said to mark Western
liberal democracies. One lEAP scholar proposed to
dispense with the oppositional elements of democracy altogether, arguing that
'the genuine consent of the people going through the process of selection in a
one-party state is ... democratic' and that whereas Western democracy allowed
debate both inside and outside government, the 'Eastern form of democracy'
allowed government to reach a consensus 'through closed debate with no
opposition from without'. (Wu Teh Yao, Politics East
- Politics West, Singapore, Pan Pacific Book Distributors, 1979, pp. 57-58).
The PAP nonetheless
wanted Singapore to be called a democracy, thus shoring up its credentials as a
modern state commanding respect in the international sphere where no state
could actually call itself authoritarian. Postcolonial states such as Singapore
had argued for independence on the basis of self-determination and all the
normative implications this principle has for democracy. But substance
generally mattered less than appearances. In Singapore , as in other
authoritarian states, the challenge for the PAP in the postcolonial order was
to revise democracy so as to retain the formal institutions while eliminating
any substantive challenges to their monopoly of power. The very civil and
political liberties so passionately argued for under British colonial rule were
now repudiated at the point of inconvenience to new power-holders. There is
nothing new in partisanship and self-interest defeating a general principle.
What is of interest here is the way in which particularistic cultural
principles were harnessed to this cause.
Regardless of the
actual lack of Confucian knowledge or understanding among the Singaporean
Chinese, the fact that a quarter of Singapore 's population was not ethnically
Chinese meant that those belonging to ethnic minority groups were alienated by
the emphasis on what was seen as a purely Chinese programme.
Precisely because Confucianism was equated with Chineseness,
it could not neutrally embrace a population that was also Muslim, Hindu,
Buddhist, Christian, Sikh and so on. But the political project of creating a
set of values to contrast with those of the West could not be abandoned. Confucianization therefore gave way to a 'shared national
values' campaign. Again this was initiated and closely supervised by the PAP
government, being formally introduced in a white paper entitled 'Shared Values'
released in 1991. In addition to stressing the dangers of 'Western values', four
key values were identified as common to all the major 'Asian' traditions: 'the
placing of society above self; upholding the family as the basic building block
of society; resolving major issues through consensus rather than contention;
and stressing racial and religious harmony'. (Singapore, Parliament, Shared
Values, Cmd. 1 of 1991, p. 3).
The set of Confucian
values promoted earlier was therefore transformed into a set of generic' Asian
values'. Packaging what was simply a very conservative set of social and
political values was not only more suitable for Singapore's diverse population
but more readily available elsewhere in the region, especially in neighbouring Malaysia where the then Prime Minister, Dr
Mahathir, was keen to promote Asian values as the basis for his own particular
brand of anti-Westernism while shoring up the legitimacy of his own political
position. Since then, the Asian values discourse has moved back and forth
between a narrower focus on 'Confucian values' and the broader Asianist approach, depending on the country concerned and
the audience. But Confucianism, like any relatively complex system of thought,
whether embodied in religions like Islam and Christianity or ideologies like
socialism and liberalism, contains ambiguities and contradictions accommodating
a variety of interpretations.
Interpreting
Confucius 'Confucianism' names a complex set of ideas almost universally
assumed to have originated with a historical figure known in English as
Confucius, otherwise rendered as Kongzi, Kung Ch'iu, Kung Tzu or K'ung Fu-tzu.
A native of Shandong province, Confucius is thought to have lived during the
transition from the Spring to Autumn period of the Zhou Dynasty from around 551
to 479 Be, when chaos and disorder attended the breakdown of political and
social order. The original teachings attributed to Confucius - contained
largely in the collection of sayings known as The Analects or Lunyu - reflect a concern with establishing lasting peace
and harmony in social and political life. It was a formula for what we might
now call 'good governance' incorporating a strict set of rules, rituals and
relationships supporting a moral order based on virtue. It resembled a feudal
order in which the emperor or 'son of Heaven' stood firmly at the helm.
