The Hamitic theory of race and the
possible role it played in the Rwandan Genocide
Having earlier covered this subject in a wider context the 1994
Rwandan genocide changed the way in which we think genocide occurs because it
encompassed hatreds that rested on colonial resentments, revenge massacres
since 1962, assassinations of political elites, gender, and reproduction, and
as we shall see, explicit racial mystifications.
The Hamitic hypothesis is well-known to
students of Africa. It states that everything of value ever found in Africa was
brought there by the Hamites, allegedly a
branch of the Caucasian race.
Explorers such David Livingstone and
John Hanning Speke stoked the ideas
of Hamitic superiority:
It appears impossible to believe,
judging from the physical appearance of the Wahuma
[Tutsi], that they can be of any other race than the semi-Shem-Hamitic of
Ethiopia... Most people appear to regard the Abyssinians as a different race
from the Gallas, but, I believe, without foundation.
Both alike are Christians of the greatest antiquity... [They] fought in the
Somali country, subjugated that land, were defeated to a certain extent by the
Arabs from the opposite continent, and tried their hands south as far as the Jub river, where they also left many of their numbers
behind. Again they attacked Omwita (the present Mombas), were repulsed, were lost sight of in the interior
of the continent, and, crossing the Nile close to its source, discovered the
rich pasture-lands of Unyoro, and founded the great
kingdom of Kittara, [Uganda, northern Tanzania,
eastern Congo, Rwanda and Burundi] where they lost their religion, forgot their
language, extracted their lower incisors like the natives, changed their
national name to Wahuma, and no longer remembered the
names of Hubshi or Galla….(1)
Most scholars believe that Europeans and
Africans constructed the idea of the kingdom of Kittara.
Africans did so to propagate local religions and to justify expansion, while
Europeans utilized it as a powerful tool for reconstructing Hamitic migration
patterns.(2)
Regardless of the validity of the
migration patterns, Speke completely bought into the idea of whites living in
Africa with his most powerful claim: “[T]hough even
the present reigning kings [in the Kittara area]
retain a singular traditional account of their having once been half white and
half black, with hair on the white side straight, and on the black side
frizzly.”(3)
Speke purportedly heard royalty claim
their whiteness. Despite the claim being highly suspect, it reveals several
conclusions about the mindset of the first explorer to write about Rwanda.
First, it shows that Speke believed that several monarchs in eastern Africa
understood their ethnic heritage, and second they realized to an extent their
royalty arose out of their whiteness. This was not a mere off the cuff remark,
though, as Speke doubled down these claims in his less popular What
Led to the Discovery of the Nile released later the same year as his
Journal of the Discovery of the Source of the Nile. In fact, he quotes himself
to reiterate his belief in the greatness of the Wahuma.(4)
He also reveals his fondness of the
Christian based portions of the Hamitic Hypothesis, in stating his “empathy”
towards Negroid races, he opines, “I accounted for their cruel destiny in being
the slaves of all men…by the common order of nature, they, being the weakest,
had to succumb to their superiors, the Japhetic and Semitic branches of the
family.”(5)
Perhaps if Speke had not spoken of
“Ruanda” as a country cut off from the rest of Africa, speculation surrounding
the country would have dissipated. Instead, the inconclusive attempts to find
the head of the Nile conjoined with one of the last portions of central Africa
to welcome explorers caused the colonial imagination to run wild. Additionally,
the explorers for an unknown reason refused to remain critical of the local
guides and Arab traders when it came to information surrounding Rwanda. It may
have been the hope of naïve explorers that Rwanda truly could have been the
answer that they were all searching for, but it may have also been their denial
that any African kingdom possessed the mental and militaristic fortitude to
hold Europeans at bay. Unfortunately, the reasons can only be speculated now,
but more important to the overall history of Rwanda is how those colonial
powers acted with differing sets of knowledge. As Germany and Belgium
reconciled between the imagined character of the Rwandans and the true people
who inhabited the region, they began setting the condition for their imagined
character to reign supreme. Ultimately, with the colonial powers acceptance of
their constructed knowledge, they established the precedent of tension between
the Tutsi and Hutu population during their imperial tenure.
The Hamitic concept thus had as its
function the portrayal of the Negro as an inherently inferior being and to
rationalize his exploitation. In the final analysis, it was possible because
its changing aspects were supported by the prevailing intellectual viewpoints
of the times.
German officials and colonists in Rwanda
incorporated these theories into their native policies. The Germans believed
the Tutsi ruling class was racially superior to the other native peoples of
Rwanda because of their alleged "Hamitic" origins on the Horn of Africa,
which they believed made them more "European" than the Hutu. The
colonists, including powerful Roman Catholic officials, favored the Tutsis
because of their taller stature, more "honorable and eloquent"
personalities, and willingness to convert to Roman Catholicism, the colonist.
