Early on I commented on the Greek debt crises
including also that of the other ‘Club Med’ countries.
Yet by now Greece
is a lost cause. No amount of fiddling, massaging or austerity is going to
save the country from default.
Not only is the
Greek public debt by now already a staggering
$500 billion (see below) as mentioned earlier Greece (something many
reporters and tv station covering the story are not conscious of) has a history of defaults/ refinancing.
It is unclear how important European or other foreign powers presently
consider preventing major economic, political or social instability in Greece.
The financial and political price of preventing the country’s economic collapse,
and the potential dissolution of the modern European system — has grown vastly
since the beginning of the crisis in 2008, yet not a single party has decided
to cut its losses and walk away. For better or worse, Greece is integrated into
the European system, and its failure would have repercussions on the system. If
European leaders believe the preservation of Greece is key to preventing their
own economic demise, then perhaps Greece has not lost its strategic value to
the West after all. However, that remains to be seen.
To handle the challenge of at least a structured (orderly) default the
Europeans however will need a fund of at least 2 trillion euros (something that
is not there yet).
Starting with Greek’s geography , this has been both a blessing and a
curse, a blessing because it allowed Greece to dominate the “known Western
world” for a good portion of Europe’s ancient history due to a combination of
sea access and rugged topography. In the ancient era, these were perfect
conditions for a maritime city-state culture oriented toward commerce and one
that was difficult to dislodge by more powerful land-based opponents. This
geography incubated the West’s first advanced civilization (Athens) and
produced its first empire (ancient Macedon).
However, Greek geography is also a curse because it is isolated on the
very tip of the rugged and practically impassable Balkan Peninsula, forcing it
to rely on the Mediterranean Sea for trade and communication. None of the Greek
cities had much of a hinterland. These small coastal enclaves were easily
defendable, but they were not easily unified, nor could they become large or
rich due to a dearth of local resources. This has been a key disadvantage for
Greece, which has had to vie with more powerful civilizations throughout its
history, particularly those based on the Sea of Marmara in the east and the Po,
Tiber and Arno valleys of the Apennine Peninsula to the west.
Greece is located in southeastern Europe on the southernmost portion of
the Balkan Peninsula, an extremely mountainous peninsula extending south from
the fertile Pannonian plain. The Greek mainland culminates in what was once the
Peloponnesian Peninsula and is now a similarly rugged island separated by the
man-made Corinth Canal. Greek mountains are characterized by steep cliffs, deep
gorges and jagged peaks. The average terrain altitude of Greece is twice that
of Germany and comparable to the Alpine country of Slovenia. The Greek
coastline is also very mountainous with many cliffs rising right out of the
sea.
Greece is easily recognizable on a map by its multitude of islands,
about 6,000 in total. Hence, Greece consists of not only the peninsular
mainland but almost all of the Aegean Sea, which is bounded by the Dodecanese
Islands (of which Rhodes is the largest) in the east, off the coast of
Anatolia, and Crete in the south. Greece also includes the Ionian Islands (of
which Corfu is the largest) in the west and thousands of islands in the middle
of the Aegean. The combination of islands and rugged peninsular coastline gives
Greece the 10th longest coastline in the world, longer than those of Italy, the
United Kingdom and Mexico.
Mountainous barriers in the north and the northeast mean that the Greek
peninsula is largely insulated from mainland Europe. Throughout its history,
Greece has parlayed its natural borders and jagged terrain into a defensive
advantage. Invasion forces that managed to make a landing on one of the few
Greek plains were immediately met by high-rising cliffs hugging the coastline
and well-entrenched Greek defenders blocking the path forward. The famous
battle of Thermopylae is the best example, when a force of 300 Spartans and
another 1,000 or so Greeks challenged a Persian force numbering in the hundreds
of thousands. The Ottomans fared better than the Persians in that they actually
managed to conquer Greece, but they ruled little of Greece’s vast mountainous
interior, where roving bands of Greek brigands, called khlepts,
blocked key mountain passes and ravines and entered Greek lore as heroes. To
this day, its rugged topography gives Greece a regionalized character that
makes effective, centralized control practically impossible. Everything from
delivering mail to collecting taxes, the latter being a key factor in Greece’s
ongoing debt crisis, becomes a challenge.
