The years immediately preceding the outbreak of war should not be regarded as inevitably leading to war in 1914. While with hindsight such an interpretation seems almost inescapable - given that the period was characterized by increasing international tension, mutual suspicion and a widespread arms race - it is worth noting that in fact these last years of peace saw a number of successful attempts by the Great Powers to avert a large-scale war. Peace conferences and mediation, not war, were the way to settle international crises, at least those involving the so-called Great Powers. While smaller states engaged in armed conflicts, the governments in London, St Petersburg, Paris, Berlin and Vienna did not, and war was avoided at several important junctures. This history of 'avoided wars'1 is crucial background for understanding the decision-making of European statesmen and military leaders during the final crisis in July 1914 when the Great War, so frequently anticipated and so often avoided, finally broke out. Before the war, alliance systems both sustained peace and acted as deterrents, and they 'generally functioned as a restraint on war', rather than being a cause of it.2 Also during the July Crisis, most governments continued to try to find a diplomatic solution to the international crisis that resulted from the assassination of the Austro-Hungarian heir to the throne on 28 June 1914. In Vienna and Berlin, however, there was no desire for yet another conference or for mediation. The documents that follow go some way towards explaining why this was so. However, they also show that all governments of the Great Powers shared the fear that at some point in the near future, a major European war was inevitable. This fatalism underpinned most of the decision-making of the years 1911 to 1914.

In 1911, Europe's major powers clashed over their rival interests in North Africa.3 When the French sent troops to Morocco in May to suppress a revolt (and thus, by implication, to extend their influence over that country), Germany considered this to be a move contrary to international agreements regulating Moroccan affairs in which the powers had guaranteed the independence of the Moroccan state, and demanded compensation (2). Germany tried, as before in 1905/1906, to assert her claim as a Great Power who could not simply be ignored in colonial affairs.4 After failing to find a diplomatic solution, the German government dispatched the gunboat Panther which arrived at the port of Agadir on 1 July to intimidate the French. War seemed likely (8). However, having initially attempted to restrain France during the ensuing Agadir Crisis (3), Britain eventually supported France, and the Anglo-French Entente emerged further strengthened from the negotiations that followed, while Germany found herself diplomatically isolated.

Against this background, David Lloyd George's famous 'Mansion House Speech' of 21 July 1911 (4), rejecting 'peace at any price' and threatening to fight on France's side against Germany if the need arose, caused great indignation in Germany and set the tone for widespread and on-going anti-British sentiments (18). Herbert Asquith recalled after the war that the 'speech produced a crise de nerfs at Berlin', and that the 'situation was full of grave possibilities'.5

It was during this crisis, too, that the British Committee of Imperial Defense met on 23 August 1911 to discuss how to react if the situation escalated and France required military assistance .6 Some historians have argued that this meeting marked the turning point when the British General Staff's strategy of sending the British Expeditionary Force to the Continent (the so-called Continental commitment) became accepted British military policy.7 It has even been argued that the meeting of 23 August 'set the course for 2 military confrontation between Britain and Germany', comparing it in historical importance to the German 'war council' meeting of December 1912 when war was demanded by Kaiser Wilhelm and his military advisers, decided upon and reluctantly postponed by 18 months. On balance, however, most would probably concede that the nature of the two events was very different.

The Agadir Crisis was also the backdrop to the Anglo-French military and naval talks of 1911 in which the two Entente partners firmed up their commitments to each other and agreed how to proceed militarily in case of a European war (10), although Britain did not formally commit to supporting France in a future conflict. Such a formal commitment was, in fact, never made, which explains why Britain, in July 1914, could - in an effort to bring about a peaceful solution to the crisis - play a waiting game in which she did not commit herself either to intervene or to remain neutral in any future war.

The crisis of 1911 was resolved diplomatically following international negotiations leading to the Treaty of Fez (4 November 1911). Germany was compensated with a small part of the French Congo, but the affair amounted in fact to another diplomatic defeat for Germany (much as the First Moroccan Crisis had in 1906). A, a result, Germans were becoming increasingly worried that their foreign-policy adventures were not leading to the desired breaking-up of anti-German alliances. Rightly or wrongly, they felt encircled by hostile powers. Germany had also revealed itself as an aggressive bully (as it had done previously during the First Moroccan Crisis when its aim had been to drive apart the newly-created Entente between Britain and France) and was now considered France's principal future enemy . France's relations with Britain were increasingly important, but she was also looking towards Russia, a valuable alliance partner since their agreement of 1894. Russia also had the worrying potential to become a future enemy; Russia's military, economic and financial future seemed ominously to lead to a time when France's support might no longer be needed.

