By Eric Vandenbroeck 4 August 2018
Shantung the Versailles Treaty and the Manchurian
episode
On a stopover in Honolulu
where I will be attending a meeting, I will now complete the synopsis of some
of the things I covered during my seminars in China the previous two weeks. On
11 July 2017 I already reported the strivings of
Woodrow Wilson during the Versailles deliberations in reference to Eastern
Europe and in particular also Poland. whereby one of the subjects I was
asked to highlight in China was not only the the
Japanese invasion of Manchuria began on 18 September 1931, when the Kwantung
Army of the Empire of Japan invaded Manchuria immediately following the Mukden
Incident. The Japanese established a puppet state called Manchukuo, and
their occupation lasted until the end of World War II.
Much more important
to the Chinese, even today, is the so called Shantung
incident which ignited to start Chinese nationalism. In fact the Versailles
treaty Articles 128 to 158 specified that treaties made by Germany with a
number of states were to be invalidated. The most important of these concerned
the Chinese Shantung peninsula (Articles 156– 158) where, since 1898, Germany
had held a 99-year lease for 100 square miles at Kiachow
Bay in the south. Here, at Tsingtao, they constructed a harbor where the German
Cruiser Squadron was stationed. Tsingtao was overrun by the Japanese in the
early months of the war, and they expanded their base far beyond the territory
leased to Germany. The Allies, keen to secure continued Japanese assistance in
East Asia and the Pacific, had assured Japan in 1917 that it could take over
from Germany in Shantung after the war, but U.S. delegates at the peace
conference objected to the acquisition. Under pressure to finalize the treaty
in the last days of April, Wilson agreed to a compromise: Japan could take over
Germany’s economic rights in Shantung - the port, the railways, and the mines -
but had to pull out its occupation forces. When the Chinese delegates were
handed these terms, they left the conference. Japan withdrew from Shantung in
1922, but invaded the Chinese mainland, including Shantung, fifteen years
later. It was the beginning of a war and an occupation that was to take the
life of twenty million Chinese.
What is less known is
the behavior of Woodrow Wilson when end April 1919 Wilson (USA), Clemenceau
(France), and Lloyd George (Britain) settled the last major issue on their
agenda, which was indeed the quarrel between the Republic of China and the
Japanese Empire.1
But what happened
here is that the Japanese had secretly promised military and naval assistance
to the British and the French. The Chinese however had also assisted, and the
latter were now insulted. This whereby the Chinese
claims echoed with Wilson and his 14 points.
The arguments of the
French and in particularly Lloyd George on the other hand was: It is impossible
for us to say to the Japanese: "We were happy to find you in time of war;
but now, good buy!" This whereby the Japanese compounded Wilson's
anxieties by threatening to withdraw from the Peace Conference unless their
Chinese claim was honored. Thus in a double bind, Wilson feared that if the
Japanese followed
the Italians out the door and declined to sign the treaty, Wilson
explained, Germany might also decline. And that thus the only hope for world
peace was "to keep the world together get the League of Nations with Japan
in it, and then try to secure justice for the Chinese." So Wilson joined
Clemenceau and Lloyd George in awarding the German rights in Shantung to Japan.
And in the agreement not written into the Versailles treaty Articles, Japan
promised to return Shantung Peninsula to Chinese sovereignty "at the
earliest possible time."
China's faith turned
to anger and disillusion when, in early May 1919, news reached China that the
Big Three had decided to give economic control of the Shandong Peninsula to
Japan. Thousands of protesters marched through the streets of Beijing on May 4,
protesting Japanese businesses, expressing their anger at the Western leaders
in Paris, and burning down the house of a prominent Chinese politician with
ties to Japan. Calls for a full boycott of Western and Japanese goods soon
followed, as did a wave of strikes in Shanghai, Wuhan, and other Chinese
cities.
The view from Japan
Given the above, the
First World War had starkly revealed both China’s weakness and Japan’s
strength. For their part, Japanese leaders knew that the European influence in
Asia would likely decline after the war, and they very much wanted to be the
power that would fill in the resulting vacuum. Their delegation to Paris was
led by Prince Saionji Kinmochi, a seventy-year-old
elder statesman and former prime minister who had studied at the Sorbonne and
had been a classmate of Georges Clemenceau there. Japanese leaders mistrusted
the principles of Woodrow Wilson, seeing right through his noble-sounding
ideals to the racist core that underlay them. As one Japanese newspaper wrote,
Wilson was an angel in rhetoric but a devil indeed. The Japanese knew that
Wilson held Asians to a lower standard of development than he did Europeans.