Modern Greece has traditionally been supported by three pillars. First
is shipping. As a culture that is mostly coastal it makes sense they would be
very good at sailing; however, in the age of modern transport and super
container ships, Greece simply can’t compete, and most of its ship building
industry has long ago left for greener pastures in places such as Norway, China
or Korea. The second pillar is tourism and this continues to be an option, but
tourism by itself cannot support a modern state. The final option and the one
that the Greeks have gotten the most mileage out of is leveraging Greece’s
position. Typically to allow some external power a means of battling somebody
in Greece’s neighborhood. When Greece achieved independence in the early 1800’s
that external power was the United Kingdom who used Greece as a foil against
the Turks. Later, the Americans played a similar role supporting Greece against
the Soviets. In both cases massive volumes of capital came in to support
Greece. However, in the post-Cold War era Turkey is a member of NATO, and while
the Greeks might not get along with the Turks, nobody is looking to use Greece
as a military foil against them. Greece no longer has a regional foe that it
shares with anyone else. The closest might be the Turks again, but only if the
Turks miscalculate their ongoing relationship with Israel or Cyprus and miscalculate
very very badly.
Bottom-line, the various supports that have allow the Greek state to
exist since the 1820’s simply aren’t there anymore and so the path forward goes
like this: Greece is not salvageable. Greece simply can’t compete unless it is
being given a constant, steady supply of capital from abroad that it doesn’t
necessarily have to pay back. And even if that could be restarted, Greece
cannot emerge from its own debt load. It is simply too large.
It therefore is only a question of when, not if, the Europeans pull the
plug on Athens, which most likely will be at the first opportunity, when Greece
does not present a systemic risk to the rest of Europe. At that point, without
access to international capital or more bailout money, Greece could face a
total collapse of political control and social violence not seen since the
military junta of the 1970s.
For more on the Greek Geopolitical Imperatives continue here:
A Greek default will be much larger than other recent defaults, like the
one in Argentina in 2001 or in Russia in 1998. Greek public debt now comes to
about $500 billion. Argentina's debt when it defaulted was $82 billion, and
Russia's was $79 billion. The size of Greece's public debt assures that the
consequences of a Greek default would ravage its economy.
Inside Greece, banks would face huge losses on bonds in their portfolios
and would have to close their doors until somebody -- who? -- recapitalized
them. The economy would grind to a halt. Some projections put the contraction
in the gross domestic product at more than of 25%. ATMs would stop working.
Business credit would dry up, and businesses would shut their doors. The
government would be unable to pay its bills.
But the damage wouldn't stop at Greece's borders. Bond buyers would flee
Italian and Spanish government bonds, requiring the European Central Bank and
the European Financial Stability Facility -- if it's set up by then -- to pour
billions into buying those bonds to support the markets.
European banks would take a huge hit as the value of Greek government
and corporate debt in their portfolios plunged. Big banks and insurance
companies in Germany had a total exposure of $33 billion to Greek government
and corporate debt as of the end of March, according to the Bank for
International Settlements. French banks had exposure to Greek public and
private debt of almost $80 billion.
That exposure is not spread evenly. In France, much of it is
concentrated at three big banks: Crédit Agricole (CRARF 0.00%, news), Société Générale
(SCGLY +2.89%, news) and BNP Paribas (BNPQY +2.53%, news). In Germany, the
government set up bad banks as part of its bailout of Hypo Real Estate Holding
and WestLB. Those bad banks hold more than half of
all the Greek debt held by German banks and would undoubtedly need another
infusion of taxpayer cash.
Those scenarios seem so grim that it's hard to imagine any rational
politician steering his or her country into such a storm, begging the question
what are at least some, of the reasons.
The Lying Game of Statistics
There is an interesting belief, at least in the advanced industrial
countries, that government-issued statistics reflect reality. Yet a host of
reasons exists for looking at national statistics with a jaundiced eye beyond
the risk of politicians pressuring civil servants.
Yet it is not only Government officials and civil servants.
For example while undoubtedly true that the Greeks falsified financial
data in order to join the Euro. Yet the job of bankers for example, is to
analyze data from loan applicants and to uncover falsehoods. The charge against
the Greeks can thus be extended to bankers. How could they not have discovered
the Greek deception?
Compounding this challenge, the European Union has incorporated
societies on its periphery that never have accepted the principle that states
must be transparent, a problem exacerbated by EU regulations. Southern and
Central Europeans always have been less impressed by the state than Germans,
for example. This is not simply about paying taxes but about a broader distrust
of government, something deeply embedded in history. Meanwhile, regulations
from Brussels, whose tax and employment laws make entrepreneurship and small
business ownership extraordinarily difficult, have forced a good deal of the
economy “off the books,” aka underground.
In this case what exactly is the state of the Greek, Spanish or Italian
economy remains hard if not impossible to say.
Or to stay with the example of Greece, one assessment says that 10
percent of all employees are off the books. Another says 40 percent of Greeks
define themselves as self-employed. A third estimates that 40 percent of the
total Greek economy is in the grey sector. When evaluating what tries to remain
hidden, you’re reduced to guesswork. No one really knows, any more than anyone
really knows how many illegal immigrants are participating in the U.S. economy.
