For a general overview of the Chinese Dynasties see:
Initially comparing this with a case study about Rome and France I traced the evolution of transborder sovereignty over the course of China’s longest lasting dynasty, the Zhou Dynasty which lasted from roughly 1000 BC to 221 BC. During the course of the Zhou Dynasty as compared with the case studies about Rome and early Europe, it was shown how feudal states in China were more autonomous, had no overlapping, cross-cutting authorities, and had strong territorial markers. And that during the course of the Zhou Dynasty we see a shift from transbordersovereignty to absolute sovereignty with the Warring States Period representing a transitional phase to imperial China. From the age of Confucius onward, the Chinese people in general and their political thinkers, in particular, began to think about political matters in terms of the world. And that absolute sovereignty, as a principle, had existed prior to the first Qin emperor. The essential structure of the ideological subsystem at the beginning of the Zhou dynasty was built on a two-fold distinction. One tenet held the centrality of the king and the Mandate of Heaven to legitimize his rule. The second tenet held the centrality of law and order variously derived as the overarching legitimating factor for any given ruler. Thus ancient China showed us a highly structured feudalism, a territorially bound state that struggled to develop a bureaucracy to govern it, and a nation rich in tradition before a state, as started to be the case during the Qin, could grow powerful enough to govern it. I next proceed with: The concept of Han Chinese.
As the Zhou began to consolidate and take power from the Shang, King Wen, leader of the Zhou contended that the Mandate of Heaven had passed from the dissolute and dissipated Shang kings to him by virtue of his virtue. While we may acknowledge that the Shang had become corrupt and that the Zhou was likely a more vigorous people, the moral authority to depose the Shang was somewhat dubious. In battle, the Zhou probably employed a superior combination of strategy and tactics in the critical confrontations that took place during this transitional period.
The Shang believed that the kingship fell from brother to brother and then to subsequent generations. The pre-existing ideological order had to shift significantly so that another set of rulers could claim that the Mandate of Heaven had shifted authority to them. It is from this shift that we can begin to detect the beginnings of Zhou sovereign principles. Walker notes, that, “Traditional history reports that the [Zhou] conqueror and his successors set up 1,773 states in the area where the [Zhou] established their power.”1
It was actually King Wu, Wen’s son, and later Cheng, Wu’s son, who consolidated much of the territory that was to be distributed. By the time Qin rose to power in 221 BC the number of states was down to seven. Nonetheless, we find that as a means to power, and as a result of power, King Wen and his descendants were plenty throughout the Yangtze and Yellow River Valleys. Hsu and Linduff are particularly mindful of the relative weakness of the Zhou at this point of conquest: The [Zhou] had accomplished the nearly impossible task of allying and uniting the semi-independent and independent powers of north China. The small armed force that they controlled directly was not strong enough to hold the vast territory by force. Part of their solution was to maintain ties established by the Shang and to legitimate them through moral decree. 2
There was thus at the very beginning a basis for rule based upon moral superiority. The Mandate of Heaven provided a basis for negotiations that would inevitably need to take place given the fact that the Zhou lacked the coercive power to enforce submission. But how did they maintain control over so many independent states? And, since we know that consolidation took place rather frequently-consolidation must have occurred frequently to arrive 500 years later at the 130 or states that began that Chunqiu period instead of the thousand or so that existed at the beginning of the Zhou dynasty-under what principles did the consolidation take place?
