The past ten day Salafi led unrest in reaction to an anti-Islamic video spread through the Muslim world, here a look at who is behind it.
Salafism also called salafiyya, is an Islamic trend that developed at the end of the 19th century and beginning of the 20th century in Egypt. Although bound by a common religious creed revolving around the principle of tawhid (unity), Salafism today is a diverse trend consisting of various branches. Throughout its development, Salafism has borrowed liberalist, rationalist, and jihadist ideas, which has added to some of the confusion surrounding this term. Rather than an organization or even a precise school of thought, Salafism is better understood as a dogmatic relation to the fundamentals of the religion, or in other words, as a methodology to understand and realize Islam. (1)
At the beginning of the twentieth century, the term "Salafiyya" was linked to a transnational movement of Islamic reform whose proponents strove to reconcile their faith with the Enlightenment and modernity. Toward the end of the twentieth century, however, the Salafi movement became inexplicably antithetical to Islamic modernism. Its epicenter moved closer to Saudi Arabia and the term Salafiyya became virtually synonymous with Wahhabism.
What happened is that the rise of a transnational and generic Islamic consciousness, especially after the First World War, facilitated the growth of religious purism within key Salafi circles. The Salafis who most emphasized religious unity and conformism across boundaries usually developed puristic inclinations that proved useful in the second half of the twentieth century. Due in part to their affinities with the Saudi religious establishment, they survived the postcolonial transition and kept thriving while the modernist Salafis eventually disappeared.
Salafiyya was originally designed as a pan-Islamic reform movement. It first developed in Egypt in the 1890s, where it was propagated by the Islamic scholars Muhammad Abdu (1849-1905) and Rashid Rida (1865-1935). Abdu and Rida were concerned with reforming Islam in the wake of its general decline vis-à-vis the West, and as such were walking in the footsteps of Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani (1839-1897), a political activist who strove to reform Islam and adapt it to the challenge of colonization and westernization. Abdu and Rida’s concerns grew out of the same intellectual debate that revolved around the reconciliation of Islamic heritage with modernity. They blamed the weakness of the ulama, social injustice, and blind imitation of the past (taqlid) for Islam’s relative stagnation. Their Salafism also came in response to burgeoning pan-Arab nationalism, which in itself was an attempt to reconcile Islam with modernity. (*Like we pointed out in early 2003 in his two part essay on various radical groups, the intellectual roots and historical precedents of today's Islamic revival can be traced back to Sayyid Jamâl al-Din, called al-Afghani. And entail a closeted form of the Western modernism that it so publicly claims to oppose. This included also the Deoband movement that emerged from central India in the wake of the ill-fated revolt against the British in 1857. Founded by Mohammed Zasim Nanautawi (1833-77) and Rashid Ahmed Gangohi (1829-1905), it set up madrassas in India, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.)
Early Salafis such as Abdu and Rida were more liberal than many contemporary Salafis because of their belief that the stagnation of the Ottoman caliphate, and that of Islam in general, could be alleviated by a return to the true principles of Islam with an interpretation suited to modern realities. The original Salafis were not opposed to modernization, but instead admired Europe’s technological innovations and social advancements and sought to reconcile modernity with Islam. The aftermath of World War I and the ensuing colonization of much of the Middle East by Britain and France changed the Salafi scenery. With the fall of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, reform within that caliphate, which had been the concern of the early Salafis, made way to a new priority, the struggle against colonialism as a way to recreate the caliphate. These competing elements, reforming Islam on the one hand, and fighting colonialism on the other, were reflected in the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna. The Muslim Brotherhood’s strategy was a novel one as it aimed to create a popular movement that would rely on reforming Islam to create a social revolution. During the 1930s and 1940s the brotherhood’s idea of generating a broad Islamic political and social movement began to dominate the Islamic discourse revolving around the desire to rebuild the caliphate, increasingly sidelining those voices who advocated a nationalist strategy based on reforming Arab states independently. The new strategy entailed the indoctrination of younger generations, but also the decision to find a modus vivendi with the existing political order of Arab states. (2).
