By Eric Vandenbroeck and
co-workers
Realist balance-of-power theory in Asia
Realist
balance-of-power theory in Asia predicts that, in the likely absence of U.S.
security presence in Asia, Japan would have no choice but to rearm.1
Constructivism instead, refers to the international context as explaining
why bilateral security and economic relations were preferred over multilateral
cooperative arrangements. As discussed by Katzenstein and Okawara,
realism cannot predict whether Japan will balance against the United States as
the only superpower or against China as the rising regional hegemon.2
Similarly, Japan might also choose not to resist accepting a central position
of China in Asia-Pacific rather than attempting to counter it. 3 As argued by
Kang, "Japan has not rearmed to the level it could because it has no need
to, and it has no intention of challenging China for the central position in
Asian politics."4
In contrast, Tamamoto argues that, Japan has an aversion to any Chinese
will to regional supremacy, this being deeply rooted in threat perceptions of
Japan's ruling elites. Such questions, however, will not be settled through
pure strategic thinking. Japan's choice will ultimately reflect the way it
perceives itself and its Others. The ideational context shaped by perceptions
of Japan toward its neighbors as well as those of its neighbors toward Japan
will determine policy choices. Security interests are defined by actors who act
in response to the ideational context, and, in process, their actions become
part of the context. There were often interrelated structural material and
nonmaterial factors that prevent a similar development of an Asian
regionalization process. First of all, structurally, both pre-Cold War and
post-Cold War contexts of Asia and Europe are different. The United States
supported multilateralism in Europe during the Cold War in the form of NATO and
the European integration process. These existing frameworks were helpful in
building a common identity among Europeans and in integrating formerly
communist East European nations after the end of the Cold War. This was not the
case for Asia. The United States preferred forming their alliance with Japan
and South Korea through bilateral security treaties. Hence, there was no
existing framework for building a common identity to prepare the ground of
post-Cold War regionalization. Rather, Asia was characterized by a stronger
degree of nationalism and deeply rooted historical animosity against Japan,
particularly in China and Korea. During the Cold War, Japan benefited from its
security reliance on the United States to achieve a remarkable economic
development rate. Yet this also ensured that it did not have to face up to its
history. The United States did not follow policies that could lead to a regime
change in Japan. The Japanese emperor was cleaned from all war crimes
allegations and particularly after the reverse course in American occupation
policies, leading members of the old Japanese elite to be brought back to
power. Thus, throughout the Cold War, Japan under the leadership of the LDP,
preferred to escape from its history rather than agreeing to confront it and
open a new page in its relations with other Asian countries. After the Cold
War, the shadow of history worked to prevent Japan from utilizing its
accumulated economic wealth to create regionalization processes. On the level
of perceptions, both Japan and Asia remained far from each other. Under the
hegemony of the Yoshida School which sought to utilize relations with the
United States for Japanese economic development, Japan managed to escape from
its history. In sharp contrast with Germany, for instance, whenever Japan was
caught in between the United States and East Asia, the preference was always
the United States. The primary reason for this was Japan's inability to develop
a consensus on addressing its historical constraints. Despite the shock of the
Gulf War, Japanese political, economic, and intellectual elite could not reach
an internal agreement on what would be its vision and identity. As Keio
University professor Kazuya Fukuda argues, "we could afford to have no
direction in the past when our economy prospered, but international problems
are shaking the country's foundation, which is built on international order. We
need a clear national identity."5
Yet the question is
how to define this national identity. Japan had a clear direction in the Cold
War era: Western foreign policy orientation designed to achieve economic
development but to avoid sharing security responsibilities. As it became clear
with the end of the Cold War and dramatically displayed with the Gulf War, this
magic formula was no longer working. The post-Cold War era was being
increasingly characterized by intense debates on the future direction and
orientation of Japan.
Japan’s Failure to “Escape from Asia”
The hegemonic
Japanese approach during the Cold War was the Yoshida Doctrine, characterized
by Japan’s reliance on the U.S. security system to develop itself economically
and expand its economic sphere of interests. Even though Yoshida himself
believed that it was necessary to keep Japan away from a deeper integration
with the U.S. regional security system in order to avoid affronting China and
other Asian neighbors and to prepare the way for eventual development of an
Asian community, he could not escape American pressures which dictated to him a
foreign policy made in the United States. Hence Japan always supported the
position of the United States wherever there was such a demand. More hardliner
Japanese leaders such as Kishi were even more
enthusiastic in implementing this view. They sought to return Japan to its
normal power status by means of the alliance with the United States rather than
in spite of it. In doing so, they ended up making Japan more dependent on the
United States and unable to exert itself as an independent power in Asia. With
the end of the Cold War, however, areas of conflict appeared to be enlarging.
One reason was the regionalization processes in other economic poles of the
world, namely, Europe and North America. Japan could not respond to European
integration and creation of NAFTA in the form of creating or helping to create
an Asian regional group. There were calls on Japan from Southeast Asian nations
to create an Asian economic integration such as the formation of the East Asian
Economic Caucus (EAEC) as proposed by Malaysia. However, Japan always
prioritized its relations with the United States for two reasons: first, the
United States was Japan’s primary economic market, and second, it relied on the
U.S. security umbrella. Under both the Yoshida and Kishi
doctrines, Japan developed its trade relations with Asian nations only as an
extension of its relations with the United States. Actually Japan developed its
relations with Asia only to the extent the United States allowed it. In this
regard, Japan was part of the U.S. global grand strategy. It was a stranger in
the region in which it was geographically located.
Japan was always cold
to the idea of creating an Asian economic integration in the form of a trade
block and monetary system. Instead it preferred the loose mechanism of the Asia
Pacific Economic Caucus (APEC) that incorporates East Asian economies together
with the United States, Canada, and Australia. APEC is a nonbinding forum for
dialogue rather than an institution for decision making. Malaysian Prime
Minister Mahathir campaigned for establishment of an Asian grouping, East Asian
Economic Group (EAEG). The group would bring together a core of East Asian
states that arguably shared a common culture and value system.7 Eventually, the
establishment of the East Asian Economic Caucus (EAEC) was finally achieved but
only in a much watered-down format. Realism would point to structural factors
in explaining Japan’s uneasiness to contribute to a regionalization process
that would exclude the United States. The primary structural factor was China’s
emerging power. Although the Japanese economy was several times larger than
that of China, the prospects of a Chinese hegemony in East Asia was real. Given
the Chinese population of over one billion people in addition to Chinese
dominated economies of Southeast Asia, it was not possible for Japan or for
Southeast Asians to balance this power. However, this realist perspective does
not provide a sufficient explanation of the Japanese position vis-a.-vis Asian
regionalization without the input of nonmaterial factors, namely, identity as
rooted in history. In the words of Funabashi, “it appears that history.. .has
become the leading player on the East Asian international political scene where
the past is more unpredictable than the future.”6
Towards a Re-Asianization of
Japan?
Although many
nationalists interpreted the post-Cold War era as requiring a more assertive
Japanese foreign policy, many called for a reevaluation of Japan's approach to
Asian regionalization. Koyabashi Y otaro, one of Japan's influential industrialists and
Chairman of the Board of Directors of International University of Japan,
championed these demands for a "re-Asianization
of Japan." He argued: Since the Meiji Restoration in the late 1800s,
progress in Japan has been guided by an official policy of de-Asianization and pro-Westernization. Adhering to this
policy seemed a rational and natural course, as Japan was driven to develop its
technology and economy in order to take its place among advanced nations of the
West........Yet Japan's single-minded drive for modernization took place at the
expense of something very significant-the friendship and trust of other Asian nations.
Today, Japan should be pursuing a path of "re-Asianization."
This term may easily conjure up an image of Japan isolating itself within the
boundaries of Asia, or placing itself at the center of Asia by dominating other
countries in the region. This is not the case. The re-Asianization
I am promoting is not exclusive. Rather, it involves strengthening ties in
Asia, while at the same time maintaining close relations with the West.9 Koyabashi acknowledges that Japan alone cannot be the
leader of Asia and argues that Japan should be the coleader of Asia with China.
10 Funabashi Y oichi, a leading columnist of Japan's
liberal daily, Asahi Shimbun, argues that "East Asian regionalism and the
Japan-U.S. alliance can compatibly build a relationship of prosperous
coexistence." In his view, Japan is not in a position to choose one over
the other: "Japan must overcome its dependence on the United States and
its fear of China and develop its own Asian vision."11 More recent, Keizai
Doyukai, an association of corporate executives,
published a proposal regarding Japan's role in today's world. The proposal
called for a greater economic integration in Asia and supported abolishment of
the yen in favor of creation of a common Asian currency.12
Another such effort
was a 1993 article written by a senior foreign policy bureucrat
Ogura Kazuo, Ajia no Fukken
no tameni (for a Restoration of Asia). Ogura argued
that Asian countries had to get rid of their Western minded elites and
overcome past anomosities in order to prepare itself
for a Asian century. Ogura asserted: As we prepare for the twenty-first
century, we must seriously reaxime the role of these
Western-oriented intellectuals and leaders... [who] are using their links with
the West to maintain the legitimacy of their superior position. What we see is
in a sense a survival, although under a different guise, of the old colonial
arrangement by which natives with Western learning could skillfully develop
ties with the rulers and thereby dominate the unWesternized
general populace. Under these circumstances, members of the political elite
have been hesitant to stress Asian values lest they undermine the legitimacy of
their own power.13 These demands for Japan to reevaluate its position in Asia
have increased following the Asian financial crisis that primarily hit the
Japanese economy.