In these uncertain times, demands for a preventive war were voiced among Germany's military leaders, and calls for army increases were frequently made. Moreover, Austria-Hungary had only provided lukewarm support for her Dual Alliance partner, leading to fears that the ally could only be counted on in a crisis pertaining to its own interests. Germany's decision-makers arrived at the realization that only a crisis in the Balkans would guarantee the all-important Austro-Hungarian support required in a future war - looking further ahead, this would be an important factor in the July Crisis following Archduke Franz Ferdinand's assassination.

In February 1912, there was a chance of an improvement of Anglo-German relations which had been tense after years of a naval arms race precipitated by Admiral von Tirpitz's naval building plan,9 when the British Minister of War Richard Haldane travelled to Berlin to discuss the possibility of a rapprochement.10

Germany's aim was a 'definitive agreement' between the two naval rivals which Britain could not undertake given her existing Entente with France and Russia, and given that Germany was if turn not willing to reduce her naval building programme. The British government was divided on whether to corn: to an agreement with Germany , and France was assured that Britain, whatever arrangement might be made, would still support her Entente partner if she became the victim of an unprovoked attack, although this did little to assuage the French Government', fears about a possible Anglo-German rapprochement . In the words of the Russian ambassador in Paris, they displayed 'a certain nervousness'.11 The negotiations were ultimately unsuccessful, and did not result in a formal agreement - Germany offered too little and wanted too much in return,12 and Britain was unwilling to destabilize her existing agreements in return for such little practical gain.

In 1912, the Balkans once again demanded the attention of Europe's statesmen.13  Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro and Serbia formed the Balkan League, and in October 1912, the League declared war on Turkey which was defeated and driven out of most of the Balkans. 'Everyone is stunned', recorded the Russian Ambassador Benckendorff in London, commenting in particular on the new respect accorded to Bulgaria's victories. 'No one say' anymore that this is a squabble among rotten little nations.’14   The Great Powers were on the brink of war; would Austria-Hungary be willing to let Serbia fight a successful Balkan war and increase her power? France had assured Russia of her support if Austria-Hungary attacked Serbia, and Germany had likewise shored up her ally in case Austria-Hungary found herself embroiled in a war with Russia. In November 1912, partial mobilization measures were agreed upon in St Petersburg, and Europe faced its gravest crisis yet. In Berlin, Chief of Staff Moltke favored 'an immediate strike' , while the French Minister of War Millerand worried about the possibility that German troops might be moved from the East to threaten France . Millerand even tried to force the Russians' hand, and it was certainly clear to the government in St Petersburg that France would play her part in a forthcoming war. However, the victors later fell out over the spoils, and ended up fighting each other in the Second Balkan War of 1913. As a result of the wars, Serbia doubled her territory, and now posed an even greater threat to Austria-Hungary, both externally, due to her size and obvious military capability, and internally by encouraging the sizeable Serbian minority within the Dual Monarchy to demand its independence. Once again, Europe was on the brink of war. It was recognized in the Entente that Austria-Hungary could not ignore Serbia's provocations in the long term, and that the tensions between them might well lead to war in the future. What is more, Russia had kept extra troops on duty after the summer maneuvers, an intimidating measure as far as Austria-Hungary's military leaders were concerned. They were well aware that Russian troops outnumbered Austro-Hungarian ones; in the military district of Warsaw alone, 320,000 Russian troops would be opposed by 21,000 Austrian ones, a worrying realization.15

