The years immediately preceding the outbreak of war should not be
regarded as inevitably leading to war in 1914. While with hindsight such an
interpretation seems almost inescapable - given that the period was
characterized by increasing international tension, mutual suspicion and a
widespread arms race - it is worth noting that in fact these last years of
peace saw a number of successful attempts by the Great Powers to avert a
large-scale war. Peace conferences and mediation, not war, were the way to
settle international crises, at least those involving the so-called Great
Powers. While smaller states engaged in armed conflicts, the governments in
London, St Petersburg, Paris, Berlin and Vienna did not, and war was avoided at
several important junctures. This history of 'avoided wars'1 is crucial
background for understanding the decision-making of European statesmen and
military leaders during the final crisis in July 1914 when the Great War, so
frequently anticipated and so often avoided, finally broke out. Before the war,
alliance systems both sustained peace and acted as deterrents, and they
'generally functioned as a restraint on war', rather than being a cause of it.2
Also during the July Crisis, most governments continued to try to find a
diplomatic solution to the international crisis that resulted from the
assassination of the Austro-Hungarian heir to the throne on 28 June 1914. In
Vienna and Berlin, however, there was no desire for yet another conference or
for mediation. The documents that follow go some way towards explaining why
this was so. However, they also show that all governments of the Great Powers
shared the fear that at some point in the near future, a major European war was
inevitable. This fatalism underpinned most of the decision-making of the years
1911 to 1914.
In 1911, Europe's major powers clashed over their rival interests in
North Africa.3 When the French sent troops to Morocco in May to suppress a
revolt (and thus, by implication, to extend their influence over that country),
Germany considered this to be a move contrary to international agreements
regulating Moroccan affairs in which the powers had guaranteed the independence
of the Moroccan state, and demanded compensation (2). Germany tried, as before
in 1905/1906, to assert her claim as a Great Power who could not simply be
ignored in colonial affairs.4 After failing to find a diplomatic solution, the
German government dispatched the gunboat Panther which arrived at the port of
Agadir on 1 July to intimidate the French. War seemed likely (8). However,
having initially attempted to restrain France during the ensuing Agadir Crisis
(3), Britain eventually supported France, and the Anglo-French Entente emerged
further strengthened from the negotiations that followed, while Germany found
herself diplomatically isolated.
Against this background, David Lloyd George's famous 'Mansion House
Speech' of 21 July 1911 (4), rejecting 'peace at any price' and threatening to
fight on France's side against Germany if the need arose, caused great
indignation in Germany and set the tone for widespread and on-going
anti-British sentiments (18). Herbert Asquith recalled after the war that the
'speech produced a crise de nerfs at Berlin', and that the 'situation was full
of grave possibilities'.5
It was during this crisis, too, that the British Committee of Imperial
Defense met on 23 August 1911 to discuss how to react if the situation
escalated and France required military assistance .6 Some historians have
argued that this meeting marked the turning point when the British General
Staff's strategy of sending the British Expeditionary Force to the Continent
(the so-called Continental commitment) became accepted British military
policy.7 It has even been argued that the meeting of 23 August 'set the course
for 2 military confrontation between Britain and Germany', comparing it in
historical importance to the German 'war council' meeting of December 1912 when
war was demanded by Kaiser Wilhelm and his military advisers, decided upon and
reluctantly postponed by 18 months. On balance, however, most would probably
concede that the nature of the two events was very different.
The Agadir Crisis was also the backdrop to the Anglo-French military and
naval talks of 1911 in which the two Entente partners firmed up their
commitments to each other and agreed how to proceed militarily in case of a
European war (10), although Britain did not formally commit to supporting France
in a future conflict. Such a formal commitment was, in fact, never made, which
explains why Britain, in July 1914, could - in an effort to bring about a
peaceful solution to the crisis - play a waiting game in which she did not
commit herself either to intervene or to remain neutral in any future war.
The crisis of 1911 was resolved diplomatically following international
negotiations leading to the Treaty of Fez (4 November 1911). Germany was
compensated with a small part of the French Congo, but the affair amounted in
fact to another diplomatic defeat for Germany (much as the First Moroccan
Crisis had in 1906). A, a result, Germans were becoming increasingly worried
that their foreign-policy adventures were not leading to the desired
breaking-up of anti-German alliances. Rightly or wrongly, they felt encircled
by hostile powers. Germany had also revealed itself as an aggressive bully (as
it had done previously during the First Moroccan Crisis when its aim had been
to drive apart the newly-created Entente between Britain and France) and was
now considered France's principal future enemy . France's relations with
Britain were increasingly important, but she was also looking towards Russia, a
valuable alliance partner since their agreement of 1894. Russia also had the
worrying potential to become a future enemy; Russia's military, economic and
financial future seemed ominously to lead to a time when France's support might
no longer be needed.
