Al Qaeda,
the group established by Osama bin Laden and his colleagues, was never very
large -- there were never more than a few hundred actual members. We often
refer to this group, and since the recent dead of bin
Laden led by Ayman al-Zawahiri, as the al Qaeda core or al Qaeda
prime. While the group's founders trained tens of thousands of men at their
camps in Afghanistan and Sudan, they initially viewed themselves as a vanguard
organization working with kindred groups to facilitate the jihad they believed
was necessary to establish a global Islamic caliphate. Most of the men trained
at al Qaeda camps were members of other organizations or were grassroots
jihadists. The majority of them received basic paramilitary training, and only
a select few were invited to receive additional training in terrorist
tradecraft skills such as surveillance, document forgery and bomb making. Of
this select group, only a few men were invited to join the al Qaeda core
organization.
Bin
Laden envisioned another purpose for al Qaeda: leading the charge against
corrupt rulers in the Muslim world and against the United States, which he
believed supported corrupt Muslim rulers. Al Qaeda sought to excise the United
States from the Muslim world in much the same way that Hezbollah drove U.S.
forces out of Lebanon and Somalia forced the U.S. withdrawal from Mogadishu.
Al
Qaeda became a network of networks -- a trait demonstrated not only by its
training methods but also in bin Laden's rhetoric. For example, bin Laden's
1998 "World Islamic Front" statement, which declared jihad against
Jews and Crusaders, was signed by al-Zawahiri (who at
the time was leading the Egyptian Islamic Jihad) and
leaders of other groups, including the Egyptian Islamic Group, Jamiat-ul-Ulema-e-Pakistan
and the Jihad Movement of Bangladesh.
Following
the 9/11 attacks, the United States applied against the al Qaeda core the full
pressure of its five counterterrorism levers: intelligence, military, law
enforcement, diplomacy and financial sanctions. As a result, many al Qaeda
members, eventually including bin Laden, were captured or killed and their
assets were frozen. Such measures have ensured that the group remains small for
operational security concerns. The remaining members of the group mostly are
lying low in Pakistan near the Afghan border, and their isolation there has
severely degraded their ability to conduct attacks. The al Qaeda core is now
relegated to producing propaganda for guidance and inspiration for other
jihadist elements. Despite the disproportionate amount of media attention given
to statements from al-Zawahiri and Adam Gadahn, the al Qaeda core constitutes only a very small
part of the larger jihadist movement. In fact, it has not conducted a
successful terrorist attack in years.
However,
the core group has not been destroyed. It could regenerate if the United States
eased its pressure, but we believe that will be difficult given the loss of the
charismatic bin Laden and his replacement by the irascible al-Zawahiri.
Franchises
and Grassroots
An
element of the jihadist movement that is often loosely referred to as al Qaeda
is the worldwide network of local or regional militant groups that have assumed
al Qaeda's name or ideology. In many cases, the relationships between the
leadership of these groups and the al Qaeda core began in the 1980s and 1990s.
Some
groups have publicly claimed allegiance to the al Qaeda core, becoming what we
refer to as franchise groups. These groups include al Qaeda in Iraq, al Qaeda
in the Islamic Maghreb and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. Even though these
franchises bear the al Qaeda name, they are locally owned and operated. This
means that the local commanders have significant latitude in how closely they
follow the guidance and philosophy of the al Qaeda core.
Some
franchise group leaders, such as AQAP's Nasir al-Wahayshi, maintain strong relationships with the al Qaeda
core and are very closely aligned with the core's philosophy. Other leaders,
such as Abu Musab Abd al-Wadoud of AQIM, are more distanced. In fact, AQIM has seen
severe internal fighting over these doctrinal issues, and several former
leaders of Algeria's Salafist Group for Preaching and
Combat left the group because of this conflict.
The
last and broadest element of the global jihadist movement often referred to as
al Qaeda is the grassroots jihadists. These are individuals or small cells of
individuals that are inspired by the al Qaeda core -- or increasingly, by its
franchise groups -- but that may have little or no actual connection to these
groups. Some grassroots jihadists travel to
places such as Pakistan or Yemen to receive training from the franchise groups.
Other grassroots militants have no direct contact with other jihadist elements.
The
core, the franchises and the grassroots jihadists are often interchangeably
referred to as al Qaeda, but there are important differences among these actors
that need to be recognized.
Important
Distinctions
There
are some other important distinctions that inform our terminology and our
analysis. Not all jihadists are linked to al Qaeda, and not all militant
Islamists are jihadists. Islamists are those who believe society is best
governed by Islamic law, or Sharia. Militant
Islamists are those who advocate the use of force to establish Sharia. Militant Islamists are found in both Islamic sects.
Al Qaeda is a Sunni militant Islamist group, but Hezbollah is a Shiite militant
Islamist group. Moreover, not all militant Muslims are Islamists. Some take up
arms for tribal, territorial, ethnic or nationalistic reasons, or for a
combination of reasons.
In
places such as Iraq, Afghanistan, Yemen, Libya and northern Mali, several
militant groups are fighting foreign forces, their government or each other --
and sometimes all of the above. Some of these groups are jihadists, some are
tribal militias, some are brigands and smugglers, and others are nationalists.
Identifying, sorting and classifying these groups can be very difficult, and
sometimes alliances shift or overlap. For example, Yemen's southern separatists
will sometimes work with tribal militias or AQAP to fight against the government;
other times, they fight against these would-be allies. We have seen similar
dynamics in northern Mali among groups such as AQIM, Ansar
Dine, the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa, various Tuareg groups and other tribal militias in the region.
Militant
Islamists have seized the opportunity to grow in influence in such places, as
have the subset of militant Islamists we call jihadists. So in this context,
while the al Qaeda core has been crippled, other portions of the jihadist
movement are thriving. This is especially so among those that
aspire to mount local insurgencies rather than those more concerned with
planning transnational attacks. The nuances are important because as the
composition and objectives of jihadist groups change, so do their methods of
attack.
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In
2005, 53% of all groups employing SAs were Salafi-Jihadist
in nature. Global Jihad P.2. |
Strategy
and Goals of al Qaeda. Global
Jihad P.3. From Local to Global Jihad. Global Jihad P.4. |
A
Second Look at the Salafi Movement. Global Jihad P.5. Al Qaeda’s Adaptive
Strategy and Iraq. Global
Jihad P.6. |