The conflict between Dutch speaking Flanders and French speaking Wallonia is a long-standing one, but the most recent episode has prompted the Belgian public and policymakers to remark that it could be the end of Belgium, with the possibility of a split in the country that would lead each half to be either fully or partially integrated with neighboring France and the Netherlands. This would have geopolitical repercussions for Europe - not just because Belgium hosts the headquarters of both the European Union and NATO, but also because of the symbolism such a split would have for a Europe skittish of border alterations.  

Case Study: From Kosovo to Belgium and back. 

Straddling the two key portions of the North European plain has been a blessing and a curse for Belgium. It has been able to parlay its central location as an advantage. Its proximity to the English Channel and the plentiful coal deposits of the Ardennes led it to successfully adopt industrialization from the British Isles in the early 19th century. It was from Wallonia - the French-speaking southern region of Belgium - that industrialization spread to France, Germany and the rest of Europe in the mid-19th century. Wallonia also benefited from the plentiful capital financial resources of nearby Brussels and Amsterdam, cities that successfully monetized their location at the fulcrum of the North European plain and the Rhine.  

But this geography also puts Belgium along the path of least resistance - geographically speaking - between France and Central Europe. Therefore, Belgium historically has been used by invading armies crossing the North European plain on the east-west axis, hence the country’s nickname, “the battlefield of Europe.”  

The history of modern Belgium begins in the early 19th century, when Europe’s primary concern was containing France. The 1815 Congress of Vienna established the United Kingdom of the Netherlands as a buffer against France, but with prodding from Paris, Belgium seceded just 15 years later. France hoped to annex Belgium, but European powers - led by the United Kingdom, then a global superpower - installed a German-born monarch to rule a supposedly neutral Belgium. This new state was dominated by French-speaking elites and the industrial powerhouse of Wallonia, much to Dutch-speaking Flanders’ chagrin. Despite British guarantees of its neutrality, Belgium had neither the resources nor the geographical barriers to defend its neutrality - although a spirited defense against the German offensive in 1914 quite possibly gave France sufficient time to prevent a total collapse in the first month of World War I.

After World War II, as Europe began to rebuild economically and politically, Belgium’s status as “the battlefield of Europe” made it a symbolic choice for the eventual headquarters of both the EU and NATO. 

However, despite Brussels’ rising profile as the “capital of Europe,” the internal discord between French- and Dutch-speaking populations continues to be a defining feature of Belgian politics. The split between Wallonia and Flanders has evolved as Flanders pushed ahead in terms of population and economic power; the Dutch-speaking region currently accounts for around 60 percent of Belgium’s population and economic output. The crux of the problem, therefore, is that the economically stronger Flanders wants to dissolve the remaining vestiges of Wallonia’s political advantages. But Francophones in Wallonia understand that this likely will lead to an end in economic transfer payments and their economic ruin.  

Despite the intractable nature of the political conflict between the two communities, the geopolitical need for Belgium has not changed. NATO is fraying as French and German security concerns diverge from those of Central Europe and the United States, and as Paris and Berlin become more accommodating to a resurgent Russia. Meanwhile, the Greek debt crisis and the lack of urgency with which Berlin has handled it has shown the rest of Europe that national interests take precedent over a united Europe. This does not mean that NATO and the EU are on the verge of collapse, but it does point to an uncertain future for Europe.  

In this environment, Belgium is still useful as a buffer. First, until France and Germany share a capital - something which certainly is not in the cards - Belgium will serve as a no-man’s land between the two European powers. Although France previously sought to incorporate Wallonia, contemporary Paris faces military and economic limitations in relation to Germany, which would oppose any such move. Second, the United Kingdom - and by extension the United States - has an interest in using Belgium as a wedge to prevent a potential Franco-German axis from developing. Third - and not insignificantly, considering its ties to the Dutch-speaking Flanders - the Netherlands understands that while a buffer in Flanders would be useful, it would also bring it closer to France, which would almost certainly claim Wallonia. The bottom line is that Belgium’s role as a buffer on the narrow corridor of the North European Plain has not diminished in the 21st century; it is a buffer state that everyone is comfortable with.  

And yet, though none of Belgium’s neighbors have an interest in its dissolution, it could break apart due to its internal political crisis.  

This scenario could set a precedent for other secessionist regions in the European Union, particularly Catalonia and the Basque region in Spain, and Scotland and Northern Ireland in the United Kingdom. The dissolution of an advanced EU economy that hosts NATO and the EU headquarters would break the taboo of border changes in Western Europe. It could also embolden Central European states looking to address perceived territorial injustices - Hungary, for example - to argue that if Belgium can change or dissolve its borders, then why not renegotiate past treaties? If Wallonia can decide to join France, why should the Hungarian-majority parts of Romania, Slovakia and Serbia not have the opportunity to decide to join Hungary?  

For now, Belgium’s dissolution however would not serve the interests of the European powers that surround it. And while “being a buffer” seems like a sorry reason for the existence of an independent sovereign state, Belgium has thus far had sufficient geopolitical underpinnings to last for 200 years.  

Following is the content basis for a seminar I held on related subjects late 2006:

 

 

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