While Shang had been conquered by Wen and his son Wu, the Shang territory had not been brought under the dominion of Zhou rule until the rule of Cheng. Cheng’s ascension to the throne was interrupted by the meddling of Wu’s brother, Zhou Gong Dan, because Cheng was still in his minority. A civil war subsequently erupted between Zhou Gong Dan and his brothers. The battle over succession rights came to also involve the remaining Shang power, Wu Geng. Wu Geng sided with Zhou Gong Dan. Zhou Gong Dan triumphed, but Shang would never be a threat to the Zhou kings again. In the early portion of Cheng’s rule, Zhou Gong Dan acted as the de facto regent. Some scholars credit Zhou Gong Dan with the creation of Chinese feudalism while others contend that he actually supported a meritocracy. Cheng and Zhou Gong Dan’s victory not only secured the eastern portion of the new kingdom for Zhou domination it also legitimized the process by which the mandate would be passed along. King Cheng received the mandate, but was dependent upon Zhou Gong Dan and his half-brother Shao Gong Shi for legitimacy, and indeed was more puppet than prince.3
Once Cheng came of age the debate-captured in the Book of History (Shu Jing)-between Zhou Gong Shi and Shao Gong Shi over the nature of the mandate established the principle of rule for much of the Western Zhou period into the beginning of the Chunqiu period. In it Zhou Gong Shi supports a meritocracy while Shao Gong Shi believes that heaven bestows legitimacy upon the eldest son regardless of merit. King Cheng sided with Shao Gong Shi. In so doing Cheng established a hereditary principle of rule that bound all feudal lords to him and his kin while making merit-based claims more or less illegitimate.
In feudal treaties medieval France the fealty of a vassal was contingent upon the time and place and the nature of the conflict. It was not unusual for a vassal to have to commit troops to both sides of a conflict. In contrast, in ancient China, we find enfeoffed elites in Zhou strictly bound by pre-ordained laws and regulations. For example, the hierarchy of royalty is laid out in the first line of the first verse of book three: According to the regulations of emolument and rank framed by the kings, there were the duke; the marquis; the earl; the count; and the baron: in all. Five gradations (of rank). There were (also), in the feudal states, Great officers of the highest grade, the ministers; and Great officers of the lowest grade; officers of the highest, the middle, and the lowest grades: in all five gradations (of office).4
Laid out as such with five ranks and five offices universally applied we find something far more hierarchical and consistent than France where titles were varied more according to local custom and historical circumstance. The section immediately following the description of rank and office establishes that land granted to the son of Heaven (the king) and all lower feudal ranks. While it was possible for elites to be enfeoffed multiple times to gain lands, the allotment of each was predetermined. In fact it was quite common for feudal lords to trade various lands amongst each other within the preordained limits. The trade of the lands was itself strictly regulated by the king and his ministers.
However, the rites and rituals bound the king as much as the vassals. For example, in the case of the ritual hunt, held three times a year:
23. Not to hunt when there was no (special) business in the way was deemed an act of irreverence. To hunt without observing the rules (for hunting) was deemed cruelty to the creates of HeavenHowever, the rites and rituals bound the king as much as the vassals. For example, in the case of the ritual hunt, held three times a year:
23. Not to hunt when there was no (special) business in the way was deemed an act of irreverence. To hunt without observing the rules (for hunting) was deemed cruelty to the creates of Heaven 24. The son of Heaven did not entirely surround (the hunting ground); and a feudal prince did not take a (whole) herd by surprise.5
Presumably, the regulations of verse 24 reflect specifically on the moral grounds established in verse 23. The king, the son of Heaven was bound by ritual and decree to hunt in a sporting manner, that is, to give the prey a chance to escape. Even if we grant that such regulations were developed after the fact and represent some sort of agreement between the king and his vassals, we must nonetheless consider instances in which the Mandate of Heaven overruled norms of religious propriety. For example, King Wu’s initial war against Shang was based upon auspicious omens which contradicted accepted norms. Wu’s father Wen had died and custom held that Wu was supposed to accompany his father’s corpse home. However, before mourning the death of his father Wen, we read that he used turtle shell divination and found the omens promising and thus felt obliged to attack.6 The conflict then between omens from heaven and regulations determining behavior is thus present at the very beginning of the Zhou dynasty. Omens overruled norms in this case. Therefore when we read in the Book of Documents (Section II, verses 10 & 11) that the king is bound to consult with others before placing individuals in offices we must assume that such rules, and thus hierarchies were coequal with the boundaries of the Zhou dynasty if they did not exceed them in the first place. The Book of Rites notes that: 10: The rule was that the abilities of all put into offices over the people should first be discussed. After they had been discussed with discrimination, the men were employed. When they had been (proved) in the conduct of affairs, their rank was assigned; and when their position was (thus) fixed, they received a salary. 11: It was in the court that rank was conferred, the (already existing) officers being (thus) associated in the act.7
Officers of the royal court were able to vouch for capabilities of other potential officers.8 Furthermore, the marriage of rank and office was open to, at the very least, input from the lesser nobles. The Mandate of Heaven suggests a hierarchy that exists based strongly on the ideological subsystem.