Although authoritarian, it placed an unequivocal emphasis on benevolence and
leadership by moral example rather than force or coercion, and enjoined the
ruler to govern not in his own interests, but in the interests of those under
his care. This approach was deemed likely to engage widespread acquiescence and
contentment among the populace at large, and was therefore much more rational
and efficacious than blunt instruments of coercion.
Rulers were regarded
as successful to the extent that their conscientious duty of care attracted
uncoerced deference, loyalty and obedience, producing widespread peace and
harmony. While maintaining the need for hierarchy as a vital principle of this
order, meritocracy was introduced as a means of nurturing moral qualities and
making the best use of available talent. This system further implied duties and
obligations according to one's place in the system. Family relations were
rigidly defined according to gender and birth order. These relations were
projected onto the wider sphere of society and state, with the emperor standing
as the ultimate father figure. Society and state were conceived as a single
organic entity with no distinction between the political and social realms.
Despite usually being categorized in religious terms - possibly because of
references to the 'way of heaven' and to the emperor as the 'son of heaven',
and due to a metaphysical conception of heaven more generally as a source of
virtue - Confucianism is an essentially secular tradition of thought.34 It also
displays a thoroughgoing humanism with clear universalist assumptions that
matches anything produced in European philosophy. (Ray Billington,
Understanding Eastern Philosophy, London, Routledge, 1997, p. 119).
Confucian thought was
developed by generations of scholars with figures as diverse as the mystical
Mencius (Mengzi or Meng Ke) to the rationalist His in
Tzu contributing highly influential interpretations. The contrast can be
illustrated by reference to their views of human nature. While Mencius
championed the inherent goodness of the human (equating goodness with what was
natural), His in Tzu regarded it as essentially evil, and believed that only
training and education could overcome it. Different Chinese emperors adopted
and developed aspects of the tradition in ways that added to its complex
evolution. Confucianism as a tradition of social and political thought, then,
has not maintained a single, consistent and uncontested body of doctrine no
tradition does. It owes much to successive thinkers and their attempts to
maintain its practical relevance at different times and according to different
demands. It is not a 'neatly packaged organic whole in which the constitutive
parts fall naturally into their places' but has rather displayed the usual
ruptures of cultural constructions, 'being forged and re-forged, configured and
re-configured'. ( Kai-Wing Chow, On-Cho Ng and John B. Henderson (eds),
Imagining Boundaries: Changing Confucian Doctrines,Texts
and Hermeneutics, Albany, State University of New York Press, 1999, p. 3).
Nor was Confucianism
the only body of thought to develop in China. Scholars of Chinese political
philosophy can point to the existence of anarchists, humanitarian socialists,
legalists, ceremonialists, absolutists, cooperativists,
imperialists and constitutional monarchists. And there are more distinct
philosophical traditions associated with Taoism and Buddhism, each of which has
had a significant impact. It would therefore be a serious mistake to simply
conflate Chineseness with Confucianism - a mistake
parallel to conflating European social and political thought with liberalism
while ignoring conservatism, socialism and other systems of ideas. (Leonard
Shih lien Hsii, The Political Philosophy of
Confucianism, London, Curzon Press, 1975, p. xviii).
Fact is however also
that 'Confucianism', as a word and doctrine, may have a relatively recent
origin, emerging in the sixteenth century when Jesuits who travelled to China
sought to encapsulate a particular complex of ideas encountered there. (Xinzhong Yao, An Introduction to Confucianism, Cambridge
(MA), Cambridge University Press, 2000, pp. 16-17).
And the historical
figure of Confucius that emerged in the twentieth century is more likely a
product fashioned over just a few centuries, rather than millennia, and
performed 'by many hands, ecclesiastical and lay, Western and Chinese'. (Lionel
M. Jensen, Manufacturing Confucianism: Chinese Traditions and Universal
Civilization, Durham NC, Duke University Press, 1997, pp. 4-5).
The Lunyu most likely is a composite work compiled by different
authors over time rather than by a single figure and significant portions of
the 'Five Classics' are also of doubtful historicity. (Hsii,
Political Philosophy of Confucianism, pp. xiii-xv).
