By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers
For
a general overview of the Chinese Dynasties
see:
During the course of the Zhou Dynasty as
compared with the case studies about Rome and
early Europe, it was shown how feudal states in
China were more autonomous, had no overlapping, cross-cutting authorities, and
had strong territorial markers. And that during the course of the Zhou Dynasty
we see a shift from transbordersovereignty to
absolute sovereignty with the Warring States Period representing a transitional phase to
imperial China. From the age of Confucius onward, the Chinese people in
general and their political thinkers, in particular, began to think about
political matters in terms of the world. And that absolute sovereignty, as a
principle, had existed prior to the first Qin
emperor. The essential structure of the ideological subsystem at the
beginning of the Zhou dynasty was built on a two-fold distinction. One tenet
held the centrality of the king and the Mandate of Heaven to legitimize his
rule. The second tenet held the
centrality of law and order variously derived as the overarching legitimating
factor for any given ruler. Thus ancient China showed us a highly
structured feudalism, a territorially bound state that struggled to develop a
bureaucracy to govern it, and a nation rich in tradition before a state, as started to be the case during the Qin, could grow
powerful enough to govern it. I next proceed with: The
concept of Han Chinese.
As the Zhou began to consolidate and take
power from the Shang, King Wen, leader of the Zhou contended that the Mandate
of Heaven had passed from the dissolute and dissipated Shang kings to him by
virtue of his virtue. While we may acknowledge that the Shang had become
corrupt and that the Zhou was likely a more vigorous people, the moral
authority to depose the Shang was somewhat dubious. In battle, the Zhou
probably employed a superior combination of strategy and tactics in the
critical confrontations that took place during this transitional period.
The Shang believed that the kingship fell
from brother to brother and then to subsequent generations. The pre-existing
ideological order had to shift significantly so that another set of rulers
could claim that the Mandate of Heaven had shifted authority to them. It is
from this shift that we can begin to detect the beginnings of Zhou sovereign
principles. Walker notes, that, “Traditional history reports that the [Zhou]
conqueror and his successors set up 1,773 states in the area where the [Zhou]
established their power.”1
It was actually King Wu, Wen’s son, and later
Cheng, Wu’s son, who consolidated much of the territory that was to be
distributed. By the time Qin rose to power in 221 BC the number of states was
down to seven. Nonetheless, we find that as a means to power, and as a result
of power, King Wen and his descendants were plenty throughout the Yangtze and
Yellow River Valleys. Hsu and Linduff are
particularly mindful of the relative weakness of the Zhou at this point of
conquest: The [Zhou] had accomplished the nearly impossible task of allying and
uniting the semi-independent and independent powers of north China. The small
armed force that they controlled directly was not strong enough to hold the
vast territory by force. Part of their solution was to maintain ties
established by the Shang and to legitimate them through moral decree. 2
There was thus at the very beginning a basis
for rule based upon moral superiority. The Mandate of Heaven provided a basis
for negotiations that would inevitably need to take place given the fact that
the Zhou lacked the coercive power to enforce submission. But how did they
maintain control over so many independent states? And, since we know that
consolidation took place rather frequently-consolidation must have occurred
frequently to arrive 500 years later at the 130 or states that began that
Chunqiu period instead of the thousand or so that existed at the beginning of
the Zhou dynasty-under what principles did the consolidation take place?
While Shang had been conquered by Wen and his
son Wu, the Shang territory had not been brought under the dominion of Zhou
rule until the rule of Cheng. Cheng’s ascension to the throne was interrupted by
the meddling of Wu’s brother, Zhou Gong Dan, because Cheng was still in his
minority. A civil war subsequently erupted between Zhou Gong Dan and his
brothers. The battle over succession rights came to also involve the remaining
Shang power, Wu Geng. Wu Geng
sided with Zhou Gong Dan. Zhou Gong Dan triumphed, but Shang would never be a
threat to the Zhou kings again. In the early portion of Cheng’s rule, Zhou Gong
Dan acted as the de facto regent. Some scholars credit Zhou Gong Dan with the
creation of Chinese feudalism while others contend that he actually supported a
meritocracy. Cheng and Zhou Gong Dan’s victory not only secured the eastern
portion of the new kingdom for Zhou domination it also legitimized the process
by which the mandate would be passed along. King Cheng received the mandate,
but was dependent upon Zhou Gong Dan and his half-brother Shao Gong Shi for
legitimacy, and indeed was more puppet than prince.3
Once Cheng came of age the debate-captured in
the Book of History (Shu Jing)-between Zhou Gong Shi and Shao Gong Shi over the
nature of the mandate established the principle of rule for much of the Western
Zhou period into the beginning of the Chunqiu period. In it Zhou Gong Shi
supports a meritocracy while Shao Gong Shi believes that heaven bestows
legitimacy upon the eldest son regardless of merit. King Cheng sided with Shao
Gong Shi. In so doing Cheng established a hereditary principle of rule that
bound all feudal lords to him and his kin while making merit-based claims more
or less illegitimate.