The Zhou sovereign principle contended that ‘Place (in terms of rank and office) is determined by regulations and regimentation is determined by ritual.’ This is clearly different than both the hierarchical sovereignty of Rome and the bartered sovereignty of feudal Europe. A common identity exists among and between the feudal states. It is on the one hand determined by a strict regimentation of land grants and offices conferred by the king—in consultation with other officers of the court—and on the other hand regulated by the laws of heaven. While one might be outside the bounds of the terrestrial regimentation, one was never outside of the celestial regulation. Let me be quite explicit here that this is not a common Chinese identity. The Chinese identity, an idea of China as a territory were quite a ways off. This is instead an ideological role structure based on kinship and rank and land-holding. This is a form of transborder sovereignty. We may understand it both by its ability to transcend Zhou borders, but also by its ability to link feudal states inside the Zhou world order.
The Move East and the Rise of the Ba System
This principle-which we can think of in terms of terrestrial regimentation and celestial regulation-was challenged periodically and over time enforced differently. Ferguson and Mansbach point out that, “The relative isolation in which early Chinese polities and civilization developed meant that a ‘Chinese’ identity and loyalty to the ideal of a united China were rarely at issue. Nevertheless, the aspiration toward unity often flew in the face of the reality of disunity and civil strife.”9
From the onset of the Zhou dynasty in about 1070 BC to the collapse of the Western Zhou rule in 722 BC we find this principle to be rather stable. It is after barbarian invasions-from the north and the west-forced the Zhou capital eastward from Zongahou to Luoyang that the underlying subsystems begin to shift suddenly. In moving eastward the Zhou king Pingwang was too weak to assert the control that he had formerly had—which had been marginal to begin with. The mandate remained in name and ideology, but ceased to regiment and regulate the affairs of the feudal lords. While they remained bound by a common identity and written language, they were now left to openly vie for power within the vacuum left by impotent Zhou king. The Spring and Autumn period was marked by constant and internecine warfare and remarkable intellectual ferment.10
In the beginning of this new intellectual environment we see the rise of the ba (hegemony) system. Yuri Pines, among others, have divided the Spring and Autumn period into three distinct eras.11 In the first from about 722 to 643 the mandate still held significant power among the competing lords. In the second era, from 643 to 546, the ba system became the dominant mode of interaction. The last phase from 546 to 453 saw the collapse of the ba system into a state or near anarchy that hastened the shift towards the Warring States Period. This section with deal with the first two phases of the Chunqiu period and the following section will deal with the last phase.
Hegemony and Heaven
It is during this first portion of the Chunqiu period that many of the intellectual foundations of a shifting sovereign principle were laid. The period between the fall of Western Zhou and the life of Confucius (Kung-fu Tzu) between 551 and 479 BC represent an attractive time to attach to the shift in the sovereign principles. The Warring States Period which began in roughly 403 BC is probably reflective both of the practical exigencies of the time as well as the revolution in ideas that had taken place during the Spring and Autumn Period. Pines contention is that the Confucian revolution that took place in the beginning of the Warring States Period was more reflective of the prior intellectual discourse than a new idea of sovereignty sui generis.12 The variety of innovations that took place during the Warring States Period are more reflective of the sort of competing solutions that characterized early modern Europe. The Spring and Autumn period were the moment when the principle of transborder sovereignty collapsed. The Warring States Period was the period when contending solutions battled it out for supremacy. The growing security subsystem encouraged new contenders to seek new alternative principles of rule, though they would continue to lack the overall power to enforce these new sovereign principles. The centuries following the shift represent the attempt to vie for the power of a unified empire which had only been agreed to in principle prior to that.
