By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers
Everywhere one looks today, signs of a resurgent Russia are omnipresent.
Although Vladimir Putin has undoubtedly worked hard to craft this image, it is a mirage. Russia is doomed over the
long-term, and its short-term maneuvers aren’t enough to compensate for this
fact.
Traditionally, Russian power has rested on four pillars:
population, energy, weaponry and geography. Three of these are diminishing.
The backbone of modern Russian power has been its massive population.
Nowhere was this better demonstrated than in WWII. Russia no doubt played a
leading role in orchestrating Hitler’s demise, starting with its legendary
stands in Leningrad and Stalingrad. However, Stalin sapped the military might
of Nazi Germany less because of the strategic or tactical genius he possessed,
and almost entirely through his willingness to expend the lives of his
citizenry.
According to some estimates, the Soviet Union lost somewhere between 22
and 28 million people during WWII. To put this in perspective, the United
States and Great Britain each lost less than half a million people and even
Germany only lost between 7 and 9 million lives during the war. Nonetheless,
for nearly half a century after the war the Soviet Union could credibly
threaten the much richer West solely because of the sheer number of men it
could put under arms.
Yet like most of Europe, Russia has recently seen its population dwindle
even as countries like China, India and much of the third world have seen sharp
rises in their own populations. As AEI’s Nicholas Eberstadt
observed in World Affairs: “in the last sixteen years of the Communist era,
births exceeded deaths in Russia by 11.4 million; in the first sixteen years of
the post-Soviet era, deaths exceeded births by 12.4 million.” Unless Russia can
reverse this depopulation for a sustained period of time, it will likely become
increasingly irrelevant in international politics.
Another source of modern Russian power has been its massive energy
reserves. Indeed, high oil prices during the 1970s allowed the Soviet Union to
flex its muscles abroad. However, as energy prices stabilized during the 1980s
the artifice upon which the Soviet system began to crumble. Far from continuing
to expand, the end of the decade saw the Soviet empire disintegrate, with
Moscow powerless to stop it.
The so-called resurgence Russia has enjoyed since Putin first assumed
power has also been built on high energy prices. And like the Soviet leaders
before him, Putin has squandered the temporary respite provided by high energy
prices instead of using it to reinvest in the country and its people. As the
European Bank of Reconstruction and Development noted gloomily in December
2012, “Not only are Russian exports highly concentrated in natural resources,
this concentration has increased over time: the shares of oil, gas and other
minerals in Russia’s exports are higher today than they were 15 years ago.”
It went on to reflect: “In 2012 Russia remains highly dependent on its
natural resources. Oil and gas now account for nearly 70 percent of total goods
exports…. Oil and gas revenues also contribute around half of the federal
budget. The non-oil fiscal deficit has averaged more than 11 per cent of GDP
since 2009, while the oil price consistent with a balanced budget is now in the
region of US$115 per barrel and rising.”
The problem with the Russian Federation’s economic model, much like that
of the Soviet Union’s before it, is that it is only sustainable so long as
energy prices remain artificially high. But, of course, energy prices are
almost certainly going to decline over the coming years as a result of greater
energy efficiency in the West, slowing growth in the East, and greater supply
as a result of the energy revolutions being enjoyed in the Western Hemisphere
and elsewhere around the world. And as goes the price of oil so goes the
Russian state.
Also like the Soviet Union, Putin’s Russia has managed to maintain a modicum
of global influence through the sale of its military weaponry. Although Russian
military technology is greatly inferior to the West and the United States, it
is sufficient to meet the national security needs of most states around the
world. More importantly, Moscow continues to exhibit a willingness to provide
it to states that the West refuses to deal with on moral or geostrategic
grounds. In these states at least, Russia has been able to maintain a degree of
influence.
This source of influence will also diminish in the years ahead. In some
places, this will be because of declining defense budgets. In most cases,
however, it will merely be because of greater competition from the likes of
China and South Korea, the former at least also willing to overlook the moral
transgressions of potential buyers.
Thus, over the long-term Russian power will have to come nearly
exclusively from its prized geography. To be fair, the value of this real
estate is increasing thanks to the increased importance of Asia and the warming
of the Arctic. Still, this alone is hardly sufficient to sustain Russia as the
major power it once was, and may someday become again.
Also in the case of the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense Plans (the
European Phased Adaptive Approach project or EPAA) is to defend the United
States and Europe against ballistic missiles from Iran. Given that, Russia's
opposition does not seem to make sense.
Russia's main concern, however, is twofold. Regardless of a negotiated
solution with Iran, Washington's pursuit of the EPAA secures an enduring
footprint in Central and Eastern Europe, a region of direct interest to Russia
as it seeks to reassert its presence and influence. Moscow resents Washington's
meddling and is fearful of any attempt to contain its strategic ambition across
its periphery. Additionally, while the Kremlin knows that European missile
defense is no threat to Russia's strategic nuclear capability right now, one of
the strengths of the EPAA is its capacity for evolution. Further phases of the EPAA
will seek to deploy enhanced systems with greater area coverage and capability.