In these uncertain times, demands for a preventive war were voiced among
Germany's military leaders, and calls for army increases were frequently made.
Moreover, Austria-Hungary had only provided lukewarm support for her Dual
Alliance partner, leading to fears that the ally could only be counted on in a
crisis pertaining to its own interests. Germany's decision-makers arrived at
the realization that only a crisis in the Balkans would guarantee the
all-important Austro-Hungarian support required in a future war - looking
further ahead, this would be an important factor in the July Crisis following
Archduke Franz Ferdinand's assassination.
In February 1912, there was a chance of an improvement of Anglo-German
relations which had been tense after years of a naval arms race precipitated by
Admiral von Tirpitz's naval building plan,9 when the British Minister of War
Richard Haldane travelled to Berlin to discuss the possibility of a
rapprochement.10
Germany's aim was a 'definitive agreement' between the two naval rivals
which Britain could not undertake given her existing Entente with France and
Russia, and given that Germany was if turn not willing to reduce her naval
building programme. The British government was
divided on whether to corn: to an agreement with Germany , and France was
assured that Britain, whatever arrangement might be made, would still support
her Entente partner if she became the victim of an unprovoked attack, although
this did little to assuage the French Government', fears about a possible
Anglo-German rapprochement . In the words of the Russian ambassador in Paris,
they displayed 'a certain nervousness'.11 The negotiations were ultimately
unsuccessful, and did not result in a formal agreement - Germany offered too
little and wanted too much in return,12 and Britain was unwilling to
destabilize her existing agreements in return for such little practical gain.
In 1912, the Balkans once again demanded the attention of Europe's
statesmen.13 Bulgaria, Greece,
Montenegro and Serbia formed the Balkan League, and in October 1912, the League
declared war on Turkey which was defeated and driven out of most of the
Balkans. 'Everyone is stunned', recorded the Russian Ambassador Benckendorff in London, commenting in particular on the new
respect accorded to Bulgaria's victories. 'No one say' anymore that this is a
squabble among rotten little nations.’14
The Great Powers were on the brink of war; would Austria-Hungary be
willing to let Serbia fight a successful Balkan war and increase her power?
France had assured Russia of her support if Austria-Hungary attacked Serbia,
and Germany had likewise shored up her ally in case Austria-Hungary found
herself embroiled in a war with Russia. In November 1912, partial mobilization
measures were agreed upon in St Petersburg, and Europe faced its gravest crisis
yet. In Berlin, Chief of Staff Moltke favored 'an immediate strike' , while the
French Minister of War Millerand worried about the possibility that German
troops might be moved from the East to threaten France . Millerand even tried
to force the Russians' hand, and it was certainly clear to the government in St
Petersburg that France would play her part in a forthcoming war. However, the
victors later fell out over the spoils, and ended up fighting each other in the
Second Balkan War of 1913. As a result of the wars, Serbia doubled her
territory, and now posed an even greater threat to Austria-Hungary, both
externally, due to her size and obvious military capability, and internally by
encouraging the sizeable Serbian minority within the Dual Monarchy to demand
its independence. Once again, Europe was on the brink of war. It was recognized
in the Entente that Austria-Hungary could not ignore Serbia's provocations in
the long term, and that the tensions between them might well lead to war in the
future. What is more, Russia had kept extra troops on duty after the summer
maneuvers, an intimidating measure as far as Austria-Hungary's military leaders
were concerned. They were well aware that Russian troops outnumbered
Austro-Hungarian ones; in the military district of Warsaw alone, 320,000
Russian troops would be opposed by 21,000 Austrian ones, a worrying
realization.15
In late 1912, Austria-Hungary wanted to put a stop to Serbia's expansion
in the Balkans, if necessary by war , but Kaiser Wilhelm II was initially not
prepared to support the ally in a war against Serbia simply 'because Austria
does not want the Serbs in Albania or Durazzo'. However, Germany's military
decision-makers were quick to realize that the crisis offered a welcome
opportunity for war. The Kaiser, in a characteristic and dramatic change of
heart, and his Chief of Staff Helmuth von Moltke eventually ended up offering
their full support to the ally 'in all circumstances', in words that echoed the
same assurances they would later make to their ally in early July 1914. By this
point, the German Kaiser had decided that 'should Russian countermeasures or
demands follow which might force Franz Joseph to declare war, then he has right
on his side and I am ready [ ... ] to accept the casus foederis
in its fullest meaning and with all its consequences' . 16
This is essential background for understanding Austria's reaction to the
Serbian-supported assassination of the heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne on
28 June 1914. Given the longstanding Balkan instability, and Serbia's many
provocations, this was a threat to the Empire's international reputation that
Vienna's statesmen felt they could not ignore. With the moral right seemingly
on their side, the assassination provided an opportunity to dispose of the
Serbian threat once and for all, and this time German support in avenging an
act of terrorism and regicide would be more forthcoming, and international
toleration of such a move more likely.