After the move to Luoyang, the Zhou kings, who always lacked the logistical ability to enforce peace over great distances, were effectively deposed. Though it could not be blamed on a dissolute corruption, as is often the case in traditional Chinese narratives, the king was weak regardless. His vassals, particularly the Duke of Zheng, Zheng Huan Gong, rose up to claim power in the empire.13 Though he would not claim the title of King, the deference to the Mandate of Heaven had weakened significantly. Other, less Sinitic states, such as Chu to the south were quicker to do away with the formalities of the kingship; their leaders began to refer to themselves as king despite the hierarchy implied by the mandate.14 On the one hand this implies that the sovereign principle had failed utterly and completely. On the other hand the contending states were still bound by some recognition of their common bonds and that domination of one another was somehow crucial to the survival of their own state. This suggests that the anarchy which they entered into was structured à priori by their recognition of each other. The resultant conflict over the leadership of the Zhou empire can be understood in this context. At the point when Duke Zheng began to assume hegemony over the whole of the Zhou system, the empire was still only marginally organized. States were small and segmented, and were mostly centered on walled cities In between the zones of immediate control were numerous non-Zhou peoples.15 As Pines notes, “The ‘state’ was but a network of several walled cities and townships that were ruled from the capital.”16 With the move of the capital that network weakened significantly. There are two significant shifts to the ba system that took place during this period. First, in principle the shift from the mandate of heaven weakened the moral underpinnings of the United Zhou state without undermining the general fact of their unity. This presented a fundamental problem of organization. How does one unite the state without being able to use the Mandate of Heaven as a justification? The moves by Duke Zheng and later Duke Huan of Qi began to provide the template for this. Second, the growing states began to assert their control over their territory. The barbarians that forced the Zhou king to move west were in fact closely related to the nomadic people that interpenetrated the Zhou city-states. There was a direct threat to Zhou power in the midst of the numerous Zhou states. The solution borne out, in particular by Duke Huan, was to absorb the smaller city-states and form larger administrative units. Taken together these two problems and their solutions begin to point the way the next revolution in sovereign principles.
Duke Zheng’s innovation vis-à-vis the Mandate of Heaven was to balance between the order provided by heaven and the exigencies of realpolitik. On the one hand he engaged in base politics as needed, conferring and negotiating when necessary, and conquering and pillaging when necessary as well.17 On the other hand he limited the extent of his actions as he deemed them appropriate. In technical terms he was simultaneously bound by a logic of appropriateness and a logic of consequences.18 It is perhaps more apt, to reflect on the period as characterized by a logic of argumentation in the sense used by Risse.19 The justifications for the order and place of Heaven were brought up and debated in a discursive manner. The evolving ideology of this period did not spring from one individual’s mind, but emerged from a meeting of minds.
Duke Huan picked up Zheng’s solution—though it would continue to evolve—and applied it to the organizational problems of the period. The feudal organization in this period was highly inefficient. It was far more structured than France, but it was nonetheless reliant upon a series of demands falling from the king down through each level of subordinates. Duke Huan’s state of Qi revolutionized the structure of this system by forming administrative units divided by function and not by family. In so doing each function could be isolated and called upon for what issues were necessary. In the process of doing so Qi was able to absorb numerous bordering states while also exerting control over the other powerful states that were beginning to emerge. Where the mandate system was organized by the dual principles of regimentation and regulation, the ba system was organized by the principles of competitive centralization and administrative efficiency. The state with the most efficient allocation of resources and hierarchy derived the right through strategic superiority to demand the fealty of the other states. It was not purely a principle of domination through preponderance. It was also a far more impersonal principle than those discussed earlier in the dissertation. As we shall see in subsequent sections, while this principle came to define numerous possible outcomes the guiding principle of a centralizing hegemony was nevertheless constant. Strategies for centralization and efficiency varied, copycatting was prevalent, but the power of one state over others remained a central tenet of the system. This set of principles was delineated in the first phases of the Spring and Autumn Period.
