The Israel-Hamas
war launched Saturday, Dec. 27, was the first Middle East conflict in 60 years
in which the United States played no role.
Israel
has not formally spelled out the practical targets of its Gaza operation,
beyond "reshaping the security situation in southern Israel to allow the
population to live normal lives free of missile terror." Some ministers
have sworn to smash Hamas and terminate its rule of Gaza. But a prime, unspoken
strategic goal is undoubtedly to take the Middle East extremists down a peg or
two or more – terminally, if possible - before the new US president starts
dealing with them.
Thus
a joke is going around Washington that the Obama gang is thankful Israel went
ahead before he took over.
However,
once Israeli tanks and boots hit the ground in the Gaza Strip, there is no
guarantee that the conflict will wind up any time soon. Israeli officials are
all talking about a long haul.
The
Bush administration at least, is expected to veto any UN Security Council
resolution that condemns Israel and demands a halt to its military operations.
The
Israeli offensive has a broader, long term aspect, say Washington
insiders: It is a counterattack against Iran, Syria and their bellicose
pretensions to regional domination at the head of a flock of non-state
extremist organizations by exploiting the explosive Palestinian issue to
destabilize and delegitimize the mainstream Arab governments – especially those
committed to a negotiated peace with Israel.
By
parading its military might, Israel aims to show the pretenders up as useless
when it comes to saving one of their own. Tehran may have trained Hamas
commanders, supplied its rockets for shooting at Israel , egged it on to
challenge "the Zionist entity" - and even sent an al Qods general to
design its Gaza bunkers - but when it comes to rescuing Hamas from doom at
Israel 's hands, the Islamic Republic is a paper tiger.
Without
a proven long-reaching military arm, Tehran would forfeit its claim to be the
preeminent regional power and lose its case for being treated in this capacity
by the Obama administration as the precondition for their dialogue.
Similarly,
Syria and its president Bashar Assad, who poses as the great protector of the
Palestinian Hamas, Islamic Jihad and other radical non-state terrorist groups
and hosts their commands in Damascus, will lose face and share Iran 's fate as
a second-rater.
It is
too soon to tell how the Israeli campaign, which still faces several stages,
will turn out, but there is clearly a rift developing in the Arab-Muslim camp.
Hamas, which started out as an offshoot of the Egyptian
Muslim Brotherhood movement, has won a Palestinian election and acquired a
sovereign territory. He fears that the appetite of the parent movement, the
outlawed Brotherhood, will be whetted by the Hamas model and it may try by
covert means to emulate it. The Egyptian president would prefer to see Hamas crushed
by Israel before the Brotherhood gets the idea of seizing a slice of Egyptian
territory and ruling it with the help of an Islamic militia of its own.
And
both Egypt and Saudi Arabia want the Palestinian Authority under the wing of
its chairman Mahmoud Abbas, restored to power in the Gaza Strip as well as the
West Bank.
Ranged
on the opposite side are Syria, Qatar and Iran, who are determined to maintain
Hamas' dominance in the Palestinian movement.
Israel's
Gaza operation showed at least some defects, and Hamas no doubt has developed a
plan for withstanding an Israeli invasion by developing a guerrilla campaign.
One
of the most serious casualties of Israel 's offensive against Hamas so far
however, is the rupture between America 's two foremost military Middle East
allies, Turkey and Israel.
The
ability by Hamas’ to launch missiles into Israeli territory will go on for a
while. The Israelis next must decide whether they will be drawn into a brutal
house-to-house operation in one of the most densely populated parts of the
world.
After
the Israeli operation in Gaza, the Palestinian territories however, will more
or less remain politically, territorially, economically and militarily divided
between the Gaza Strip and the West Bank, making the formation of a viable
Palestinian state virtually impossible. And seen from a today's vantage
point, Hamas will still be a force in Gaza; the group has extensive social
networks in the region and maintains substantial popular support in Gaza.
Furthermore, Hamas’ rival Fatah is severely internally divided and lacks the
ability to impose its influence in Gaza, regardless of how strong or weak Hamas
is.