The 1997 Asian
financial crisis came as a shock to many Japanese. Despite enormous effects on
the Japanese economy, Japan could not respond to this crisis efficiently. The
Asian financial was caused by the massive outflow of foreign capital from key
Asian countries, starting with Thailand and quickly spreading over Southeast
Asia and South Korea. In 1996, about $100 billion flowed into East Asia, but in
1997, $150 billion flowed out in the three months after July. Only China
appeared to resist the crisis due to its stringent policies on controlling
capital outflow and fixed currency regime. The Japanese economy was adversely
affected by the crisis due to the significance of Asian markets for Japan. IMF
and proponents of the neoliberal economic system argued that domestic policies
had caused the Asian financial crises and the only way to exit the crisis was
through implementation of the IMF austerity programs. However, this argument
was not accepted by some Asian governments, most notably Malaysia.14 Many
Asians believed that Asia had to have regional financial arrangements to
protect themselves from similar volatility in the future. In Japan, there were
calls to address the crisis independent of the United States. For instance, Shintaro Ishihara, Japan's most outspoken nationalist,
argued: Japan should put its glut of financial capital to good use by
transforming it into an effective investment. There are numerous ways of
creating products more attractive than U.S. treasury bonds. Under a sort of
Marshall Plan for Asia, an Asian Recovery Bank could be established on Japan's
initiative. As East Asia has more energy than any other developing region, it
ought to be possible to get people to buy into its future, especially if the
Japanese government showed confidence by guaranteeing investments in [the
bank].
This is a battle of
minds and money. Japan has a historical responsibility toward the East Asian
countries which, as America's prey, are being slaughtered en
masse. It needs a new strategy. We should challenge Asia with an Asian standard
that exists within a fair and free framework.13
The Japanese
government, under the leadership of Vice Minister of Finance Sakakibura Eisuke, launched an
initiative to establish an AMF. Surprisingly, for the first time since Second
World War Japan assumed a pan-Asianist approach, by
proposing establishment of an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF). It would create a $100
billion fund provided by East Asian states with a regional financial
surveillance mechanism and emergency loan facility to detect and suppress
future financial crisis. This regional fund would in practice replace IMF in
East and Southeast Asia, although Japanese officials stressed that AMF would
supplement and reinforce at a regional level existing IMF surveillance and loan
facilities. However, IMF and U.S. officials were clearly concerned that the AMF
proposal would undermine IMF's austerity programs by softening the level of
conditionality.16 Both the United States and China but not South Korea were
concerned about the rise of a Japanese leadership and hegemony in the region.
Instead the United States advised Japan, in the words of U.S. Commerce
Secretary William M. Daley, that "the most important contributions Japan
can make to restore stability and growth in Asia are to take steps necessary
first, to strengthen domestic demand; second, to deregulate Japan's economy;
and third, to open up Imports."17
After external
pressures, Japan had to give up the idea. In the view of critics, "Japan
appeared once again to have crumbled in the face of U.S. pressure and to have
prioritized the U.S.-Japan bilateral relationship over its commitment to any
form of regional multilateral cooperation.“18 For instance, Malaysian Prime
Minister Mahathir Mohamed remarked that Japan had lost the will to be
"lead goose in the region," supposedly Japan's role in the flying
geese theory of economic development.19 Sakakibura
resigned in 1999, but he did not appear to lose his interest in the idea albeit
acknowledging its difficulty: The whole idea of regional cooperation is
proceeding, although gradually. There are now discussions among China, Korea
and Japan going on. ASEAN countries are inviting Korea, China and Japan to
participate in their cooperative schemes. It has started to move and that is
good. But I don't think a monetary fund can be established in a short period of
time....................... I feel it is absolutely necessary for Asian
countries to develop a regional mechanism. If we cannot develop a regional
mechanism, we have only two options: belong to the U.S. dollar zone or the
European grouping. But I would like to see a third pillar in the world
economy.20
When the proposal was
killed, Japan created the Miyazawa Fund to provide liquidity to crisis-ridden
Asian nations through bilateral arrangements. The Japanese proposal to create
the AMF and the subsequent withdrawal from this plan reflect an internal clash
within domestic politics and Japanese bureaucracy. Although it would be
simplistic to call this a clash of pan-Asianism and
pro Americanism, Japanese politicians and bureaucrats had their own view of
international politics. Sakakibura and other
bureaucrats of the Ministry of Finance and Ministry of International Trade and
Industry had more multilateral Asianist perspectives
to the international political economy of East Asia. Japan's Foreign Ministry
(MOFA), however, emphasized bilateral relations with the United States. As
explained by Hook, each of these ministries perceived clearly the challenges
posed to Japan by the international structure, but the response of each and
adjustment between and amongst their varying interests, which determined the
final policy objectives of Japan was shaped by the norms of developmentalism, Asianism and bilateralism.21
The Shadow of History
Arguably there is no
country in the world where history does not act as a constraining factor for
foreign policy options. However, arguably the influence of history on Japanese
foreign policy has been more intense than any other case. In no other country
can a visit to a sacred place infuriate foreign capitals. In this sense,
Japanese foreign policy following the Second World War has been a captive of
its history. This remains to be the case after the Cold War, despite the change
in the international system. With the end of the Cold War, the world has
entered a new era characterized by lack of conventional security dilemmas. The
demise of the Soviet empire paved the way for democratization in Eastern Europe
and further integration into Western Europe. In East Asia, however, a similar
integration process did not take place. Although the collapse of the Soviet
Union contributed to stability in East Asia, an equally optimistic atmosphere
akin to Europe was absent. In contrast to Europe, continuities rather than
change characterized East Asian politics after the Cold War. Korea remained
divided, with North Korea eager to go nuclear. Despite the fact that China has
taken remarkable steps towards integrating its economic system with the
capitalist world, its domestic political system continued to be controlled by
the Communist Party. The Chinese developmental model was followed by
Indo-Chinese nations. Japan and South Korea have placed larger emphasis on their
relations with the United States. Although realists would have a hard time
explaining European integration with its steady progress toward
supranationalism, they would rejoice at pointing fingers at East Asia as a
waterproof case of realism. They often neglect the role of psychological and
perceptional factors rooted in the legacy of history in shaping East Asian
international in the post-Cold War era.22
Japan’s relations
with the rest of Asia as well as Asian relations with Japan in the post-Cold
War era are shaped by the burden of history. A legacy of Japanese guilt and
remorse for the suffering of Asians at the hands of the Japanese before and
during the Second World War continues to cause Japan to pursue a foreign policy
that lacks self confidence and assertiveness.23 Both
this legacy itself and the inability of Japan to respond to this burden are
deeply rooted in the way Japan sees its place in Asia. The previous chapters
have discussed the emergence and consolidation of Japanese civilizational identity
during the Meiji period and how this sense of remoteness from Asia prevented
its peaceful integration with Asia during the ultra-nationalism and pan-Asianist imperialism.
In the Cold War era,
Japan continued its self-identification as part of the Western, this time
American, alliance. Japanese foreign policy was delegated to the United States.
To the extent its suited American policies, Japan tried to develop relations
with Asia through foreign aid programs. As discussed above, both liberal
conservatives belonging to the Yoshida School and the right-wing conservatives
belonging to the Kishi School saw alliance with the
United States not only as unavoidable but also desirable and profitable. The
security alliance system with the United States provided Japan maneuvering room
to expand its sphere of interests into Southeast Asia. It allowed Japan not to
militarize but instead to concentrate on economic development. A militarized
Japan would create anxiety in the rest of Asia and complicate Japan’s difficult
position. On the other hand, this comfortable security system meant that Japan
did not have to face its history and redefine its position. However, with the
collapse of the bipolar international system, Japan faced an identity question
increasingly more seriously. The search for a Japanese national identity
started in the 1980s and Japanese Prime Minister Nakasone was one of the first
to recognize this need. His answer was internationalization (kokusai-ka), which tried to portray Japan as an
international power. Yet internationalization was not a solution for Japan’s
own conflict with itself and its civilizational identity. Such a response to
Japan’s identity escapes from its confrontation with history as well as its
role as an Asian power. Positioning Japan as a unique country through the Nihonjin-ron discourse or as an internationalized nation (kokusai kokka) was hardly an
answer to regional challenges awaiting Japan in Asia. Despite the growing but
still politically underrepresented calls for a reAsianization
of Japan, the primary difficulty for Japan to develop an Asian outlook stems
from its failure to come to terms with its history. Japanese foreign policy
after the Second World War has truly became a captive of its own history.