The crisis in November 1912 brought Europe to the brink of war: with
hindsight, it can be regarded as a dress-rehearsal for what was to come in the
summer of 1914. While Germany assured Austria-Hungary of unlimited support, the
Tsar and his Minister of War, Sukhomlinov, were at
the same time discussing the possibility of partial Russian mobilization. If
implemented, this decision would almost certainly have led in turn to an
Austro-Hungarian general mobilization, and in the light of Germany's promise to
her ally, a European war would have been difficult to avoid.17
During this crisis, French military experts considered the Entente's
chances of victory 'with great optimism', as Poincare told the Russian
Ambassador Isvolsky on 12 September, because
Austria-Hungary's forces would be tied up in the Balkans and Italy was bound to
France, due to her agreement and the Italo- Turkish (or Libyan) war.18 He based his confidence on assessments by the
French General Staff who had predicted in a report of 2 September 1912 that the
Entente would have the greater chance of victory if war were to result from an
Austrian intervention in the Balkans.19
Germany's military leaders were not yet quite so confident of Germany's
chances, leading to the infamous discussion to 'delay' the war for a while in
the so-called German 'War Council' meeting of December 1912 which took place
against the background of the Balkan Wars threatening to embroil the Great
Powers . Historians have long debated the significance of this event during
which Kaiser Wilhelm II and his senior military advisors reacted to news from London
that Britain would support France in a future conflict by discussing unleashing
a war at that moment and then deciding to postpone it, and they are divided
over how to evaluate its importance. For some, the timing of the outbreak of
war, exactly 18 months later as discussed in December 1912, appears too much of
a coincidence. At best, the event demonstrates the extent to which German
decision-makers felt themselves to be beleaguered and convinced that war was
inevitable; at worst, it has been seen as the point at which they actually
decided to provoke a war in the not-too-distant future when certain conditions
(such as the widening of the Kiel Canal) had been met.20 It is undisputed,
however, that Germany's military planners used the occasion of the Balkan
crisis to advocate war, emphasizing their chances of winning at that moment,
and at the same time using the opportunity to underline their frequent calls
for army increases.
Throughout this period, the question of Belgian neutrality was at the
forefront of the minds of military planners in Paris and Berlin. In France,
Chief of the General Staff Josef Joffre was compelled to put political above
military considerations in his strategic planning. He would not be able to
violate Belgian neutrality in a future war 21. In Germany, however, a different
approach was adopted. The Chief of the General Staff Moltke made clear that
political concerns were of secondary importance compared with military
considerations, and that Belgium would have to be invaded when war began. In
meetings with the Belgian King Albert in November 1913. Moltke and Kaiser
Wilhelm II even attempted to intimidate the Belgians into allowing them to
march through Belgium unopposed.22 Moltke told King Albert unambiguously: 'It
is very much in the interest of the small states to be with us, because the
consequences of the war will be grave for those who go against us.23 The
Belgians turned down this extraordinary request (which revealed not only
Germany's aggressive intentions, but also details of her intended war-plan), as
they would again later during the July Crisis - keen to preserve her status as
an independent country, Belgium refused to allow either France or Germany
access to her territory.
