By Eric Vandenbroeck
In what appears to be one of the most serious escalations between the
two countries in recent years China yesterday warned India it is willing to defend
territory “at all costs.” This comes amid earlier reports in the case of China
that thousands of tons of equipment have
been moved into the region.
Thus, in what is dubbed India's China war round two, Indian and Chinese troops are facing off once
again. This time, however, the skirmishes are taking place not in the
disputed territories of Arunachal and Ladakh but along the border of the North
Eastern state of Sikkim, at Doko-La, which lies at
the tri-junction of India, China, and Bhutan.
To understand the conflict however one has to know that the area was the
site of a bloody war in 1962 that ended up with China seizing control of some
of the territory.
Above
the Himalayan Nathu La pass was the site of clashes
in the 1960s
Following the 1962 debacle, diplomatic relations between India and China
were suspended for almost fifteen years. They resumed only in 1976 when both
countries exchanged ambassadors. It took three more years for the first
official visit since 1960 to take place, when External Affairs Minister Atal
Bihari Vajpayee went to China to discuss the border issue and China’s support
to insurgent groups in Northeast India. China’s attack on Vietnam, following
the latter’s invasion of Cambodia, interrupted the visit but did not end the
dialogue between the two countries.
In May 1980, soon after her re-election, Indira Gandhi met Chinese
premier Hua Guofeng at Tito’s funeral in Yugoslavia. The meeting led to the
June 1980 Chinese proposal of a “package deal” institutionalizing the status
quo, which India refused. The same year, however, India informed China that it
was ready to resume the process of normalization. An annual dialogue at the
level of vice-ministers started in June 1981 and continued until 1988 when
Rajiv Gandhi visited Beijing, the first visit an Indian prime minister had made
to China since 1955. India dropped its earlier demand “of asking for settlement
of the border as a precondition for any improvement in relations in other
fields.” Two joint working groups were established to deal with trade
negotiations and the border issue.
What India and China currently
want
The prevailing narrative for many years was based on a book entitled
“India’s China War”, published in 1970 and written by Neville Maxwell, an
Anglo-Australian journalist. He argued that India provoked the war by setting
up new military outposts along the disputed border in line with then-prime
minister Jawaharlal Nehru’s a “forward policy”, launched less than a year
before the hostilities erupted.
Recent archival research, however, has shown that China began preparing
for military action as early as 1959 and that the war had more to do with
domestic problems in China, including the disastrous Great Leap Forward
campaign launched in the late 1950s which resulted in widespread famine and
sparked opposition within the Communist Party against leader Mao Zedong.
It was also a time when China wanted to dethrone India from its dominant
role in the Non-Aligned Movement, which bound together newly independent states
in Asia and Africa, and replace it with Chinese leadership over revolutionary
movements in what Beijing later called the “Third World.”
India’s motives in this conflict are relatively easy to unravel. As the
patron and de facto security guarantor of Bhutan, New Delhi has an
all-but-official obligation to defend that nation’s territorial claims. Under
the 1949 Treaty of Friendship, Bhutan’s King Druk Gyalpo
pledged “to be guided by the advice of the Government of India in regard to its
external relations.” The treaty was revised in 2007 to commit both governments
to “cooperate closely with each other on the issues relating to their national
interests.” Beneath the diplomatic language, the intent remained the same:
Bhutan would let India control its foreign policy, and India would protect
Bhutan from external threat.
Moreover, a Chinese military presence at Doklam,
particularly one with transportation infrastructure capable of supporting deeper
incursions, would threaten a 17-mile-wide strip of land known as the Siliguri
Corridor linking seven Northeastern Indian states to the rest of the country.
The corridor is often referred to as India’s “Chicken Neck”, and New Delhi had no
intention of letting Beijing gain control of it. The 2007 treaty with Bhutan
ominously notes that “neither Government shall allow the use of its territory
for activities harmful to the national security and interest of the other.”
Even if Bhutan were willing to let China take control of Doklam,
India would likely have been unwilling (and, by treaty, unrequired) to stand
aside.
China’s initial move, even if it appeared to be the opening gambit in a geopolitical
chess-game, might initially not have been intended as such. Beijing has been on
a nationwide infrastructure building-spree since the 1990s, and sensitive
border areas have not been left out of this program. To Indian eyes, the
creation of a paved highway on highly strategic terrain looked like the laying
of a foundation for a potential invasion; but to China, it may have been
nothing more than the same sort of gravel-to-asphalt upgrade underway
throughout the country.
Chinese and Indian troops frequently push one another’s border positions
a few hundred yards (or more) one way or another, depending on how much ground
they can seize before higher authorities intervene. In April of 2013, for
example, a Chinese platoon advanced 12 miles
into Indian-held territory near Daulat Beg Oldi in
Kashmir, but it withdrew about three weeks later, after intensive diplomatic
wrangling. Another factor suggesting mishap rather than high-level
premeditation is the tactical set-up: India commands the high ground, which
means if the People’s Liberation Army tried to push beyond Doklam
toward the Siliguri Corridor it would be forced to attack largely uphill for
about 90 miles.
Having rupted in mid-June after the first week
or so, it went from being a field-level initiative to a policy choice
undertaken at the highest echelon of the Chinese government. Indeed, Beijing
stoked nationalist sentiments among the Chinese public by running inflammatory
stories in the state-controlled press and social media. The Chinese government
arguably had four key objectives in the dispute, two directed squarely at India
and two of with more direct implications for the U.S. and other nations around
the world.