Japanese political and intellectual elites have distinct approaches to this
question, but one can distinguish three basic responses to the question of
history: (1) confronting history, (2) escaping from history, and (3) embracing
history. The first approach has ironically a very weak basis in the ruling
political party, the Liberal Democratic Party. In the political platform, it is
best represented by the Social Democrats. The two last approaches reflect
intra-LDP conflicts, chiefly among the Hashimoto faction and the Mori faction,
respectively. These two factions have direct linkages to Yoshida and Kishi schools.
Confronting History
The liberal Japanese
view on how to tackle the problem of history advocates that Japan adopt the
German way. Unlike Japan, Germany has arguably confronted its own history and
emerged on a clean slate. For instance, it cannot be imagined that a German
prime minister would visit a place of religious significance or a monument
built in honor of Nazi German leaders. In Japan, however, there was no such direct
confrontation with history. In comparing Japan to Germany, the mainland Chinese
People's Daily argues the following: "Germany actually serves as a
realistic and bright mirror for Japan. Japan that wants to be a 'normal
country' should seriously compare itself with Germany, to see how Germany
approaches history and takes history as a mirror.“24 The leading proponent of
the idea that Japan has to follow the German example is Doi Takako, once the
leader of the Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ). In 1990, she prepared a
parliamentary proposal to apologize for Japan's colonization of Asia and its
war of aggression. It failed to win support of other parties. In 1991, some
members of the LDP prepared a similar proposal, which was rejected by nationalist
LDP members of the Diet. When, in 1993, LDP faced its first electoral defeat in
38 years of its history, a coalition government was formed by other parties,
but due to their conflict the government collapsed in 1994. At this point, the
LDP formed a coalition government with the Socialist Party, which became the
Social Democratic Party (SDP), but it was the junior partner in this coalition
and the position of prime minister went to moderate leftist Murayama Tomiichi. One of the deals that SDP imposed on the
coalition agreement was the following: "on the occasion of the fiftieth
anniversary of the end of WWII, we will actively strive, among other things, to
adopt a parliamentary resolution reflecting upon the past war and expressing
our resolve for peace in the future.“25
On June 9, 1995, Diet
passed the resolution titled "Resolution to Renew the Determination for
Peace on the Basis of Lessons Learned from History." Unlike other
policy-related resolutions proposed by the government, it obtained the support
of 511 members of the lower house, the House of Representatives. On the day of
the vote, all 171 members of Shin shinto (New
Frontier Party), then Japan's largest opposition party, and more importantly
many members of LDP were missing. Having disappointed with this level of
support, Murayama did not push the resolution to the upper house, the House of
Councilors, as it was normally the practice for passing a resolution in the
Japanese Diet. 26 This was the first such resolution ever passed in the
Japanese parliament after World War II. The content was prepared with a view of
nationalist opposition in juxtaposing Japanese "colonial rule" and
"acts of aggression" with those of Western imperialist nations. As
Ryuji Mukae observes, it expressed hansei (self-reflection) rather than shazai
or owabi (apology),27 Prime Minister Murayama issued
an apology on August 15, 1995, at the fiftieth anniversary of the San Francisco
Treaty. However, this apology was framed as a personal apology with the usage
of "I" rather than the "we" pronouns: During a certain
period in the not too distant past, Japan, following a mistaken national
policy, advanced along the road to war, only to ensnare the Japanese people in
a fateful crisis, and, through its colonial rule and aggression, caused
tremendous damage and suffering to the people of many countries, particularly
to those of Asian nations. In the hope that no such mistake be made in the
future, I regard, in a spirit of humility, these irrefutable facts of history,
and express here once again my feelings of deep remorse and state my heartfelt
apology. Allow me also to express my feelings of profound mourning for all
victims, both at home and abroad, of that history.28
LDP members of the
Diet expressed their reactions to Murayama's apology, arguing that the prime
minister deviated from the text of the resolution passed in the parliament.29
It was also noteworthy that eight of his cabinet members were visiting Yasukuni
Shrine, a shire that venerates Japan's war casualties, including fourteen
executed Class-A criminals, at the time of Murayama's speech. Murayama
government which never enjoyed popular support got further weakened by an
allegedly slow response during the Kobe earthquake. In the 1996 general
elections, socialists lost many seats in the parliament. LDP formed a coalition
government and Ryfitaro Hashimoto, the former chief
of LDP's liberal faction which is a direct descendant of the Yoshida faction,
became prime minister. Hashimoto served as prime minister between January 11,
1996, and July 30, 1998.Clash of LDP Factions: Escaping from History vs.
Embracing History Although LDP is generally very conservative and nationalistic
when it comes to the matter of history, there are clearly two different
positions, informed by views of Yoshida and Kishi
lines. Among the largest LDP factions is Heisei KenkyUkai,
led by Tsushima Yuji after former faction leader Hashimoto's death in 2006. The
faction represents Yoshida's liberal conservative approach in Japanese
politics, whereas the Seiwa Seisaku
KenkyUkai (the former Mori faction, now led by Machimura Nobutaka) represents a
more assertive and nationalist line, defending Japan's return to normal power
status. It used to be the largest faction in the party. However, the recent
elections and the tide of nationalism brought more nationalist members of the
party to the Diet. On the question of history, however, both of these groups
are highly conservative. Their chief difference stems uom
disagreements not over the content of history but over the style in which
historical questions need to be tackled. The Tsushima faction, its ideology
derived from the Yoshida school, defends a position which can be described as
"escaping from history." Their approach rests in a strategy of
avoiding discussions and confrontations related to history. Consequently, in
foreign policy matters, Tsushima faction prefers maintenance of Yoshida
Doctrine as Japan's basic foreign policy strategy and prefer to avoid
provocations in relations with China and South Korea. The Yoshida School
proponents, chiefly the Tsushima faction, inside the LDP represent this view.
Members of the faction firmly oppose attempts to return to the normal power
status, which would require Japan to remilitarize. While in power, former
faction leader Hashimoto followed policies that aimed to counter China through
stronger ties with regional powers, chiefly Russia and ASEAN. In 1997, as prime
minister of Japan, Hashimoto indicated his interest in developing a more
assertive Japanese foreign policy characterized by regional initiatives that
aimed to counter the growing power of China. He proposed his Silk Road or
Eurasian diplomatic initiative aimed to develop deeper ties between Japan and
Russia and oil-rich Central Asian nations. Despite the end of the Cold War,
Japan and Russia remained minimal1y engaged because of the disputed islands
north of Japan. Hashimoto for the first time developed a new approach to Russia
by sidelining the disputed islands problem. He also offered the creation of a
Eurasian region that would link both maritime and continental Asia, a plan that
would provide Russia with a place in maritime zone of Asia and reduce its
dependence on relations with China. With these ambitious moves, Japan was
clearly aiming to avoid isolation in the context of growing Sino-Russian
relations and the changes brought by the end of the Cold War. As a part of this
new approach, Japan did not raise the issue of islands in supporting Russia's
membership in the G-8 group. However, this strategic initiative on the part of
Japan was less directly linked to regionalism initiatives in other parts of the
world than to the rise of China in order to gain leverage in global politics.30
Similarly, Hashimoto’s interest in developing closer relations with Southeast
Asia aimed to counter the growing influence of China. In his tour of Southeast
Asia in January 1997, Hashimoto proposed regular summit meetings between Japan
and Southeast Asia, a proposal which the Southeast Asian nations did not
respond wholeheartedly because of their concerns with offending China.31
However, he did not agree to support creation ofa
Asian regional organization that would include China and South Korea in
addition to ASEAN and Japan.32 Overall, he did little to go beyond the
conventional Cold War Japanese foreign policy approach that had avoided
approaching Japan’s regional neighbors with self
confidence. At the center of Japan’s difficulty in forming such relations with
China and Korea was its inability to directly confront the question of history.
Hashimoto faction has represented the hegemonic orientation towards history
within the LDP characterized by ambivalence and reluctance to deal with the
burden of history. To illustrate Hashimoto’s own stance on history, it should
be noted that in 1996 Hashimoto visited the highly controversial Yasukuni
Shrine eleven years after the visit by Nakasone, provoking an angry response
from China that “Japan has failed to repent that period of history and settle
its war crimes.“33 Hashimoto responded to these protests by asking “why should
it matter anymore?“34 Yet he did not repeat the visit. Hashimoto’s own foreign
policy reflected this attitude and aimed to create regional counterweights
north and south of China. This, however, proved to be difficult because of
China’s growing influence in the region because no regional actor was willing
to sacrifice their own relations with China to offer Japan any realistic chance
of countering China. Yet complicating all of these for Japan was the fact that
China was growing in significance in the eyes of Americans themselves.
The Tsushima faction
has represented the hegemonic Japanese school of thought during much of the Cold
War when demands by the United States for Japan’s cooperation were stronger and
consequently Japan had leverage on the United States. However, this strategy
faced two immediate problems associated with the end of the Cold War
international system. First, security in Northeast Asia was more a Japanese
problem than an American one. It was Japan that needed the United States to
address the problem, and the United States had insisted Japan share its cost in
the form of commitment in areas beyond the Pacific, such as the Iraq War.