At the same time, Russia saw herself provoked by the close ties between
Germany and Turkey. Their long-standing military association was further
underlined when a German officer, Otto Liman von Sanders, was posted to a
German military mission in Constantinople in late 1913, charged with
reorganizing the Turkish army. Russia reacted indignantly to this apparent
extension of German interest in such a strategically important part of the
world, and with war once again on the cards during the crisis, the Liman von
Sanders affair has subsequently been considered the 'last conflict before the
catastrophe'.24
The crisis was resolved peacefully in early 1914, but had further
destabilized relations between the Great Powers, particularly between Russia
and Germany which were characterized by mutual suspicion and hostile press
campaigns. Russia was particularly keen to strengthen the Entente. Sazonov, encouraged by Benckendorff
in London and Isvolsky in Paris, believed that
Russia's Great Power status depended on support from France and Britain.25
That a war between the major European powers was not inevitable is
underlined, to give but one prominent example, by the fact that in France, the
possibility of a future rapprochement with Germany was not ruled out by leading
statesmen, particularly by Joseph Caillaux, and that
improved future Franco-German relations were not out of the question in 1913
(64).26 In that year, Max War burg
wrote to Under-Secretary of State Wahnschaffe: 'By
and large it is certainly ridiculous to speak today of the possibility of a
French-English-German rapprochement, but I was told seriously in conversations
that one would not be surprised if we were there in five years' time.’27
However, in August 1913 the French and Russian General Staffs had come to an
agreement about military cooperation and finally signed the Franco-Russian
Military Convention on 9 September 1913.28
The year 1914 was dominated by speculations about Russia's current and future military strength, not
just in Germany and Austria-Hungary, but also in France and Britain (74), (75).
British foreign policy was determined by the fear of Russia's and Germany's
future strength. With a view to protecting British interests in the Empire,
Anglo-Russian naval negotiations took place in 1914.29 On Russia's side, this
was seen as a first step towards cementing a more formal defensive alliance
between the three Entente partners. Sazonov was
concerned about the effectiveness of the Entente, 'whose actual existence is as
little proved as the existence of the Sea Serpent.30 The prospect of an
Anglo-Russian naval convention about which Berlin learnt from a spy in the
Russian Embassy in London led to further insecurity in Germany, and provided
military leaders and right-wing pressure groups with ammunition for their
requests to build more ships and increase armaments. In the early summer of
1914, demands were made for preventive war in Germany, Austria and Italy as the
outlook for the long-term future of the Triple Alliance seemed bleak. In
Vienna, Chief of the General Staff Franz Conrad von Hotzendorf
had demanded a war against Serbia on at least 25 occasions in 1913 alone, and
his aggressive attitude towards Serbia, which extended by proxy to Russia, was
well known in St Petersburg, too.31 While frequently demanding a preventive
war, German decision-makers nonetheless also continued to hope - as they would
in July 1914 - that Britain might still be won over and at least remain neutral
in a future war.
While the Entente-partners France and Britain discussed whether a more
formal agreement between Britain and Russia might be possible (83), in Russia
not everyone was convinced that the future lay with the Entente. The war-party
in Russia encouraged an anti-German press campaign, while Russian conservatives
advocated redirecting Russia's foreign policy towards more cordial relations
with Germany. Here, too, was potential for a development which could, in time,
have diffused the volatile relationship between the two Great Powers, and
perhaps have prevented war. British decision-makers were certainly concerned
that there was a real possibility of a Russo-German rapprochement, as indeed
were the French.
While in May 1914 the US envoy Colonel Edward House recorded in dismay
that the situation in Europe was 'extraordinary' and a war likely, by the early
summer of 1914 the international situation was actually less tense than it had
been for years, and Anglo-German relations in particular were much
improved,32 leading Arthur Nicolson to
observe: 'Since I have been at the Foreign Office, I have not seen such calm
waters.33 He could not have known that he was observing the proverbial calm
before the storm.
1 Jost Dulffer, Martin Kroger and
Rolf-Harald Wippich (eds), Vermiedene Kriege.
Deeskalation und Konflikte der Grossmaechte zwischen
Krimkrieg und Erstem Weltkrieg (1856-1914), Oldenbourg,
Munich 1997. More recently,
the thesis that war was actually improbable, rather than unavoidable, was
tested by Holger Afflerbach and David Stevenson
(eds), An Improbable War?: The Outbreak of World War I and European Political
Culture before 1914, Berghahn Books, New York 2007.
2 William Mulligan, The Origins of the First World War, Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge 2010, p. 229. Similar arguments have been made by
Holger Afflerbach, Der Dreibund. Europaische Grossmacht- und Allianzpolitik vor dem Ersten Weltkrieg, Bohlau, Munich 2003 and Friedrich KieRling,
Gegen den 'grossen Krieg'? Entspannung in den internationalen
Beziehungen, 1911-1914, Oldenbourg,
Munich 2002.