Jin and Chu
The end of the Chunqiu period was defined almost entirely by the successive hegemonies of Jin and Chu. This section will show how, despite the shifting balance of power the essential sovereign principle remained the same. D. C. Lau points out that in Confucius’ Analects the phrase Heaven’s Mandate (tien ming) is only used twice.20
Pines, argues convincingly that this is because pragmatic politics had eroded the extent to which people could trust in an understandable esoteric world order, “Reliance on Heaven’s justice was not a convincing way of dealing with acute political problems.”21
Lau offers a more subtle reading of this, but one which nonetheless supports this claim. He argues that:
The [Mandate] of Heaven is a moral imperative and, as such, has nothing to do with the agency of Heaven in bringing about what comes to pass. The only development by Confucius’ time was that the [Mandate] of Heaven was no longer confined to the Emperor. Every man was subject to the [Mandate] of Heaven which enjoined him to be moral and it was his duty to live up to the demands of the [Mandate].22
For Lau, the distinction between tien (heaven) and tien ming (Heaven’s Mandate) is the distinction between the destiny upon which man can act and have agency and the vagaries of fortune which every man is subject to. Though the hegemonies of Jin and Chu preceded Confucius the general distinction between destiny and fortune was already very much in the air.
Jin’s rise was predicated upon this newly forming distinction. Situated to the north of the central plain upon which the Empire was based Jin was at once forced to contend with barbarians invasions from the north and brutal Chinese politics to the south. It was nevertheless a superior state in many regards. Its most important innovation occurred under Jin Xian Gong. He sought to eliminate the dominance of aristocracy and kinship linkages in a decidedly non-Confucian way. Xian Gong consolidated power in numerous states by killing or otherwise overthrowing the local elites still tied into the royal lineage.23 The growing administrative capacities of the states during this period led to numerous wars in which states were eliminated and leaders were assassinated.24
The Jin ruling class was the best at doing this for nearly 80 years. While this may seem short-lived, given the uncertainty of the times it was impressive regardless. What we find however is that even with this fairly ruthless shift from kinship based aristocracy to bureaucratic expansion the basic principles of rule remained the same. The centrality of the common identity and the pursuit of power over other contending powers continued to hold the international order together. Some speak of the balancing centripetal and centrifugal pressures that define Chinese history, but even in the face of these numerous competing states we ought to be startled at the strength of the centripetal forces at work. Engaged in bloody and ruthless wars, competing for hegemony over the system, not only did the lords continue to accept their essential commonalities, those commonalities spread into the marcher regions of the international order. The speed of assimilation during this period was remarkable.
Eventually the state of Chu began its ascension to a prominent position in the Zhou world order. Chu developed on its own outside of the Zhou dynasty. For a time in the middle to late Chunqiu period became its most powerful state. Chu attempted to take control of the ba during the course of its rise, but it was stymied in numerous circumstances by the other contending states of the time-Qi, Qin, Jin, and later Wu. Chu was far more powerful than any other single state. Jin had, by that time, fallen back into the pack. Together with other states Jin was able to check Chu power. However Chu was still able to introduce its own innovations into the international order. Chief among them was the complete dismissal of the Mandate of Heaven.25
Though unable to fully shoulder the power and responsibilities of the ba, the Chu were nonetheless able to deeply influence the discourse of power at the time. Trade, warfare, and assimilation continued apace of each other, while the ideological scope of the mandate shrank and became less relevant relative to other contending ideologies. The Chu focused the justification for their power on neither a mandate nor destiny, but on the pragmatic facts of their centralization and bureaucratization. Ironically, the instability of the Chunqiu period finally resulted in a stable sovereign principle precisely when no power was able to dominate enough to implement it. Numerous scholars, including Hui, have referred to this period as a multi-state system based upon balance of power politics. Rightly so, the logic of balancing was dominant during this period. However, the immediate practicalities of balance of power politics continued to operate under the umbrella of competing attempts at domination based, in part, on the Chu model of rule—hereditary kingships, centralized bureaucracies, and discredited minor nobility. “Domains were no longer to be divided among the relatives and sons of rulers as fiefs; by the end of the [Chunqiu] period the common practice was to appoint magistrates to govern the districts of a state. Such an administration had long been in effect in Chu.26 The Warring States Period that followed—as I shall show in the following section—was in some ways inevitable, and inevitably fleeting. The scope of every subsystem was growing beyond any individual state, but the rulers of each were incapable of defeating each other immediately.