Second, China has replaced Japan as the most significant trade partner and
investment opportunity for the United States. As China was becoming fully
integrated into the world economy, one could talk no longer about an exclusive
American preference for Japan in the Pacific. In this sense, it was no longer
feasible for Japan to expect the United States to tolerate its traditional
security strategies.
The Japanese
right-wing conservatives believed (and still do today) that Japanese foreign
policy has been hijacked by its history and the only solution to escape from
this dilemma is through embracing Japan’s historical past. This “no repentance”
position has its precedent in the vision of Kishi and
later Nakasone, who in a contradictory way, advocated internationalization of
Japan. Such nationalists, who have risen to a hegemonic position within the LDP
with the coming to power of Koizumi, have developed a revisionist stance as
regards the past, particularly the Second World War and Japan’s colonization of
Asia. These elements within the LDP believe that an apologetic stance is
futile. If Japan wants to form a national identity, it cannot be built on
shame. Although there are some revisionists who accept the need to apologize,
this had to be done only to Asians rather than Western nations. They point out
that the West was equally guilty for its colonization of Asia and imperialist
policies but never apologized for its past.
On December 1, 1994,
a number of key LDP members of Diet formed a group, called the
Parliamentarians’ League on the Fiftieth Anniversary of the End of World War II
(PLF A). The group, led by nationalist Okuno Seisuke, claimed an original membership of 143 members,
which amounted to half of all LDP Diet members and included influential LDP
leaders such as Secretary-General Mori, MITI Minister Hashimoto, former
Secretary-General Kajiyama, and Japanese Defense
Agency Director General Tamazawa. PLF A issued its
Operational Guidelines adopted on January 31, 1995, which stated: We cannot
approve of a resolution containing words of remorse, apology, and the renounciation of war because it would be tantamount to
reconfirming: biased post-war interpretations of our history, thereby creating
difficulties for our nation’s future.35 The group leader, former education
minister Okuno Seisuke,
known for his views that Japan fought the war to liberate Asians from Western
colonialism, made statements to the effect that comfort women who were forced
to work as sex slaves did it for money.36 Okuno
believed that “the war was to liberate Asians from the colonial control of the
Caucasian race.“37 The group’s secretary general was Itagaki
Tadashi, son of General Itagaki Seishiro
who was a military officer in Manchuria and war minister of the anny. He was convicted for war crimes and executed for his
involvement in the Manchurian Incident of 1931. His son, Itagaki
Tadashi, led the Japan War-Bereaved Families Association, a powerful pro-LDP
group with strong ties to the Yasukuni Shrine, and was harshly critical of the
Murayama government’s apologetic stance.38 In 1996, Itagaki
had a famous debate with a Korean woman, Kim Sang-Hee,
who claimed to have been abducted by the Japanese military in Korea and forced
to work as a sex slave at the hands of the Japanese army in 1937. In response
to her accusations, Mr. Itagaki told her: “I don’t
believe there has ever been such a case. Are you sure that in those eight years
you didn’t receive a single sen (IOOth
of a yen)?”39
Japan as "Normal Power"
The second LDP
approach is Japan's returning to normalcy, that is, synchronizing its economic
power with a parallel military power and refusing an apologetic approach. In
doing so, Japan would gain a national character and identity. Under the
nationalist Koizumi government, the question of Japan's return to the
"normal power" status was intensely debated. A growing group of
nationalists within the LDP made demands that Japan should develop its own
foreign and security policy strategy even independent of the United States.
This would be possible with a military power commensurate with Japan's economic
capabilities. The primary architect of Japan's return to normalcy has been
Ozawa Ichiro, currently a member of the Democratic Party of Japan. Ozawa was
Nakasone's Home Minister and later became LDP secretary general in 1989. He
split from the LDP to form the Japan Renewal Party, which was part of the
LDP-free coalition in 1993 together with other parties, including the Socialist
Party. Ozawa laid down his ideas about Japan in A Blueprint for a New Japan or
Nihon Kaizo Seikaku, which
was his master plan to transform Japan into a "normal state," through
political reforms as well as constitutional revision. In this book which came
out of a study group of bureaucrats and scholars, he advocated Japan assume a
larger role in UN international operations: Japan should be a "responsible
member of the international community, bearing the costs of peace and freedom,
and limiting the power of the central government.',40 He also defended adding a
third paragraph to Article 9 of the Constitution, allowing Japan to participate
actively in UN peace-keeping operations. The book caused a storm of protests in
Japan, and Ozawa was accused of diverting Japan from its peaceful orientation..
Attempts to implement some of these ideas during the conservative-socialist
coalition came into conflict with the position of the socialists who eventually
left the coalition. It is ironic that many of these discussions have become
mainstream in the current context of Japanese politics.
Case Study: Japan Finding itself again
More recently
"normal power" discourse is best represented by members of the Mori
faction, from which former Prime Minister Koizumi Junichiro obtained his
support. The current Prime Minister Abe Shintaro
belongs to this group as well. Proponents of "normal power" status
believe that Japan's militarization cannot be achieved independently of the
United States and therefore they advocate complete support of American policies
such as the Iraq War in exchange for American support for Japanese
militarization. Furthermore, they favor a stronger role for Japan's emperor in
politics. In this regard, former Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori's remarks that
Japan is a divine nation with the emperor at its core was quite noteworthy. In
addition, Foreign Minister Aso urged the emperor to
visit the controversial Yasukuni Shrine. Beyond discourse, the most concrete
step towards "normalization" was the endorsement by former Prime
Minister Koizumi of legislation to upgrade Japan's Defense Agency to a
cabinet-level ministry. Japan's lack of a defense ministry was a symbol of its
low profile in security matters in line with its pacifist constitution.
According to Defense Agency Director General Fukushiro
Nukaga, the next logical step will be scrapping
Article 9. Nukaga asserts that the change would mean
not only that his organization would have greater control over its policies and
budget, but also the agency and troops would face new and heavy
responsibilities.41 A group of young LDP leaders, including Abe Shinzo, who was
elected as LDP president and consequently became prime minister in September
2006, and Foreign Minister Aso Taro, are supporters
of a more assertive and independent Japanese foreign policy. Abe and Aso, maternal grandsons of Kishi
and Yoshida respectively, are likely to expand Koizumi' s nationalist
overtures. Despite being a maternal grandson of Yoshida Shigeru, Aso is among those who believe that his grandfather's
doctrine needs to be replaced by an assertive foreign policy direction. In
October 2005, Aso drew worldwide attention when he
stated that Japan is the only country in the world having "one nation, one
civilization, one language, one culture and one race." He sees China as a
major threat to Japan: "There is a neighbouring
country with a population of more than a billion that has atomic weapons, and
has had double-digit growth in military spending for 17 straight years. It's
becoming a considerable threat.“42
Before his election
as LDP president and prime minister of Japan, Abe Shinzo was a strong supporter
of Koizumi' s persistent stance on the Yasukuni Shrine issue against the
pressure exerted by China and South Korea. Because of the escalation of the North
Korean conflict following its claim over testing of a nuclear bomb in October
2006, Abe saw that it was necessary to obtain the support of North Korea's
neighbors to address the crisis. Consequently, he has not repeated his
predecessor's visits to the Yasukuni Shrine. Yet it is not clear how his
nationalist stance on critical issues such as history and the Yasukuni Shrine
would help him mend relations with China. Even though he has declared that his
government has no intention to distance itself from the apologetic statements
of the previous governments, his view on history remains revisionist as
reflected on such statements that the Class-A war criminals as convicted by the
Allied Powers after the war are not criminals under Japan's domestic law.43 Despite
the recent attempt to resolve the North Korean issue through the Chinese help,
Abe supports the view that China desires to hold Japan captive by means of the
question ofhistory.44 To counter China, he proposed strategic links with India,
Australia, and democratic Asian states, in addition to already existing
alliance with the United States. Abe stated that his platform included the
issue of constitutional reform.45 He claims that Japan needs a military that
can cope with growing obligations abroad in the twenty-fIrst
century. As a symbolic step that would facilitate the process of Japan's
normalization, Abe believes that it is necessary and only natural to elevate
the status of the Defense Agency to a cabinet-level ministry.46 Abe's other
challenger Fukuda Yasuo supports the conciliatory approach to China and North
Korea. Regardless of the LDP presidential elections, these two hawkish leaders
will play significant roles in LDP politics, because of the definite tilt
towards nationalism among young members of the LDP. They constitute the core
support group for Koizumi, who was elected to the LDP presidency and became
prime minister through their support. Most other members of the Machimura (former Mori) taction agree that the Yoshida
Doctrine is outdated in the post-Cold War system, as Japan is no longer capable
of playing with the dynamics of superpower rivalry. Hence, they argue, it is
necessary for Japan to assume an independent capability of protecting its
security interests in a region characterized by problems such as North Korea
and the rise of China. The image of an unappreciated Japan in the Gulf War is
strong in their mind set. The rival Tsushima (former Hashimoto) faction opposes
this attempt for a remilitarization of Japan. Endorsing the Yoshida Doctrine,
the faction advocates a cautious realism in believing that economic growth has
priority to security issues, as Japan's economic power boosts its regional and
international status. The Machimura faction, however,
appears to believe that an economically strong but militarily weak Japan does
not suit post-Cold War Japan's needs to prepare for an eventual withdrawal of
the United States from Asia The Yasukuni Shrine and the History Debate Yasukuni
Jinja, literally the Peaceful Nation Shrine, was built in 1869 on the orders of
Emperor Meiji to honor victims of the Boshin Civil
War (1868-69) that took place between the Tokugawa Shogunate and the
pro-imperial forces. According to one interpretation, it is "the Japanese
equivalent of America's tomb of the unknown soldier at Arlington National
Cemetery.“47 However, the Yasukuni Shrine has a deeper meaning, because the war
dead are not only remembered but also worshipped as, according to Shintoism,
their souls are transformed into kami or deities when they died. Since then the
shrine has enshrined the souls of2.5 million of Japan's war dead, which has
included, since 1978, fourteen Class-A war criminals convicted by the Tokyo War
Tribunal. Prime ministerial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine were always a
political issue.
