- Afghanistan: A precipitous U.S. withdrawal could
destabilize the Afghan government and potentially lead to an expanded,
multiparty civil war. Conversely, a prolonged presence could prompt the Taliban
to walk away from talks and intensify their attacks, provoking a major
escalation. Either would mean that 2021 marks the year Afghanistan loses its
best shot at peace in a generation. Ethiopia: If the federal government invests
heavily in Tigray, works with the local civil service as it is rather than
emptying it of the TPLF rank and file, stops the harassment of Tigrayans
elsewhere, and runs disputed areas rather than leaving them to Amhara
administrators, there might be some hope of peace. It would be critical then to
move toward a national dialogue to heal the country’s deep divisions in Tigray
and beyond. Absent that, the outlook is gloomy for a transition that inspired
so much hope only a year ago.
- The Sahel: Without more concerted efforts to tackle
the Sahel’s rural governance crisis, it is hard to see how the region can
escape today’s turmoil. Broadly speaking, such efforts would require state
actors and others to focus first and foremost on mediating local conflicts,
talking to militants where necessary, and using the resulting agreements as the
basis for the return of state authority to the countryside. Foreign military
operations are essential, but international actors should emphasize local
peacemaking and push for governance reform. Little suggests the military-first
approach will stabilize the Sahel. If anything, over recent years, it appears
to have contributed to the uptick in inter-ethnic bloodshed and Islamist
militancy. Yemen: Absent a course correction, 2021 looks set to be another
bleak year for Yemenis, with the war dragging on, disease and potentially
famine spreading, prospects for a settlement evaporating, and millions of
Yemenis getting sicker and hungrier by the day. -Venezuela: At present,
Maduro’s government shows no sign it would hold a fair vote. Most of his rivals
want to overthrow and prosecute him. A settlement looks as distant as ever. But
after two years of fruitless and harmful efforts to provoke sudden political
rupture, building support for a more gradual transition is the best path
forward. Somalia: Much hinges on the February presidential vote. A reasonably
clean election, whose results the main parties accept, could allow Somalia’s
leaders and their foreign backers to step up efforts to reach agreement on the
federal relationship and constitutional arrangements and accelerate security
sector reform. On the other hand, a contested vote could provoke a political
crisis that widens the gulf between Mogadishu and the regions, potentially
triggers clan violence, and risks emboldening al-Shabab.
- Libya: Fighting seems unlikely to flare back up in
the immediate future because outside actors, while keen to consolidate their
influence, do not want another round of open hostilities. But the longer the
cease-fire terms go unfulfilled, the higher the risk of mishaps provoking a
return to war. To avoid this outcome, the U.N. must help forge a road map to
unify Libya’s divided institutions and de-escalate tensions among regional
foes. Iran-United States: Incoming US President Biden has signaled that he will
shift course, agree to rejoin the JCPOA if Iran resumes compliance, and then
seek to negotiate a follow-on deal tackling ballistic missiles and regional
policy. Tehran has signaled that it is prepared for a mutual adherence to the
existing nuclear deal. That seems the safest and swiftest bet, although even
then, obstacles will abound. The U.S. and Iranian governments will need to
agree on the sequencing of steps between sanctions relief and nuclear
restraints and how sanctions should be lifted. The window could be short, with
presidential elections in Iran scheduled for June and a more hard-line
candidate predicted to win. But if they return to the JCPOA, the larger challenge
will be to address the regional tensions and polarization that, left to fester,
will continue to jeopardize the deal and could trigger conflict. European
governments are exploring the possibility of prompting Iran and Gulf Arab
states to engage in a dialogue to reduce regional tensions and prevent an
inadvertent outbreak of war; the Biden administration could put its full
diplomatic weight behind such an effort. Russia-Turkey: Russia has seen
tensions with the West mount against the backdrop of wars in Ukraine and Syria,
charges of election interference, and the poisoning of opponents on foreign
soil, as well as U.S. and European sanctions. Turkey chafes at U.S. support for
the YPG and refusal to extradite Fethullah Gulen—the cleric Ankara accuses of
masterminding an attempted coup in 2016—as well as European critiques of its
democratic backsliding and alleged bias in the Cyprus conflict. Sanctions
imposed by Washington in response to Ankara’s purchase and testing of the
Russian S-400 missile defense system encapsulate these tensions. By cutting
bilateral deals in various conflict zones, both Russia and Turkey see the
potential for gain. Still, ties born of opportunity don’t always last. With
their respective forces so close to multiple front lines, potential flashpoints
abound. A downturn in their relations could spell trouble for both nations and
more than one warzone.
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