In late 1912, Austria-Hungary wanted to put a stop to Serbia's expansion in the Balkans, if necessary by war , but Kaiser Wilhelm II was initially not prepared to support the ally in a war against Serbia simply 'because Austria does not want the Serbs in Albania or Durazzo'. However, Germany's military decision-makers were quick to realize that the crisis offered a welcome opportunity for war. The Kaiser, in a characteristic and dramatic change of heart, and his Chief of Staff Helmuth von Moltke eventually ended up offering their full support to the ally 'in all circumstances', in words that echoed the same assurances they would later make to their ally in early July 1914. By this point, the German Kaiser had decided that 'should Russian countermeasures or demands follow which might force Franz Joseph to declare war, then he has right on his side and I am ready [ ... ] to accept the casus foederis in its fullest meaning and with all its consequences' . 16

This is essential background for understanding Austria's reaction to the Serbian-supported assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne on 28 June 1914. Given the longstanding Balkan instability, and Serbia's many provocations, this was a threat to the Empire's international reputation that Vienna's statesmen felt they could not ignore. With the moral right seemingly on their side, the assassination provided an opportunity to dispose of the Serbian threat once and for all, and this time German support in avenging an act of terrorism and regicide would be more forthcoming, and international toleration of such a move more likely.

The crisis in November 1912 brought Europe to the brink of war: with hindsight, it can be regarded as a dress-rehearsal for what was to come in the summer of 1914. While Germany assured Austria-Hungary of unlimited support, the Tsar and his Minister of War, Sukhomlinov, were at the same time discussing the possibility of partial Russian mobilization. If implemented, this decision would almost certainly have led in turn to an Austro-Hungarian general mobilization, and in the light of Germany's promise to her ally, a European war would have been difficult to avoid.17

During this crisis, French military experts considered the Entente's chances of victory 'with great optimism', as Poincare told the Russian Ambassador Isvolsky on 12 September, because Austria-Hungary's forces would be tied up in the Balkans and Italy was bound to France, due to her agreement and the Italo- Turkish (or Libyan) war.18  He based his confidence on assessments by the French General Staff who had predicted in a report of 2 September 1912 that the Entente would have the greater chance of victory if war were to result from an Austrian intervention in the Balkans.19

Germany's military leaders were not yet quite so confident of Germany's chances, leading to the infamous discussion to 'delay' the war for a while in the so-called German 'War Council' meeting of December 1912 which took place against the background of the Balkan Wars threatening to embroil the Great Powers . Historians have long debated the significance of this event during which Kaiser Wilhelm II and his senior military advisors reacted to news from London that Britain would support France in a future conflict by discussing unleashing a war at that moment and then deciding to postpone it, and they are divided over how to evaluate its importance. For some, the timing of the outbreak of war, exactly 18 months later as discussed in December 1912, appears too much of a coincidence. At best, the event demonstrates the extent to which German decision-makers felt themselves to be beleaguered and convinced that war was inevitable; at worst, it has been seen as the point at which they actually decided to provoke a war in the not-too-distant future when certain conditions (such as the widening of the Kiel Canal) had been met.20 It is undisputed, however, that Germany's military planners used the occasion of the Balkan crisis to advocate war, emphasizing their chances of winning at that moment, and at the same time using the opportunity to underline their frequent calls for army increases.

Throughout this period, the question of Belgian neutrality was at the forefront of the minds of military planners in Paris and Berlin. In France, Chief of the General Staff Josef Joffre was compelled to put political above military considerations in his strategic planning. He would not be able to violate Belgian neutrality in a future war 21. In Germany, however, a different approach was adopted. The Chief of the General Staff Moltke made clear that political concerns were of secondary importance compared with military considerations, and that Belgium would have to be invaded when war began. In meetings with the Belgian King Albert in November 1913. Moltke and Kaiser Wilhelm II even attempted to intimidate the Belgians into allowing them to march through Belgium unopposed.22 Moltke told King Albert unambiguously: 'It is very much in the interest of the small states to be with us, because the consequences of the war will be grave for those who go against us.23 The Belgians turned down this extraordinary request (which revealed not only Germany's aggressive intentions, but also details of her intended war-plan), as they would again later during the July Crisis - keen to preserve her status as an independent country, Belgium refused to allow either France or Germany access to her territory.