The difference, however, is that this knowledge is of profound importance to
the entire EU bailout.
Greek numbers on the consequences of austerity for government workers do
not take into account that many of those workers show up to work only
occasionally while working another job that is not taxed or known to the state
statistical services. Thus, one has a complete split between the state and
banking systems’ ability to honor debt obligations, the insistence on austerity
and the social reality of the country.
The realization that the rational civil servants of Brussels and Berlin
have failed to create systems that understand reality strikes at their
self-perceptions. There is a willful urge to retain the perception that they
understand what is going on.
Thus the crisis we are seeing, which Brussels, Luxemburg or/and Germany
somehow try’s to solve, rests on a highly unstable base. First, the European
banking system, like the American banking system, does not understand its
status. Second, the entire mathematics of national statistics is inherently
imprecise. Third, the peripheral countries of the European Union have economies
that cannot be measured at all because their informal economies are massive.
The fundamental principles and self-conception of Central Europe diverge
massively. The elites of these countries might like to think of themselves as
Europeans first, by definition, but the public know they are not, and they
don’t want to be.
Thus a precise solution to a vastly uncertain problem is unlikely to
return Europe to its happy past. Reality, or rather the fundamental unreality
of Europe, has returned.
In some sense, this is no different from the United States and China.
But the United States has its Constitution and the Civil War’s consequences to
hold itself together in the face of this problem, and China has the Communist
Party’s security apparatus to give it a shot. Europe, by contrast, has nothing
to hold it together but the promise of prosperity and the myth of the rational
civil servant, the cultural and political side of the underlying geopolitical
problem.
Consequences of the Coming
Default
The first Consequence of a coming default is that Greece most likely
will have to be kicked out of the euro zone, but between here and there, first,
a firebreak fund. The EFSF expansion has to happen because if you cannot
sequester the money of Greek government debt that exists outside of Greece,
then you’re going to trigger a massive financial catastrophe. And so to prepare
for a Greek ejection, you have to prepare a fund that can handle three things more
or less simultaneously. First, you need about 400 billion euro to firebreak
Greece off from the rest of euro zone. Second, you need about 800 billion euro
in order to prevent a wide-scale banking meltdown, because the day that Greece
defaults on that debt, the day that it’s ejected from euro zone, there will be
catastrophic banking collapses in Portugal, Italy, Spain and France, probably
in that order.
Third, the markets will go wild and the state that is in the most danger
of falling after Greece is Portugal, Spain and Italy. Using the bailouts that
have happened to date as a template, any bailout of these three would have to
provide enough financing money that has not been made available yet.
General conclusion: European Union member states are not as committed to
the bloc as they once were. Yet all members joined with the understanding that
the union would grant them wealth. However, all those understandings are now in
breach.
Overall, the European economy is stagnant at best now. One of the few
European states still showing signs of economic activity is Germany.
It is most likely that ongoing efforts to strengthen the euro zone’s
bailout fund, a precondition for any solution that would save Europe, will
continue apace in the coming quarter. And while I do expect a structured Greek
default, there won’t be a euro dissolution or general European catastrophe in
the fourth quarter of 2011. But whatever fondness EU member countries have felt
for the bloc is ending. While in the coming months the leaders and populations
of the 27 EU states will feel nostalgic for the past, they will be unwilling to
bear the collective financial burden required to preserve it, disillusioned
with what Europe is becoming but only willing to blame others while evaluating
the options they might have if the European experiment comes to an inglorious
end.
Several other weak points beside the Greek bailout that could trigger a
series of events in the European system are:
• The Italian government and
Belgian caretaker government are both in precarious positions. An Italian
government collapse likely would overwhelm the fail-safes the Europeans have
thus far established. Belgium does not even have a government in any practical
sense, making it impossible for Brussels to negotiate, much less implement,
austerity measures. A financial crash in Belgium would bring the financial
crisis into the Northern European core.
• Political miscalculations or
opposition to more bailouts in Germany could limit financial support to Greece
at a key moment. Greece is living on bailout funds and will default on its debt
should the payout schedule be more than moderately interrupted. Such
interruption would trigger a financial cascade, starting in Greece and ending
in the Western European banks before EU bailout programs are expanded
sufficiently to handle the fallout.
• European banks suffer from a
number of deep maladies that include exposure to U.S. subprime real estate,
Europe’s home-grown real estate troubles, over crediting both within and beyond
the euro zone and decades of being used as slush funds by various governments.
Just as a sovereign debt meltdown could trigger a banking catastrophe, a
banking meltdown would trigger a sovereign debt catastrophe. Addressing this
issue will be a primary topic of the Oct. 17-18 EU heads of government summit.
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