In feudal treaties medieval France the fealty of a vassal was contingent upon
the time and place and the nature of the conflict. It was not unusual for a
vassal to have to commit troops to both sides of a conflict. In contrast, in
ancient China, we find enfeoffed elites in Zhou strictly bound by pre-ordained
laws and regulations. For example, the hierarchy of royalty is laid out in the
first line of the first verse of book three: According to the regulations of emolument
and rank framed by the kings, there were the duke; the marquis; the earl; the
count; and the baron: in all. Five gradations (of rank). There were (also), in
the feudal states, Great officers of the highest grade, the ministers; and
Great officers of the lowest grade; officers of the highest, the middle, and
the lowest grades: in all five gradations (of office).4
Laid out as such with five ranks and five
offices universally applied we find something far more hierarchical and
consistent than France where titles were varied more according to local custom
and historical circumstance. The section immediately following the description
of rank and office establishes that land granted to the son of Heaven (the
king) and all lower feudal ranks. While it was possible for elites to be
enfeoffed multiple times to gain lands, the allotment of each was
predetermined. In fact it was quite common for feudal lords to trade various
lands amongst each other within the preordained limits. The trade of the lands
was itself strictly regulated by the king and his ministers.
However, the rites and rituals bound the king
as much as the vassals. For example, in the case of the ritual hunt, held three
times a year:
23. Not to hunt when there was no (special)
business in the way was deemed an act of irreverence. To hunt without observing
the rules (for hunting) was deemed cruelty to the creates of HeavenHowever, the rites and rituals bound the king as much
as the vassals. For example, in the case of the ritual hunt, held three times a
year:
23. Not to hunt when there was no (special)
business in the way was deemed an act of irreverence. To hunt without observing
the rules (for hunting) was deemed cruelty to the creates of Heaven 24. The son
of Heaven did not entirely surround (the hunting ground); and a feudal prince
did not take a (whole) herd by surprise.5
Presumably, the regulations of verse 24
reflect specifically on the moral grounds established in verse 23. The king,
the son of Heaven was bound by ritual and decree to hunt in a sporting manner,
that is, to give the prey a chance to escape. Even if we grant that such
regulations were developed after the fact and represent some sort of agreement
between the king and his vassals, we must nonetheless consider instances in
which the Mandate of Heaven overruled norms of religious propriety. For
example, King Wu’s initial war against Shang was based upon auspicious omens
which contradicted accepted norms. Wu’s father Wen had died and custom held
that Wu was supposed to accompany his father’s corpse home. However, before
mourning the death of his father Wen, we read that he used turtle shell
divination and found the omens promising and thus felt obliged to attack.6 The
conflict then between omens from heaven and regulations determining behavior is
thus present at the very beginning of the Zhou dynasty. Omens overruled norms
in this case. Therefore when we read in the Book of Documents (Section II,
verses 10 & 11) that the king is bound to consult with others before
placing individuals in offices we must assume that such rules, and thus
hierarchies were coequal with the boundaries of the Zhou dynasty if they did
not exceed them in the first place. The Book of Rites notes that: 10: The rule
was that the abilities of all put into offices over the people should first be
discussed. After they had been discussed with discrimination, the men were
employed. When they had been (proved) in the conduct of affairs, their rank was
assigned; and when their position was (thus) fixed, they received a salary. 11:
It was in the court that rank was conferred, the (already existing) officers
being (thus) associated in the act.7
Officers of the royal court were able to
vouch for capabilities of other potential officers.8 Furthermore, the marriage
of rank and office was open to, at the very least, input from the lesser
nobles. The Mandate of Heaven suggests a hierarchy that exists based strongly
on the ideological subsystem.