Beginning in the 1950s, a new phase began for the Muslim Brotherhood when the movement clashed head on with Arab governments in places like Jordan, Egypt, and later Syria, countries that had come under the influence of Gamal abd-el Nasser’s hybrid form of socialism and pan-Arabism. Sayyed Qutb was the predominant ideologue against the Baathist and Nasserite form of Arab socialism. In his writings, which focused on social injustice, Qutb’s ideas marginalized the pure reformist Salafiyyah, on which al-Banna grew up. Following the violent crackdown of the Muslim Brotherhood under Nasser, the remnants of the movement found refuge in Saudi Arabia under King Faisal. In Saudi Arabia, the Muslim Brotherhood’s remnants were led by Muhammad Qutb, Sayyed’s brother. They quickly established a foothold in Saudi Islamic universities in the 1960s. By the 1970s, the Saudi education system was filled with Muslim Brothers and other Salafis, who managed to spread their books across the larger Muslim world. The Muslim Brotherhood’s remnants, who established themselves in Saudi Arabia, introduced a politically oriented agenda to the existing Salafi movement in Saudi Arabia. There, they also encountered the more traditional, apolitical Saudi Wahhabi scholars—an encounter that created a new, more militant form of Salafism. Wahhabism, a doctrine related to Salafism, originated in Saudi Arabia in the course of the 19th century. Both Wahhabism and Salafism advocate the immediate, ‘fundamentalist’ interpretation of Islamic teachings. The two movements differ, however, in their original doctrine, in that Wahhabism rejected all traces of modernity, while Salafism, at least initially, attempted to reconcile Islam with modernity. Wahhabism centers around a group of sheikhs who studied in Wahhabi learning centers, mostly in Saudi Arabia and Gulf States. Wahhabis continue to extend their influence through fatwas, and are frequently speaking at conferences and giving lectures. Their doctrine is also spread through the Internet, television, and Wahhabi publications. Although Wahhabism originated in Saudi Arabia and is still strongest in the Arabian peninsula, Wahhabism has spread to other countries, and Wahhabi sheikhs are conveying their message to younger generations of Wahhabi students. (Muwahideen ‘monotheists’ is the name by which Wahhabis call themselves.)
The encounter between the remnants of the Muslim Brotherhood with the Saudi Salafi-Wahhabist scholars, many of whom were opposed to the Saudi regime’s modernist trend, gave rise to a new form of Salafism that combined a puritan notion of Islam with the militant dimension of the salaf, the generation of the prophet and his companions. Faisal’s embrace of Salafi pan-Islamism resulted in cross-pollination between ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s teachings on tawhid, shirk and bid’a and Salafi interpretations of ahadith (the saying of Muhammad). Some Salafis nominated ibn Abd al-Wahhab as one of the Salaf (retrospectively bringing Wahhabism into the fold of Salafism), and the Muwahideen began calling themselves Salafis.Many Saudi and other Arab scholars who adopted this militant form of Salafism taught or studied at these Saudi institutions. They included, most famously, Abdallah Azzam and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, both of whom would later play a key role in the formulation of global jihadi doctrine.The 1980s and early 1990s witnessed a number of key historical events, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Iran-Iraq war, the first Palestinian intifada of 1987, and the U.S.presence in Saudi Arabia, which had a profound impact on the future trajectory of the Salafi movement. On one hand, these events promoted the rise of more politically minded Salafis in Saudi Arabia like Safar al-Hawali and Salman al-Awdah. They represented a younger generation of Salafi scholars who distanced themselves from the older, more traditional and purist generation of Salafis who opted to stay out of politics and were more concerned with religious questions. (3)
On the other hand, the war in Afghanistan gave rise to the Salafi-Jihadist faction of Salafism, of which Al Qaeda became the most prominent exponent. In the mid-1990s, the Saudi regime cracked down on the younger generation of Salafi scholars, with Salafi-Jihadists gradually filling the vacuum. Many of the repressed young Saudi Salafis, including Saad al-Faqih and Abu Baseer al-Tartousi, left Saudi Arabia for London. The meeting of these individuals with radical Algerian Salafis and Palestinian scholars such as Abu Qatada, in addition to the inspiration provided by Al Qaeda’s spectacular terrorist attacks like 9/11, led to the gradual conjoining of the apolitical and politically minded trends of Salafism into militant Salafi-Jihadism. As a result of these developments, Salafism, in the modern usage, refers less to the reformation and modernization of Islamic societies, and more to a stance of ignoring the West.