A Shor’ Chronology:
NATO Expands Into the Former Soviet space
April 2, 2004: In the spring of 2004, three former Soviet republics –
Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania – joined NATO, along with several Central
European states. The 2004 accession completed a process that began in the 1990s
of former Soviet republics and satellites joining the U.S.-led military
alliance. The Kremlin, focused on domestic political consolidation, could not
provide the necessary counterweight to curb NATO’s expansion to Russia’s
borders.
Color Revolutions Test
Russia's Limits
Dec. 3, 2004: The Color Revolutions presented Russia with a challenge as
the 2003 Rose Revolution brought pro-Western Mikhail Saakashvili to power in
Georgia, and the 2004 Orange Revolution led to the victory of a pro-Western
coalition in Ukraine. Russia's efforts to influence political transitions in
the former Soviet periphery failed as unfriendly governments emerged along the
country's western and southern borders.
Russia Uses Energy Politics to
Flex its Muscles
Jan. 2, 2006: Starting in January 2006, Russia used natural gas cutoffs
and price hikes in Ukraine to pressure the country politically. Due to
Ukraine’s role as a transit country for Russian natural gas, Russia’s energy
posturing emphasized not only to Ukraine but also to the rest of Europe that
dependency on Russian imports makes the Kremlin a political actor in Europe
that cannot be ignored. Such pressure on Kiev also exploited fractures and
disagreements that already existed within the Orange Coalition.
Bucharest NATO Summit
Threatens Russian Interests in the Region
April 3, 2008: NATO countries failed to reach a decision on Ukrainian
and Georgian membership at the Bucharest Summit but did commit to supporting
membership efforts in the future. Furthermore, during the summit the NATO
countries officially endorsed U.S. plans for ballistic missile defense
installations in Poland and the Czech Republic. Ukraine is essential for
Russia's ability to defend itself, and the Kremlin regards U.S. plans for a
missile defense shield in Central and Eastern Europe as a threat to Russia's
security.
Russia Reasserts its Military
Power
Aug. 12, 2008: With NATO split over the issue of Georgia’s and Ukraine’s
potential accession, Moscow had to show that the West would not support the
former Soviet states should it come to a direct confrontation. Russia’s
invasion of Georgia in August 2008 was designed to re-establish the credibility
of the country’s military, confirm Russia’s position as a regional power and
derail any plans for Georgian or Ukrainian NATO accession. Russia’s military
offensive also sent a strong message to the other former Soviet states. For
example, Kazakhstan reconsidered plans for exporting oil west through
non-Russian routes, and both Ukraine and Kazakhstan ceased weapon shipments to
Georgia as a result of the hostilities.
Political Reversals Bring
Pro-Russian Governments to Office
Jan. 13, 2010: Starting in 2010, political transformations in some
former Soviet countries reversed the changes brought about during the Color
Revolutions. In January 2010, Ukraine's presidential elections resulted in the
victory of Viktor Yanukovich, thus sealing the slow
political decline of the factions that led the Orange Revolution and ultimately
leading to closer cooperation between Kiev and Moscow. In April of that year,
the ouster of former Kyrgyz President Kurmanbek
Bakiyev signaled an evolution in the country's foreign policy orientation in
favor of Russia. In October 2012, Georgia also experienced a major political
shift, as the Georgian Dream coalition under the leadership of Bidzina Ivanishvili defeated the victors of the Rose
Revolution in the country's parliamentary elections while promising to improve
Georgia's relations with Russia.
The Customs Union Enhances
Russia's Economic Sphere of Influence
Mid-2012 marks the halfway point between Russia's formation of the
Customs Union in 2010 and its planned debut of the Eurasian Union in 2015.
Moscow planned for the Customs Union to evolve in multiple stages over the
course of several years. These stages included the introduction of the unified
Customs Code in July 2010, the adoption of a unified customs border in January
2011 and the formation of a Single Economic Space in 2012. The Eurasian Union
is seen as the extension and evolution of these stages into their final form.
In a technical sense the Customs Union has not evolved into what Moscow
said it hoped for. Still, Russia has made considerable progress in
re-establishing influence in many of its former Soviet republics. The ongoing
transition from Customs Union to the Eurasian Union is important to watch, but
it should be seen as one aspect of Russia's broader strategy to increase its
presence and heft within the former Soviet Union.
Russia Engages in a Battle for
Influence in Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia
Nov. 27, 2013: Russian pressure and economic incentives led the Yanukovich administration to decline signing the European
Union association agreement in 2013. During the November Vilnius Summit,
Georgia and Moldova initialed agreements. As ongoing protests challenge the Yanukovich government's decision in Ukraine, and as both
Georgia and Moldova struggle with Russian political pressure and their
respective pro-Russian breakaway regions, the struggle for influence in the
former Soviet periphery is continuing, though Russia retains considerable
leverage throughout the region.