Although many
Japanese prime ministers including Shidehara, Yoshida, Kishi,
and Hashimoto visited the shrine in their individual capacity, it was Nakasone
who did it for the first time in his official capacity. It is interesting to
note that the Yasukuni visits are not necessarily related to factional loyalty
of LDP politicians. Whereas Yoshida visited the shrine four times, militarist Kishi Nobusuke visited it only
two times and Mori Yoshiro did not make any visit while in office.48 However,
Nakasone's visit was significant because it was made after the controversial
decision to enshrine the convicted war criminals in 1978. Only two Japanese
prime ministers so far repeated Nakasone's visits: Hashimoto and Koizumi.
Whereas Nakasone and Hashimoto refrained from further visits because of
protests from China and South Korea, Koizumi displayed a stiff resistance to
international and domestic opposition in repeating his Yasukuni Shrine
attendance.49
Koizumi made six
Yasukuni visits, including his August 14,2006, visit on the anniversary of the
Japanese surrender, the last one before he steps out in September. Koizumi
clearly utilized these visits to assert his view of Japanese nationalism and
his approach to history. According to this notion, for Japan to escape from its
moral capitulation to China, it needs to assert that it has nothing to feel
ashamed of in its history. The Yasukuni Shrine works for this purpose because
this view is shared by the way history is told at Yasukuni's controversial
museum, Yushukan. Yasukini
Shrine's English website greets its visitors with the message that "we
hope that many worshipers will come to know the elevated thoughts of the noble
souls who gave up their lives for the country that they loved." so The
website has a direct link to the controversial war memorial museum, Yushukan, that is attached to the Yasukuni Shrine. Yushukan's website opens with a modem-looking flash
introduction, which starts with a sentence amidst sketches of war aircraft that
were used in kamikaze attacks: "The truth of modem Japanese history is now
restored." The shrine's display of war pictures does not refer to any
enemy but presents the war in Asia as a war for the liberation of Asia and
remembers "heroic" sacrifices of the Japanese soldiers in this war.
Yasukuni Shrine's English website displays a note by Kenji Ueda, president of Kokugakuin University, in which the author asserts what he
calls "A Correct View of History" as follows: The text books used in
history instruction at intermediate schools from the 1997 school year will
contain material on the subject of comfort women. The textbooks depict as a
historical fact the story of Asian women who were forced into prostitution by
the Japanese Army. Imparting this story to students who are still young and
immature has become a great problem since last year. This matter is drawn upon
the judgment professed by the Military Tribunal for the Far East that Japan
fought a war of aggression. Can we say that this view is correct? We must pass
judgment on this matter in the same manner of a tribunal that passes judgment
after gathering credible proof. We cannot help but feel that the possibility of
ulterior motives have not been discounted. Isn't it a fact that the West with
its military power invaded and ruled over much of Asia and Africa and that this
was the start of East-West relations? There is no uncertainty in history.
Japan's dream of building a Great East Asia was necessitated by history and it
was sought after by the countries of Asia. We cannot overlook the intent of
those who wish to tarnish the good name of the noble souls of Yasukuni.51
The Yasukuni Shrine's
display of history closely follows ideological trends in Japan. With the rise
of nationalism in the country, there is a greater acceptance and endorsement of
this view of history. As Richard Bitzinger explains:
Ten years ago that museum contained some expressions of regret and remorse for
the loss of life, both Japanese and foreign... .Back then there wasn't an
effort to tell a story about the war. Now, it is revisionist. A whitewash.
Major battles where many thousands lost their lives on both sides are simply
called Japanese "operations" or "incidents.“52 Japanese
businessmen and intellectuals seem to be divided on the issue of prime
ministerial visits to the shrine. Fukuoka District Court ruled out on April 7,
2004, that Koizumi's visits contravened the constitutional principle of
secularism. Four major Japanese newspapers appeared to be divided on the court
decision: Asahi and Mainichi were supportive of the court, whereas Yomiuri and
Sankei were critical. Intense debate in the Japanese media illustrates the
nationwide controversy of the issue, as "Japanese media rarely experience
such disagreement on legal matters."53 For instance, in an opinion piece
that appeared on the Daily Yomiuri, Yoshiyuki Kasai, the chairman of Central
Japan Railways, strongly urges Koizumi and his successors not to stop visits:
The Yasukuni issue, from the Chinese point of view, is a kind of allegiance
test to see whether Tokyo will bow to Beijing. Accordingly, not only Koizumi,
but also his successor, must not avoid visiting the shrine, irrespective of
their individual beliefs. China, in its pursuit of hegemony over the
Asian-Pacific region, is trying to split public opinion in Japan and drive a
wedge between Japan and the Unite States. For the
Chinese, the Yasukuni issue is nothing but a convenient tool to use in this
strategy. 54
The right-wing
nationalist Sankei newspaper was highly supportive of Koizumi's visits and urge
him not to stop them. 55 In an opinion piece that appeared in Asahi Shimbun, Taichi Sakaiya, a former
bureaucrat at MITI, believes that Koizumi should make these visits in a private
capacity and explain the rationale behind his visits better. The author argues
that because Yasukuni is a religious place, visiting the shrine by a state
official in his official capacity violates the principle of secularism. On the
other hand, he claims praying at the shrine should be viewed in the context of
Shintoism, which is based on the belief system that "all people good or
bad become 'deities' when they die. People worship good gods to seek their
blessings and offer prayers to bad gods to deliver them from evil.,,56 In an
interesting development, eight former prime ministers expressed their
disappointment with Koizumi' s insistence to visit the Yasukuni. They met the
former House of Representatives Speaker Yohei Kono. Kono, who was one of LDP's
most senior politician known for his long career as a Foreign Minister and
known as pro-Chinese, asked Koizumi to consider his visits, but Koizumi
insisted that he would make the most appropriate decision. 57
The Question of China and the United States
The emergence of
China as a global economic power has been the most important challenge for
Japan. While in the context of the Cold War, Japan could ignore China and rely
on the United States for its security and economic relations, this appears to
be increasingly difficult. In the 1980s, the major academic and political attention
on East Asia was centered on Japan; China has regained its central status. The
discourse of “Japan as Number One” has been replaced by the debates that
highlight the growing significance of China. 58 China has replaced the United
States as Japan’s largest trading partner, and China became the third largest
trade partner of the United States after Canada and Mexico. Currently Japan
exports more to China than to the United States, helping to ease its
economic troubles and preventing a fall into recession. Also, Japan is China’s
top import supplier. Trade volume between Japan and China, including Hong Kong,
reached $213 billion in 2004, accounting for 20.1 percent of Japan’s total
trade. Trade volume between Japan and the United States was $197 billion, which
amounted to 19 percent of total Japanese exports and imports.59
China is integrating
its economy heavily with the United States, decreasing Japan’s relative
significance to the United States.60 Arguably, both economically and
politically the world’s most important bilateral relations are between the
United States and China. Chiefly through sales by Wal-Mart corporation, which
is the most significant importer of Chinese goods in the United States, China
has become the number 1 exporter to the United States.61 China is a large
investment zone for American companies. However, the direction of investment is
not one-way. China has started to invest in the United States through purchase
of key American companies such as IBM computers.62 While the Chinese bids to
buy other American companies such as the oil giant Unocal have provoked an
intensive debate in the U.S. Congress for security implications, the United
States is well aware of China’s importance for the U.S. economy and hardly in a
position to take any preventive measures against Chinese investments.
