Having
followed this matter for some months, today, Russian President Vladimir
Putin asked Russia's Federation Council today, to reverse its March decision authorizing
military intervention. At the same time, Putin also announced that while he
supports Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko's
cease-fire, talks with separatists in eastern Ukraine are necessary too.
Roll back to late March: President
Putin had annexed Crimea while denying Russian troops were involved. He had put
tens of thousands of Russian troops on high alert near Ukraine's border. He was
insisting Viktor Yanukovych was still the rightful
Ukrainian president even though he had absconded. He was castigating the new
Kiev government as illegitimate and neo-fascist, and rejecting Kiev's plan for
early elections. And he was warning that if Russian speakers in what he claimed
were historically Russian lands in Ukraine were threatened, he might use the
authority granted him by the Russian parliament to send his troops in. His
position was one of apparent strength and he was milking the opportunity to
demonstrate Russia's clout. Three months on the picture looks rather different.
President Putin's position has shifted - so where does he stand now?
He has contradicted
himself by admitting that Russian troops were in fact involved in taking over
Crimea and even honoured some of them with medals,
although he continues to deny Russian military involvement in eastern Ukraine.
He has stopped calling the Kiev government illegal, recognised
Ukraine's new President, Petro Poroshenko, and
engaged with him on peace negotiations. And despite their repeated calls for
help, he has not acted on his chilling threat to order a full-blown invasion of
eastern Ukraine to aid pro-Moscow rebels. He has not even backed their
secessionist moves - either their May referendums, or their proclamations of
self styled republics since. Instead, Russian troops near Ukraine's border have
been ordered back to barracks (though the Americans say some build up may still
be going on).
About turn
He has some good reasons
to back off. His retaking of Crimea was popular in Russia in part because it
looked so painless: a simple bloodless transfer of power. But eastern Ukraine
is different. It is a bloody, murky conflict with mounting numbers of
casualties and refugees. This is a war most Russians do not want to see and
which they certainly do not want their sons involved in. Putin needs to cast
himself as a peace envoy, not threaten invasion any more.To
add to that, the Ukraine government's response has probably been tougher than Mr Putin expected. Having learnt a bitter lesson from
Crimea that trying to avoid conflict can lead to territory being seized,
President Poroshenko has ordered the army in, to push
back at the rebels and negotiate a settlement from a position of relative
strength. And the West too has been more robust and less forgiving than perhaps
Mr Putin expected, given what happened in 2008.
Then, Russia's short war
with Georgia ended after some EU leaders hurriedly brokered a peace deal which
left two chunks - South Ossetia and Abkhazia - nominally independent but
actually under Moscow's thumb. Putin probably thought that once again EU
leaders would weigh their economic interests and conclude that a damaging row
with Russia was something they could not afford. In fact, the experience of
Georgia has had the opposite effect. It has made the annexation of Crimea look
part of a pattern. It has made some EU countries fear that Mr
Putin plans might extend to seizing further territory. And this time they worry
that the conflict is not far away in the Caucasus, but right on Europe's - and Nato's - doorstep. Hence the co-ordinated push on sanctions, currently still minimal, but
which could become tougher in time. And it seems that Western governments are
no longer inclined to take Mr Putin at face value.
Having concealed the use of Russian troops in Crimea, when he protests now that
none of his troops are involved in Eastern Ukraine, he sounds disingenuous. He
is instead suspected of conducting another "maskirovka"
- destabilizing part of Ukraine by stealth, through irregulars and volunteers
who are nonetheless with their heavy weapons allowed free access across the
Russian border, at the same time as he loudly appeals to Kiev to halt its
advance.
Putin said it is
"pointless" for separatist groups to disarm while other groups, such
as the pro-Ukrainian Right Sector movement, have not. On June 23, after informal
consultations, the self-proclaimed prime minister of the Donestk
People's Republic, Alexander Borodai, declared a
cease-fire in the region. On June 24, however, separatists near Slovyansk shot down a Ukrainian military Mi-8 helicopter
with a man-portable air defense system, killing all on board. Fighting
continues in the Slovyansk area and in some of the
eastern border regions.
Although Putin's public
support for diplomatic talks and the decision of some separatist leaders to
call for a cease-fire may lead to a limited de-escalation in eastern Ukraine, a
significant reduction in armed separatist activity throughout the contested
east is unlikely. EU and U.S. pressure as well as Russia's long-term goal of
creating a neutral, decentralized Ukraine have extended the cessation of
hostilities. The Kremlin wishes to avoid imposing significant, sectorwide sanctions -- a Russian proposal that the
European Union is set to discuss at its upcoming summit this week.