The Warring States
On the surface of things the Warring States period ushered in a brutal era of war and contestation among the remaining great powers. This is certainly one of the implied consequences of having fewer powers, consolidated states, and continuing competition for dominance. However, as Hsu points out this period actually experienced fewer wars albeit with ten times as many soldiers.27 It would seem as if the generals of the Warring States period sought larger engagements with more decisive outcomes-this certainly follows from widely accepted strategies as enumerated in the Art of War.28 On the basis of war frequency the Warring States period is something of a misnomer; on the basis of casualties it is, however, quite apt. Sun Tzu’s strategy relied on equal parts deterrence and deception. He believed in building a large army to discourage battle in the first place, but in the course of battle he believed in value of surprise as a means of minimizing losses. Confucius believed that the regulations of the Mandate of Heaven fell to each individual—not just the elites—and indeed the peasantry and the gentry were absorbed into the warring classes. The dominance of chivalry and chariot warfare was gradually replaced by the more ‘democratic’ strategy of sending hundred of thousands of soldiers in waves against each other. Given the intensity of wars and the nature of the strategies one is tempted to classify it as an example of realist logic. The dominant strategies among the states during the time amounted to variations in bandwagoning and balancing strategies.
There are problems with such an analysis. If we were to accept a defensive version of realism we ought to expect the states to compete for power up to the point where they guaranteed their own security.29 Alternatively if we were to accept an offensive version of realism the would compete for power up to the point that, as Clausewitz argued, “the establishment of an equilibrium is no longer conceivable”28 States ought to compete for hegemony or domination, and not peace. On the surface the latter certainly seems to be true. Each state dismissed the need to a hegemon, but they each individually sought to assume that role. Because of this balancing techniques were prevalent in the early part of Zhanguo period and continued to be used throughout the period.30
Contradicting the contention that there was a growing logic of domination s was the fate of all previous domination-seekers Qi, soon experienced a decline in power.32 And here it is not that logics shifted, but that capacities shifted. The offensive realist position seems to be more descriptive, but even this claim is problematic. It is not at all clear that the Warring States pursued power purely for the sake of power and/or security. Rather it seems more likely that they pursued a similar goal: domination of the Zhou order. The goal of politics, policy, and war then seems to dedicated to an agreed upon norm; each state individually pursued domination over a predefined concept, a Zhou world order, rather than a nebulous concept like power or domination.
In contrast to the Western rationalist school of though which, Blieiker argues, reinforces the central tenets of realism, “Chinese philosophers tend to consider rational and logical analysis inappropriate for examining the dynamics of human thought and (inter)action. Rather, an assessment of a particular societal phenomenon should be based on such factors as detached awareness, instinct, wisdom, and spontaneity. Confucians and Taoists thus favour a discursive, correlative or narrative approach which takes the form of poems, stories or aphorisms.”33 Such an insight must lead us naturally to two separate conclusions. First, later Zhou states-though territorially distinct-at least agreed upon the basic approach to knowledge. This implies of course more than a passing agreement about the nature of the game- pursuing power-but also the intuitive reason and method of doing so. The Zhou li (The rites of Zhou) along with a number of norms, liaheng (vertical alliance strategy), hezong (horizontal alliance strategy), Ba (hegemony), Meng (alliance), and Hui (conference) basically amount to a practicum of politics, which was not either rational or obvious.34 Second, schools of thought diverged, but the intellectual ferment was naturally delimited by those who had been part of the Zhou feudal system, or had at least acceded to the centrality of the Zhou state. Barbarians were left out of these considerations and were unconcerned with the evolution of this thought.During the early part of the Warring States period we see this basic idea reinforced. Confucian philosophy reinforced the notion of a united Zhou empire as the penultimate goal. For Confucius, a well-ordered state-a world state-would lead to the ideal and most peaceful organization of society. Confucius was writing at the end of the Chunqiu period when any given state lacked the power to make this a reality.35 The disjuncture between the ideal and the practical reality caused a rebirth of intellectual discourse attempting to address the issue.After Confucius a great flowering of philosophies took place. We find his disciple Mencius preaching the inherent goodness of people, the Taoists preaching a curious political philosophy of reflection and inaction, and the Legalists preaching the benefits of power politics and order.36 It was the discourse between these schools that was notable. By the end of the Warring States period the Legalists had formed the dominant core of political philosophy, “From the age of Confucius onward, the Chinese people in general and their political thinkers, in particular, began to think about political matters in terms of the world.”37