Meanwhile, the United States became China’s largest export destination. Like
many American companies, Japanese companies utilize China as a production base
to export into the U.S. market and the Japanese exports to China are partly
used in Japanese-owned production facilities in China. Despite China’s growing
significance to Japan, the perceptions of China in Japan remains low. Opinion
poll research data indicate favorable opinion of China has declined, particularly
after the Koizumi government came into office. In an opinion poll conducted by
Asahi Shimbun in 1999, only 30 percent of the respondents in Japan answered
affirmatively to the question, “in the future, do you think China and Japan
will be able to work together to adopt the same common values about democracy
and a market economy?” Only 55 percent of the respondents did not believe that
they will be able to work together. According to the same poll, 55 percent of
the respondents thought that relations of Japan with the United States were
more important than those with China, whereas only 15 percent of the
respondents pointed to China as the more important partner and 21 percent
indicated that both countries were equally significant. 63 In another poll sponsored
by the Japanese government, Japanese respondents were asked how closely they
felt toward China. The results were as follows: 12 percent very closely, 37
percent rather closely, 30 percent not very closely, 18 percent not closely at
all.64
However, in 2004, a
cabinet office survey finds that only 37.6 percent of the respondents feel
friendly towards China, and 58.2 percent of them do not. Interestingly, the
same poll finds pro-South Korean feelings as increasing. When it comes to South
Korea, 56.7 percent of the respondents indicated favorable opinion.65 In this
regard, the anti-Japanese feelings expressed in China following Koizumi’s
provocative Yasukuni Shrine visits seemed to have exacerbated anti-Chinese
feelings among the Japanese public.
In addition to the
China problem, the emergence of a nuclear North Korea is the most significant
challenge for Japan. A nuclear North Korea would significantly reduce Japan’s
relative security position in East Asia. Japanese sense of security and
confidence will dwindle in the context of Korean and Chinese nuclear powers.
Again, Japanese response to this challenge can never be free from its
historical baggage. If Japan resorts to nuclear weapons on its own, this would
be reacted by other Asians. If Japan maintains its current policy of relying on
the U.S. security umbrella, then it would also be seen as half hearted. The
shadow of history haunts Japanese foreign policy options. However, there is no
single way to look at this dilemma. Japanese intellectuals, policymakers, and
opposition groups have their distinct ways to approach the problem, in such
ways that render use of “national identity” highly problematic.
Japan and the Iraq War
Former Prime Minister
Koizumi will be remembered for his assertive pro-U.S. stance. Like his
factional predecessor Kishi, Koizumi believed in a
utilitarian approach to relations with the United States and sought to utilize
this alliance to increase Japanese assertiveness in foreign policy. The Koizumi
government contributed to the post September 11 U.S. foreign policy both in
discursive and practical ways. In addition to its dispatch of naval forces to
the Indian Ocean during the Afghanistan War, Japan made its first deployment of
troops to a conflict zone, Iraq, after the Second World War. According to
polls, a majority of the people opposed their country’s sending troops to Iraq.
The critics asserted that this was a clear violation of Article 9, which banned
Japan from sending troops to conflict zones. However, the government legally
justified its dispatch of troops, arguing that Shiite-populated Samawah where Japanese troops were stationed in Iraq was
itself a nonconflict zone. However, as Japan’s
well-known Middle East expert Sakai Keiko argues, the entire country had to be considered
as a conflict zone rather than a part of it and thus legality of the
government’s claim is highly disputed. Bb Sasaki Takeshi, president of Tokyo
University, “WTites that the deployment of troops to
the Iraq War can be interpreted as one consequence of the post-Cold War history
of U.S.-Japan relations. According to him, three factors contributed to Japan’s
decisions:
1. The Gulf War
paranoia: Japan was not appreciated for its financial contribution short of
military commitment.
2. North Korea as a
suspected nuclear power prevents Japan from completely disentangling itself
from the U.S. security umbrella. Continued U.S. commitment to Japan’s defense
required Japan to similarly be committed to U.S. security priorities: “an
assessment that the war in Iraq is a war against international terrorism is not
totally absent in Japan, but in comparison with Spain, for example, the
circumstances are fundamentally different because of the issues surrounding
North Korea.”
3. Personal relations
between Koizumi and Bush are the closest between the leaders of these countries
since the era of Nakasone and Reagan.67 The Gulf War diplomacy of Japan was
largely criticized by the United States despite the fact that Japan contributed
to the war cost. As a Foreign Ministry official states, “we shouldn’t shoulder
war costs.. . . Our effort was not appreciated much in the time of the Gulf
War, and we faced criticism that we only offered money.“68 However, the
Gulf War syndrome of Japan cannot be thought of independently of its quest for
returning to a normal power nation status under the Koizumi government.
Moreover, international legality and popularity of the Iraq War were very much
in question so that no Gulf country asked Japan to contribute to the war. Japan
could side with the rest of the world in not joining the United States and
still show its independent foreign policy abilities. In comparison, Germany,
which was in a comparable situation with Japan in terms of returning to normal
power status following the Cold War, chose to exert its political power by not
joining the United States. For Turkey as well, refusing to allow U.S. troop
passage was an attempt to escape the Cold War international system, which
locked the country in complete obedience to the United States. Hence the Gulf
War syndrome appears to be a useful discourse to convince public opinion that
Japan had to be more involved in international crisis. Meanwhile, Japanese
public opinion remained overwhelmingly opposed to the deployment of SDF. As of
July 2004, the support level is slightly above 30 percent while Koizumi
government has been losing support in parallel to the Iraq war.69
It should be noted,
however, that this level of support was in the context of no Japanese military
casualty so far in the Iraq War. In historical comparison, the Iraq dispatch of
Japanese troops is the first extension of Japanese alliance with any Western
power in its history beyond the Pacific. In the Anglo-Japanese alliance during
the First World War, Japan limited its alliance responsibility to the
Asia-Pacific region. Thus, the dispatch is not only legally but also
symbolically a controversial issue. It also shows continuation of Japan’s
Western orientation and inability to devise diplomacy independence from the
U.S.-Japan alliance system. One of the foreign policy expectations of the
Koizumi government from the Iraq War is to obtain U.S. support for a permanent
Security Council seat in the United Nations. Koizumi has eagerly lobbied for
this goal that would give Japan a global security role and contribute to its
return to normal power status. With the calls for reforming the UN system,
Japan appears to be a strong contender for a permanent UN Security Council
seat. The other candidates are Germany, India, and Brazil. The United States
supports the bid of Japan but opposes Germany apparently because of its
opposition to the Iraq War, despite the fact that Germany is the second largest
contributor of troops to UN-mandated missions. Condoleezza Rice refused to
endorse the German bid: “the only country that we have said unequivocally that
we support is Japan, having to do with Japan’s special role in the U.N. and
support for the U.N.“70 The support of the United States appears to be a key
factor for Japan to achieve this goal; therefore Japan’s participation in the
coalition in the Iraq War was timely. However, any reform within the UN system
must be approved by all current veto-holding members of the Security Council
that includes China. The Chinese strictly object to Japan’s quest for a
permanent Security Council seat. In April 2005, during a state visit to India,
Chinese Prime Minister Wen Jiabao, supported Indian ambition to gain a
permanent seat, but objected to that of Japan by arguing that Japan need to
face up to history before seeking such a goal.71 Once again, Japan confronts
the challenge of China in its drive to achieve a global security role. China
utilized the Internet in the form of online petitions with millions of people
signing their names in opposition to the Japanese bid.72
Conclusion P.2
The end of the Cold
War meant the end of Japan's comfortable escape from its history. It also meant
that Japan could no longer enjoy a privileged relationship with the United
States while China was isolated from the international system. This special
relationship had allowed Japan to escape from any further punishment for its
past and to retain its political system as symbolized by the dramatic comeback
of Kishi Nobusuke who has
his personal signature in many of the prewar decisions. Due to this special
relationship, Japan was not tolerated and allowed to forget rather than deal
with its war history and its occupation of Asia. In this regard, much was in
contrast with Germany, which, having dealt with the question of history, was
able to further the process of integration in Europe. One can regard the entire
history of Japanese foreign policy as a response to the question of how to
locate China in Japanese national identity. Once removed from its central place
in the Meiji era, China never returned back to its original place in Japanese
identity. In the post-Cold War security and economic structure in East Asia,
however, Japan has faced a new reality about China. It was a regional and
increasingly global actor. Japan's ability to reconcile its identity and
reality will shape the future relations between these two countries.
The end of the Cold
War did not necessarily bring improvements in Japan's security environment. The
question of North Korea remains unsolved. If the nuclear ambitions of North
Korea are fully materialized, this leaves the Japanese with a situation in
which they are the only nonnuclear East Asian nation. Given the uncertainty
about the prospects of American military presence in East Asia, this may lead
Japanese to search for their own nuclear power in the context of historically
rooted culture of insecurity. It is hard to predict future developments in
Japanese foreign policy. Much depends on whether nationalists continue to rule
the country. Much depends on the questions of the military presence of the
United States in East Asia, the question of North Korea, and ultimately the
future role that China desires to play. The Korean situation and the rise of
China have changed the ideational context in East Asia to the advantage of
nationalists. Consequently, the nationalist faction within the LDP has
solidified its power, having occupied the position of prime minister in the
last ten years. Unless antinationalist LDP factions and parties are able to put
a more organized resistance, one can only expect an increasingly assertive
Japanese foreign policy. In this situation, Japan's return to its "normal"
status will be unavoidable. However, nationalists will not bring a change to
Japan's long-term psychological isolation from Asia. Under them, Japan will
remain a country that is physically in Asia but psychologically remote from it.