The Zhou sovereign principle contended that
‘Place (in terms of rank and office) is determined by regulations and
regimentation is determined by ritual.’ This is clearly different than both the
hierarchical sovereignty of Rome and the bartered sovereignty of feudal Europe.
A common identity exists among and between the feudal states. It is on the one
hand determined by a strict regimentation of land grants and offices conferred
by the king - in consultation with other officers of the court – and on the
other hand regulated by the laws of heaven. While one might be outside the
bounds of the terrestrial regimentation, one was never outside of the celestial
regulation. Let me be quite explicit here that this is not a common Chinese
identity. The Chinese identity, an idea of China as a territory were quite a
ways off. This is instead an ideological role structure based on kinship and
rank and land-holding. This is a form of transborder sovereignty. We may
understand it both by its ability to transcend Zhou borders, but also by its
ability to link feudal states inside the Zhou world order.
The
Move East and the Rise of the Ba System
This principle-which we can think of in terms
of terrestrial regimentation and celestial regulation-was challenged
periodically and over time enforced differently. Ferguson and Mansbach point out that, “The relative isolation in which
early Chinese polities and civilization developed meant that a ‘Chinese’
identity and loyalty to the ideal of a united China were rarely at issue.
Nevertheless, the aspiration toward unity often flew in the face of the reality
of disunity and civil strife.”9
From the onset of the Zhou dynasty in about
1070 BC to the collapse of the Western Zhou rule in 722 BC we find this
principle to be rather stable. It is after barbarian invasions-from the north
and the west-forced the Zhou capital eastward from Zongahou
to Luoyang that the underlying subsystems begin to shift suddenly. In moving
eastward the Zhou king Pingwang was too weak to
assert the control that he had formerly had—which had been marginal to begin
with. The mandate remained in name and ideology, but ceased to regiment and
regulate the affairs of the feudal lords. While they remained bound by a common
identity and written language, they were now left to openly vie for power
within the vacuum left by impotent Zhou king. The Spring and Autumn period was
marked by constant and internecine warfare and remarkable intellectual
ferment.10
In the beginning of this new intellectual
environment we see the rise of the ba (hegemony)
system. Yuri Pines, among others, have divided the Spring and Autumn period
into three distinct eras.11 In the first from about 722 to 643 the mandate
still held significant power among the competing lords. In the second era, from
643 to 546, the ba system became the dominant mode of
interaction. The last phase from 546 to 453 saw the collapse of the ba system into a state or near anarchy that hastened the
shift towards the Warring States Period. This section with deal with the first
two phases of the Chunqiu period and the following section will deal with the
last phase.
Hegemony
and Heaven
It is during this first portion of the
Chunqiu period that many of the intellectual foundations of a shifting
sovereign principle were laid. The period between the fall of Western Zhou and
the life of Confucius (Kung-fu Tzu) between 551 and 479 BC represent an
attractive time to attach to the shift in the sovereign principles. The Warring
States Period which began in roughly 403 BC is probably reflective both of the
practical exigencies of the time as well as the revolution in ideas that had taken
place during the Spring and Autumn Period. Pines contention is that the
Confucian revolution that took place in the beginning of the Warring States
Period was more reflective of the prior intellectual discourse than a new idea
of sovereignty sui generis.12 The variety of innovations that took place during
the Warring States Period are more reflective of the sort of competing
solutions that characterized early modern Europe.
The Spring and Autumn period were the moment when the principle of transborder
sovereignty collapsed. The Warring States Period was the period when contending
solutions battled it out for supremacy. The growing security subsystem
encouraged new contenders to seek new alternative principles of rule, though
they would continue to lack the overall power to enforce these new sovereign
principles. The centuries following the shift represent the attempt to vie for
the power of a unified empire which had only been agreed to in principle prior
to that.