The elevation of the militant interpretation of the concept of jihad as a central element of Islam dates back to ibn Taymiyyah (1268-1328), a medieval theologian who continues to exert tremendous impact upon the contemporary Salafi-Jihadist movement. Ibn Taymiyyah elevated the importance of Jihad to the same level as the five ordinary ‘pillars of Islam,’ namely the five daily prayers (salat), the pilgrimage to Mecca (hajj), alms-giving to the needy (zakat), the declaration of faith (shahadah), and the fast of Ramadan (sawm). At a time when most clerics regarded participation in jihad as a collective duty, one that does not require the participation of every individual, only those of a select group, ibn Taymiyya argued that the goal of jihad is the victory of Allah, and therefore those who opposed jihad would oppose God himself. Adopting ibn Taymiyya’s stance on jihad, modern Salafi-Jihadist groups place jihad at the top of the agenda of duties for Muslims. They justify attacks against the West as a defensive jihad which was provoked by an attack against Islam, which renders the joining of Jihad an individual duty (fard ayn) for every Muslim, including all segments of the umma, be they rich or poor, men or women. This explains Al Qaeda’s framing of all of its activities as defensive. As Osama bin Laden stated, Al Qaeda was set up to wage jihad against infidelity, particularly to encounter the onslaught of the infidel countries against the Islamic states. Jihad is the sixth undeclared element of Islam.
Except for the Palestinian Hamas movement, the Muslim Brotherhood did not take part in the process by which some elements of Salafism turned increasingly militant. Instead, since the 1970s, the Muslim Brotherhood adopted a more pragmatic stance, opting to participate more openly in the political and social life of its various host countries. In places like Egypt, Jordan, Algeria, Iraq, and Yemen, the Brotherhood attempted to transition into a legitimate political party, with varying rates of success. Hence, the global rise of Salafi-Jihadism widened the division between Salafi-Jihadists, which are increasingly equated with Salafism at large, and the Muslim Brotherhood. On its end, the Muslim Brotherhood stopped using Salafi rhetoric but, because their social infrastructure, the dawa, is reformist, they can still be viewed in part as Salafi in the original sense of the word. In recent years, a growing rift has developed between Salafi-Jihadists and the Muslim Brotherhood. Zawahiri, for example, acknowledges the Muslim Brotherhood as the largest Islamic movement, but accuses it of “committing suicide ideologically and politically” ever since it pledged allegiance to the regime of Hosni Mubarak. Zawahiri writes that the Muslim Brotherhood has “made mistakes that are tantamount to crimes that must be punished.” These crimes include what Zawahiri describes as the brotherhood’s abandonment of jihad as the guiding concept; its embrace of worldly matters; its championing of modern religious jurisprudence (the ‘new fiqh’) which violates the sanction against innovation (bidah); and their overall lack of support for the mujahideen. (Al-Zawahiri, Knights under the Prophet’s Banner, Part 9, see also footnote 5)
Egyptian and Palestinian parliamentary elections in early 2006, where individuals with established ties to the Muslim Brotherhood were among those vying for votes, illustrated this growing rift. Zawahiri openly criticized the Brotherhood for participating in the Egyptian parliamentary elections. He also made a jab at the Palestinian Hamas, which in January 2006 had won parliamentary elections in the Palestinian Authority, lecturing them that power is not an end in itself. Real power is application of sharia on earth … entering the same parliament as the lay people, recognizing their legitimacy and the accords they have signed is contrary to Islam.” (4)
The Situation Today
Today, a large number of different Salafi groups exists, charging each other with deviations from ‘true’ Salafi tenets. Each group regards itself as the only true heirs of the program of Allah, as conveyed by his messenger, Muhammad, and as practiced by him and his companions, known as the salaf, or the ancient ones. Traditionally, Salafis favour the strict implementation of Islamic religious law, the sharia, and thus reject all other schools of thought as innovation (bida). In terms of the religious and legal interpretations of Islam, most Salafis accept only the Quran and the Sunna (the sayings attributed to the prophet) as valid religious and legal interpretations of Islam, while rejecting less rigid forms such as the analogies and consensus as innovations that are in dissonance with God’s word. Since they advocate a return to what they regard as the basics of religion, they are at times called fundamentalists or neo-fundamentalists.
