Already before, but
even more so after the Mongol ruler Tamerlane/Tîmûr bin Taraghay Barlas's imperial power built and secured
long-distance trade routes and boosted commerce by providing currency and legal
structures.(1) In their urge to build empires, kings and sultans devoted state
resources to explore beyond their borders, spending state funds to organize
expeditions and to acquire scientific and technical knowledge necessary for
long-distance travel. Empires worked like gene-mixers, intermixing the
different genetic strains that marked geographically dispersed humans after
their ancestors had left Africa. In the process, they brought about microbial
and biological unity. Not only did empires extend legal systems to encompass a
vast part of the earth, but they spread religion, promoted long-distance
trading, and built worldwide transportation and communication networks, widely
diffusing languages, flora, and fauna and bringing together knowledge and
technology that would otherwise have been confined to separate corners of the
world. In this chapter we will look at examples of how the warriors and the
empires they built connected the world in myriad ways that none of them could
ever imagine. Empires may seem a system of the past, but the notion of imperial
domination still thrives. (See Darwin, After Tamerlane, 2007)
Not unlike the Pax
Romana of the Romans, the Pax Americana dominates the world, linking the world
ever tighter while provoking an anger that is as global as America's influence.
Islamist extremists-still seething with rage at the humiliation suffered by
Muslims since the collapse of the caliphate-plot terrorist attacks and dream of
an empire establishing "Allah's sovereignty on earth."1
Whatever their
motives, the empire builders,-old and new-have never lacked philosophical and
political justification for dominating other human beings. Plato justified the
distinction between superior and inferior in linguistic terms. To him,
Barbarians, or the non-Greek barbaros (all those who
could not speak Greek and whose language sounded like people stuttering "barbar") were less than fully human.2 He deemed that
barbarians were enemies by nature and that it was proper to wage war on them,
even to the point of enslaving or extirpating them. Aristotle further developed
the notion of enemies by nature and maintained that barbarians, especially
those of Asia-meaning people living east of the Bosporus-were slaves by nature.
He told his student, the young king of Macedon Alexander, that it was proper to
treat barbarians as slaves.3 But Alexander interpreted the good-evil difference
not by race but by behavior, with the good as the true Greek and the bad the
true barbarian. By subjugating the bad and uniting the good, he wished to
achieve what has been the ideal of kingship: the creation of homonoia, or unity and concord, a union of hearts. As the
great scholar of Hellenism Sir William Tarn put it, Alexander wanted to be
"the harmonizer and reconciler of the world-that part of the world which
his arm reached; he did have the intention of uniting the peoples of his empire
in fellowship and concord and making them of one mind."4 He wanted to be
remembered not as a conqueror but, in Plutarch's words, "as one sent by
the gods to be the conciliator and arbitrator of the universe."5 In a bid
to realize his dream of creating a universal empire of homonoia,
Alexander the Great's army marched across West Asia and Asia Minor. After
crushing the Persian Empire and pillaging and burning Persepolis, Alexander
proceeded as far east as the Punjab plains of India, connecting for the first
time the Mediterranean world with the Indian subcontinent. While Alexander and
his troops marched on, thousands of soldiers and administrators were left
behind to rule the annexed territories.
The Roman Empire that
emerged from the small city-state in the Tiber River Valley and spread to what it
believed to be the end of the oecumene, or inhabited
world, developed other justifications to rule over people considered barbarous.
The Romans developed an elaborate administrative system and a legal code to
bring others under their control, and their actions were touted as acts of
generosity, as spreading civitas, or civic society, the origin of civilization.
"Roman imperialism came to be seen not as a form of oppression, as the
seizure by one people of the lands, the goods, and the persons of others,"
Anthony Pagden notes, "but as a form of
beneficent rule that involved not conquest but patronage, and whose first
purpose was the improvement of the lives of others."6 In what could be
seen as a precursor to the imperial British argument of the "white man's
burden" and the French mission civilisatrice,
Roman historian Cicero argued that even Africans, Spaniards, and Gauls, "savage and barbarous nations," were
entitled to just government. Pagden quips that by
extension this meant "if their own rulers were unable to provide it, then
the Romans would be happy to do so for them."?