After the move to Luoyang, the Zhou kings,
who always lacked the logistical ability to enforce peace over great distances,
were effectively deposed. Though it could not be blamed on a dissolute
corruption, as is often the case in traditional Chinese narratives, the king
was weak regardless. His vassals, particularly the Duke of Zheng, Zheng Huan
Gong, rose up to claim power in the empire.13 Though he would not claim the
title of King, the deference to the Mandate of Heaven had weakened
significantly. Other, less Sinitic states, such as Chu to the south were
quicker to do away with the formalities of the kingship; their leaders began to
refer to themselves as king despite the hierarchy implied by the mandate.14 On
the one hand this implies that the sovereign principle had failed utterly and
completely. On the other hand the contending states were still bound by some
recognition of their common bonds and that domination of one another was
somehow crucial to the survival of their own state. This suggests that the anarchy
which they entered into was structured à priori by their recognition of each
other. The resultant conflict over the leadership of the Zhou empire can be
understood in this context. At the point when Duke Zheng began to assume
hegemony over the whole of the Zhou system, the empire was still only
marginally organized. States were small and segmented, and were mostly centered
on walled cities In between the zones of immediate control were numerous
non-Zhou peoples.15 As Pines notes, “The ‘state’ was but a network of several
walled cities and townships that were ruled from the capital.”16 With the move
of the capital that network weakened significantly. There are two significant
shifts to the ba system that took place during this
period. First, in principle the shift from the mandate of heaven weakened the
moral underpinnings of the United Zhou state without undermining the general
fact of their unity. This presented a fundamental problem of organization. How
does one unite the state without being able to use the Mandate of Heaven as a
justification? The moves by Duke Zheng and later Duke Huan of Qi began to
provide the template for this. Second, the growing states began to assert their
control over their territory. The barbarians that forced the Zhou king to move
west were in fact closely related to the nomadic people that interpenetrated
the Zhou city-states. There was a direct threat to Zhou power in the midst of
the numerous Zhou states. The solution borne out, in particular by Duke Huan,
was to absorb the smaller city-states and form larger administrative units.
Taken together these two problems and their solutions begin to point the way
the next revolution in sovereign principles.
Duke Zheng’s innovation vis-à-vis the Mandate
of Heaven was to balance between the order provided by heaven and the
exigencies of realpolitik. On the one hand he engaged in base politics as
needed, conferring and negotiating when necessary, and conquering and pillaging
when necessary as well.17 On the other hand he limited the extent of his
actions as he deemed them appropriate. In technical terms he was simultaneously
bound by a logic of appropriateness and a logic of consequences.18 It is
perhaps more apt, to reflect on the period as characterized by a logic of
argumentation in the sense used by Risse.19 The justifications for the order
and place of Heaven were brought up and debated in a discursive manner. The
evolving ideology of this period did not spring from one individual’s mind, but
emerged from a meeting of minds.
Duke Huan picked up Zheng’s solution - though
it would continue to evolve – and applied it to the organizational problems of
the period. The feudal organization in this period was highly inefficient. It
was far more structured than France, but it was nonetheless reliant upon a
series of demands falling from the king down through each level of
subordinates. Duke Huan’s state of Qi revolutionized the structure of this
system by forming administrative units divided by function and not by family.
In so doing each function could be isolated and called upon for what issues
were necessary. In the process of doing so Qi was able to absorb numerous
bordering states while also exerting control over the other powerful states
that were beginning to emerge. Where the mandate system was organized by the
dual principles of regimentation and regulation, the ba
system was organized by the principles of competitive centralization and
administrative efficiency. The state with the most efficient allocation of
resources and hierarchy derived the right through strategic superiority to
demand the fealty of the other states. It was not purely a principle of
domination through preponderance. It was also a far more impersonal principle
than those discussed earlier in the dissertation. As we shall see in subsequent
sections, while this principle came to define numerous possible outcomes the
guiding principle of a centralizing hegemony was nevertheless constant.
Strategies for centralization and efficiency varied, copycatting was prevalent,
but the power of one state over others remained a central tenet of the system.
This set of principles was delineated in the first phases of the Spring and
Autumn Period.
