It
was not difficult to notice the absence of a single military commander in the
National Transitional Council delegations representing the rebels in Libya
received in London on April 12 for talks with Prime Minister David Cameron and
then on to Paris on April 14 to meet French President Nicolas Sarkozy.
This
absence was odd since the subject of their conversations, aside from the
rebels’ failed application for political recognition and more financial
assistance, is presumed to have been ways and means of winning the war and
driving a defeated Muammar Qaddafi out of power.
At
least one military figure should have between present for this discussion.
This
week too, media coverage of the Libyan warfront underwent a tidal change. All
of a sudden, the most embattled cities since February vanished from front-page
reports: Misrata, Ras Lanuf, Brega and Ajdabiya dropped out of the headlines without explanation.
NATO bombardments moved away from battering pro-Qaddafi military targets in
those cities and switched to Tripoli and another missile blitz for
short-cutting an end to the war by killing the Libyan ruler.
General
Sir David Richards, Britain’s top military commander, said Sunday, May 15, that
the Libyan leader would be left “clinging to power” unless NATO broadened its
bombing targets to the country’s infrastructure. His pessimistic summing-up of
a week of accelerated air strikes on the Libyan capital was an admission that
those air strikes had so far failed in their objective and, unless the
offensive was widened - which the British and French air forces cannot manage
without US air force intervention - Muammar Qaddafi would have the last laugh
on NATO.
This
admission contrasted starkly with the confident NATO claims of progress pouring
out of alliance sources. The widening gap between the hype and the reality of
the Libyan war indicates the disarray in Western ranks caused, as Libya's rebel
commanders are in advanced secret negotiations with Qaddafi's military chiefs.
Those
talks have progressed to a point close to agreement on a truce, our sources
report.
The
commanders in Benghazi and various other rebel factions opted for talks when
they realized they would never defeat Qaddafi's army - even with NATO air
cover. They lacked both the necessary trained combat strength and weapons
systems for beating Qaddafi's fighting machine which is backed and augmented by
warriors from friendly tribes.
The
plan to approach the rebels came from Abdullah Sanousi,
head of Qaddafi's spy agency.
Hailing
from a clan in rebel-held Cyrenaica in western Libya, Sanousi
began using his tribal connections with the rebels two weeks ago to plant
secret agents in the rebel command center of Benghazi. They came close enough
to the rebel commanders to draw them into initial conversation on ways to end
the fighting.
Those
conversations evolved into negotiations, areas of agreement and a suspension of
fighting by both camps.
The
two sides got together on a smokescreen to cover their breakthrough. It came in
the form of a big victory whereby the rebels drove Qaddafi's troops out of the
strategic Misrata airport and capturing of large
quantities of weapons including 40 Grad missiles.
Rebel
commanders get a substantial cut of Libya's oil revenue
This
charade was staged jointly by rebel and Qaddafi's commanders on May 11. The
rebels told Sanousi's agents that they needed a big
battlefield victory before accepting a truce. Qaddafi approved the stunt and
let them move in and of Misrata airport with a
quantity of weapons as booty.
After
that, calm descended on the embattled town.
Meanwhile,
Sanousi's agents clinched another point of agreement
with the rebel commanders. This one not only saved them from more combat
against unequal odds but also lined their pockets.
We
report a secret agreement on a ceasefire in the Sirte
oil basin ranging from Sabha in the south and
enclosing the oil towns of Sirte, Uqayla,
Bin Jawad, Ras Lanuf and Brega on the coast.
This
agreement stipulates non-interference in oil production in this basin and its
exporting facilities.
In
return, from the estimated $100 million dollars a day earned from oil revenue,
Qaddafi has agreed to shave off $10-15 million for the rebel commanders,
provided the money is not spent on buying weapons or recruiting manpower for
fighting the regime.
This
secret accord has transformed many of the unkempt rebel fighters overnight into
security personnel hired to guard the oil fields and production facilities.
Having
jumped to the rebel commanders' double game, the British and French governments
looked for another way to dispose of Qaddafi outside the failed battlefield.
They accordingly pressed the prosecutor general of the War Crimes Court in The
Hague to ask the judges to issue an international arrest warrant and summons
for questioning against Qaddafi, his son Saif
al-Islam and Abdullah Sanousi, the three live wires
instrumental in pulling off deals with the rebel commanders for ending the
Libyan war without gains for the Western coalition.