They are at times also referred to as Wahhabis, although most scholars regard Wahhabism as a branch of Salafism, and Wahhabis themselves tend to call themselves Muwahideen (monotheists) or Salafis. Most branches of Salafism reject any form of adaptation or compromise with other religions, and do not believe in discussions or other contacts with Christians and Jews. That said,mainstream Salafism does not believe in the need to harm Christians and Jews, arguing that as long as these ‘people of the book’ (dhimmi) remain non-belligerent infidels, they shall be treated with leniency. At the center of Salafi creed is the concept of tawhid (unity of God), which Salafis understand literally. While all Muslims believe in the unity of God, Salafis take tawhid to a more extreme level. Since God is one, Salafis believe that Muslims must abide only by God’s laws. The unity of God extends to a unity of worship of Allah, as a result of which all man-made laws must be rejected as an interference with the word and will of God. Salafis therefore reject the division of religion and state, which would suggest that man-made laws are supreme to those of Islam. Except for the contemporary Muslim Brotherhood, which adopts a more pragmatic position, Salafis, for instance, believe that current Arab rulers are apostates because they “legalize what God prohibits and forbid what God permits.” (5)
Only God can be worshipped, and no other entity can be invoked. Similarly, no living person must be venerated, which is why Salafis, especially of the Wahhabi branch, vehemently oppose personal idolatry. Wahhabis, for instance, demolished the shrine even of the Prophet Muhammad for that reason.In order to abide by and protect tawhid, Salafis believe that Muslims must strictly follow the Quran and emulate the model of the prophet Muhammad, who, as the Muslim exemplar, embodied the perfection of tawhid. Salafis believe that only the salaf, the Prophet Muhammad and his companions, led a lifestyle that was in accordance with God’s will and hence pleasing to him. They hence imitate Muhammad’s lifestyle on even the most mundane issues. Since their only goal is to please God, Salafis do not engage in the study of history and philosophy, and reject the application of Western laws of logic and reasoning. Rationalism is considered as opening a gateway to human desire, distortion, and deviancy, because Salafis consider the Quran and hadith to be self-explanatory. Using ‘rationalism’ in effect would challenge the attributes of God because all knowledge comes from and is contained within Islam. (6)
The expansion of Islam to new territories led to the adoption of various local cultural elements into Islamic tradition. Salafis reject these cultural variations as innovation (bid’a) which do not reflect genuine Islam. Salafism is hence understood in part as a movement designed to purify Islam from these foreign and modern influences, a process that Olivier Roy has termed the ‘deculturation’ of Islam. Through the education of Muslim men of the true meaning of Islam, Salafis aspire to create the genuine Muslim individual and to unite these genuine Muslims in a global Islamic community of believers, the umma. Abiding by the true tenets of Islam and widening the community of real believers is considered an act that is pleasing to God and that leads to the purification of self (tazkia), which is central to Salafi thought. (7) Salafis make a particular diagnosis of the current state of Islam, as well as of the reasons for this state and possible remedies. They believe that Islam is in decline because it has abandoned the righteous path of Muhammad and his companions. The umma’s past strength, they believe, derived from its faith and practices, which were in accordance with God’s will. Muslims can only recapture the glory of Islam if they return to the authentic faith and original practices of the salaf, i.e., the Prophet and his companions. (8)
There are thus two major trends of Salafism, namely mainstream Salafism which is nonviolent, and Salafi-Jihadism which advocates the waging of jihad. Mainstream Salafism can now be further divided into two trends—the original reformist (or purist) trend that rejects Western political culture and all that it entails; and second, the socio-political trend of the Muslim Brotherhood and similar movements like the Jamaat-i-Islami, which accept the principle of pluralism in the modern polity, at least as a temporary step on the way to the establishment of the caliphate. Apart from the major trends, there are also a number of smaller Salafi trends of various kinds in the Arab and larger Islamic world, such as trends led by scholars and abided by a small number of followers. They include such scholars as Muhammad Said al-Buti, Nassir al-Albani, Zein al-Abedin Srour, or Abdul Majid al-Zindani. Mainstream Salafis however believe in the spreading of Islam via proselytizing rather than using violence. Their main aim is to promote the Salafi creed and fight against practices they deem as being deviant from true Islam. The purists among them reject political activity, which they believe leads to corruption. They do not regard themselves as a political movement, but consider themselves as a vanguard on a mission to protect tawhid and resist corruptive and innovative influences on Islam. Among the most well-known groups of mainstream Salafism are the tablighi, a group established in the late 1920s in India. Tablighis, also known as tablighi jamaat, are missionary Salafis, traveling across the world while promoting a non-violent dawa (call to Islam). The tablighi became one of, and perhaps the most leading group practicing Islamic revivalism in the 20th century. Wahhabis, discussed earlier, can also be thought of as a mainstream trend of Salafism.