Jin
and Chu
The end of the Chunqiu period was defined
almost entirely by the successive hegemonies of Jin
and Chu. This section will show how, despite the shifting balance of power the
essential sovereign principle remained the same. D. C. Lau points out that in
Confucius’ Analects the phrase Heaven’s Mandate (tien
ming) is only used twice.20
Pines, argues convincingly that this is
because pragmatic politics had eroded the extent to which people could trust in
an understandable esoteric world order, “Reliance on Heaven’s justice was not a
convincing way of dealing with acute political problems.”21
Lau offers a more subtle reading of this, but
one which nonetheless supports this claim. He argues that:
The [Mandate] of Heaven is a moral imperative
and, as such, has nothing to do with the agency of Heaven in bringing about
what comes to pass. The only development by Confucius’ time was that the
[Mandate] of Heaven was no longer confined to the Emperor. Every man was
subject to the [Mandate] of Heaven which enjoined him to be moral and it was
his duty to live up to the demands of the [Mandate].22
For Lau, the distinction between tien (heaven) and tien ming (Heaven’s Mandate) is the distinction between the
destiny upon which man can act and have agency and the vagaries of fortune
which every man is subject to. Though the hegemonies of Jin
and Chu preceded Confucius the general distinction between destiny and fortune
was already very much in the air.
Jin’s
rise was predicated upon this newly forming distinction. Situated to the north
of the central plain upon which the Empire was based Jin
was at once forced to contend with barbarians invasions from the north and
brutal Chinese politics to the south. It was nevertheless a superior state in
many regards. Its most important innovation occurred under Jin
Xian Gong. He sought to eliminate the dominance of aristocracy and kinship
linkages in a decidedly non-Confucian way. Xian Gong consolidated power in
numerous states by killing or otherwise overthrowing the local elites still
tied into the royal lineage.23 The growing administrative capacities of the
states during this period led to numerous wars in which states were eliminated
and leaders were assassinated.24
The Jin ruling
class was the best at doing this for nearly 80 years. While this may seem
short-lived, given the uncertainty of the times it was impressive regardless.
What we find however is that even with this fairly ruthless shift from kinship
based aristocracy to bureaucratic expansion the basic principles of rule
remained the same. The centrality of the common identity and the pursuit of
power over other contending powers continued to hold the international order
together. Some speak of the balancing centripetal and centrifugal pressures
that define Chinese history, but even in the face of these numerous competing
states we ought to be startled at the strength of the centripetal forces at
work. Engaged in bloody and ruthless wars, competing for hegemony over the
system, not only did the lords continue to accept their essential
commonalities, those commonalities spread into the marcher regions of the
international order. The speed of assimilation during this period was
remarkable.
Eventually the state of Chu began its
ascension to a prominent position in the Zhou world order. Chu developed on its
own outside of the Zhou dynasty. For a time in the middle to late Chunqiu
period became its most powerful state. Chu attempted to take control of the ba during the course of its rise, but it was stymied in
numerous circumstances by the other contending states of the time-Qi, Qin, Jin, and later Wu. Chu was far more powerful than any other
single state. Jin had, by that time, fallen back into
the pack. Together with other states Jin was able to
check Chu power. However Chu was still able to introduce its own innovations
into the international order. Chief among them was the complete dismissal of
the Mandate of Heaven.25
Though unable to fully shoulder the power and
responsibilities of the ba, the Chu were nonetheless
able to deeply influence the discourse of power at the time. Trade, warfare,
and assimilation continued apace of each other, while the ideological scope of
the mandate shrank and became less relevant relative to other contending
ideologies. The Chu focused the justification for their power on neither a
mandate nor destiny, but on the pragmatic facts of their centralization and
bureaucratization. Ironically, the instability of the Chunqiu period finally
resulted in a stable sovereign principle precisely when no power was able to dominate
enough to implement it. Numerous scholars, including Hui, have referred to this
period as a multi-state system based upon balance of power politics. Rightly
so, the logic of balancing was dominant during this period. However, the
immediate practicalities of balance of power politics continued to operate
under the umbrella of competing attempts at domination based, in part, on the
Chu model of rule—hereditary kingships, centralized bureaucracies, and
discredited minor nobility. “Domains were no longer to be divided among the
relatives and sons of rulers as fiefs; by the end of the [Chunqiu] period the
common practice was to appoint magistrates to govern the districts of a state.