The Germans favored Tutsi dominance over the farming Hutus (almost in a
feudalistic manner) and granted them a basic ruling position. These positions
eventually turned into the overall governing body of Rwanda.
Taking it a step further, the Belgian period
In 1919, as part of the Versailles
Treaty, Rwanda was awarded to Belgium as a League of Nations trust territory.
Continuing where the German colonialists
left of Belgian missionaries reaffirmed the racial superiority with the
teaching of Tutsi divinity and by denying Hutus’ access to higher forms of
education. Mgr. Léon Classe oversaw the majority of
racially segregated policies. But going a step further, he separated the Tutsi
from the Hutu population in schools and created a two-tiered education system.
The Hutu tier received a more simplistic education focused on mining and
farming, while the church exposed the Tutsi to a more intensive education,
geared towards colonial administration.
As Edith R.Sanders
described, the “White Fathers” and the Belgian administration concluded, on
flimsy evidence based on the Hamitic race theory, that Tutsis and Hutus were of
completely
separate ethnic origin and that Tutsis were the Hutus' natural masters.
This had a great impact including on Rwandans who attended colonial schools.
According to the myth the colonialists propagated, Hamites were of “Caucasian”
origin, were the agents of “civilization” in black Africa, and were lighter
skinned.(6)
According to Augustin Mvuyekure, missionary discourse and the Belgian
administration “ossified” Hutu and Tutsi “socio-professional categories” into
fixed categories of race and ethnicity, thereby laying the foundation for future
ethnic violence. (7)
In 1933 the Belgian rulers then issued
identity cards, dividing everyone as either Hutu or Tutsi. Anyone who owned ten
cows was automatically designated a Tutsi so that the system was based more on
caste than on ethnicity—and they locked all Hutus into blue-collar jobs.
In fact, these reforms went so far as to
reshape the governmental structure over each hill.
Under the previous Rwandese system,
three types of chiefs governed the land, but these reforms consolidated all
three positions into one, thus making tax collecting easier and lessening
corruption. The Belgian administration also passed legislation that determined
that the state held all land, regardless if Hutu lived on it.(8)
By assuring a Tutsi monopoly of power,
the Belgians set the stage for future conflict in Rwanda. Although one could
argue such was not their intent. They were not implementing a divide and rule
strategy so much as they were just putting into effect their racist
convictions.
Education also played an ever-growing
role in Belgian occupation, for example in 1920 Rwanda had 123 schools and
6,000 students, but by 1948, they had 1,618 schools with 142,652 students, and
in 1957, it is estimated that a third of all children attended school.(9)
This worked against the colonial power
though, as more Hutu learned of the Hamitic Hypothesis, the more they concluded
that the Tutsi were outside invaders who -took the Hutu’s land. Subverting
their role of inferiority in society, “Hutuness” as
an idea found itself rapidly adopted by the oppressed Hutus.
The very act of recording the ethnic
groups not only made them more important but fundamentally changed their
character. The Hutu and Tutsi designations were no longer amorphous categories;
instead, they became inflexible. Europeans began to refer to them as ethnic
differences. The elite, the Tutsi, were the immediate beneficiaries, and they
played that superiority to its best advantage.
Thus while Rwandan identity before
colonialism was fluid but that with the onset of colonialism and the
introduction of the Hamitic hypothesis identities became static and fixed which
led to unimaginable violence. Prior to colonialism, ethnic identities tended to
dynamically shift and merge into new conceptualizations. With colonialism, this
natural development of identity was undermined as people were organized into
either one or another single identity category.
And when seen as racially superior by
Belgian officials, Tutsi youth were given jobs within colonial administrations at
the expense of Hutu men. The result was not only the creation of racial
distinctions but social resentment between the two divisions within Rwandan
society.
In 1959, violence between the Tutsi and
Hutu erupted. Hutus overthrew Tutsi rule, declared an independent republic and
elected the first Hutu president, Grégoire Kayibanda.
Mass killings of Tutsis occurred during the transition to Hutu rule, hinting at
things to come The Hutu-led government used the same system of racial
oppression that existed during colonialism, except that now they were in
control. Even though the Hutus had suffered from this identity classification,
they kept it to use it against the Tutsi who had once used it against them.
The Hutu Parti
du Mouvement de l'Emancipation
Hutu (Parmehutu) thus sought to rid the country of
“double colonialism”, both from Belgian and Tutsi rule. Both demands were
formulated in the so-called “Bahutu Manifesto” of
1957. It stipulated that Tutsi-Hutu cleavages are the result of a ‘”political
monopoly held by one race, the Mututsi, […] [which]
"has become an economic and social monopoly” (10). The Hamitic Myth became
the ideological basis for the 1959 Hutu Revolution that abolished the monarchy
and turned Rwanda into a republic. As a result of the uprising, thousands of
Tutsi were victimized and killed, being publicly vilified as “henchmen” of
colonialism and proponents of “Hamitic-feudalist” rule (11).