Often the dream of
universal empire was simply the question of personal ambition for power and
glory. From King Jayavarman VII of Cambodia, who
proclaimed himself a universal emperor in the twelfth century, to the
sixteenth-century Japanese warlord Toyotomi Hideyoshi, rulers were attracted to the idea of universal
empire-even in a geographically limited universe. Hideyoshi
saw himself as a universal monarch who would eventually "rule the whole
human race from his residence in Peking or in India."8 He invaded Korea
twice in a failed bid to reach China, which presumably was the limit of his
universe. The classical Greco-Roman notion of political empire was updated
after the American Revolution and the rise of the United States. The concept of
empire as a civilizing mission was converted to Thomas Jefferson's "empire
of liberty," and with the adoption of the Monroe Doctrine in 1823 it was
presented as an anti-colonial enterprise. Under President Theodore Roosevelt
the doctrine was interpreted to give the United States a free hand in its Latin
backyard. America's avowed mission to be a beacon of liberty in a broader world
was challenged during the post-World War II period of Soviet military expansion.
The notion of advancing liberty by extending American power abroad acquired
greater urgency. America's responsibility, President Harry Truman admitted in
1947, was even greater than that which had faced "Darius I's Persia,
Alexander's Greece, Hadrian's Rome [and] Victoria's Britain." The only way
to "save the world from totalitarianism," he argued, was for
"the whole world [ to] adopt the American system," for "the
American system" could survive only by becoming "a world
system."9
Sixty years later
that thesis still stands, and the collapse of the Soviet Empire has not
weakened the rationale. Although the world's leading democracy may find the
concept controversial, the United States-a central hub of the world economy, a
far-flung military presence with more than seven hundred military installations
worldwide and an immense political-cultural influence-has come to acquire the
attributes of an empire. Writer Jonathan Schell would prefer to call the United
States an imperial power without an empire. Whatever the name, American power,
exercised in the name of promoting democracy and human rights, of securing
global peace and ensuring freedom of the seas and skies, girds the globalized
world. Whatever the United States chooses to do affects people and countries allover the world. The ubiquitous presence of American
brand-name products-such as McDonald's, present in 120 countries-has led
critics to call globalization nothing but Americanization. I 0 The global
security concerns of the United States can be seen in the fact that the
power-projection capability of the U.S. Air Force has a presence or/and
conducted training operations in some 170 countries.11 The British writer and
labor politician Harold Laski was prescient: "America bestrides the world
like a colossus," he wrote in 1947. "Neither Rome at the height of
its power nor Great Britain in the period of economic supremacy enjoyed an
influence so direct, so profound, or so pervasive. "12 But as we already
know, the dream of empire has an ancient pedigrees and its integrating impact
has been a long time coming.
The Aztecs and Incas
had no universal pretensions; their empires were driven by their cosmology and
faith in the spirits of the dead. Aztec cosmology dictated an unflagging effort
to satisfy the sun god. If the sun was not nourished with the vigorous blood of
warriors, he would grow too weak for his daily struggle against the forces of
darkness, and the universe would be destroyed. So the Aztecs presented captives
to the sun god in ritual ceremonies of human sacrifice.13 The unrelenting quest
for sacrificial victims brought many Central American tribes under Aztec power
by the fifteenth century. The Incas' practice of worshipping their dead rulers
required sizable amounts of land and labor for the maintenance of their
mummies. This need forced the new emperor to conquer new territories and
exploit their wealth and resources. "By creating unrelenting pressures for
new agricultural lands, the cult of the royal mummies eventually drove [the Inca
empire] Tawantinsuyu into disastrous military
adventures."14 An incredibly diverse collection of peoples were brought
into the Inca domain-territory that would eventually fall in the hands of the
Spanish conquistadors, aided partly by dissention within this heterogeneous
empire.