Such an administration had long been in effect in Chu.26 The Warring States
Period that followed—as I shall show in the following section—was in some ways
inevitable, and inevitably fleeting. The scope of every subsystem was growing
beyond any individual state, but the rulers of each were incapable of defeating
each other immediately.
The
Warring States
On the surface of things the Warring States
period ushered in a brutal era of war and contestation among the remaining
great powers. This is certainly one of the implied consequences of having fewer
powers, consolidated states, and continuing competition for dominance. However,
as Hsu points out this period actually experienced fewer wars albeit with ten
times as many soldiers.27 It would seem as if the generals of the Warring
States period sought larger engagements with more decisive outcomes-this
certainly follows from widely accepted strategies as enumerated in the Art of
War.28 On the basis of war frequency the Warring States period is something of
a misnomer; on the basis of casualties it is, however, quite apt. Sun Tzu’s strategy
relied on equal parts deterrence and deception. He believed in building a large
army to discourage battle in the first place, but in the course of battle he
believed in value of surprise as a means of minimizing losses. Confucius
believed that the regulations of the Mandate of Heaven fell to each individual
- not just the elites - and indeed the peasantry and the gentry were absorbed
into the warring classes. The dominance of chivalry and chariot warfare was
gradually replaced by the more ‘democratic’ strategy of sending hundred of thousands of soldiers in waves against each
other. Given the intensity of wars and the nature of the strategies one is
tempted to classify it as an example of realist logic. The dominant strategies
among the states during the time amounted to variations in bandwagoning
and balancing strategies.
There are problems with such an analysis. If
we were to accept a defensive version of realism we ought to expect the states
to compete for power up to the point where they guaranteed their own
security.29 Alternatively if we were to accept an offensive version of realism
the would compete for power up to the point that, as Clausewitz argued, “the
establishment of an equilibrium is no longer conceivable”28 States ought to
compete for hegemony or domination, and not peace. On the surface the latter
certainly seems to be true. Each state dismissed the need to a hegemon, but
they each individually sought to assume that role. Because of this balancing
techniques were prevalent in the early part of Zhanguo
period and continued to be used throughout the period.30
Contradicting the contention that there was a
growing logic of domination s was the fate of all previous domination-seekers
Qi, soon experienced a decline in power.32 And here it is not that logics
shifted, but that capacities shifted. The offensive realist position seems to
be more descriptive, but even this claim is problematic. It is not at all clear
that the Warring States pursued power purely for the sake of power and/or
security. Rather it seems more likely that they pursued a similar goal:
domination of the Zhou order. The goal of politics, policy, and war then seems
to dedicated to an agreed upon norm; each state individually pursued domination
over a predefined concept, a Zhou world order, rather than a nebulous concept
like power or domination.
In contrast to the Western rationalist school
of though which, Blieiker
argues, reinforces the central tenets of realism, “Chinese philosophers tend to
consider rational and logical analysis inappropriate for examining the dynamics
of human thought and (inter)action. Rather, an assessment of a particular
societal phenomenon should be based on such factors as detached awareness,
instinct, wisdom, and spontaneity. Confucians and Taoists thus favour a discursive, correlative or narrative approach
which takes the form of poems, stories or aphorisms.”33 Such an insight must lead us naturally to two
separate conclusions. First, later Zhou states-though territorially distinct-at
least agreed upon the basic approach to knowledge. This implies of course more
than a passing agreement about the nature of the game- pursuing power-but also
the intuitive reason and method of doing so. The Zhou li (The rites of Zhou)
along with a number of norms, liaheng (vertical
alliance strategy), hezong (horizontal alliance
strategy), Ba (hegemony), Meng (alliance), and Hui (conference) basically
amount to a practicum of politics, which was not either rational or obvious.34
Second, schools of thought diverged, but the intellectual ferment was naturally
delimited by those who had been part of the Zhou feudal system, or had at least
acceded to the centrality of the Zhou state. Barbarians were left out of these
considerations and were unconcerned with the evolution of this thought.During the early part of the Warring States period
we see this basic idea reinforced. Confucian philosophy reinforced the notion
of a united Zhou empire as the penultimate goal. For Confucius, a well-ordered
state-a world state-would lead to the ideal and most peaceful organization of
society. Confucius was writing at the end of the Chunqiu period when any given
state lacked the power to make this a reality.35 The disjuncture between the
ideal and the practical reality caused a rebirth of intellectual discourse
attempting to address the issue.After Confucius a
great flowering of philosophies took place. We find his disciple Mencius
preaching the inherent goodness of people, the Taoists preaching a curious
political philosophy of reflection and inaction, and the Legalists preaching
the benefits of power politics and order.36 It was the discourse between these
schools that was notable. By the end of the Warring States period the Legalists
had formed the dominant core of political philosophy, “From the age of
Confucius onward, the Chinese people in general and their political thinkers,
in particular, began to think about political matters in terms of the world.”37
Part 1: Rome
Part 2: Europe
1. Richard L. Walker,The
Multi-state System of Ancient China, 1953 pg. 20.