Part 1: Rome
Part 2: Europe
1. Richard L. Walker,The Multi-state System of Ancient China, 1953 pg. 20.
2. Hsü, and Linduff. Western Chou civilization. pg. 100.
3. Shaughnessy, pp. 310-315).
4. Confucius, and James Legge. 1968. The Sacred books of China: The texts of Confucianism. Translated by J. Legge. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass., pg. 27
6. Marshall, S. J. 2001. The mandate of heaven: hidden history in the I ching. New York: Columbia University Press. pg. 80
7. Confucius, and Legge.
8. It is important to note that at this point while the merit of an officer might be important the offices were largely distributed through linkages of kinship.
9. Ferguson, Yale H., and Richard W. Mansbach. 1996. Polities: authority, identities, and change. Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press. pg. 192.
10. Li, Xueqin, and Kwang-chih Chang. 1985. Eastern Zhou and Qin civilizations. New Haven: Yale University Press. pg. 9
11.Pines, Yuri. 2002. Foundations of Confucian thought: intellectual life in the Chunqiu period, 722-453 B.C.E. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. pp. 2 -7.
13. Hsü. The Spring and Autumn Period. pp. 550-1
14. Ferguson, and Mansbach. Polities: authority, identities, and change. pg. 185
15. Hsü, and Linduff. Western Chou civilization. pg. 548
16. Pines. pg. 2
17. Hsü, and Linduff. Western Chou civilization. Pines.
20. Confucius, and D. C. Lau. 1979. The analects (Lun yü). New York: Penguin Books. pg. 27
21. Pines. pg. 64
22. Confucius, and Lau. The analects (Lun yü). pg. 28
23. Hsü. The Spring and Autumn Period. pg. 559
24. Walker., Nylan, Michael. 2001. The five "Confucian" classics. New Haven: Yale University Press. pp. 262-3
25. Cook, Constance A. 1999. The Ideology of the Chu Ruling Class: Ritual Rhetoric. In Defining chu: image and reality in ancient China, edited by J. S. Major and C. A. Cook. Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. pp. 70-1.
26.Cho-yün Hsü, Ancient China in transition: an analysis of social mobility, 722-222 B.C, 1965, pg. 92.
27. Ibid. pp. 62-8.
28. Sun Tzu’s strategy relied on equal parts deterrence and deception. He believed in building a large army to discourage battle in the first place, but in the course of battle he believed in value of surprise as a means of minimizing losses.
30. Sunzi, and Carl von Clausewitz. 2000. The book of war. Edited by C. Carr. Modern Library pbk. ed, Modern Library war. New York: Modern Library. pg. 923
31. Hui. pp. 55-9
32. Ibid. pg. 64
33. Bleiker, Roland. 2001. East-West Stories of War and Peace: Neorealist Claims in the Light of Ancient Chinese Philosophy-. In The Zen of international relations: IR theory from East to West, edited by S. Chan, P. G. Mandaville and R. Bleiker. New York: Palgrave. pg. 188
34. Bozeman, Adda B. 1994. Politics and culture in international history: from the ancient Near East to the opening of the modern age. 2nd ed. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. pp. 140-141
35. Feng, Youlan, and Derk Bodde. 1948. A short history of Chinese philosophy. New York: Macmillan Co.
36. Ibid. pg. 181