By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers
Modern
History of Islamic Egypt
Founded in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna the Muslim Brotherhood (al-lichwan al-Muslimun) initially in
Egypt itself combined two elements—reforming Islam and fighting colonialism.
The Muslim Brotherhood’s strategy was a novel one as it aimed to create a
popular movement that would rely on reforming Islam to create a social
revolution. During the 1930s and 1940s then, the brotherhood’s idea revolved
around the desire to rebuild the caliphate, increasingly sidelining those
voices who advocated a nationalist strategy based on reforming Arab states
independently. The new strategy entailed the indoctrination of younger
generations, but also the decision to find a modus vivendi with the existing
political order of Arab states.1
In October 1940, representatives of the Free Arabs signed an Axis-Arab
Manifesto of Liberation in Berlin. Both Hitler and Mussolini expressed strong
support for an independent, united Arab nation. Members of the Muslim
Brotherhood thus would often say prayers for an Axis victory during their
meetings. This included rumors that Benito Mussolini was an Egyptian Muslim
whose real name was Musa Nili (Moses of the Nile) and that Adolf Hitler too had
secretly converted to Islam and bore the name Hayder, or "the brave
one." 2
Reflecting this connection the Muslim Brotherhood also disseminated
Hitler’s Mein Kampf and The Protocols of the Elders of Zion widely in Arab
translations, helping to deepen and extend already existing hostile views about
Jews and secular Western societies generally.3
Beginning in the 1950s in Egypt, a new phase began for the Muslim
Brotherhood when the movement clashed head on with Arab governments in places
like Jordan, Egypt, and later Syria—countries that had come under the influence
of Gamal abd-el Nasser’s hybrid form of socialism and
pan-Arabism. The influence of conservative Islam in Egyptian public life was
greatly abetted by the changing orientation of state elites that began in the
1970's. By using Islam as a basis of nationalist legitimacy, both Sadat and current
Egyptian President Mubarak, abandoned the earlier commitments to secular
modernity that marked the Nasser era. It also ereated
an opportunity for conservative activists to promote their vision of Islam in
public life.
Becoming a member of the Muslim Brotherhood is a five- to eight-year
process. You ascend through five levels and you get tested at each level.
Candidates are vetted over their commitment to the Brotherhood’s ideological
principles -- whether they are really religious and, most importantly, if they
are willing to take orders from the Brotherhood's central leadership.
The leadership of the Muslim Brotherhood supported the new government of
Gamal Abdel Nasser until it became apparent that he had no intention of
founding an Islamic government. Both Nasser and his chief assistant, Anwar
Sadat, had made contact with the Muslim Brotherhood before their seizure of
power in July 1952. By the early 1950s, the Muslim Brotherhood had two million
members scattered throughout the Muslim world, but most of its political
strength remained in Egypt. The leadership formed a terrorist branch, the
Secret Organ, to carry out assassinations against political leaders opposing
its policies. Nasser's settlement in 1954 of a Suez Canal dispute caused the
leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood to attempt an assassination of Nasser in
Alexandria, Egypt, on October 26, 1954, but they failed. The Egyptian
government arrested Hodeibi and other leaders.
Several of the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood were executed and over 4,000
were arrested and imprisoned. After the Nasser government banned the Muslim Brotherhood,
both leaders and members went underground. It was at this time that the
influence of Sayyid Qutb became the dominant
philosophy in the Muslim Brotherhood. In his book, Signposts Along the Road,
and other writings, he declared perpetual religious war (iihad)
against all religions other than Islam and against the Nasser government. Quth and other leader, of the Muslim Brotherhood were
arrested tortured, and executed in 1965.
The encounter between the remnants of the Muslim Brotherhood with the
Saudi Salafi-Wahhabist scholars—many of whom were
opposed to the Saudi regime’s modernist trend—gave rise to a new form of
Salafism that combined a puritan notion of Islam with the militant dimension of
the salaf—the generation of the prophet and his
companions. Faisal’s embrace of Salafi pan-Islamism resulted in
cross-pollination between ibn Abd al-Wahhab’s teachings on tawhid, shirk and bid’a and Salafi interpretations of ahadith.
Some Salafis nominated ibn Abd al-Wahhab as one of the Salaf (retrospectively
bringing Wahhabism into the fold of Salafism), and the Muwahideen
began calling themselves Salafis. Many Saudi and other Arab scholars who
adopted this militant form of Salafism taught or studied at these Saudi
institutions. They included, most famously, Abdallah Azzam and Abu Muhammad
al-Maqdisi, both of whom would later play a key role in the formulation of
global jihadi doctrine.The 1980s and early 1990s
witnessed a number of key historical events—the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan,
the Iran-Iraq war, the first Palestinian intifada of 1987, and the U.S.presence in Saudi Arabia—which had a profound impact on
the future trajectory of the Salafi movement. On one hand, these events
promoted the rise of more politically minded Salafis in Saudi Arabia like Safar
al-Hawali and Salman al-Awdah.