Beijing’s first strictly regional goal may have been to keep India from
thinking it was at parity with China. The 1962 war, in which China invaded
India without great difficulty, and unilaterally withdrew a month later while
retaining the only pieces of territory it wanted to keep, shattered any
illusion that the two giant nations of Asia were either friends or peers. In
subsequent decades, Indian leaders were generally wary of offending Beijing.
Through the Mao Zedong years and after, the military and economic gap
(especially from the 1990s onward) between the two nations seemed to grow ever
wider. In the new century, however, India’s confidence has steadily grown:
leaders of both major political parties increasingly describe Pakistan as their
nation’s rival of the past, and China as the rival of the future. Under Prime
Minister Narendra Modi, this attitude has been matched by action. Modi has
stepped up India’s construction of military and dual-use infrastructure along
the LAC, and increased security cooperation with its Pacific partners,
including Australia, Japan, and Vietnam.
This increased desire for security cooperation extends straight across
the ocean. During the four summit meetings over the past three years, Indian and
U.S. leaders have pushed to advance security cooperation as speedily as
possible. During Modi’s visit to Washington in June 2017, for example, India
announced that it would purchase 22 Guardian MQ-9B unmanned aerial vehicles
from the United States for maritime surveillance. On July 10, the United States
and India began the twenty first edition of their annual Malabar naval
exercise, which for the first time featured aircraft
carriers from these two nations as well as Japan. In the past, India had
generally shied away from multilateral exercises involving Washington, or from
any actions which could be read by Beijing as a step toward a de facto U.S.
alliance. China, understandably, would like to keep it that way.
Perhaps the most important Chinese concern in the Himalayas, however,
deals with the future of the 82-year-old Dalai Lama. Indian leaders have given
the Dalai Lama sanctuary in the town of Dharamsala for nearly six decades, but
Modi has been more willing than any of his recent predecessors to press China’s
Tibetan sore spot. In 2014 he broke protocol by inviting Lobsang
Sangay, prime minister of the Tibetan
government-in-exile, to his inauguration. In April 2017, six months after
encouraging a similar tour by the U.S. ambassador, Modi permitted the Dalai
Lama to visit Tibetan communities in the
state of Arunchal Pradesh-territories claimed by
China.
Beijing has objected vociferously to each of these steps, with the
Foreign Ministry noting in April, “China will firmly take necessary measures to
defend its territorial sovereignty and legitimate rights and interests.” China
intends to select the Dalai Lama’s successor, as it did in 1995 for Tibetan
Buddhism’s second-ranking cleric, the Panchen Lama. China’s claim to the areas held
by India (and Bhutan) flows from its claim to Tibet. If Tibet is an integral
part of China, then all territories ever controlled (or claimed) by Tibet are
also integral parts of China. A high-profile scare on the Doklam
Plateau, inhabited only by seasonal Tibetan and Bhutanese yak-herders, may have
been intended to send India an implicit message: namely, not to repeat its
decision to shelter the Dalai Lama 1959, and as we have seen above, a key cause
of China’s 1962 invasion.
Update 29
Aug. 2017:
The key takeaways from the
incident
As is known by now, around 75 days after Indian and Chinese soldiers
entered a what became a high-stakes standoff on the Doklamplateau,
which abuts the Indo-Sino border in the Sikkim sector, the two sides agreed to withdraw
their troops thus ending the danger of war.
Although China claims more than 35,000 square miles of Indian-held land
along the eastern portion of the LAC alone, it did not choose any part of this
area as the site for an international incident. By focusing on Bhutan instead,
China may have been trying to drive a wedge between India and its most
vulnerable ally. New Delhi would defend its own sovereign territory, but
Beijing may have wanted to see whether India would go to war against a much
stronger adversary to defend someone else’s real estate. Perhaps India would
back down and compromise in some way: for example, permitting Bhutan to trade
its claim on Doklam for China’s dropping its quest
for two other disputed areas held by the tiny kingdom. Several nations in South
Asia (the Maldives, Nepal, and Sri Lanka) look to India for some degree of
security protection, and several in Southeast Asia (including Indonesia,
Malaysia, and Vietnam) have expressed interest in greater security engagement;
a failure to fully protect its most direct client would have grave implications
for India’s credibility as a partner.
In addition, China’s speedy movement of road-construction equipment into
the disputed area suggests that Beijing could be replicating its approach in the South China Sea where it is building infrastructure
to establish de facto ownership. China’s strategy in the South China Sea has
been unfolding in public view for years. Since December 2013, Beijing has reclaimed more than 2,900 acres,
essentially building islands on top of barren reefs in the Paracel and Spratly
chains. So far, this strategy has been successful. None of its rivals has
accepted Beijing’s claims, but none has taken a meaningful step to remove
China’s new array of landing strips, naval facilities, and surveillance
stations.
But Doklam may not be the last such move
outside of the maritime arena. China not only has unresolved land disputes with
India, but it could also conceivably use a build-it-and-own-it approach to
reopen long-dormant border disputes with Vietnam or Myanmar. It could even
leverage its investment in infrastructure projects throughout Asia, Africa, and
Latin America to extract political concessions, a tactic that European
imperialist powers employed for hundreds of years.
If China regards Doklam as a success, it may
be tempted to reuse the same template elsewhere, whether at an atoll in the
Pacific or at a copper mine in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Thus although
troops are backing off their mountain-top positions, only time will tell
whether their rumblings have actually subsided or rather, created the
conditions for a new attempt.
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