Even
if the ICC judges were prevailed upon to issue these warrants, there is no
force in Libya for executing them.
On
May 10, Saudi King Abdullah during the Gulf Cooperation Council summit proposed
inviting two Arab monarchs, Morocco's King Mohammed V and Jordan's King
Abdullah II to join the GCC with full membership privileges. Neither kingdom is
situated in the Persian Gulf geographic region which is represented by the GCC;
nor do they have oil or gas and their economies are weak and dependent on
American aid. Morocco and Jordan are furthermore not in Iran's cross-hairs, the
threat of which is uppermost in the minds of Gulf rulers (along with the crisis
in Yemen).
Nonetheless
both sides stand to gain from the partnership.
Although
they have not yet officially answered the invitation, it will be taken up
willingly by the monarchs of Rabat and Amman. Their entry into the Gulf
alliance would bring their armies into the mutual defense system known as Gulf
Shield. It would qualify them for a military role in the ongoing Saudi-led GCC
operation for propping up the Bahraini throne but, as full members, they would
also enjoy the benefits of the Gulf's common market and be able to trim down
their dependence on American economic and military aid.
The
affluent and powerful Arab Gulf grouping, for its part, would gain extra
leverage for pursuing its main goals. Attaching Jordan and Morocco would
downgrade the Egyptian-dominated Arab League and bypass its decisions which
must be unanimous to be binding.
Saudi
Arabia, one of the Arab League's seven founding members in 1945, is now bent on
expanding the Sunni Arab royalist alignment to replace the League.
Saudi
Arabia also no longer depends on an American defense umbrella for its security
and America can no longer rely on Riyadh to regulate its oil supply policy –
and therefore its financial activities on world markets – for meeting US
political, military and economic interests.
Obama
initially sent two senior officials to Riyadh - US Defense Secretary Robert
Gates on April 6 and by US National Security Adviser Tom Donilon
on April 12 - to try and bring the Saudis back into the fold. Abdullah was not
to be talked around.
Riyadh's
policy reorientation
The
king has created the Saudi version of a unity government by pulling together
the three main royal factions on the basis of a consensus. Abdullah's own
faction and the two headed by Saudi Foreign Minister Saud bin Faisal, and Saudi
Interior Minister and designated crown prince, the Sudairi
Prince Nayef, all agree that the kingdom has come to
a parting of the ways in its historic alliance with the United States. Saudi
Arabia is strong enough and rich enough to look after its security and
interests without America and is at liberty to turn to other world powers for
help, such as China and Russia.
The
functions of Saudi intelligence have been rearranged to reflect the new
coalition: Up until now, Prince Muqrin bin Abdulaziz ruled supreme over Saudi intelligence agencies.
In recent weeks, some of his functions were transferred to the National
Security Council Director, the Sudairi Prince Bandar
bin Sultan.
Muqrin
deals with the intelligence matters relating to Iran, Iraq, Persian Gulf states
and outside the Middle East in such areas as Afghanistan and Pakistan.
Bandar
is in charge of intelligence and undercover operations in the Arab countries
which are in the throes of popular uprisings. Formerly a long-serving Saudi
ambassador to Washington, he has also been taxed with dealing with issues
arising from the dismantling of the working alliance between the United States
and Saudi Arabia.
The
decision by Riyadh to shop for ballistic missiles in China instead of America
fell within his remit along with the negotiations for concluding the
transaction.
Bandar
is running Saudi intervention against Assad in the Syrian popular uprising.
When he needed the help of Saudi clandestine networks in Iraq for his Syrian
project, he turned to Muqrin and they worked it out
together.
In
another facet of the division of labor, Bandar handles Saudi day-to-day
activities for spiking America's Middle East policies, whereas Muqrin is in charge of the high-level policy interchanges
between the Saudi and US intelligence services.
For
Riyadh, there is no contradiction between the two functions: King Abdullah does
not seek to sever all Saudi ties with the US. Indeed, however it may look,
Riyadh attaches great importance to those ties, such as they are, provided only
that they do not amount to a special relationship in the old format.