At the same time, Russia saw herself provoked by the close ties between Germany and Turkey. Their long-standing military association was further underlined when a German officer, Otto Liman von Sanders, was posted to a German military mission in Constantinople in late 1913, charged with reorganizing the Turkish army. Russia reacted indignantly to this apparent extension of German interest in such a strategically important part of the world, and with war once again on the cards during the crisis, the Liman von Sanders affair has subsequently been considered the 'last conflict before the catastrophe'.24

The crisis was resolved peacefully in early 1914, but had further destabilized relations between the Great Powers, particularly between Russia and Germany which were characterized by mutual suspicion and hostile press campaigns. Russia was particularly keen to strengthen the Entente. Sazonov, encouraged by Benckendorff in London and Isvolsky in Paris, believed that Russia's Great Power status depended on support from France and Britain.25

That a war between the major European powers was not inevitable is underlined, to give but one prominent example, by the fact that in France, the possibility of a future rapprochement with Germany was not ruled out by leading statesmen, particularly by Joseph Caillaux, and that improved future Franco-German relations were not out of the question in 1913 (64).26   In that year, Max War burg wrote to Under-Secretary of State Wahnschaffe: 'By and large it is certainly ridiculous to speak today of the possibility of a French-English-German rapprochement, but I was told seriously in conversations that one would not be surprised if we were there in five years' time.’27 However, in August 1913 the French and Russian General Staffs had come to an agreement about military cooperation and finally signed the Franco-Russian Military Convention on 9 September 1913.28

The year 1914 was dominated by speculations about Russia's  current and future military strength, not just in Germany and Austria-Hungary, but also in France and Britain (74), (75). British foreign policy was determined by the fear of Russia's and Germany's future strength. With a view to protecting British interests in the Empire, Anglo-Russian naval negotiations took place in 1914.29 On Russia's side, this was seen as a first step towards cementing a more formal defensive alliance between the three Entente partners. Sazonov was concerned about the effectiveness of the Entente, 'whose actual existence is as little proved as the existence of the Sea Serpent.30 The prospect of an Anglo-Russian naval convention about which Berlin learnt from a spy in the Russian Embassy in London led to further insecurity in Germany, and provided military leaders and right-wing pressure groups with ammunition for their requests to build more ships and increase armaments. In the early summer of 1914, demands were made for preventive war in Germany, Austria and Italy as the outlook for the long-term future of the Triple Alliance seemed bleak. In Vienna, Chief of the General Staff Franz Conrad von Hotzendorf had demanded a war against Serbia on at least 25 occasions in 1913 alone, and his aggressive attitude towards Serbia, which extended by proxy to Russia, was well known in St Petersburg, too.31 While frequently demanding a preventive war, German decision-makers nonetheless also continued to hope - as they would in July 1914 - that Britain might still be won over and at least remain neutral in a future war.

While the Entente-partners France and Britain discussed whether a more formal agreement between Britain and Russia might be possible (83), in Russia not everyone was convinced that the future lay with the Entente. The war-party in Russia encouraged an anti-German press campaign, while Russian conservatives advocated redirecting Russia's foreign policy towards more cordial relations with Germany. Here, too, was potential for a development which could, in time, have diffused the volatile relationship between the two Great Powers, and perhaps have prevented war. British decision-makers were certainly concerned that there was a real possibility of a Russo-German rapprochement, as indeed were the French.

While in May 1914 the US envoy Colonel Edward House recorded in dismay that the situation in Europe was 'extraordinary' and a war likely, by the early summer of 1914 the international situation was actually less tense than it had been for years, and Anglo-German relations in particular were much improved,32  leading Arthur Nicolson to observe: 'Since I have been at the Foreign Office, I have not seen such calm waters.33 He could not have known that he was observing the proverbial calm before the storm.

1 Jost Dulffer, Martin Kroger and Rolf-Harald Wippich (eds), Vermiedene Kriege. Deeskalation und Konflikte der Grossmaechte zwischen Krimkrieg und Erstem Weltkrieg (1856-1914), Oldenbourg, Munich 1997. More recently, the thesis that war was actually improbable, rather than unavoidable, was tested by Holger Afflerbach and David Stevenson (eds), An Improbable War?: The Outbreak of World War I and European Political Culture before 1914, Berghahn Books, New York 2007.

2 William Mulligan, The Origins of the First World War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2010, p. 229. Similar arguments have been made by Holger Afflerbach, Der Dreibund. Europaische Grossmacht- und Allianzpolitik vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg, Bohlau, Munich 2003 and Friedrich KieRling, Gegen den 'grossen Krieg'? Entspannung in den internationalen Beziehungen, 1911-1914, Oldenbourg, Munich 2002.