Salafi-Jihadism in turn is an ideology composed of an internally coherent system of beliefs, prescribes strict codes of behavior, presents a clear diagnosis of the causes responsible for the predicaments of its adherents, identifies its enemies, and prescribes clear steps to be taken to remedy the problem. Like other ideologies, it is an outgrowth of modernity—a negative effect of the industrialization that has swept through Europe beginning in the 19th century. It is intimately linked to the dislocating and turbulent effects of globalization, as rapid changes in the social, political, and economic realms of life are turning established and rooted notions of identity provided by traditional social structures upside down. Like other ideologies such as fascism or communism, Salafi-Jihadism gives individuals a new sense of identity by offering individuals a membership to a supranational entity. A new sense of belonging to a new community is provided to individuals who are confused by modernization. That community is the umma, the Muslim community of believers, which embodies and provides a sense of comfort, dignity, security, and identity to the downtrodden Muslim.
And where the outbreak of the Arab Spring in 2011 then, brought significant attention to groups, known as Islamists, seeking to establish Islamic states in countries once ruled by secular autocrats, much less attention was paid to the Brotherhood's principal Islamist competitors, members of the ultraconservative Salafist movement, despite their second-place finish in Egypt's parliamentary elections.
By the end of the 2000s, Salafism had spread across the Arab world, most notably to Egypt and Tunisia, expanding both the number of its adherents and its institutional scope, which now included social organizations engaged in charity, relief and community work. They stopped short of formal political groups, largely because of the autocratic regimes under which they lived, but they quietly developed the infrastructure for such groups. It was under these circumstances that the Salafists found themselves at the beginning of the Arab Spring.
The case of Egypt's Salafists is the most telling. Like the Muslim Brotherhood, they were caught unprepared when the popular agitation largely led by liberal youth groups broke out and began to consume decades-old secular autocratic regimes. While they eventually were able to overshadow the largely non-Islamist forces that played a key role in forcing the ouster of then-President Hosni Mubarak, they lacked the political machine that the Brotherhood had developed over the course of some 80 years. The result was the rise of various Salafist forces haphazardly trying to assert themselves in a post-authoritarian Egypt.
Several Egyptian Salafist groups applied for licenses to form political parties. Two prominent parties -- al-Nour and al-Asala -- emerged along with a host of individuals, such as Hazem Salah Abu Ismail, who ran as an independent candidate for president. The two Salafist parties banded together with the newly formed political wing of the former jihadist group Gamaa al-Islamiya -- the Building and Development Party -- to form the Islamist Bloc. The alliance was able to garner more than a quarter of ballots cast in the parliamentary polls late last year, coming in second place behind the Brotherhood.
What was most important about these Salafists participating in mainstream politics is that they embraced the electoral process after decades of having denounced democracy as un-Islamic. In other words, they ultimately adopted the approach of the Muslim Brotherhood, which they had hitherto vehemently rejected. This transformation has been more a rushed affair stemming from expediency rather than a natural ideological evolution.
There is an expectation that radical forces joining the political mainstream could, over time, lead to their de-radicalization. That may be true in the case of states with strong democratic systems, but in most Arab countries -- which are just now beginning their journey away from authoritarianism -- the Salafist embrace of electoral politics is likely to delay and perhaps even disrupt the democratization process and destabilize Egypt and by extension the region.
Much of this chaos will stem from the fact that the move to accept democratic politics has led to further fragmentation of the Salafist landscape. Many Salafists still are not comfortable with democracy, and those who have cautiously adopted it are divided into many factions. The result is that no one Salafist entity can speak for the bulk of the groups.