They also blamed Wilson’s promises of national self-determination for the rise
in anti-Japanese sentiment in both China and Korea. Hoping to catch Wilson in a
trap and expose his hypocrisy, the Japanese delegates came to Paris seeking to
force the insertion of a racial equality clause into the final treaty. Either
the Allies would agree, and thereby undercut their own rationale for
imperialism, or they would refuse and give the Japanese a tremendous public
relations victory across Asia, especially inside the European and American
colonial empires.
But not having China
present among the signatories was another of the bad tastes that the signing
ceremony left behind. British diplomat Sir James Headlam-Morley
and American general Tasker H. Bliss were among the senior officials who
sympathized with the Chinese and thought they had been correct to refuse to put
their names on a treaty so humiliating to their country. The Shandong decision
was deeply unpopular not only among the Chinese, but also among diplomats in
Paris who recognized just how badly it undermined the very principles upon
which they were trying to rebuild the world. Headlam-Morley
worried about the ramifications of China’s noninvolvement in that new world
order. Chinese anger at the West, as well as the West’s acquiescence in Japan’s
power grab, would inevitably lead to an increase in Japanese strength, a
development that worried both the Europeans and the Americans. It also, Headlam-Morley feared, set up the dangerous possibility of
the creation of a bloc of anti–League of Nations states led by an alliance
between Germany, the Soviet Union, and China. Neither option augured well for
the West or for stability in East Asia. The Americans, too, were worried about
the growth of Japanese power, but Wilson scarcely had time to think about Asia.
First he had to find a way to get the US Senate to approve the Treaty of
Versailles and its most controversial provision, the Covenant of the League of
Nations. The battle to do so proved to be one of the most arduous, partisan,
and acrimonious debates in the history of American American
politics. In the end it may well have led Wilson to suffer the strokes that
incapacitated him, destroyed the remainder of his presidency, and muddled his
legacy.
As symbols of how
much remained to accomplish, the Italians were showing signs of anger over
Allied refusal to recognize their claims to Fiume, and in China, a series of
protests, some of them violent, had broken out over the news that Japan would
take effective control of the Shandong Peninsula. In March the German minister
of defense, Gustav Noske, had ordered forty thousand
members of the Freikorps paramilitary units to use machine guns, flamethrowers,
mortars, and even airplanes against left-leaning Germans. More than 1,200 of
them lay dead. Sooner or later the negotiations had to end, and the treaty with
Germany had to be signed if any semblance of stability were to return.
The Treaty of Versailles
As I pointed out on
20 Jan. 2017, the League of Nations ratified the Treaty
of Versailles of which I detailed what excactly it
entailed, officially ending World War I with Germany. Much has been written
about the treaty which concluded the First World War, its competing and
sometimes conflicting goals. A second article published shortly thereafter overed
Weimar politics and the Versailles Peace Treaty.
In the elections held
in September 1930, when the number of Nazi representatives rose to 107, the new Nazi members behaved like hooligans at the
first sitting of the new Reichstag. Alan Bullock pointed out that “in speaking
of the Nazi movement as a ‘party’ there is awas no
more a party in the normal democratic sense of the word than the Communist
Party is today. It was an organized conspiracy against the State”. Hitler
himself always insisted that his organization was a movement rather than a
party. 2
Several other factors
combined to weaken the Versailles System as it had been revised by the Treaty of Locarno. The Locarno
Treaties were seven agreements negotiated at Locarno, Switzerland, on 5–16
October 1925 and formally signed in London on 1 December, in which the First
World War Western European Allied powers and the new states of Central and
Eastern Europe sought to secure the post-war territorial settlement, and return
normalizing relations with defeated Germany (the Weimar Republic). It also
stated that Germany would never go to war with the other countries. Locarno
divided borders in Europe into two categories: western, which were guaranteed
by Locarno treaties, and eastern borders of Germany with Poland, which were
open for revision.
The Reparations Conference at Lausanne
This was then
followed by the long delayed Reparations Conference that opened at Lausanne on
17 June 1932, a fortnight after Germany's Brüning Government’s fall. Brüning
was replaced as Chancellor by Franz von Papen, a former soldier who had joined
the Centre Party and now displaced his own Party’s leader to become Chancellor.