3 For background on the Agadir Crisis, see e.g. J.-c. Allain, Agadir
1911: Une Crise imperialiste en
Europe pour la conquete de Maroc (Paris, 1976); M.L. Dockrill, 'British Policy During the Agadir Crisis of
1911', in EH. Hinsley (ed.), British Foreign Policy
Under Sir Edward Grey, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 1977, pp. 271-287;
Emily Oncken, Panthersprung
nach Agadir. Die
deutsche Politik wiihrend der Zweiten Marokkokrise,
Droste, Dusseldorf 1981; Geoffrey Baraclough,
From Agadir to Armageddon. Anatomy of a
Crisis, London 1982; Dulffer et al. (eds), Vermiedene Kriege; Ralf Forsbach, Alfred von Kiderlen-Wiichter (1852-1912). Ein Diplomatenleben im Kaiserreich, 2 vols,
Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Gottingen 1997; T.G.
Otte, 'The Elusive Balance. British Foreign Policy and the
French Entente before the First World War', in Alan Sharp and Glyn Stone (eds),
Anglo-French Relations in the Twentieth Century: Rivalry and Cooperation,
Routledge, London and New York, 2000; pp.23-26.
4 For details of the First
Moroccan Crisis, see e.g. Frederick V. Parsons, The Origins of the Morocco
Question 1880-1900, Duckworth, London 1976; Martin Mayer, Geheime
Diplomatie und offentliche Meinung. Die
Parlamente in Frankreich, Deutschland, und Grossbritannien
und die erste Marokkokrise 1904-1905, Droste, Dusseldorf
2002.
5 Herbert Asquith, The Genesis of the War, Cassell and Co., London, New
York et al., 1923, pp. 93-4. He commented that 'war had been escaped over this
business; no one could say, or can say now, how narrowly' (p. 95). For details
of Lloyd George's speech, and his attitude towards Germany during the Crisis,
see Bentley B. Gilbert, 'Pacifist to Interventionist: David Lloyd George in
1911 and 1914. Was Belgium an Issue?', Historical Journal, 28,4, 1985, pp.
863-885, pp. 866ff.
6 Asquith commented that 'it seemed to me to make it opportune to
institute afresh a thorough and comprehensive investigation by the Committee of
Imperial Defence of the parts which our navy and army
should respectively (and co-ordinately) play in the
event of our being involved in a European war. Such an inquiry accordingly took
place in the autumn of 1911. It furnished information, and led to the adoption
of plans which, three years later, were found to be of the utmost importance
and value', Asquith, Genesis, p. 96. For details on the workings of the cm, see
John P. Mackintosh, 'The Role of the Committee of Imperial Defence
before 1914', English Historical Review, 77, July 1962, pp. 490-503. For a
detailed discussion of the genesis of this meeting see Nicholas J. d'Ombrain, 'The Imperial General Staff and the Military
Policy of a "Continental Strategy" during the 1911 International
Crisis', Military Affairs, 34, 3, October 1970, pp. 88-93.)
7 See e.g. Samuel R. Williamson, The Politics of Grand Strategy: Britain
and France Prepare for War, 1904-1914, Harvard University Press, Cambridge MA
1969, pp. 187-204; John Gooch, The Plans of War: The General Staff and British
Military Strategy, c.1900-1916, London 1974, pp. 289-92. Less convinced about
the importance of the meeting are e.g. Keith Neilson, 'Great Britain', in
Richard F. Hamilton and Holger H. Herwig (eds), War Plannu.:
1914, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge et aI.,
2010, pp. 175-197, p;: 183ff. and Hew Strachan 'The British Army, its General
Staff and the Continental Commitment 1904-14', in David French and Brian Holden
Reid (eds The British General Staff. Reform and Innovation, 1890-1939, Frank
Cass London and Portland, OR 2002, pp. 75-94.
8 The case for the importance of the meeting is made by Niall Ferguson,
in Pity of War, Allen Lane, London 1998, p. 65. This interpretation is not wide
shared, and, according to Nielson, it is 'deeply flawed'. 'Great Britain', p. 185 n. 43.
