The popular uprising against Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak that has turned Cairo’s Tahrir Square into a giant tent city, and which features large demonstrations across the country will almost surely continue, but they would have to grow in size and frequency in order to change Egypt’s current situation.

The military-backed National Democratic Party (NDP) regime is in the early phases of a process aimed at moving the country into a post-Mubarak transitional period. Led by new Vice President and former intelligence chief Omar Suleiman, the regime is negotiating with the many opposition groups seeking a share in the still-unformed transitional government. The regime wants this transition to be orderly, while the opposition is pushing for more rapid and dramatic change. Suleiman’s strategy is thus focused on keeping the opposition divided and dragging out the negotiations process as long as possible in hopes that he can prevent a strong coalition from emerging that could challenge the military’s hold on power.

The key figures managing the transition besides Suleiman are Defense Minister Field Marshal Hussein Tantawi, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces Lt. Gen. Sami Annan and Prime Minister and former air force chief Ahmed Shafiq. This “old guard” of the Egyptian military appears to have agreed that it wants a legitimized and orderly succession. This is motivated by a desire to have time to divide up personal financial interests, avoid tasking the military with overtly governing the country and ensure that any infusion of democracy does not result in the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood winning an election outright. This explains why Suleiman has repeatedly rejected calls for Mubarak’s immediate deposal; such a move likely would entail a slew of constitutional amendments that would need to be negotiated before fresh elections, which would be legally required within 60 days. This likely would create chaos in Egypt.

Dealing with the Opposition’s Main Demand

The most pressing problem for the regime is that the core demand of all Egyptian opposition groups is still Mubarak’s immediate resignation. Suleiman and Shafiq have both been extremely clear that this is not an option, but the opposition has refused to budge. This forces the regime to give the protesters enough concessions to convince them to participate in negotiations while not appearing weak by giving in, a difficult task in the face of continuing protests.

Rumors today that Mubarak could be sent to Germany soon for medical treatment could be a way for the regime to get around this problem. If Mubarak were to become a figurehead president of Egypt ensconced in a German hospital room, the opposition groups would then lose the one point that currently unites them. Trying to agree on a common vision for Egypt’s future is much more difficult than rallying around the removal of Mubarak, and it is likely that the protest movement would lose momentum as a result, especially as a growing number of Egyptians want to see the country return to normal. Mubarak’s going to a foreign country for medical treatment would be a boon to Suleiman, as it would prevent him from having to openly cave to opposition demands, and it would place the most public symbol of the opposition’s discontent outside the country.

Divisions Within the Opposition

Manufacturing divisions within the opposition is not something the regime necessarily needs help with, as the multiple groups united by their discontent with Mubarak are quite adept at achieving disunity on their own. There is no overall leader among the opposition’s ranks, nor is there a common vision for the future. The various opposition groups might have common ground on the simple demand that Mubarak leave office, but even that point has exceptions, as evidenced by a proposal from the self-appointed council of opposition members called the “Wise Men,” which asked Suleiman to invoke an article of the constitution that would relegate Mubarak to a ceremonial role and give Suleiman executive authority. (Even this suggestion was rejected.)

The first significant round of talks Suleiman held with any of the opposition groups occurred yesterday Feb. 6. The talks included members of smaller opposition parties and a representative of the Wise Men, but more important, Egypt’s largest opposition group, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB), broke from the position it had held throughout the crisis and agreed to attend. Though the MB has subsequently stressed that it was not satisfied with the outcome of the talks, stating that the group retains the right to simply refuse further talks if the regime does not display genuine progress in the negotiations, the mere fact that the MB showed up at all is significant. It was a good sign for the military’s attempts to begin engaging what is likely to become a major political force in Egypt in the coming years.

The Feb. 6 meeting did not produce anything of much substance. Suleiman rejected the calls for Mubarak to step down. He did, however, promise to establish a constitutional reform committee that would propose revisions to portions of the constitution that deal with restrictions on presidential candidates by the first week of March. The most important outcome of the talks, though, was that they proved that Suleiman’s strategy may be successful in the end. While groups such as the MB and other more marginal players were there, there was no one from the most well-known youth protest movements in attendance, and Mohammed ElBaradei, seen until recently as the most likely political figurehead for the opposition, was not even invited.

The regime also seems to be manufacturing groups that it can brand as representatives of the youth protest movement. The most ardent opponents of any kind of concessions to the regime thus far have been the youth groups, such as the April 6 Movement, and the tens of thousands who came out onto the streets Jan. 25 after being urged to do so by the Facebook group page “We Are All Khaled Said.” (The Khaled Said group page administrator was recently revealed to be an Egyptian Google executive named Wael Ghonim, who was arrested Jan. 28 by security services and released today Feb. 7, becoming a hero to the protest movement in the process.) Suleiman knows he must include sectors of this demographic in any talks for them to be considered legitimate, which explains the strange reports of a previously unknown youth group called the January 25 Movement sending six representatives to meet with the vice president Feb. 6 in talks held after the main negotiations. State-owned media reported that the January 25 Movement had agreed to allow Mubarak to stay in office until September, a clear break from the opposition’s consensus. Though one of the members of this cadre was later quoted as saying he did not represent the masses of protesters on the streets, the message the regime intended to send by including them was that all cross sections of Egyptian society are being represented in the negotiations. The April 6 Movement responded shortly thereafter by announcing the formation of a new umbrella group of youth protest movements known as the “Coalition of the Angry Youth Uprising.” The April 6 Movement said, “The people who negotiated with Suleiman only represent themselves,” and that “all the youth organizations are united in their position: No negotiations until Mubarak’s departure.”

The regime has also continued to deploy internal security forces to intimidate and arrest members of these opposition groups while simultaneously calling for talks. This is unlikely to stop in the near future, as the two tactics — instilling fear and confusion and building trust — go hand in hand as part of the regime’s overall strategy of keeping the opposition off balance.

Problems Ahead

The military’s main objective is to preserve as much of the post-Mubarak regime as it can. It prefers to do this from behind the scenes rather than overtly. Though moves are being made to disassociate the regime from the Mubarak name as much as possible, the military needs a political vehicle that can replace the ruling NDP to keep a check on incoming opposition forces, such as the MB. This could come in the form of a repackaged NDP, replete with a new name and stripped of the Mubaraks and those most associated with their rule, or through a coalition of opposition forces that the military feels it can control.

The existing regime knows it will not be able to simply sideline the opposition as it has done in the past. Things have changed permanently in Egypt as a result of the protests and the resulting political fallout. But while it shapes a political opening, the regime has an interest in keeping the nebulous opposition as fractured as possible.


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