3 For background on the Agadir Crisis, see e.g. J.-c. Allain, Agadir 1911: Une Crise imperialiste en Europe pour la conquete de Maroc (Paris, 1976); M.L. Dockrill, 'British Policy During the Agadir Crisis of 1911', in EH. Hinsley (ed.), British Foreign Policy Under Sir Edward Grey, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1977, pp. 271-287; Emily Oncken, Panthersprung nach Agadir. Die deutsche Politik wiihrend der Zweiten Marokkokrise, Droste, Dusseldorf 1981; Geoffrey Baraclough, From Agadir to Armageddon. Anatomy of a Crisis, London 1982; Dulffer et al. (eds), Vermiedene Kriege; Ralf Forsbach, Alfred von Kiderlen-Wiichter (1852-1912). Ein Diplomatenleben im Kaiserreich, 2 vols, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Gottingen 1997; T.G. Otte, 'The Elusive Balance. British Foreign Policy and the French Entente before the First World War', in Alan Sharp and Glyn Stone (eds), Anglo-French Relations in the Twentieth Century: Rivalry and Cooperation, Routledge, London and New York, 2000; pp.23-26.

 4 For details of the First Moroccan Crisis, see e.g. Frederick V. Parsons, The Origins of the Morocco Question 1880-1900, Duckworth, London 1976; Martin Mayer, Geheime Diplomatie und offentliche Meinung. Die Parlamente in Frankreich, Deutschland, und Grossbritannien und die erste Marokkokrise 1904-1905, Droste, Dusseldorf 2002.

5 Herbert Asquith, The Genesis of the War, Cassell and Co., London, New York et al., 1923, pp. 93-4. He commented that 'war had been escaped over this business; no one could say, or can say now, how narrowly' (p. 95). For details of Lloyd George's speech, and his attitude towards Germany during the Crisis, see Bentley B. Gilbert, 'Pacifist to Interventionist: David Lloyd George in 1911 and 1914. Was Belgium an Issue?', Historical Journal, 28,4, 1985, pp. 863-885, pp. 866ff.

6 Asquith commented that 'it seemed to me to make it opportune to institute afresh a thorough and comprehensive investigation by the Committee of Imperial Defence of the parts which our navy and army should respectively (and co-ordinately) play in the event of our being involved in a European war. Such an inquiry accordingly took place in the autumn of 1911. It furnished information, and led to the adoption of plans which, three years later, were found to be of the utmost importance and value', Asquith, Genesis, p. 96. For details on the workings of the cm, see John P. Mackintosh, 'The Role of the Committee of Imperial Defence before 1914', English Historical Review, 77, July 1962, pp. 490-503. For a detailed discussion of the genesis of this meeting see Nicholas J. d'Ombrain, 'The Imperial General Staff and the Military Policy of a "Continental Strategy" during the 1911 International Crisis', Military Affairs, 34, 3, October 1970, pp. 88-93.)

7 See e.g. Samuel R. Williamson, The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain and France Prepare for War, 1904-1914, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA 1969, pp. 187-204; John Gooch, The Plans of War: The General Staff and British Military Strategy, c.1900-1916, London 1974, pp. 289-92. Less convinced about the importance of the meeting are e.g. Keith Neilson, 'Great Britain', in Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig (eds), War Plannu.: 1914, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge et aI., 2010, pp. 175-197, p;: 183ff. and Hew Strachan 'The British Army, its General Staff and the Continental Commitment 1904-14', in David French and Brian Holden Reid (eds The British General Staff. Reform and Innovation, 1890-1939, Frank Cass London and Portland, OR 2002, pp. 75-94.

8 The case for the importance of the meeting is made by Niall Ferguson, in Pity of War, Allen Lane, London 1998, p. 65. This interpretation is not wide shared, and, according to Nielson, it is 'deeply flawed'. 'Great Britain', p. 185 n. 43.