One scholar argues
that the Jesuitical re-creation of the 'native hero', Kongzi,
was taken up by Chinese intellectuals, becoming part of the inventive
myth-making vital to engineering 'a new Chinese nation through historical
reconstruction', a project itself inspired by 'the imported nineteenth-century
Western conceptual vernacular of nationalism, evolution, and ethos [which] lent
dimension to the nativist imaginings of twentieth-century Chinese, who
reinvented Kongzi as a historical religious figure.'
(Jensen, Manufacturing Confucianism, p. 5).
The complexity of
Confucianism is further illustrated by its treatment of political criticism. On
one reading, it posits coterminous political and social realms. Harmony - the
basic principle for the right ordering of these realms - depends ultimately on
individuals acting correctly in their given roles and accords with an organic
conception of the state and an uncompromisingly moralistic view of political
power together with the idea of rule by moral example. Thus political power is
not obtained through competitive adversarial processes but bestowed on certain
individuals in accordance with the fundamental principles of a static, passive,
paternalistic and hierarchical order. The stress on harmony and consensus can,
on this reading, be interpreted as incompatible with criticism of those who
hold political power for it threatens the integrity of the state, bringing
disorder and confusion. Such an interpretation is anathema to the give-and-take
of competitive politics. It is antithetic as well as to the idea that people
within a society have different outlooks, values and interests and are entitled
to give them political _expression. On this composite reading, it seems
reasonable to infer an antipathy to the contemporary democratic process which
takes open dispute, lively contestation and compromise as normal. Confucianism,
however, is sufficiently complex and fluid to lend itself to varying
interpretations. While the principles set out above describe an ideal order, it
does not assume that political leaders have perfect knowledge or always conduct
themselves in accordance with the highest principles. Elements of the tradition
assign a valid place to criticism and modify the idea that the 'mandate of
heaven' is completely unassailable from below. Criticism is permitted if based
on moral concerns, although it cannot legitimately be political as it is in a
system where competition for power is regarded as normal. (Peter R. Moody,
Political Opposition in Post-Confucian Society, New York, Praeger, 1988, p. 3).
And although the
enforcement of laws and morals usually requires unquestioning obedience, there
are textual exceptions for resistance on moral grounds. A leading contemporary
Confucian scholar notes that in the case of a morally responsible minister,
'where the ruler has departed from tao, it is quite
proper for the minister to follow tao rather than his
ruler', and notes that: 'If the ruler is dogmatic and authoritarian, the
subject can revolt and choose a better one. The Book of Mencius considers
revolution to be the right of the people. (Tu Wei-Ming, Confucian Ethics Today,
Singapore, Federal Publications, 1984, p.24).
On another
interpretation, Confucianism can actually support civil liberties, including
freedom of _expression, which is basic to the role of constitutional
opposition, although the grounds on which this can be done differs from the
standard liberal justification: 'Whereas Western liberals justify freedom of
speech on the ground of personal autonomy, Confucians see this as a means for
society to correct wrong ethical beliefs, to ensure that rulers would not
indulge in wrongdoing.' (Joseph Chan, 'A Confucian Perspective on Human Rights
for Contemporary China' in Joanne R. Bauer and Daniel A. Bell (eds), Fhe East Asian Challenge for Human Rights, Cambridge,
Cambridge University 'Press, 1999, p. 237).
Others emphasize that
Confucianism 'is too rich and complex to be presumed ignorant of the value of
individuality' and see openings in it that are hospitable to republican ideas,
at least in so far as the value of individual self-development and' the
cultivation of virtue is concerned. One scholar has produced a detailed study
attempting to identify underlying liberal ideas in Chf1tese political
philosophy. (See Wm. Theodore de Bary, The Liberal
Tradition in China , New York , Columbia University Press, 1983. See also David
Kelly, 'The Chinese Search for Freedom as a Universal Value' in David Kelly and
Anthony Reid (eds), Asian Freedoms: The Idea of Freedom in East and Southeast
Asia, Cambridge , Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 93-119).