2. Hsü, and Linduff. Western Chou civilization. pg. 100.
3. Shaughnessy, pp. 310-315).
4. Confucius, and James Legge.
1968. The Sacred books of China: The texts of Confucianism. Translated by J. Legge. Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass.,
pg. 27
5. Ibid.
6. Marshall, S. J. 2001. The mandate of
heaven: hidden history in the I ching. New York:
Columbia University Press. pg. 80
7. Confucius, and Legge.
8. It is important to note that at this point
while the merit of an officer might be important the offices were largely
distributed through linkages of kinship.
9. Ferguson, Yale H., and Richard W. Mansbach. 1996. Polities: authority, identities, and
change. Columbia, S.C.: University of South Carolina Press. pg. 192.
10. Li, Xueqin, and
Kwang-chih Chang. 1985. Eastern Zhou and Qin
civilizations. New Haven: Yale University Press. pg. 9
11.Pines, Yuri. 2002. Foundations of
Confucian thought: intellectual life in the Chunqiu period, 722-453 B.C.E.
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press. pp. 2 -7.
12. Ibid.
13. Hsü. The Spring
and Autumn Period. pp. 550-1
14. Ferguson, and Mansbach.
Polities: authority, identities, and change. pg. 185
15. Hsü, and Linduff. Western Chou civilization. pg. 548
16. Pines. pg. 2
17. Hsü, and Linduff. Western Chou civilization. Pines.
18. Risse.
19. Ibid.
20. Confucius, and D. C. Lau. 1979. The
analects (Lun yü). New
York: Penguin Books. pg. 27
21. Pines. pg. 64
22. Confucius, and Lau. The analects (Lun yü). pg. 28
23. Hsü. The Spring
and Autumn Period. pg. 559
24. Walker., Nylan,
Michael. 2001. The five "Confucian" classics. New Haven: Yale
University Press. pp. 262-3
25. Cook, Constance A. 1999. The Ideology of
the Chu Ruling Class: Ritual Rhetoric. In Defining chu: image and reality in
ancient China, edited by J. S. Major and C. A. Cook. Honolulu: University of
Hawaii Press. pp. 70-1.
26.Cho-yün Hsü,
Ancient China in transition: an analysis of social mobility, 722-222 B.C, 1965,
pg. 92.
27. Ibid. pp. 62-8.
28. Sun Tzu’s strategy relied on equal parts
deterrence and deception. He believed in building a large army to discourage
battle in the first place, but in the course of battle he believed in value of
surprise as a means of minimizing losses.
29. Mearsheimer.
30. Sunzi, and Carl
von Clausewitz. 2000. The book of war. Edited by C. Carr.
Modern Library pbk. ed, Modern Library war. New York:
Modern Library. pg. 923
31. Hui. pp. 55-9
32. Ibid. pg.
64
33. Bleiker, Roland. 2001.
East-West Stories of War and Peace: Neorealist Claims in the Light of Ancient
Chinese Philosophy-. In The Zen of international relations: IR theory from East
to West, edited by S. Chan, P. G. Mandaville and R. Bleiker. New York: Palgrave. pg. 188
34. Bozeman, Adda B. 1994. Politics and
culture in international history: from the ancient Near East to the opening of
the modern age. 2nd ed. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers. pp. 140-141
35. Feng, Youlan,
and Derk Bodde. 1948. A
short history of Chinese philosophy. New York: Macmillan Co.
36. Ibid. pg. 181
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