While European leaders are
unlikely to agree on effective sanctions against Russia, Moscow is under
pressure from Paris and Berlin to take some sort of public action to help
resolve the crisis. Russia is not willing to sour relations with two European
heavyweights that can help Russia promote its agenda in other areas. By
supporting talks, Russia shows it is working to promote de-escalation in
eastern Ukraine and aims to avoid further sanctions. On the other hand, these
informal consultations enable Russia to continue negotiating over the future of
Ukraine while pursuing concessions from the government in Kiev. The Kremlin is
also coming under increasing pressure domestically. There is a growing
sentiment in Russia that Moscow needs to focus more on domestic matters and
less on Ukraine.
The participation of
Donetsk People's Republic members in informal consultations June 23 signals an
evolution in the ongoing conflict. Poroshenko had
previously rejected Russian pressure to negotiate with the leadership of the
armed separatist movement in eastern Ukraine. Similarly, separatists had
opposed the idea of holding direct talks with the government in Kiev. On June
23, separatist leaders, pro-Russian Ukrainian politicians, Russia's ambassador
to Ukraine, former Ukrainian President Leonid Kuchma
and an Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe representative,
Heidi Tagliavini, met in Donetsk. While Ukrainian
government officials -- who were represented informally by Kuchma
-- were notably absent along with some key separatist leaders, the unofficial
discussions demonstrated that all parties are open to a limited form of
negotiations.
Understanding Putin's Logic
Despite the informal
consultations, however, the Kiev government, the Kremlin and the various
separatist leaders remain divided on most key issues. Even as Borodai declared a cease-fire in Donetsk, he emphasized
that the separatist leadership will take part in formal negotiations only if
Ukrainian troops leave eastern Ukraine and the self-declared republics are
granted a special status under Ukraine's Constitution. While Poroshenko has advocated a cease-fire and proposed
decentralization as a part of his peace plan, the separatists' policy demands
remain unacceptable to the government in Kiev, which has worked to reassert
military control over the eastern regions and strongly opposes the
federalization of Ukraine.
So what happens next?
It may well depend on Mr Putin's calculation about how far Russia and Russians
are prepared to stomach further sanctions - and that is more complicated than
it seems. There appear to be two opposing schools of thought on this in Moscow.
On the one hand there are nationalists and conservatives - including many
involved in defence and security - who
see the West as hostile and unfriendly and welcome sanctions as a means to
decouple from it. On the other hand there are pro-Western liberals and
reformers who believe a long term rift with the West would be disastrous for
Russia's economy. Which side is Mr Putin on? I
suspect his nationalist heart is with the anti-Westerners, but his pragmatic
head may be with the economic reformers. And perhaps he will use that dichotomy
to his advantage.
For the Kremlin, limiting
Ukraine's moves toward European integration and integration with other Western
institutions in general remains a priority. When Ukraine signs the European
Union's association and free trade agreements on June 27, Russia is likely to
respond with some trade restrictions but will not go as far as military
intervention or suspending ties with the Kiev government. Russia's long-term
goal remains to preserve Ukraine as a neutral buffer state, protecting the
Russian core. The Kiev government's aspirations for further Western integration
will therefore continue to challenge the Kremlin's position on Ukraine's
future.
Poroshenko has indicated that
constitutional amendments regarding decentralization will be introduced in the
Ukrainian parliament this week, but the timeline for implementation remains
unclear. Moreover, critical natural gas negotiations with Russia are ongoing. On
these issues, as well as more long-term matters such as Ukraine's integration
with Western institutions, the Kremlin is working to safeguard its leverage in
ongoing negotiations with Kiev. As a result, Russia will not approve the
disarmament or withdrawal of separatist groups operating in eastern Ukraine
until Kiev takes significant action on these matters.
Under the current
circumstances the EU is also unlikely to slap new sanctions on Russia, and the
US, for the time being will follow suit.
Conclusion
Putin’s seizure of Crimea
appears to have been an improvised gambit, developed under pressure,
that was triggered by the fear of losing Russia’s strategically
important naval base in Sevastopol.
NATO’s enlargement remains
a sore point for Russian leaders, and some in the Kremlin certainly dream of
restoring Russia’s lost grandeur. Yet the chaotic manner in which the operation
in Crimea unfolded belies any concerted plan for territorial revanche. Although this might at first seem reassuring, it
in fact presents a formidable challenge to Western officials: in Putin, they
must confront a leader who is increasingly prone to risky gambles and to
grabbing short-run tactical advantages with little apparent concern for
long-term strategy.