9 For details of the Tirpitz Plan, see e.g. Volker R. Berghahn, 'Zu den Zielen des deutschen Flottenbaus unter Wilhelm Il.', Historische Zeitschrift, 210, 1970, pp. 34-100 and idem, Der Tirpitzplan. Genesis und Verfall einer innenpolitischen Krisenstrategie unter Wilhelm II., Droste Verlag, Dusseldorf 1971; Rolf Hobson, Imperialism at Sea: Naval Strategic Thought, the Ideology of Sea Power, and the Tirpitz Plan, 1875-1914, Brill, Boston 2002. For a recent reinterpretation of British foreign policy and the naval race, see for example Dominik Geppert and Andreas Rose, 'Machtpolitik und Flottenbau vor 1914. Zur Neuinterpretation britischer Aussenpolitik im Zeitalter des Hochimperialismus', Historische Zeitschrift 293 (2011), pp. 401-437; Andreas Rose, Zwischen Empire und Kontinent - Zur Transformation britischer Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik im Vorfeld des Ersten Weltkrieges, Veroffentlichungen des Deutschen Historischen Instituts London, 70, Munich 2011; Matthew Seligmann, The Royal Navy and the German Threat, 1901-1914: Admiralty Plans to protect Britain Trade in a War against Germany, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2012.

10 For details of the Haldane Mission, see e.g. Stephen E. Koss, Lord Haldane. Scapegoat for Liberalism, Columbia University Press, New York, London 1969, pp. 65ff.; R.T.B. Langhorne, 'The Naval Question in Anglo-German Relations, 1912-1914', Historical Journal, XIV, 2, 1970, pp. 359-370; Wolfgang j. Mommsen, Grossmachtstellung und Weltpolitik 1870-1914, Ullstein, Frankfurt/Main, Berlin 1993, pp. 228ff.; Forsbach, Kiderlen- Wachter, Vol. II, pp. 579ff.

11 Friedrich Stieve, Isvolsky and the World War. Based on the Documents recent: published by the German Foreign Office, transl. E.W. Dickes, George Allen Unwin, London 1926, p. 77.

12 Langhorne, 'The Naval Question', p. 359, n. 5. The German government gave Haldane a copy of their forthcoming new naval law which was much more expansive than the Admiralty had expected and only worried Britain's navy leaders more.

13 For details of the Balkan Wars in the context of worsening European relation see David Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War. Europe 1904-1914 Clarendon, Oxford 1996, pp. 231ff. and Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalker, How Europe went to War in 1914, Allen Lane, London 2012, p. 251.

14 Benckendorff to his wife, 27 and 26 October 1912, cited in Marina Sorok; Britain, Russia and the Road to the First World War. The Fateful Embassy of Count Aleksandr Benckendorff (1903-1916), Ashgate, Farnham 2011, pp. 228-9.

15 Gunther Kronenbitter, 'Krieg im Frieden'. Die Fuhrung der K.u.K. Armee und die GrofSmachtpolitik Osterreich-Ungarns 1906-1914, Olden bourg, Munich 2003, p. 383.

16 Wilhelm II to Kiderlen-Wachter, 21 November 1912, GP, 33, No.12405

17 This point is made, for example, by L.C.E. Turner, 'The Russian Mobilization in 1914', in Paul M. Kennedy (ed.), The War Plans of the Great Powers, 1880-1914, Allen & Unwin, London 1979, pp. 252-268, p. 255. See also below, Note 69, and 40 for details of the conference at Tsarskoe Selo on 23 November.

18 Luigi Albertini, Origins of the War of 1914,3 vols, Eng. trans!., Oxford University Press, Oxford 1952-57, Vo!. 1, p. 373, who points out that after the war Poincare kept silent about these statements to Isvolsky. In the same meeting Poincare assured Isvolsky that should Russia be forced to become involved in a war against Austria-Hungary, 'the French government would recognise this in advance as a casus foederis and would not hesitate for one moment to fulfil the obligations which it has incurred in respect of Russia.’

19 Documents diplomatiques francais 1871-1914, 3e serie, 3, No. 359. For a discussion of the importance of this document, see Turner, 'Russian Mobilization', p. 256.