9 For
details of the Tirpitz Plan, see e.g. Volker
R. Berghahn, 'Zu den Zielen des deutschen Flottenbaus
unter Wilhelm Il.', Historische Zeitschrift, 210, 1970, pp. 34-100 and idem,
Der Tirpitzplan. Genesis und Verfall einer
innenpolitischen Krisenstrategie unter Wilhelm II., Droste Verlag, Dusseldorf 1971; Rolf Hobson, Imperialism
at Sea: Naval Strategic Thought, the Ideology
of Sea Power, and the Tirpitz Plan, 1875-1914, Brill, Boston 2002. For a recent reinterpretation
of British foreign policy and the naval race, see for example Dominik Geppert and Andreas Rose, 'Machtpolitik und Flottenbau vor 1914. Zur Neuinterpretation britischer Aussenpolitik
im Zeitalter des Hochimperialismus', Historische Zeitschrift 293 (2011), pp.
401-437; Andreas Rose, Zwischen Empire und Kontinent - Zur Transformation
britischer Aussen- und Sicherheitspolitik im Vorfeld
des Ersten Weltkrieges, Veroffentlichungen des
Deutschen Historischen Instituts London, 70, Munich 2011; Matthew Seligmann,
The Royal Navy and the German Threat,
1901-1914: Admiralty Plans to protect
Britain Trade in a War against Germany, Oxford
University Press, Oxford 2012.
10 For details of the Haldane Mission, see e.g. Stephen E. Koss, Lord
Haldane. Scapegoat for Liberalism, Columbia University Press, New York, London
1969, pp. 65ff.; R.T.B. Langhorne, 'The Naval Question in Anglo-German
Relations, 1912-1914', Historical Journal, XIV, 2, 1970, pp. 359-370; Wolfgang
j. Mommsen, Grossmachtstellung und Weltpolitik
1870-1914, Ullstein, Frankfurt/Main, Berlin 1993, pp.
228ff.; Forsbach, Kiderlen-
Wachter, Vol. II, pp. 579ff.
11 Friedrich Stieve, Isvolsky and the World
War. Based on the Documents recent: published by the German Foreign Office,
transl. E.W. Dickes, George Allen Unwin, London 1926,
p. 77.
12 Langhorne, 'The Naval Question', p. 359, n. 5. The German government
gave Haldane a copy of their forthcoming new naval law which was much more
expansive than the Admiralty had expected and only worried Britain's navy
leaders more.
13 For details of the Balkan Wars in the context of worsening European
relation see David Stevenson, Armaments and the Coming of War. Europe 1904-1914
Clarendon, Oxford 1996, pp. 231ff. and Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalker, How
Europe went to War in 1914, Allen Lane, London 2012, p. 251.
14 Benckendorff to his wife, 27 and 26 October
1912, cited in Marina Sorok; Britain, Russia and the
Road to the First World War. The Fateful Embassy of Count Aleksandr Benckendorff (1903-1916), Ashgate, Farnham 2011, pp. 228-9.
15 Gunther Kronenbitter,
'Krieg im Frieden'. Die Fuhrung der K.u.K. Armee und die GrofSmachtpolitik
Osterreich-Ungarns 1906-1914, Olden bourg, Munich 2003, p. 383.
16 Wilhelm II to Kiderlen-Wachter, 21 November
1912, GP, 33, No.12405
17 This point is made, for example, by L.C.E. Turner, 'The Russian
Mobilization in 1914', in Paul M. Kennedy (ed.), The War Plans of the Great
Powers, 1880-1914, Allen & Unwin, London 1979, pp. 252-268, p. 255. See
also below, Note 69, and 40 for details of the conference at Tsarskoe Selo on 23 November.
18 Luigi Albertini, Origins of the War of 1914,3 vols, Eng. trans!.,
Oxford University Press, Oxford 1952-57, Vo!. 1, p. 373, who points out that
after the war Poincare kept silent about these statements to Isvolsky. In the same meeting Poincare assured Isvolsky that should Russia be forced to become involved in
a war against Austria-Hungary, 'the French government would recognise
this in advance as a casus foederis and would not
hesitate for one moment to fulfil the obligations which it has incurred in
respect of Russia.’
19
Documents diplomatiques francais 1871-1914, 3e serie, 3, No. 359. For a discussion of the
importance of this document, see Turner, 'Russian Mobilization', p. 256.
20 The most detailed discussion of the war council and the available
evidence is provided by John Rohl, The Kaiser and his
Court, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994, who also provides a
detailed bibliography of the controversy around the war council (pp. 255£.).