Here, the hypothesis fulfilled two
purposes. First, ethnocultural Hutu-nationalist propaganda aimed at the
systematic social exclusion or outright elimination of the Tutsi to create a
pure Hutu nation. (12) Distinguishing between the two objectives is a matter of
degree. While the first theory emphasizes socioeconomic balancing and a shift
in power politics, the second adds an element of racial exclusives’ which
produces a Hutu anxiety of incompleteness that requires the extermination of
the Tutsi group.
Hintjens aptly notes that before colonialism, cross-cutting
allegiances served to prevent the crystallization of anything akin to
"ethnic" identities’ (2001, 28). Making race the master-signifier of
belonging annulled those allegiances. Indigenous identities began to compete
with an externally-imposed racial categorization.
On achieving independence in 1962,
Rwanda’s internal cleavages further deepened. Belgium's strategic shift in favor of the Hutu opposition left the Tutsi isolated and
vulnerable to extremist violence. During Grégoire Kayibanda
’s presidential years, structural discrimination and indoctrination against the
Tutsi remained common practice (13). “Tutsification”
of neighboring Burundi, after a successful military
coup in 1965, further exacerbated anti-Tutsi sentiments and quickly revived the
parlance of a “Hamitic plot” (14). Also, the formation of the Tutsi-led Rwandan
Patriotic Front (RPF) in their Ugandan exile nurtured resentments against a
returning “master race” trying to reverse the 1959 Hutu revolution and
re-imposing its supposedly “age-old” domination over Rwanda (15). The specter of the “evil Hamite” was haunting the region again,
but this time fiction merged with fact, and whether it was the “killing fields”
of 1972 in neighboring Burundi or the approaching
“Tutsi army” of the RPF in 1990, reality seemed to evidence whatever “secret
plot” the Tutsi were said to have made.
In 1992, Léon Mugesera,
a staunch supporter of Rwandan President Habyarimana, revitalized this claim,
inciting the country’s Hutu to commit genocide against the Tutsi who he deemed
an embodiment of those nomadic invaders.
Echoes of the Hamitic hypothesis and its
accompanying stereotypes were constantly heard during the genocide. An obvious
reference to this was by the ruling party’s vice president, Dr. Leon Mugesera, in 1992, when he said, “They [the accomplices of
the RPF] belong to Ethiopia, and we are going to find them a shortcut to get
there by throwing them in the Nyabarongo river. I
must insist on this point. We have to act. Wipe them all out!” (16). The two
strong messages here – that the Tutsi are other and that they are from
somewhere else – formed a central theme of the propaganda campaign. Coupled
with this idea is one of Hutus as being the original inhabitants of Rwanda, who
were cruelly subjugated by Tutsi invaders. In the early 1990s MRND (the ruling
party) supporters were often heard putting forward the following version of
history:
“We Hutu are Bantus. Although the Twa were here first, when we arrived we lived in peace with
them. We cleared the land and farmed it. They made pots or hunted in the forests.
The first kings in Rwanda were Hutu, but the Tutsi say they were Tutsi. The
Tutsi used their cattle to trick Hutu into doing their work for them. Then the
Tutsi managed to conquer one Hutu kingdom. When the Europeans came, they helped
the Tutsi conquer the rest of our lands” (Taylor, 2001, 83).
Also elsewhere the Hamitic Hypothesis
and the extraneous provenance of the Tutsi did feature in genocidal propaganda.
For example, the January/February 1992 edition of Kangura
Magazine claimed that a genocide of the “Bantu” had been planned and
“consciously orchestrated by the Hamites, thirsty for blood” (17) Among the
“enemies” identified in a memorandum of 21 September 1992, issued by Colonel De´ogratias Nsabimana (Chief of
Staff of the Forces Arme´es Rwandaises)
were the “Nilo-Hamitic people of the region’”(Des Forges, A. 1999, p. 63).
The Hamitic hypothesis influenced the
extremist Tutsi as well. Before the genocide, a supporter of the Rwandan
Patriotic Front said to Taylor, “We Tutsi were once the nobles in this land,
and the Hutu were our slaves. Hutu do not have the intelligence to govern. Look
at what they have done to this country in the last thirty years” (2001, 85)
Taylor describes how Tutsi extremists have used the Hamitic hypothesis to claim
intellectual superiority and Hutu extremists to insist upon the foreign origins
of Tutsi, and the autochthony of Hutu. Both are reproducing a colonial pattern
that “essentialists’ ethnic difference, justifies political domination by a
single group, and nurtures a profound thirst for redress and vengeance on the
part of the de-favourized group” (2001, 57).