They represented a younger generation of Salafi scholars who distanced
themselves from the older, more traditional and purist generation of Salafis who
opted to stay out of politics and were more concerned with religious questions.4
By 1980 the Brotherhood had become an international organization
represented in more than 50 countries worldwide, and by 2006 72 countries.
For example in France, the Union des Organisations
Islamiques de France (Union of Islamic Organizations
of France) has become the predominant organization in the government's Islamic
Council. In Italy, the Unione delle
Comunita' ed Organizzazioni
Islamiche in Italia (Union of the Islamic Communities
and Organizations in Italy) is the government's prime partner in dialogue
regarding Italian Islamic issues.
According to an article in Time, Nov. 2, 2003, parallel to European
Union integration efforts, the Muslim Brotherhood is also seeking to integrate
its various European proxies. Over the past fifteen years, the Muslim
Brotherhood has created a series of pan-European organizations such as the
Federation of Islamic Organizations in Europe, in which representatives from
national organizations can meet and plan initiatives.
Perhaps the Muslim Brotherhood's greatest pan-European impact has, as
with the Islamische Gemeinschaft Deutschland, been
with its youth organization. In June 1996, Muslim youth organizations from
Sweden, France, and England joined forces with the Federation of Islamic
Organizations in Europe and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth to create a
European Islamic youth organization. Three months later, thirty-five delegates
from eleven countries met in Leicester and formally launched the Forum of
European Muslim Youth and Student Organizations (FEMYSO), which maintains its
headquarters in Brussels.
Ibrahim el-Zayat, who held the presidency
until his commitments in Germany forced him to step down, even used the FEMYSO
perch to address the European Parliament. Because the Muslim Brotherhood
provides the bulk of FEMYSO's constituent organizations, it provides the
"de facto voice of the Muslim youth in Europe." While FEMYSO claims
that it "is committed to fighting prejudices at all the levels, so that
the future of Europe is a multicultural, inclusive and respectful one,"such statements ring hollow given the position of
sponsors like the World Assembly of Muslim Youth which believes that "the
Jews are enemies of the faithful, God, and the Angels; the Jews are humanity's
enemies. … Every tragedy that inflicts the Muslims is caused by the Jews."
Bassam Tibi, a German professor of Syrian descent and an expert on Islam
in Europe, thinks that Europeans—and Germans in particular—fear the accusation
of racism. Radicals in sheep's clothing have learned that they can silence
almost everybody with the accusation of xenophobia. Thus any criticism of
Muslim Brotherhood-linked organizations is followed by outcries of racism and
anti-Muslim persecution.5
The most dynamic and deadly offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood is Hamas.
Only after the outbreak of the Intefada 1987 was the
Muslim Brotherhood formed into the political entity that carries out a
terrorism war against Israel. At the same time that Hamas
was launching war with Israel it was also establishing schools, hospitals,
mosques, and other services in the Gaza Strip and in the West Bank. Hamas's
popularity among Palestians comes from a combination
of its orientation, war against Israel, social services that it provides. See
Banna, Hassan; Hamas (Haara Muqawama al-Islami)
(Islamic Rev Movement).
Some sensation caused a document found by the Swiss authorities in 2001
at the home of a senior Brotherhood financier. The Arabic document, dated
December 1982 and widely known as “The Project”, a Muslim Brotherhood plan to
bring Europe under Sharia law. It initially was part of the charter of the
international organization of the Muslim Brotherhood, which was official
established on July 29, 1982. It reflects a vast plan which was revived in the
1960s, with the immigration of Brotherhood intellectuals, principally Syrian
and Egyptians, into Europe.
Sylvain Besson was the first western author to write about it in his
book and a related article published in the Swiss daily, Le Temps, L'islamisme
à la conquête du monde (Islamism and the Conquest
of the World), profiling his book, which is only available in a French-language
edition. Today, some authors regard it as the movement's strategy for
global dominion, while others see it as a mundane ‘wish list’.
The conclusion of most scholars on the subject today is that the Muslim
Brotherhood doesn't function like other political parties and is unlikely to
moderate its long-held extremist views. It is a nationwide pyramid-shaped
hierarchy in which top leaders are able to quickly disseminate orders down to
cells, which are called families. It has vetted its members for their
commitment to the cause and their willingness to follow leaders' orders. It is
also an organization that can move people with the efficiency of the military.