20 The most detailed discussion of the war council and the available evidence is provided by John Rohl, The Kaiser and his Court, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, who also provides a detailed bibliography of the controversy around the war council (pp. 255£.). For the most recent summary of the event and its importance see John Rohl, Wilhelm II. Der Weg in den Abgrund, 1900-1941, Beck, Munich 2008, 2nd edn 2009, Vol. 3, pp. 963ff. (English translation forthcoming, Cambridge University Press 2013.) Historians who do not see a direct connection between the famous meeting and the outbreak of war 18 months later include W.J. Mommsen, 'Der Topos vom unvermeidlichen Krieg: Aussenpolitik und offentliche Meinung im Deutschen Reich im letzten Jahrzehnt vor 1914', in idem, Der autoritdre Nationalstaat, Frankfurt/Main 1990, pp. 380ff.; E. Zechlin, 'Die Adriakrise und der "Kriegsrat" vom 8. Dezember 1912', in idem Krieg und Kriegsrisiko. Zur Deutschen Politik im Ersten Weltkrieg. Dusseldorf 1979; L.C.F. Turner, The Origins of the First World War, Edward Arnold, London 1970.

21 For details, see e.g. Roy A. Prete, Strategy and Command. The Anglo-French Coalition on the Western Front, 1914, McGill-Queen's University Press. Montreal et al., 2009, pp. 21ff.

22 For details, see Jean Stengers, 'Guillaume II et Ie Roi Albert a Potsdam en  novembre 1913', Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres et des Sciences Morales et Politiques, 7-12,1993, pp. 227-253; Annika Mombauer, Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First World War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2001, pp. 153ff.

23 Cited in Jean Stengers, 'Guillaume II et le Roi Albert', pp. 227-253.

24 On the Liman von Sanders affair, see e.g. William Mulligan, 'We Can't Be More Russian Than the Russians: British Policy During the Liman Von Sanders Crisis. 1913-1914', Diplomacy & Statecraft 17, 2, 2006, pp. 261-282; Martin Kroger, 'Letzter Konflikt vor der Katastrophe: Die Liman-von-Sanders-Krise 1913114', in Dulffcr et al. (eds), Vermiedene Kriege, pp. 657-671; Mustafa Aksakal, The Ottoman Road to War in 1914. The Ottoman Empire and the First World War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008, pp. 80ff.; Hans Herzfeld, 'Die Limankrise und die Politik der Grossmiichte in der Jahreswende 1913-1914', Berliner Monatshefte, September 1933, pp. 837-858; October 1933, pp. 973-993.

25 Soraka, Britain, Russia and the Road to the First World War, p. 239.

26 For details see Klaus Wilsberg, 'Terrible ami - aimable ennemi', Kooperation und Konflikt in den deutsch-franzosischen Beziehungen 1911-1914, Bouvier Verlag, Bonn 1998, pp. 99-103.

27 Warburg to Wahnschaffe, 12 April 1913, PA-AA, Frankreich 102, vol. 57, cited in Wilsberg, 'Terrible ami - aimable ennemi', p. 98.

28 DDF, 3e serie, 3, No. 79. As Turner points out, the Franco-Russian convention highlights to what extent 'all military thinking in Europe was dominated by the implications of the Schlieffen Plan. Moreover [ ... ] the potential application of that plan would lead automatically to intense military activity in eastern Europe. Russia would have to invade East Prussia as soon as possible to relieve pressure on France, while Austria would be compelled to attack in Russian Poland to bring relief to the German Eighth Army in East Prussia', in 'Russian Mobilization', p. 257.

29 For details, see Soraka, Britain, Russia and the Road to the First World War, pp. 246-8; Stephen Schroeder, Die englisch-russische Marinekonvention, Vandenhoek& Ruprecht, Gottingen 2004.

30 Cited in LV. Bestuzhev, 'Russian Foreign Policy, February to June 1914', Journal of Contemporary History, 1,3, July 1966, pp. 93-112, p. 108.

31 Hew Strachan, The First World War, Vol. 1: To Arms, Oxford University Press, Oxford 2001, p. 69, Bruce Menning, 'Russian Military Intelligence', article MS, forthcoming.

32 An example of this is the British naval visit to the Kid Regatta (86).

33 Nicolson to Goschen, 5 May 1914, TNA, FO 800/374, cited in Zara Steiner and Keith Neilson, Britain and the Origins of the First World War, Palgrave Macmillan, London 2003, p. 229.

 

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