Again others argue
that none of this should be taken to imply that there is anything like a
liberal tradition implicit in Confucian thought, claiming the latter lacks such
inherently liberal notions as individual and human rights, evidence for which
might be taken to lie in the absence of any institutional protection for
dissenters.( James Cotton, “The Limits to Liberalization in Industrializing
Asia: Three Views of the State”, Pacific Affairs, 64 (3), 1991: 320). The same,
however, applies to the Athenian polis where democratic ideas were developed
and institutionalized in the absence of liberal norms upholding individual
rights and the protection of dissidents or critics.
In summary,
Confucianism may be interpreted as both allowing and disallowing criticism,
depending on the circumstances. Even assuming that only a conservative reading
was obtainable, it does follow that societies with a Confucian legacy are
incapable of tolerating a form of oppositional politics compatible with
democratic government. A 'culture' that exists at any given point of time does
not forever determine how people think and behave, at least not if culture is
understood as a dynamic set of practices that are created and recreated in
response to changing circumstances rather than as a straitjacket that forever
binds communities within its grasp to a fixed set of beliefs and values. And
even if we suppose that Confucianism and liberalism represent completely antagonistic
value systems, we still cannot conclude that 'Western thought' and 'Asian
thought' are polar opposites on a cultural/ideological spectrum. Neither
liberalism nor Confucianism exhaust the varieties of accessible thought in
either category, If we compare key aspects of Confucianism not with liberalism,
but with Western/European conservative ideology and nationalist thought, it is
relatively easy to find points of convergence. The nineteenth-century
philosopher and nationalist, Ernest Renan, took the view that free speech
should not enjoy institutional protection, albeit for different reasons than
conservative Confucianism. (See Preston King, Toleration, London, Frank Cass,
1996, p. 107).
Closer to the latter
tradition is a strand of classical European conservatism founded on organic
principles of harmony, consensus and the notion that people have allotted roles
and functions, duties and obligations.( Robert Eccleshall,
Vincent Geoghegan, Richard Jay and Rick Wilford, Political Ideologies: An
Introduction, London, Unwin Hyman, 1984, pp. 79-114).
This also accords
with contemporary communitarian thinking which has its champions in both the
Asian region and the West. Communitarianism itself comes in both conservative
and socialist varieties, the shared point of departure being their opposition
to liberal individualism and the repudiation of a range of community ties and
obligations that is thought to be implied by it. Modern representative
institutions reflect a certain ethic of political rule expressed by the word
'democracy' itself, a form of rule meaning 'rule or power of the people'. In
its indirect, representative form, this means that people choose their rulers,
but do not themselves rule directly. Beyond the descriptive meaning of
democracy, there is also a distinct normative dimension. It provides democracy
with its most basic justification: that it is right that people exercise
ultimate political authority. This does not mean that political rule is always
directed to the welfare or best interests of the people at large. For although
this may be assumed to be part of the package, it does not distinguish the
primary normative principle of a benevolent dictatorship from a democracy.
A pluralist position
supports the notion that a variety of institutional forms can accommodate the
primary norm of democratic rule, and these may reflect a variety of cultural
(or other) factors. In addition, and again without losing the connection with
the primary normative principles of democracy, such as liberty, equality and
community. This does not imply that equality, for example, may legitimately be
crushed in the name of freedom - or vice versa. It does not resolve such vexed
questions as whether social and economic equality are a 'democratic right', or
at least a prerequisite for meaningful political equality. And it does not
offer a resolution of the apparent tensions between communitarian and
individualistic approaches to social, economic and political life. Issues such
as freedom and equality, or political and civil rights as distinct from social
and economic rights, and individualistic versus communal approaches are often
posited in a dichotomous, oppositional either/or form. This oppositional
construction is misleading in the sense that equality does not preclude freedom
(and vice-versa), that the enjoyment of political and civil rights does not
entail the suppression of social and economic rights (and vice-versa), and that
individualistic and communitarian approaches are not necessarily mutually
exclusive.