Ukrainian anti-government
demonstrators in Kiev's Independence Square on Feb. 22
Conclusion: The end of the Cold War
redrew the political lines of Europe. The Soviet Union collapsed, leaving 15
newly independent states in Eurasia. The Warsaw Pact ceased to exist, and so
the former Soviet satellite states in Central Europe no longer were under Moscow's
military and economic umbrella. With the West riding high on its victory, the
European Union and NATO then began a process of eastward enlargement. Over the
next 15 years, many of the states from the former Soviet bloc were integrated
into the Western alliance structure. Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic
joined NATO in 1999. The rest of Central Europe and the Baltic states joined
the European Union and NATO between 2004 and 2007.
The push for Western integration did not stop there. Ukraine and Georgia
both experienced color revolutions in the mid-2000s that ushered in
Western-friendly governments. These governments then formally sought to gain EU
and NATO membership, with the West starting to support their long-term
orientation toward these blocs in much the same way they did with Central
Europe and the Baltics a decade earlier.
This deeper push into the Russian periphery did not succeed. By then,
Russia was no longer the weak and chaotic state of the 1990s and early 2000s.
It had consolidated internally and recovered economically on the back of high
energy prices. Russia was thus in a position to respond to these moves, which
it did in the form of occasional natural gas cutoffs to Ukraine and the 2008
Russo-Georgian War. The war not only showed that Russia was able to defeat
Georgia militarily in a matter of days, but also that notions that the West
would offer Georgia military support were illusory. The war also served as a
message from Moscow to the rest of the former Soviet periphery that it would
not tolerate any serious efforts toward further Western integration.
Moscow used the next five years to push back against Western gains on
the Russian periphery. During this period, it was the European Union and the
United States that were distracted, the former with its own political and
economic crisis and the latter with its commitments in the Middle East. A
relatively unburdened Russia took full advantage of this window of opportunity.
Meanwhile, pro-Western governments in Ukraine and Georgia were voted out
in favor of administrations more friendly -- or at least more pragmatic --
toward Moscow. Russia strengthened its influence in other states courted by the
West, such as Belarus and Armenia. It also boosted its own rival economic and
security blocs like the Customs Union and the Collective Security Treaty
Organization to counter EU and NATO expansion.
But while the West may have been down in the competition over the
borderlands during this time, it wasn't out. Efforts at EU integration of the
countries on Russia's periphery continued, albeit more slowly and indirectly.
These efforts included free-trade and association agreements meant to
strengthen ties between the Russian periphery and the European Union without
involving actual membership.
Former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich's
rejection of such deals led to the Western-backed demonstrations in Kiev that
culminated in his overthrow. This not only led to the current standoff between
Russia and the West over the fate of Ukraine, it has also thrown other
countries in the periphery, like Georgia and Moldova, back into the center of
the tug-of-war over their orientation once again. The standoff has been a
source of concern to those already under the EU and NATO economic and security
umbrella, including Poland and the Baltics. These countries fear they, too,
could fall back into the increasingly intense Western-Russian competition for
influence in the Russian periphery.
The West's efforts in Ukraine are therefore merely the latest chapter in
the competition between Russia and the West that has taken various forms since
the end of the Cold War. The Western counterpunch over Ukraine is a major
message to Moscow: Russia cannot take its position and influence in the
borderland states for granted. But as it is likely to show now in Crimea and
via efforts to extend Russian citizenship to ethnic Russians and Russian
speakers throughout the former Soviet Union, Moscow is not without its own
levers, and the European Union and the United States still have their own
constraints to serious engagement in the Russian periphery.
Gunmen have infiltrated and shut down Ukrainian naval headquarters in
Sevastopol, Interfax-Ukraine reported March 2. In addition, a Ukrainian
military source said the Russian military, after initially claiming it was
simply guarding a Ukrainian air force anti-aircraft missile division in
Sevastopol, took control of the unit and its equipment. Russia’s moves in the
autonomous republic of Crimea have raised tensions between Kiev and Moscow, but
the new Ukrainian government and its military are in no position to challenge
Russia.
This could mean that Crimea might now be permanently lost for the
Ukraine.
There is a grouping in the region called the Visegrad battlegroup. It is within the framework
of NATO and consists of Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary. It is
now more a concept than a military. However, with U.S. commitment and the
inclusion of Romania, it could become a low-cost (to the United States) balance
to a Russia suddenly feeling insecure and therefore unpredictable. This, and
countering Russian commercial imperialism with a U.S. alternative at a time
when Europe is hardly in a position to sustain the economies in these
countries, would be logical.
For updates
click homepage here