For the most recent summary of the event and its importance see John Rohl, Wilhelm II. Der
Weg in den Abgrund, 1900-1941, Beck, Munich 2008, 2nd edn
2009, Vol. 3, pp. 963ff. (English translation
forthcoming, Cambridge University Press 2013.) Historians who do not see
a direct connection between the famous
meeting and the outbreak of war 18 months later include
W.J. Mommsen, 'Der Topos vom unvermeidlichen Krieg: Aussenpolitik
und offentliche Meinung im Deutschen Reich im letzten
Jahrzehnt vor 1914', in idem, Der autoritdre
Nationalstaat, Frankfurt/Main 1990, pp. 380ff.; E. Zechlin, 'Die Adriakrise und
der "Kriegsrat" vom 8. Dezember
1912', in idem Krieg und Kriegsrisiko. Zur Deutschen Politik im Ersten
Weltkrieg. Dusseldorf 1979;
L.C.F. Turner, The Origins of the First World War, Edward Arnold, London 1970.
21 For details, see e.g. Roy A. Prete,
Strategy and Command. The Anglo-French Coalition on the Western Front, 1914,
McGill-Queen's University Press. Montreal et al., 2009, pp. 21ff.
22 For details, see Jean Stengers, 'Guillaume
II et Ie Roi Albert a Potsdam en novembre 1913',
Bulletin de la Classe des Lettres
et des Sciences Morales et Politiques, 7-12,1993, pp. 227-253; Annika Mombauer, Helmuth von Moltke and the Origins of the First
World War, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2001, pp. 153ff.
23
Cited in Jean Stengers, 'Guillaume II et le Roi Albert', pp. 227-253.
24 On the Liman von Sanders affair, see e.g. William Mulligan, 'We Can't
Be More Russian Than the Russians: British Policy During the Liman Von Sanders
Crisis. 1913-1914', Diplomacy
& Statecraft 17, 2, 2006, pp. 261-282; Martin Kroger, 'Letzter Konflikt vor der Katastrophe: Die
Liman-von-Sanders-Krise 1913114', in Dulffcr et al. (eds), Vermiedene
Kriege, pp. 657-671; Mustafa Aksakal,
The Ottoman Road to War in 1914. The Ottoman Empire and the First World War,
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2008, pp. 80ff.; Hans Herzfeld, 'Die Limankrise und die Politik der Grossmiichte in der Jahreswende
1913-1914', Berliner Monatshefte, September 1933, pp.
837-858; October 1933, pp. 973-993.
25 Soraka, Britain, Russia and the Road to the
First World War, p. 239.
26 For
details see Klaus Wilsberg,
'Terrible ami - aimable ennemi', Kooperation und Konflikt in den deutsch-franzosischen Beziehungen 1911-1914, Bouvier Verlag, Bonn
1998, pp. 99-103.
27
Warburg to Wahnschaffe, 12 April 1913, PA-AA,
Frankreich 102, vol. 57, cited in Wilsberg, 'Terrible
ami - aimable ennemi', p. 98.
28
DDF, 3e serie, 3, No. 79. As Turner points out, the
Franco-Russian convention highlights to what extent 'all military thinking in
Europe was dominated by the implications of the Schlieffen Plan. Moreover [ ...
] the potential application of that plan would lead automatically to intense
military activity in eastern Europe. Russia would have to invade East Prussia
as soon as possible to relieve pressure on France, while Austria would be
compelled to attack in Russian Poland to bring relief to the German Eighth Army
in East Prussia', in 'Russian Mobilization', p. 257.
29 For details, see Soraka, Britain, Russia
and the Road to the First World War, pp. 246-8; Stephen Schroeder, Die englisch-russische Marinekonvention,
Vandenhoek& Ruprecht, Gottingen 2004.
30 Cited in LV. Bestuzhev, 'Russian Foreign
Policy, February to June 1914', Journal of Contemporary History, 1,3, July
1966, pp. 93-112, p. 108.
31 Hew Strachan, The First World War, Vol. 1: To Arms, Oxford University
Press, Oxford 2001, p. 69, Bruce Menning, 'Russian
Military Intelligence', article MS, forthcoming.
32 An example of this is the British naval visit to the Kid Regatta
(86).
33 Nicolson to Goschen, 5 May 1914, TNA, FO
800/374, cited in Zara Steiner and Keith Neilson, Britain and the Origins of
the First World War, Palgrave Macmillan, London 2003, p. 229.
For updates click homepage
here