As an example of the kind of radicalism the Brotherhood continues to publicle engage in, on Dec. 22, 2005, the leader of Egypt's
Muslim Brotherhood stated that the Holocaust
was a "myth" and denounced Western governments for criticizing
those who say the Jewish genocide did not happen.
The Interior Minister of Saudi Arabia, Prince Naif Ibn Abdul Aziz has
stated that the Muslim Brotherhood organization was the cause of most problems
in the Arab world. 'The Brotherhood has done great damage to Saudi Arabia,' he
said. Prince Naif accused the foremost Islamist group in the Arab world of
harming the interests of Muslims. 'All our problems come from the Muslim
Brotherhood. We have given too much support to this group..." "The
Muslim Brotherhood has destroyed the Arab world,' he said. 'Whenever they got
into difficulty or found their freedom restricted in their own countries,
Brotherhood activists found refuge in the Kingdom which protected their
lives... But they later turned against the Kingdom...' The Muslim Brotherhood
has links to groups across the Arab world, including Jordan's main
parliamentary opposition, the 'Islamic Action Front,' and the 'Palestinian
resistance movement, 'Hamas."(*)
It was only in the 1930s that pan-Arab ideologues came to consider Egypt
an integral and important part of the "Arab nation." Sati al-Husri even argued that, by virtue of its size, geographic
location, and illustrious past, Egypt was destined to spearhead the Arab quest
for unity. This theme struck a responsive chord among intellectuals and
politicians within Egypt, where King Farouq (1937-52), himself of non-Arab
stock, invested considerable energies in establishing himself as the leader of
all Arabs, if not the caliph of all Muslims. Yet it would not be until Gamal
Abdel Nasser's rise to absolute power in the mid-1950s that Egypt became
synonymous with the Arab imperial dream: Egypt p.1
.
State actors in Egypt appeal to Islam in order to situate their rule within
a broader framework of moral order, and to tie the Egyptian public to its
political leaders in a web of rights and duties defmed
by religious obligation. The significance, and viability, of this approach is
based upon the majority population's continuing identification with, and belief
in, Islam. Despite the perceived 'secular' quality of the Egyptian state and
its leaders, it has never, in fact, broken with its religious moorings,
preferring instead a time honored use of 'official Islam' to sanction political
authority. Even during Gamal Abd' al-Nasser's rule (case study above), the
modernizing state never sought to eradicate religious belief. Rather, the
regime appealed to a more modernist interpretation of Islam in order to
challenge traditional elites and to sanctify its socialist program of
development. Egypt p.2 .
It should not be said that Islamists promoted a fascist concept of
state. However, especially after the visit by Baldur von Schirach
(as leader of German youth) to the Midlle-East in
1937, paramilitary youth organizations became a popular phenomenon. These
authoritarian structure, fascist slogans, and contacts with Germans and
Italians, and their presence in NSDAP rallies (together with politicians) in
Nuremberg were in fact a source of anxiety for the British and the French.
British government also sent a special commission headed by Earl Peel to
investigate the matter. In its report of 1937, the commission proposed
termination of the mandate and partition of Palestine (one-fifth of the land to
go as a Jewish state, an Arab state in the rest of the country, and minor areas
remaining under British mandate, in addition to Transjordan. Egypt p.3 .
The Islamic discourse that now dominates in Egypt has demonstrated intolerant
and exclusive tendencies, and as such does not provide the kind of pluralist
basis for a what is in fact a diverse society. How this affects Egypt's future
remains to be seen, though it is likely that the two opposing elements of
Egyptian culture-the secular intellectual and conservative Islamic-will
continue to clash. If the state is able to improve economic well-being,
increase political participation or otherwise generate alternative sources of
legitimacy, its dependency upon religious politics may diminish, and the
influence of conservative Islam may lessen. The irony, of course, is that any
effort to genuinely open the political arena will seriously threaten the
existence of the regime, since free elections would likely benefit the Islamist
opposition. In other words, the state has limited its options by embracing
conservative Islam as a source of legitimacy. Egypt
p.4.
1 Trevor Stanley, "Understanding the Origins of Wahhabism and
Salafism," Terrorism Monitor 3, no. 14, 15 July 2005.
2 Amir Taheri, Holy Terror: Inside the World of Islamic Terrorism, 1987,
p. 50.
3 Klaus-Michael Mallmann and Martin
Cüppers, Halbmond und Hakenkreuz: Das ‘Dritte Reich’, 2006.
4 Q.Wiktorowicz, "Anatomy of the Salafi
Movement," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Volume 29, Number 3,
April-May 2006, pp 222-24.
5 Bassam Tibi, Islamische Zuwanderung,
Die gescheiterte Integration Munich, 2002, p. 135.
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