Representatives from
Great Britain, Germany, and France met at Lausanne that resulted in an
agreement to suspend World War I reparations payments imposed on the defeated
countries by the Treaty of Versailles. Thus by this time the British policy was
firmly set towards the cancellation of reparations. At an Anglo-French
conference held at the British Embassy in Paris MacDonald, now Prime Minister
of the National Government, declared that British policy “was that the Great
Powers must agree to wipe the slate clean” (BDFP II, 3: 173) but the French
Prime Minister, Herriot cautioned that if a final settlement was reached at
Lausanne, “the French Government would have an impossible task. It was necessary
to proceed by stages” (ibid.: 175). He went on, “He himself was not entirely
convinced of Germany’s good faith.
The injustices heaped
upon a defeated Germany, allegedly undefeated in the
field and stabbed in the back at home, in effect serve to reinforce an idea
that things would be normal if only the external burdens, imposed by the
allies, could be lifted. One could also argue that the constant, indeed ritual,
complaints about Versailles in effect served to disguise the extent to which
the War had impoverished Germany … These illusions were dangerous … [because] …
as long as the truth about the War, its causes and consequences remained
excluded from mainstream public political discussion, it was impossible to face
harsh economic and political realities … Responsible politics remained a
hostage to myths about the First World War, and Weimar democracy eventually had
to pay the price.3
After the first
plenary sessions at Lausanne there ensued a long series of meetings, some
between the British and the French or the British and the Germans only, others
being more multilateral, which failed to reach agreement until the Conference
was close to having to be adjourned because its leading members were required
by urgent business in their own countries. Much of the disagreement concerned a
proposal that in return for reparations being cancelled, Germany should make a
contribution to the restoration of Europe and would issue bonds to do this but
there was much disagreement on the terms on which these bonds should be issued.
However, by the time the fourth plenary session convened on 8 July, an
agreement had been reached, although agreement was so late that the documents
were not ready for signing and the session had to be adjourned while they were
typed.
On 14 September the
German Foreign Minister, von Neurath advised
Henderson that “in view of the stage reached by the discussions at the
Conference the question of equality of rights for the disarmed states could no
longer remain without a solution. On that occasion, he accordingly declared
that the German Government (which had refused to take part in the conference)
could not take part in the further labors of the Conference before the question
of Germany’s equality of rights had been satisfactorily cleared up”.
The disarmament
question, therefore, remained unresolved and Germany’s intention to rearm was
becoming clearer; for some time her clandestine
attempts to rearm with Soviet Russian help had been known to the Western
allies. In April 1922 Germany and the Soviet Union signed a treaty of trade and
friendship at Rapallo, Italy. The published version of the treaty established
friendly relations between the two nations that included trade and investment.
But the treaty also had a secret annex, signed two months later, that
established close military cooperation between the two powers.
Much has
been written about the appeasement diplomacy that led up to the Second World
War and it is not the primary focus of this article. However, one of the
mainsprings of the Allies’, especially the British, tolerance of Hitler’s early
expansionary moves was the by now well-established view among Western
politicians and newspapermen alike that the terms of the Treaty of Versailles
were unjust and provided a just cause for German complaints and activities.
Lord Lothian, the former Philip Kerr remarked of the reoccupation of the
Rhineland in 1936 that the Germans “were only walking into their own back
garden”. The appeasement policy, which was very much the creation of the
English right wing in Parliament and outside it, was enthusiastically supported
by Geoffrey Dawson, the Editor of The Times and many others, including the
British Ambassador in Berlin, Sir Neville Henderson. Among British Ministers
and their circle of acquaintances, particularly
the group known as the Cliveden Set, support for appeasement and rejection
of the Versailles Treaty was general.
In his policy
statement Mein Kampf Hitler had stated that his major
international ambition was “Lebensraum in the East”, not a desire to attack the
Western Powers, which gave the French and British Governments the hope that
diverting Hitler’s ambitions eastward could be achieved.