Thus following the fall of the colonial
period of Rwanda, instability became the norm. In the wake of the Hutu
revolution, countless Tutsis fled to the neighboring
country’s hills to live in refugee camps for more than thirty years. Europeans
provided aid, along with the US in supporting the refugees, but the world media
elected to focus on cold war politics instead of attempting to understand the
complications within this refugee crisis. Many of the Tutsis began to
radicalize their host populations, notably leading to what some have deemed as
a genocide in Burundi in the 1970s. The refugee situation only became more
precarious with the Tutsi refugee population propping up a new leader in
Uganda, one who supported the right of the Tutsis to go back to their homeland.
Born from Uganda’s successful coup was the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF), the
military arm that represented the Tutsi refugees during the Rwandan genocide.
After a failed coup in 1990, they struck a peace agreement in 1993 allowing for
the peaceful re-entry of refugees into Rwanda. However, splinter factions of
the Hutu army—disaffected with the refugees and planning a genocide—shot down
the then president of Rwandan’s plane killing him and starting a 100-day
genocide.
In the end, the addition of fear and
intra-ethnic intimidation became the primary drivers of the violence. A
defensive civil war and the assassination of a president created a feeling of acute
insecurity. Rwanda's unusually effective state was also central, as was the
country's geography and population density, which limited the number of exit
options for both victims and perpetrators.
Today, there is the opportunity to allow
for more helpful, unifying identities to emerge. Healthy identities develop not
through insisting on fixed identity categories but through allowing multiple
identities, such as ethnicity, family, clan, and nationality to dynamically
develop through dialogue and debate.
1) John Hanning
Speke, The Discovery Of The Source Of The Nile p. 247.
2) Ndebesa Mwambutsya, “Pre-Capitalist Social Formation: The Case of
The Banyankole of Southwestern Uganda” Eastern Africa
Social Science Research Review 6, no. 2 (January, 1991): 78-82.)
3) Speke, The Discovery Of The Source Of
The Nile, 247.
4) John Hanning
Speke, What Led to the Discovery of the Nile (Edinburgh, GB: William,
Blackwood, and Sons, 1864), pp.367-68.
5) Ibid., 340.
6) Edith R. Sanders, "The Hamitic
Hypothesis; Its Origin and Functions in Time Perspective", The Journal of
African History, Vol. 10, No. 4, 1969, pp. 521-532.
7) Father Augustin Mvuyekure “Idéologie
Missionnaire et Classifications Ethniques en Afrique”, in Jean-Pierre Chrétien
and Gérard Prunier, eds., Les Etnies on une Histoire. Paris: Karthala,1989, 303-324).
8) This aided the Tutsi led government
in their destruction of countless Hutu landholding, and subsequent occupation
of their land. The Hutu population, however, did not forget this as 1959 revolutions
unfolded many Hutu burned down Tutsi houses. Gerard Prunier,
The Rwandan Crisis: History of a Genocide(New York: Columbia University Press,
1995) 27-28.
9) Mary T. Duarte, “Education in
Ruanda-Urundi, 1946-61,” The Historian 57, no. 5 (December, 1995):
275-84.-----took the Hutu’s land. Subverting their role of inferiority in
society, “Hutuness” as an idea found itself rapidly
adopted by the oppressed Hutus.
10) Maximilien Niyonzima
et al. "Manifesto of the Bahutu: Note on the
Social Aspect of the Indigenous Racial Problem in Ruanda", United Nations
Visiting Mission 1957, Annex I.
11) Mahmood Mamdani “From Conquest to
Consent as the Basis of State Formation: Reflections on Rwanda”, In: New Left
Review, 1996, p. 12.
12) Helen M. Hintjens:
"When identity becomes a knife: reflecting on the genocide in
Rwanda", In: Ethnicities, 1 (1), 2001, p. 41 and Peter Gourevitch:
"We Wish to Inform You That Tomorrow We Will Be Killed With Our
Families", (London: Picador) 2000, p.95.
13) Catharine Newbury: “Ethnicity and
the Politics of History in Rwanda”, In: Africa Today, 45 (1), 1998, p. 13.
14) René Lemarchan:
”Burundi: The Killing Fields Revisited”, In: Issue: A Journal of Opinion, 18
(1), 1995,p. 60.
15) Rachel Van der Meeren:
“Three Decades in Exile: Rwandan Refugees 1960-1990”, In: Journal of Refugee
Studies, 9 (3),1996, p.259.
16) Alexander Laban Hinton (Editor),
Kenneth Roth (Foreword) "Annihilating Difference: The Anthropology of
Genocide", University of California Press, 2002, p. 159.
17) Jean-Pierre Chretien, J.-F. Dupaquier,
M. & Ngarambe J. Kabanda (Eds): "Rwanda: Les me ´ dias du
genocide", Paris: E´ditions Karthala with Reporters sans Frontie`res,
1995, p. 169.
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