If this emotional distance from the continent is not addressed, Japan may be
destined to remain as a marginal power in the shadows of the United States and
China. Most recently then, Yasuo Fukuda appointed his new team Sept. 24, 2007,
a day after being elected as Japan's ruling Liberal Democratic Party's new
president. The resignation of Japan's previous prime minister, Shinzo Abe, and
the election of Fukuda is about restrengthening the LDP for the next election
(likely within the next two years) and continuing the general trend of LDP
policies initiated under Abe's predecessor, Junichiro Koizumi. Fukuda's
election is about a tightening of internal party control, necessary before
reform efforts can be reinjected with momentum. Internal reform efforts --
aimed at reconfiguring the underlying economic structures (such as postal bank
reform and pension reform) and at breaking Japanese politics from its habit of
constant backroom dealings -- have progressed little since Koizumi left office.
The need for economic reform has barely changed since Abe's first day in
office. Japan's budget deficit and national debt, as percentages of gross
domestic product, are still the highest in the developed world. Furthermore,
Japan's demographic aging and shrinking suggests that (far) worse times are
ahead. Economic reform is imperative if the Japanese system is ever to lift out
of its indefinite decline, but domestic inertia and rural resistance are at
record highs.
Fukuda was chosen
primarily as a person about whom few could complain. He is nearly 20 years
older than Abe and has more political experience than his predecessor. The son
of a former prime minister, Fukuda has worked in at least three different
administrations; his most recent position was chief Cabinet secretary. He is
seen as a "fixer" and formulated the Koizumi government's response
and foreign policy position after 9/11, coordinating the passage of the
anti-terrorism special measures law. Although focusing tightly on foreign
policy at the expense of domestic priorities was what brought his predecessor
down, Fukuda is slated to continue with Abe's warming toward China and South
Korea. Not only will he not pay homage to the Yasukuni Shrine (a Japanese
memorial housing 14 convicted Class-A war criminals, Japanese prime ministerial
visits to which are an extremely sensitive subject with both Beijing and
Seoul), but he also likely will come out and officially confirm that he has no
plans to visit the shrine. In terms of relations with the United States, Fukuda
likely will continue to use the United States' regional needs -- such as
Japan's cooperation in security -- as well as various offers from Washington in
order to strengthen and expand Japan's interests within the region.
If anything, Fukuda
will face a tougher time than his immediate predecessor. Abe at least could
count on the echo effect, drawing from Koizumi's legacy and popularity. Fukuda
begins on the same "square one" where Abe started in September 2006
as far as challenges are concerned -- but he follows Abe, who was unsuccessful
because he failed to address domestic social priorities directly and lacked the
eccentric qualities (a la Koizumi) to endear him to the Japanese public and to
play various LDP factions against each other. It was not Koizumi's reform
agenda that made him successful; it was his strategy of keeping his opponents
guessing and daring to challenge convention. Looking ahead, more important to
watch is the rise of Ichiro Ozawa, leader of the opposition Democratic Party of
Japan (DPJ), whose mission for the last year has been to dislodge Abe. Despite
his party affiliation, his policies and ideals are more akin to those of the
LDP core conservatives than to those of his DPJ counterparts. Even if LDP
deputy leader Taro Aso had won the prime ministerial
post instead of Abe, the need to balance out powerful party factions -- many of
which are resistant to change -- would remain. Fukuda is not any more
significant than Abe in the sense that both are cogs within a Japanese system
that continues evolving in the post-Cold War reality. And the twin rewards of
autonomy and prestige are within Japan's grasp for the first time in living
memory. To reduce associated risks, Japan will be cautious. It will be normal.
It will hedge. The security strategy and institutions abetting this hedge will
be neither too hard nor too soft.
Case Study: The Rearmament of Japan
Finally then, on Oct.
15 North Korean and Japanese officials met in China, for two days of
normalization talks, results of which have not been analysed
by the time of writing although what can be said with certainty is that there
will be more talks soon.
As for today, while
Japan's imperial past gives the country some influence throughout East Asia, it
mostly has earned Japan enmity. Particularly vitriolic is the contempt in which
Japan is held by the Koreans, who resent Japanese cultural influence, economic
domination and attempts to forcibly redefine Korean identity during the
Japanese occupation. North Korea launched a ballistic missile over Japan in
1998 in a show of force, and in 2006, Pyongyang tested a nuclear device. Marry
those two technologies and Japan clearly has a pressing need for NMD, and this
is even before the economic might of South Korea is combined with North Korean
military technology in a reunification that is crawling ever closer.
Now then, in the past
few days, suddenly Russia's attention has come to rest on Japan, the state that
is most consistent in its effort to participate in national missile defense
(NMD), and on Tuesday, the Japanese government flatly, officially and firmly
rebuffed Russian calls to abandon the system. The core Russian concern is that
the system ultimately will be fine-tuned and expanded so that it can hedge in
Moscow, something that may well be lurking about in the depths of U.S.
strategic planning. But Japan wants NMD for its own reasons. China, of course,
offers a more direct and immediate challenge for Japan. As big as Asia is, it
probably does not have room for both a land-based and a sea-based regional
superpower. Japan's technological edge combined with China's existing nuclear
arsenal leaves Japan pushing for NMD, no matter what the Russians do. But even
without the more pressing concern of Asia pushing Japan toward NMD cooperation
with the United States, Russia is on Tokyo's radar. The two hardly have a
friendly history: Japan has served as Washington's proxy in East Asia, blocking
Soviet access to the Pacific. Russia still has not reached a peace accord with
Japan, for World War 2. And before that, Japan defeated Moscow in the 1904-1905
Russo-Japanese War, becoming the only Asian state to defeat a European power
and inflicting the geopolitical equivalent of a root canal. Clearly however,
the Kremlin currently is attempting to put pins in a number of potential
conflicts in order to focus on its own immediate concerns. But so far as Japan
is concerned, Russia remains firmly on the "future trouble" list.
Notes
1 Peter J.
Katzenstein and Nobuo Okawara, "Japan and
Asian-Pacific Security," in Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity,
Power, and Efficiency, ed. J. J. Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Allen Carlson
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004), 110.
2 Ibid.
3 Ibid.
4 David Kang,
"Hierarchy and Stability in Asian International Relations," in
International Relations Theory and the Asia-Pacific, ed. G. John Ikenberry and Michael Mastanduno
(New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), 177.
5 Masaru Tamamoto, IIAmbigious Japan:
Japanese National Identity at Century's End," in International Relations
Theory and the Asia-Pacific, ed. G. John Ikenberry
and Michael Mastanduno (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2003).
6 "Democracy
'key to national identity'," Yomiuri Shimbun, November 6,2003.
7 Linda Low,
"The East Asian Economic Grouping," the Pacific Review 4, no. 4
(1991).
8 Funabashi Y oichi, "East Asia's History Creating Mistrust,"
Asahi Shimbun, January 04, 2005. Also see, Yoichi Funabashi, "The Asianization of Asia," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 5
(1993).
9 Kobayashi Y otaro, "Re-Asianization Does
Not Mean Isolation," Los Angeles Times, December 3, 1991.
10 Kobayashi Y otaro, "Good Neighbors Japan and China Should Lead
Post-Cold War Asia," Phoenix Gazette, December 12, 1991.
11 Funabashi Yoichi,
"Japan Needs its 'Own' Asian Vision," Asahi Shim bun, December
14,2004. Also see Funabashi, "The Asianization
of Asia."
12 Hama Noriko,
"The 'Vision Thing' Comes to Japan in Blurry Fashion," Japan Times,
March 28, 2005.
13 Kazuo Ogura,
"'Ajia Fukken' No Tame
Ni," Chuo Karon, July 1992. Quoted in Pyle, 47.
14 For an American
critic ofneo-liberal economic philosophy on the Asian
financial crisis, see Chalmers Johnson, "Let's Revisit Asia's 'Crony
Capitalism'," Los Angeles Times, June 25, 1999.
15 Ishihara Shintaro, "Japan Must Help the Region Resist American
Control," Asiaweek October 16, 1998.
16 Glenn D. Hook et aI., "Japan and the East Asian Financial Crisis:
Patterns, Motivations and Instrumentalisation of
Japanese Regional Economic Diplomacy," European Journal of East Asian
Studies I (2002): 183.
17 Sandra Sugawara,
"Japan Approves Bank Rescue Plan," Washington Post, February 17,
1998.
18 Hook et aI., "Japan and the East Asian Financial Crisis:
Patterns, Motivations and Instrumentalisation of
Japanese Regional Economic Diplomacy," 177.