Neither
is Saudi Arabia cutting its economy off from the US dollar although this is
advocated by many in Riyadh and the Gulf emirates.
However,
they part company on at least one fundamental issue: The Saudis and their GCC
allies are single-minded about their determination to fight Iran's Islamic
regime tooth and nail wherever its footprint is encountered in any Persian
Gulf, Middle East or Arab country – even if this drive brings them into
collision with Washington and sabotages President Obama’s policy objectives.
The Saudi leadership does not trust Barack
Obama’s approach to Iran, the Arab Revolt, or the Muslim world.
President
Obama on the other hand, in his speech today, did not mention Saudi Arabia but
condemned its "repressive military action" in Bahrain. This was the
first time a US President has ever denounced a Saudi military operation.
Moscow
Takes a Stand on Arab Revolts – Opposite Washington
Yesterday,
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev issued a pointed warning to Washington.
Despite its unrelated content, this warning was shown by its timing to be
deeply relevant to the Middle East.
Failure
to agree on a new missile defense shield, said the Russian president, could
result in his government pulling out of the new nuclear disarmament treaty and
usher in a new Cold War with the West.
He
told reporters that the United States’ decision to push ahead with the European
shield despite Russia’s objections will force Moscow to take responsive
measures – "something that we (the Russians) would very much rather not
do. We would then be talking about developing the offensive potential of our
nuclear capabilities. It would be a scenario that throws us back into the Cold
War era,” Medvedev said.
On
the face of it, this threat underscored the warning coming
from Viktor Zavarzin, chairman of the State Duma’s defense committee on May 4 that the US-Romanian deal
would have a negative impact on inter-European relations and undermine
the existing balance of forces and interests. He issued this warning the day
after Romania announced a US missile interceptor system would be deployed at a
disused Soviet airbase on its territory.
Initially
Russian leaders and intelligence services were taken by surprise by the sudden
upsurge of Arab popular unrest and its rapid spread and undecided how to react.
The
discovery that the rulers targeted for ousters in Tunisia, Egypt, Bahrain and
Yemen, were not friends of Moscow but allies of Washington gave Moscow pause.
After
a while, as they watched the Tahrir Square protesters
toppling Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in February, Russian leaders decided
that Washington and US intelligence were the moving force behind the popular
masses on the march, with the aim of transforming the old Arab regimes into a
new set of rulers and political systems.
In
the first stages, the Russians were not unhappy to see these autocrats go and
so continued to sit on the fence.
Moscow
cashes in on NATO's failure to get Qaddafi
Capitalizing
on NATO's failure to oust or kill Qaddafi, Russia became the only world power
to invite an official representative from Tripoli for a visit. On Tuesday, May
17 Mohammed Ahmed al Sharif, General Secretary of the World Islamic Call
Society, the Libya-based group founded by Col. Qaddafi, duly arrived in Moscow.
Russian
Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov advised the guest that
the Libyan leadership should "explicitly embrace and begin the
implementation of UN Security Council resolutions (1973) in full." Lavrov was implying that Washington, London and Paris were
equally bound to stick to the Security Council resolution, whose provisions did
not include killing the Libyan ruler, and not just do as they pleased in Libya.
During
the spread of the Arab Revolt to Syria in April, for the first time, Russia saw
its military and strategic interests in jeopardy. For three years, since the
end of 2008, the Russians have been building the Russian Navy's Mediterranean
and Black Sea fleet headquarters at the Syrian port of Latakia.
Not for a moment do they contemplate letting a democratic regime rise in
Damascus that might force them to abandon this highly-prized facility.
Cozying
up to Assad and Palestinian Fatah and Hamas
So
when Washington finally targeted Syrian President Bashar
Assad for personal sanctions this week, Medvedev retorted that Assad must be
given a chance to honor his promises of reform and warned against foreign
interference in the country.
On
the quiet, Moscow began preparing a large shipment of advanced anti-ship Yakhont cruise missiles for Syria, the delivery of which
would greatly boost Assad's standing in the Syrian army.
The
Russians are also about to invite to Moscow delegations from Fatah and Hamas
following the promises of Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud
Abbas and Hamas leader Khaled
Meshaal to use Moscow as the venue for their
power-sharing negotiations.