Rather, it
acknowledges that different political communities can legitimately pursue
different modes of democratic _expression according to cultural or other
contextual differences. In other words, democracy can accommodate a significant
measure of cultural and political pluralism. This general pluralist position
acknowledges both the fallibility of human constructions as well as the
diversity that is characteristic of human communities - within as well as
between them. But it stops well short of an 'anything goes' relativism by
limiting interpretive possibilities and allowing that some forms of democracy
may be better than others. In this sense, it is neither universalist in
endorsing a single authoritative standard or interpretation of 'democracy', nor
relativist in endorsing any and all interpretations as equally valid. This
pluralist approach also places limits on the kinds of regimes which may
legitimately call themselves democratic. The leaders of regimes of course, can
call their preferred style of rule anything, they like, but this does not mean
that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is actually democratic.
Pluralism therefore allows for a certain degree of flexibility in both
theorizing second order norms, principles and political practice, but maintains
certain conceptual standards and limitations beyond which a regime cannot be
regarded as democratic. This provides a minimal but nonetheless necessary and
sufficient basis for comparative political scientists to go about the business
of comparing.
This contrasts with a
dogmatic relativism that allows an unlimited range of interpretive
possibilities - whether these are linked to a cultural framework or not.
Although this seems, on the face of it, to be a more 'democratic'
epistemological position to adopt than one prescribing conceptual standards and
limitations, the rigid relativist position can (and does) in fact provide a
protective cloak for authoritarianism, as illustrated in the discussion of
'Asian democracy'. The pluralist position described here also rejects a
dogmatic universalism endorsing a single authoritative standard of
'correctness' for democracy, for this works to silence alternative views and
leaves little space for the legitimate diversity that characterizes democratic
politics. But the pluralist position is not entirely unassailable either.
Indeed, given the fallibilism inherent in an open model, it must remain
receptive to criticism. So whereas the relativist and universalist positions
described here both entail a certain closure of discourse - and for that reason
are dogmatic - the pluralist position always remains open. Simply setting up a
pluralist model, however, leaves unanswered certain problems in world politics,
including accusations that some elites in 'the West' have attempted, in the
name of ethical universalism, to assume moral authority in areas such as
democracy and human rights so as to pursue hegemony by other means.(Ann Kent,
'The Limits of Ethics in International Politics: The International Human Rights
Regime, Asian Studies Review, 16 (1), 1992: 32).
Much the same has
sometimes been said about democracy promotion projects implying that the
political systems of 'non-Western' countries must be remade in the image of
'the West' in order to achieve 'true' democracy. A recent critique of the
enterprise of comparative politics suggests that the 'culture of the modern
West', because it presents itself as the framework for understanding 'the
other', continues to assume that less developed non-Western others are simply
at an earlier stage in the 'evolution of the self'. This further implies that
commonality between Western selves and non-Western others, assumed by this
implicit evolutionist framework, still needs to be nurtured: 'Those to whom
difference is attributed must be taught, and, if unwilling, they must be forced
to recognize that assimilating to the "sameness" of Europeans is good
for them. This remains the white man's pedagogical burden - a burden carried by
the politics of a particular type of comparison.' Another commentator
criticizes 'Western governments who support democracy in Africa as the process
through which the universalizing of the Western model of society can take
place.'(Claude Ake, 'The Unique Case of African Democracy', InternationaL
Affairs, 69 (2), 1993: 239).
Since culturalist
responses to universalist theories and methodologies, treat 'other cultures' on
their own terms, we may well ask whether this ' idea' can be applied to other
'cultures' who do not necessarily possess such a notion of 'culture'. Or, if
the cultural concept as formulated does have resonance 'other' places, this
then, demonstrates, the fallacy of origins, and the problems of methodological
contextualism.
For example critics
of democracy promotion in Iraq today might be right when they urge 'sensitivity
to context' and highlight the fact that democracy simply cannot be imposed by
force. Even so, attempts to apply sensitivity to context often run the risk of
simply reinforcing the power of oppressive local elites, sometimes at the expense
of local pro-democracy movements. In these instances, a normative commitment to
cultural contextualism (which is perhaps no less ethnocentric than a commitment
to democracy, human rights and a cosmopolitan ethic) has often been adopted
rather naively and without due regard to all that it entails, either
philosophically or politically. Ideas of culture and context are important, but
adopting a rigid methodological contextualism or culturalism is just as
problematic as a rigid methodological universalism.