19 Ibid.
20 "Mr. Yen's
World, An Interview with "Liberated" Ex-Bureaucrat Sakakibara Eisuke," Asiaweek, January 6, 2000, expanded online version,
http://www.asiaweek.com/asiaweeklinterview/sakakibara.eisuke. 01062000/
accessed July 26,2005.
21 Hook et aI., "Japan and the East Asian Financial Crisis:
Patterns, Motivations and Instrumentalisation of
Japanese Regional Economic Diplomacy," 177.
22 Some of the
realist interpretations of East Asian politics in the post-Cold War period concede
the role of historical legacy as a determining factor that shape security
perceptions. See Thomas J. Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance,
and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," International Security 23, no. 4
(1999). While such an eclectic approach is helpful, it contradicts realism's
commitment to materialist ontology. For a defense of eclecticism, see Peter J.
Katzenstein and Rudra Sil, "Rethinking Asian Security: A Case for
Analytical Eclecticism," in Rethinking Security in East Asia: Identity,
Power, and Efficiency, ed. J. J. Suh, Peter J. Katzenstein, and Allen Carlson
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2004).
23 For a discussion
of the role of the burden of history on Japan's relations with China, see
Michael H. Armacost and Kenneth B. Pyle, Japan and
the Engagement of China: Challenges for us. Policy Coordination (Seattle: The
National Bureau of Asian Research, 2001).
24 For a Chinese view
on the subject, see "Japan should take Germany as its 'mirror',"
People's Daily (China), April 22, 2005.
25 Asahi Shimbun, 29
June 1994, quoted in Ryuji Mukae, "Japan's Diet
Resolution on World War Two: Keeping History at Bay," Asian Survey 36, no.
10 (1996): 1014.
26 Ibid., 1011.
27 Ibid., 1011-12.
28 Statement by Prime
Minister Murayama Tomiichi on August 15, 1995, the
fiftieth anniversary of the Asia-Pacific War. Many Asian leaders expressed
their disappointment at the personal tone of the Murayama speech. For instance,
see "Singapore Premo Doubts Murayama's War
Apology," Jiji Press Ticker Service, August 28, 1995.
29 "LDP says
Murayama deviated from Diet no-war resolution," Kyodo News Agency, August
22, 1995.
30 Gilbert Rozman, Northeast Asia's Stunted Regionalism: Bilateral
Distrust in the Shadow of Globalization (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2004), 191-92.
31 Michael
Richardson, "Hashimoto's Visit Takes Up the Japan-China Balance: Tokyo
Poses ASEAN Puzzle," International Herald Tribune, January 8, 1997.
32 Michael
Richardson, "Tiptoeing Past China, Japan Extends a Hand to Asia,"
International Herald Tribune, January 15, 1997.
33 Samuel Kim, China
and the World, Donald W. Klein, "Japan and Europe in China's Foreign
Relations," in China and the World: Chinese Foreign Policy Faces the New
Millennium, ed. Samuel S. Kim (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), 141.
34 Mainichi Daily,
December 3, 1996.
35 Asahi Shimbun, 29
June, 1994, quoted in Mukae, "Japan's Diet
Resolution on World War Two: Keeping History at Bay," 1015.
36 Sydney Morning
Herald, June 6, 1996.
37 Quoted in !ida, Rethinking Identity in Modern Japan, Nationalism as
Aesthetics, 198.
38 "War-Bereaved
Families in Dilemma," Asahi Shimbun, July 8, 2005.
39 The Weekend
Australian, June 8, 1996.
40 Ichiro Ozawa,
Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation (Tokyo:
Kodansha, 1994). For a review of this book, see Chalmers Johnson, review of
Review of Blueprint for a New Japan: The Rethinking of a Nation by Ozawa
Ichiro, Monumenta Nipponica
49, no. 3 (1994).
41 Steve Herman,
"Japan to Upgrade Defense Agency to Ministry," Voice of America
(VOA), June 09, 2006. http://www.voanews.com/english/2006-06-09-voa4.cfm
Katzenstein and Okawara, "Japan and
Asian-Pacific Security."
42 Takeshi Oda,
"Japan's Foreign Minister Should Watch His Words," The Star
(Malaysia), February 24, 2006.
43 "Abe
Clarifies Views on 'History Issue', Reaffirms Government Apologies,"
Yomiuri Shimbun, October 7,2006.
44 "Yasukuni Key
to LDP Presidency," Yomiuri Shimbun, June 9, 2005.
45 "LDP
Presidential Race," Asahi Shimbun, May 26, 2006.
46 Steve Hennan, "Japan to Upgrade Defense Agency to
Ministry," Voice of America (VOA), June 09, 2006.
47 Masaru Tamamoto, "A Land without Patriots, the Yasukuni
Controversy and Japanese Nationalism," World Policy Journal 18, no. 40
(2001): 34.
48 Phil Deans,
"Yasukuni Shrine in the Context of East Asian Nationalisms,"
unpublished paper.
49 For a comparison
between the visits to Yasukuni Shrine by Nakasone and Koizumi, see Shibuichi, "The Yasukuni Shrine Dispute and the Politics
ofIdentity in Japan: Why All the Fuss?."
50 See the official
website of the Yasukuni Shrine, http://www.yasukuni.or.jp/.
51 Kenji Ueda,
"The Noble Souls ofYasukuni-Eternally,"
http://www.yasukuni.or.jp/english/ (accessed: June 12,2006).
52 "Koizumi's
Visits Boost Controversial Version of History," Christian Science Monitor,
October 21, 2005.
53 Kiroku Hanai, "A Laudible Yasukuni Ruling," Japan Times, April 26,
2004.
54 Yoshiyuki Kasai,
"China using Yasukuni as 'Test of Allegiance'" Daily Yomiuri, June
26, 2005.
55 Sankei Shimbun
published Ishihara Shintaro's recent book: Shintaro Ishihara, Nippon Yo
(Tokyo: Sankei Shimbun, 2002).
56 Taichi Sakaiya, "Koizumi
Should Explain His Yasukuni Visits," Asahi Shimbun, July 21, 2005.
57 "Yasukuni Key
to LDP Presidency," the Daily Yomiuri, June 9, 2005. Also "Yasukuni Dake Ga Nichhuu No Mondai Canai, Koizumi Shushou," Asahi Shimbun, July 19, 2005.
58 Ezra F. Vogel,
Japan as Number One: Lessonsfor America (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1979) and Ezra F. Vogel, Japan as Number One:
Revisited (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1986). Japanese
edition of this book was an all-time best seller in the 1980s. Also see Henny
Sender, "China Inc. Looks Set to Outdo Old Japan Inc," Wall Street
Journal- Eastern Edition, June 24 ,2005.
59 Paul Blustein, "China Passes U.S. in Trade with Japan, 2004
Figures Show Asian Giant's Muscle," Washington Post, January 27, 2005.
60 Meanwhile, China
has enlarged its trade relations with Europe as well. European Union has
replaced the United States as China's largest trading partner. China is EU's
second-largest exporter and third-largest importer. See "Europe's new
protectionism," The Economist, July 1, 2005, 49.
61 Wal-Mart alone
imported $18 billion worth of Chinese goods in 2004, making it China's
eighth-largest trading partner, with a volume of trade larger than that of
Australia, Canada, and Russia. Neil C. Hughes, "A Trade War with
China?," Foreign Affairs 84 (2005): 94 For Wal-Mart's own expansion in
China, see Clay Chandler et aI., "The Great
Wal-Mart of China," Fortune, July 252005 For a skeptical analysis of the
implications of China's rise for the United States, see Ted C. Fishman, China,
Inc.: How the Rise of the Next Superpower Challenges America and the World (New
York: Scribner, 2005).
62 Sender,
"China Inc. Looks Set to Outdo Old Japan Inc."
63 Asahi Shimbun,
March 17, 1999.
64 Shin Joho Center,
August 1, 1999.
65 "Public
opinion of China hits record low, national poll shows," Japan Times, December
20, 2004.
66 Eric Prideaux, interview by Keiko Sakai, Japan Times, January 9,
2005.
67 "Bush and
Koizumi," the Journal of Japanese Trade and Industry (JJTI), July 1, 2004.
68 "Japan Won't
Pay for Iraq War: LDP Exec," Japan Times, February 27, 2003.
69 "Japan's
Foreign Policy-From Pacifism to Populism," the Economist, July 8, 2004.
70 Transcript:
"Rice, Germany's Fischer Discuss Iran, Iraq, Mideast, U.N. Reform,"
June
8,2005, the Bureau of Intemational Information
Programs, U.S. Department of State.
71 Michael Collins,
"Riots and Remembrance: Rising Tensions between China and Japan,"
Contemporary Review 286 (2005): 336. Also see "Japan's Imperialist Past
Haunts Its Bid for Security Council Seat." Wall Street Journal, April I,
2005; and, Sebastian Moffett, Charles Hutzler, and Hae Won Choi, "Japan's Imperialist Past Haunts Its Bid
for Security Council Seat," Wall Street Journal- Eastern Edition, April I,
2005.
72 "'No' to
Japan's UN Bid Gets Millions of Clicks," Xinhua News Agency, March 30,
2005.
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