What Lies Ahead
Clearly, the Salafists are bereft of any tradition of civil dissent. That said, they have exhibited a strong sense of urgency to exercise their nascent freedom and engage in political activism. The outcome of this was the rioting that took place in reaction to the anti-Islamic film.
The Salafists are not just suffering from arrested political development; they face an intellectual discrepancy. On one hand, they wish to be part of the new democratic order and a mainstream player. On the other, they subscribe to a radical agenda that dictates the imposition of their stern interpretation of Islamic law across the Arab and Muslim world.
Their envisioned order is not just a problem for secularists, Christians, Jews and other minorities but also for more moderate Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood. The Brotherhood lost its monopoly on Islamism close to four decades ago but back then it didn't matter because the Brotherhood was an opposition movement. Now that the group has won political power in Egypt, the Salafists represent a threat to its political interests.
Some of the more politically savvy Salafists, especially the political parties, are willing to work with the Muslim Brotherhood toward the common goals of furthering the democratic transition and containing radical and militant tendencies. Ultimately, however, they seek to exploit the Brotherhood's pragmatism in order to undermine the mainstream Islamist movement's support among religious voters. Additionally, the Salafists are also trying to make use of their role as mediators between the Brotherhood-led government and the jihadists active in the Sinai region to enhance their bargaining power and lessen the Brotherhood's.
Salafists, whether they operate through legal means or through raw street power, can be expected to create problems for Egypt's new government led by President Mohammed Morsi, especially when it comes to foreign policy matters. A prime example is the recent case of the film-related violence, during which Morsi had a difficult time balancing the need to placate the masses at home and maintain a working relationship with the United States, upon which Egypt relies for its economic well-being. While the anger over the film is a passing phenomenon, the underlying dynamic persists.
There is also no shortage of issues for right-wing Islamists to exploit. U.S. imperatives in the region will continue to place the Morsi government in a tight spot and provide reasons for the Salafists to oppose Cairo's policies. Even more volatile than the dealings between the Morsi administration and Washington will be Israeli-Egyptian relations.
So far, Morsi has managed to avoid dealing too directly with Israel. But the Egyptian president and the Brotherhood cannot avoid this for too long. They know that they will face situations where they could be caught between the need to maintain peaceful relations with Israel and deal with Salafists taking advantage of the widespread anti-Israeli sentiment among Egyptians. This is one of the reasons Morsi and his associates have been speaking of revising the peace treaty with Israel, which is an attempt to manage the inevitable backlash on the home front.
Egypt's difficulties are particularly pronounced given the country's status as the leader of the Arab world, but Salafists of various stripes are slowly emerging as political stakeholders across the region, especially in Libya, Tunisia, Yemen, Gaza, Lebanon, Jordan and Syria. Democratization by its very nature is a messy affair in any context, but in the case of the Arab spring, Salafist entities can be expected to complicate political transitions and undermine stability and security in the Middle East.
The major challenge to stability in the Arab world thus lies only partially in the transition to democracy from autocracy. Greater than that is the challenge mainstream Islamists face from a complex and divided Salafist movement.
1) Christopher M. Blanchard, "The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya," in CRS Report for Congress RS21695, Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, Library of Congress, 2006.
2) Trevor Stanley, "Understanding the Origins of Wahhabism and Salafism," Terrorism Monitor 3, no. 14, 15 July 2005
3) Q.Wiktorowicz, "Anatomy of the Salafi Movement," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Volume 29, Number 3, April-May 2006, pp 222-24.
4) Craig Whitlock, "Keeping Al-Qaeda in His Grip," Washington Post, April 16, 2006, A1.
5) Husayn, Fuad. Al-Zarqawi: The Second Generation of Al-Qa'ida. London: Published in Arabic in 15 Parts by Al-Quds al-Arabi; Translation by Foreign Broadcast Information Service, 2005, Part 4.
6) Wiktorowicz, "Anatomy of the Salafi Movement," "Anatomy of the Salafi Movement." Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 29, no. 3 (April-May 2006): 210-11.
7) Olivier Roy, Globalized Islam:The Search for a New Ummah. New York: Columbia University Press, 2004, 244.
8) Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks,Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2004,4.