The apparent
allegiance to these ideas and institutions which emerges from 'the West's
shared history and culture' therefore needs to be placed alongside a more
complete picture of the West which includes histories and 'cultures' of
authoritarianism in both communist and fascist forms in addition to other
products of 'Western culture' which of course include genocide, slavery,
torture, fascism, militarism, colonialism, imperialism, the inquisition,
religious fundamentalism, nationalism and romanticism as well as secularism,
humanism, pacifism, communism and so on. Clearly, not all these have been
exclusive products of 'Western culture' and most have appeared in other part of
the world at one time or another. But to the extent that at one time or another
they have indeed all emerged in the West, they illustrate beyond question the
irreducible diversity of its political experiences and legacies. When something
is attributed to the 'West's shared history and culture' we must always ask:
which history and which culture?
Plus democracy has
only recently come to be regarded as the cornerstone of 'the good' in world
politics, achieving a moral prestige unknown in any previous period and claimed
as the basis for virtually all the world's regimes, regardless of actual
practices. Democracy owes its currency to two primary, inter-related factors.
The first was the experience of the Second World War. Disgust with the fascist
ideologies that had motivated the Axis powers, and the revulsion that attended
realization of their ultimate consequences in the Holocaust, served to bolster
democracy's credentials as the most desirable and morally creditable form of
government. It was linked to standards for basic human rights so grossly abused
in the death camps, and to the interests and well-being of the masses of
ordinary men and women whose political and moral status had been transformed
since the French Revolution. 'The people' now embodied the ultimate source of
political legitimacy and authority. They were those whose interests the
political system was meant to serve and, just as importantly, who were
considered most competent to judge those interests by deciding who was to
govern them.
The second factor was
the decolonization movement which gained momentum in the aftermath of the
Second World War with Harold Macmillan's 'winds of change'. Now all 'peoples',
not just Europeans, or their descendants in other parts of the globe, were
entitled to exercise the right to self-determination. So whereas the principle
of national self determination in the form of
sovereign statehood was promoted only within Europe following the First World
War, it was now extended world-wide. This set the scene for the European state
system and its foundational principles of sovereignty to become established as
the global organizing norm for political community. The sovereignty principle
of course has two dimensions, the first concerning the status and integrity of
any given state vis-a-vis other states, and decreeing nonintervention in its
internal affairs while the second concerns the location of sovereignty within
the state. Given the ascendance of democratic ideas, sovereignty was now
formally vested in 'the people'. The ideology of nationalism sought to define
this entity more precisely in terms of 'a people' delineated by common cultural
characteristics.
Or as we have seen in
our above, case study about Singapore , ideas do not belong to specific places.
They 'belong' wherever they happen to take root. Culturalist ideas developed in
the human sciences clearly have a resonance well beyond Europe or North America
. Indeed they provide many of the intellectual resources for the construction
of the Asia/West dichotomy on which the cultural politics of in this case
Confucian/Asian democracy rests. There is also a case for regarding the cluster
of concepts that underpin 'Asian values' and 'Asian identity' as assembled very
largely on the edifice of the ' Asia ' studied by Western scholars. This is so
not just in terms of the geographic conceptualization of Asia , but also those
studies based broadly on the concept of 'Asian political culture'. The subject
point produced through this paradigm is at least partly a product of
reconstituted images of cultural heritage or tradition derived substantially
from Western studies of the Orient. This by no means implies a 'Western'
hegemony or monopoly of ideas. Rather, it shows that the political elites most
closely involved in promoting culturalist projects have found those
intellectual resources most suitable for the task, and used them in what
amounts to a self-Orientalizing discourse that works precisely because it
confirms many of the old, but eminently serviceable cliches about 'East is
East'.
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