The
past three months have seen an inordinate amount
of social unrest in Indian-controlled Kashmir. India and Pakistan have
contested the region since their independence in 1947. Pakistan is using the
latest unrest in a bid to undermine Indian control of its section of the
disputed region.
Case Study: Jammu and Kashmir
In
India, both the ruling Congress Party and the main opposition Bharatiya Janata
Party issued statements Sept. 15 calling for peace in the region. Prime
Minister Manmohan Singh emphasized that the “only path for lasting peace and
prosperity in Jammu and Kashmir is that of dialogue and discussion.” By
emphasizing India’s willingness to peacefully resolve the situation, Singh is
trying to undo damage to India’s image by the near-daily reports of Indian
soldiers injuring or killing Kashmiri protesters. Singh has gone so far as to
put the Armed Forces Special Powers Act (AFSPA) on the negotiating table in his
efforts to quell the violence. AFSPA, in force since 1990, has given Indian
forces the power to enter and search homes, to make arrests without a warrant,
and to use deadly force against suspects, creating a sort of perpetual state of
martial law that has angered many in Jammu and Kashmir — contributing to more
protests. No decision has been reached in New Delhi on whether to revoke
certain measures of AFSPA.
The
current wave of protests appears to have begun June 11 after a Kashmiri student
died from injuries suffered when he was struck by a tear gas canister fired by
Indian forces during a protest in Srinagar. The incident fueled more violent
and sustained protests, which in turn led to confrontations with Indian
security forces, curfews and shoot-on-site orders for curfew violators across
Jammu and Kashmir.
Most
of the violence is taking place in the Kashmir Valley, the most populous area
of Jammu and Kashmir, with only peripheral unrest in Jammu, the second-most
populated zone of the state. The Kashmir Valley appears locked in a cycle of
retaliatory violence, with India trying to contain the situation so it does not
gain too much international attention, local Muslim Kashmiri separatists
calling for more autonomy from India (and some for outright independence), and
Pakistan exploiting the conflict. On Sept. 15, Pakistani President Asif Ali
Zardari told a press conference that his country “condemns the brutal way in
which India is handling the democratic struggle of Kashmiris.” Comments like
these seek to draw negative international attention to India’s handling of
Kashmir in a bid to undermine India’s authority over the area. Pakistan is
doing so to gain more influence in the area, which it considers strategically
important to its ability to defend against India.
The
wider region of Kashmir has been a point of contention between Pakistan and
India since the partition of British India in 1947. After the partition, the
Hindu monarch who ruled the majority-Muslim area chose to join India, a step
opposed by most Kashmiris. Pakistan took advantage of this anti-Indian
sentiment when it went to war with India over the territory in 1948. The
territory was carved up between Indian- and Pakistani-administered — and later
Chinese-administered — areas, with the Line of Control separating Indian and
Pakistani Kashmir. Since then, India and Pakistan have fought two wars over
Kashmir.
The
most densely populated area of the region is the Kashmir Valley, home to more
than one-third of Greater Kashmir’s population. The region’s largest city,
Srinagar, is located there, along with the population centers of Sopore,
Kupwara, Baramulla, Awantipora and Anantnag. The Kashmir Valley is the only
area in Greater Kashmir that can support a large population. The valley’s
terrain is more amenable to agriculture, livestock and tourism than the rugged
mountains that make up the rest of both Indian- and Pakistani-controlled
Kashmir. The Kashmir Valley is thus a key area to hold for any power looking to
control the Greater Kashmir region.
The
rest of Indian-administered Kashmir is still attractive territory to
Pakistan, however. Kashmir offers high ground that allows access to Pakistan,
which controls part of these highlands. Kashmir also is the source of
Pakistan’s water supply. The Indus — the vital river whose valley downstream
makes up Pakistan’s core — flows through Indian-administered Kashmir as do two
of its tributaries, the Chenab and Jhelum rivers. Having such strategic
waterways susceptible to Indian interference weakens Pakistan’s already unenviable
position vis-a-vis India.
That
it is the only area in Greater Kashmir that can support a large, coherent
population base that could function autonomously explains why the Kashmir
Valley has seen most of the recent protests. Pakistan has cultivated this
autonomous streak, with Islamabad seeing the Kashmir Valley as key to
undermining New Delhi’s rule over India’s section of Kashmir.
Pakistani-controlled Kashmir borders the valley on two sides, and Pakistan has
used this proximity to stir up indigenous Kashmiri groups into opposing Indian
rule, thus affording Pakistan plausible deniability as to its
involvement.
One
tactic Pakistan has used is supporting militant attacks in the Kashmir Valley
and India. Supporting groups that foment social unrest has proven the better
tactic, however. When men attacked Indian forces with rifles and explosives, it
was more acceptable for the Indians to use deadly force. But when students,
women and, to some degree, children, mass and shut down highways and airports,
often with little more than stones, sticks and fire, Indian forces reacting
with deadly force appear brutal and can end up rallying public support in
Kashmir against themselves — not to mention it is a tremendous international
embarrassment for India.
In
1989, by contrast, Pakistan deployed Islamist militants
such as Jaish-e-Mohammed,
Hizbul-Mujahideen initially
cultivated for use in Afghanistan into Indian-administered Kashmir. Over the
course of the next decade, groups such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and many others, fought for
Pakistani control of Kashmir. Such groups attacked Indian targets in Jammu and
Kashmir and in India proper. They enjoyed the support of many Kashmiris, who,
while not totally approving of violence against India, did not approve of
Indian rule either.
Since
the 1999 Kargil War between Pakistan and India, the 9/11 attacks and the Mumbai
attacks in 2008, Pakistan has come under increasing international pressure to
dial back its support for such militant groups. Pakistan’s control over its
militant proxy networks loosened substantially. Many of these groups
splintered, with their more radical elements finding common cause with al Qaeda
and ultimately turning on Islamabad, waging war against the Pakistani state. As
the Mumbai attacks demonstrated, Pakistan’s weakened control over these groups
raises the potential for them to act more autonomously and possibly draw
Pakistan into conflict with India against its will. Groups like Tehrik-i-Taliban
Pakistan have posed such a serious threat to Islamabad that the Pakistani
military deployed to northwestern Pakistan to combat the militant groups in
their home base.
As
evinced by Singh’s statement and the broaching of the AFSPA, New Delhi appears
in a mood to talk to quell the domestic unrest. Singh will find himself talking
with a major Kashmiri stakeholder, the leader of the protests, Mirwaiz Umar
Farooq. Farooq is the founder and leader of the All Party Hurriyat
Conference (APHC), an indigenous,
non-violent federation of 26 local Kashmiri groups espousing various levels of
opposition to the current Indian government, ranging from increased autonomy to
independence to unification with Pakistan. The APHC and the protests that it
has been organizing offer Islamabad exactly what it needs to continue to
pressure Indian control over Kashmir while still maintaining plausible
deniability. Islamabad can point to the current unrest in Jammu and Kashmir as
evidence for its historical assertion that the Kashmiris do not want to live
under Indian rule and want to be part of Pakistan.
Pakistani
interest in the APHC does not necessarily mean the group will become more
violent. Judging by their current performance, the Pakistanis are doing quite a
good job of demonstrating India’s challenges in controlling Kashmir without
giving Indian forces an excuse for a harsh crackdown. Pakistan’s use of social
unrest forces India to be mindful of its international image — something
Pakistan will continue to use to its advantage in the simmering conflict zone
that is Kashmir.
For
a related subject see also the history of the Jamaat-e-Islami.