Meanwhile Churchill’s
warnings were ignored; Anthony Eden was replaced as Foreign Secretary by a core
member of the Cliveden set, Lord Halifax. Eden became a bitter opponent of the
appeasement policy. Vansittart and the pro-French Foreign Office were marginalised, while Chamberlain increasingly relied instead
on Sir Horace Wilson for advice and reassurance. Like all industrial relations
experts, Wilson would have been expert in negotiations and securing
compromises, rather than facing down enemies. Welcome advice was always
forthcoming from Sir Neville Henderson. The appeasers met up socially
frequently, often at Cliveden but also at All Souls College, Oxford, as A. L. Rowse recorded:
They would not listen
to warnings because they did not wish to hear. And they did not think things
out because there was a fatal confusion in their minds between the interests of
their social order and the interests of the country. They did not say much
about it because they would have given the game away and anyway it was a
thought they did not wish to be too explicit about even to themselves but they
were anti-Red and that hamstrung them in dealing with the greater immediate
danger to their country, Hitler's Germany.4
In March 1938 Hitler
marched into Vienna and announced the Anschluss of Austria- her incorporation into
the Reich. Next, he demanded the return of the Sudeten Germans to the Reich, a
demand that was granted at the Munich Conference which denuded Czechoslovakia
of her defences against a German invasion and was
followed early the next year by an invasion and occupation of the entire
country. At the time of the Munich conference Chamberlain denied the need to go
to the aid of Czechoslovakia, “A faraway country of which we know nothing”. On
his return from Munich the Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, notoriously
waved the piece of paper that he claimed promised “peace for our time”, only
soon to be proved cruelly wrong. Only then did the Western powers recognize
that Hitler was bent on the aggressive expansion of the Third Reich. Hitler’s
next demand was for the restoration to Germany of Danzig and the Polish
Corridor. This was a step too far and his invasion of Poland on 1 September
1939 provoked the outbreak of the Second World War. All the dreams of a
European peace were lost for the five and a half year duration of what was to
be a terrible second war.
As for the Versailles
Treaty at the Paris Peace Conference (which I earlier covered
in context of the making of the Middle East) the “Big Three” were able to
agree a series of pragmatic compromises that did not always command the support
of their colleagues or publics bemuse they had interests which brought them
together: Clemenceau’s desire to maintain the alliances with Britain and
America, Lloyd George’s search for the means to ensure a lasting European peace
and Wilson’s desire to punish Germany for her wartime and pre-war crimes. The
personal chemistry that developed among them made the agreement of a peace
treaty possible. Then in the early 1920s, the animosity that existed between
Lloyd George and Poincaré prevented any chance of
agreement between them on how to
secure reparations payments.
However studies have
shown that a relatively moderate increase in taxation, coupled with an equally
moderate reduction in consumption, would have enabled the Weimar Republic to
meet the reparation debt.5 In fact, Shuker has shown that the net capital
inflow ran towards Germany in the period 1919 to 1933 at a minimum of at least
2 percent.6
The reparation terms
obliged Germany to pay 50 billion gold marks. Keynes - expecting that the C
Bonds would eventually be canceled - advised the German government to accept.
(Sally Marks, "Reparations Reconsidered: A Reminder," Central
European History 2, p.361.)
The historian of
Anglo-German ancestry Elizabeth Wiskemann recalled:
On the morning after the German “election” [the Reichstag election of 29 March
1936] I traveled to Basle; it was an exquisite liberation to reach Switzerland.
It must have been only a little later that I met Maynard Keynes at some
gathering in London. “I do wish you had not written that book’,” I found myself
saying (meaning The Economic Consequences, which the Germans never ceased to
quote) and then longed for the ground to swallow me up. But he said, simply and
gently, “So do I.”7
Despite his
undisputed command of economics, Keynes did not pick up that most of the London
schedule was phony money. When, by the second half of the 1930s, it had become
clear that Germany had not been ruined by the Treaty of Versailles but was
recommencing its attempt to take possession of most of continental Europe, he
saw that he had erred, and regretted having written The Economic Consequences
of the Peace.
But America’s default
and British evasion, a true case of Albion perfidy since Lloyd George may have
bamboozled Clemenceau by inserting in the British Treaty of Guarantee the
condition that it would come into force only if the Americans ratified their
guarantee treaty.8 The failure of the two guarantee treaties was to be the
cause of a great deal of trouble in the years following the signing of the
Treaty of Versailles. Ruth Henig 9 quotes FS Northedge
who stated that the effect of the failure of the USA to join the League was “to
widen the gulf between British and French attitudes towards the peace and thus
to contribute to their fatal inability to act together when the great
challenges to the League came in the 1930s”.
In the end all these
men’s individual aspirations and achievements were overborne by events over
which governments and their members had no control: the Wall Street Crash and
the Great Depression that followed it, although the preoccupation of those
Governments with balanced budgets and “sound money” undoubtedly made matters
much worse than they need have been.
The Manchurian
episode and the League of Nations
An important
development, on which I based a recent Seminar in China, took
place in September 1931 on the other side of the world and was the first of
the acts of aggression that were to destroy the League of Nations’ credibility
because it could not prevent or reverse them. On the pretext that Chinese
saboteurs had tried to sabotage a Japanese owned extra-territorial railway that
ran across the province of Manchuria, the Japanese army invaded that province
on 18 September and eventually rechristened it “Manchukuo”.
The source of this
action was the extreme nationalism
of army officers who openly disobeyed the civilian Government in Tokyo. The
Government attempted to control the army and deny the existence of the problem
but the army did not support them: “There now followed weeks of public
embarrassment and secret humiliation for the Wakatsuki
Government. While the army in the field boldly extended the scope of its
operations, Japanese representatives at the League of Nations in Geneva and in
Washington, London and other capitals, declared that these military measures
were only temporary and would soon cease”.10
Fighting then spread
to Shanghai and other parts of China. The League sent an investigatory
commission to Manchuria under Lord Lytton to investigate the situation.
Meanwhile, the Government was increasingly discredited internationally because
of the “blatant contrast between Japanese promises and the actions of Japanese
troops spreading fan-like through Manchuria led the world to suppose that the
cabinet in Tokyo had adopted a policy of deliberate chicanery and deceit. This
was not so. What was happening was the breakdown of co-ordination between the
civil and military wings of the Japanese structure of state power.11 When the
Lytton Committee reported it condemned Japan for an act of aggression, although
it found many Japanese grievances to be justified. The Lytton Report was
adopted by the League, “whereupon Japan, much to the private anguish of the
emperor, flounced out of the League”.12
The League of Nations
sought to restrain Japan through sanctions and sought Article 16 intervention
but it was unable to do so because the major power in the Pacific was the USA.
She has always regarded the Pacific rather than the Atlantic as her mare nostrum
but she was not a League member and was not inclined to get involved in taking
action against Japan because of growing isolationist sentiment in Congress and
among the public. Also she was disinclined to put at risk her trade with
Japan.13 The only other Power with major forces in South-East Asia was Britain,
who was also not inclined to use force against the Japanese. Taylor 14
commented that “The only Power with any stake in the Far East was Great
Britain; and action was to be least expected from the British at the exact
moment when they were being forced off the gold standard and facing a
contentious general election. In any case, even Great Britain, though a Far
Eastern Power, had no means of action”. So was executed the first act of naked
aggression by one of the future Axis powers and thus was the frailty of the
League exposed for all to see. The League was similarly ineffective when the
Chinese appealed for help after the Sino-Japanese war broke out in 1937 but by
then its credibility had been further damaged by Mussolini’s invasion of
Abyssinia and the League’s abject failure to stop it.
Hence by the end of
1931, the European and worldwide situation was looking increasingly unstable,
with the anti-system parties in Germany steadily gaining seats in the Reichstag
and the French unsympathetic to German demands for relief from reparations. And
whereby the above mentioned Reparations Conference at Lausanne which finally
resolved this problem had to be postponed from early 1932 to June and July. The
Japanese invasion of Manchuria was another cloud on the horizon because it was
a grave challenge to the credibility of the League of Nations.
1. Patricia O'Toole,
The Moralist: Woodrow Wilson and the World He Made, 2018, p. 384
2. A. Bullock,
Hitler: A Study in Tyranny. Connecticut, 1962, p. 176
3. Richard Bessel,
"Why did the Weimar Republic collapse?", in Ian Kershaw (ed.),
Weimar: why did democracy fail?, pp. 126–27.
4. A. L. Rowse, All Souls and Appeasement: A Contribution to
Contemporary History,1961, p. 110
5. See for example
William R. Keylor, Versailles, and International
Diplomacy, pp. 501–02; Also Stephen Schuker, American
"Reparations."
6. Schuker, op. cit., pp. 10–11.
7. Elizabeth Wiskemann, The Europe I Saw, 1968, p. 53.
8. A. Lentin, Lloyd George,
Clemenceau and the Elusive Anglo-French Guarantee Treaty, 1919. In A. Sharp
& G. Stone (Eds.), Anglo-French Relations in the Twentieth Century: Rivalry
and Co-operation (pp. 104– 119). London: Routledge, 2000.
9. R. Henig, Britain,
France and the League of Nations in the 1920s. In A. Sharp & G. Stone
(Eds.), Anglo-French Relations. London: Routledge, 2000, p.147.
10. R. Storry, A History of Modern Japan, 1963, p. 188.
11. ibid. p. 189
12. ibid. p. 193
13. A. J. P. Taylor, The
Course of German History, 1961, p. 63
14. ibid pp. 62– 63.
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