Nearly a thousand
years earlier, across the oceans a different empire was born to serve God. The
empire founded by the Prophet Muhammad would be unlike any in the past. It
would be God's empire, built not by a king but by millions of faithful led by a
self-proclaimed messenger of God. Until the fateful night when the Prophet came
down from the hill to proclaim the divine command of one god, the agency for
spreading the Word was dispersed in many hands. There were priests to interpret
gods' wishes and temporal rulers to carry them out. Islam eliminated not only
the middleman but the distinction between religious and temporal power. The
authority of God, as expressed in the Koran, was absolute, as was that of
Muhammad as his Prophet. As the Koran states:
"Say: 0 mankind,
I am the Allah's Messenger to all of you .... There is no god but He ....
Believe [then] in Allah and in his Messenger." This absolutist claim to
universalism was matched by the brotherhood of the umma, or community, that the
Prophet called for. Unlike religions such as Buddhism or Christianity, which
found converts among temporal authorities who would propagate the faith, Islam
was born as a state amid bitter strife among stateless Arab tribes.
The Prophet enjoined
that the umma be totally egalitarian: "0 people, your Lord is one and your
ancestor is [also] one. You are all descended from Adam and Adam was [born] of
the earth." As members of the umma, Muslims have since been obligated to
pay alms for the needy and refrain from fighting one another. Their duty is
also to bring all humanity within the umma and fight "infidels" who
resist. Islam thus eliminated not only the middleman but the distinction
between religious and temporal power. The authority of God, as expressed in the
Koran, was absolute, as was that of Muhammad as his Prophet. As the Koran
states: "Say: 0 mankind, I am the Allah's Messenger to all of you ....
There is no god but He .. ,. Believe [then] in Allah and in his
Messenger."
This absolutist claim
to universalism was matched by the brotherhood of the umma, or community, that
the Prophet called for. Unlike religions such as Buddhism or Christianity,
which found converts among temporal authorities who would propagate the faith,
Islam was born as a state amid bitter strife among stateless Arab tribes. The
Prophet enjoined that the umma be totally egalitarian: "0 people, your
Lord is one and your ancestor is [also] one. You are all descended from Adam
and Adam was [born] of the earth." As members of the umma, Muslims have
since been obligated to pay alms for the needy and refrain from fighting one
another. Their duty is also to bring all humanity within the umma and fight
"infidels" who resist.
Scholars have long
debated whether an expansionist urge is inherent in Islam. Some passages in the
Koran suggest only defensive warfare, such as "fight in the way of God
with those who fight you, but aggress not: God loves not the aggressors."
Others clearly call for proactive warfare: "Slay the idolaters wherever
you find them, and take them, and confine them, and lie in wait for them at
every place of ambush." In his last visit to Mecca in 632, the Prophet
said that although all Muslims were brethren and should not fight one another,
their mission as Muslims was "to fight people till they testify that there
is no god but God and Muhammad is the messenger of God, and perform the prayer
and pay the alms-tax." 15 Based on such conflicting statements, medieval
Muslim scholars developed a doctrine of holy war, which Islam scholar Michael
Cook says "endorsed the fundamental idea of aggressive warfare aimed at
extending the dominion of Islam, but at the same time hedged it about with a
variety of ifs and buts." Despite equivocation about applying the policy
of holy war, the concept enjoys a central place of value in Islamic heritage,
according to Cook. It "certainly made available to Muslims a moral charter
for the continuing conquest of infidel lands .... In that sense, there clearly
was something about Islam that lent itself to the creation of a global
culture." 16
Since the Prophet
Muhammad forbade razzias, or traditional raids for cattle and property, against
tribes who converted to Islam, local raiding parties had to look beyond
traditional Arab lands. The Koran allowed believers to relieve infidels of
their possessions, provided that the bounty was redistributed among the members
of the expeditionary force. The other method of property acquisition was to
collect tax from nonbelievers. In 630 Muhammad himself led an army of some
thirty thousand soldiers toward the Byzantine frontier. After a
five-hundred-mile journey up to the Gulf of Aqaba, he camped for twenty days
and negotiated a peace agreement with the Christian prince of Aylah. In rerum for an oath of allegiance and an annual
tribute, the dhimmi, or the people of the Book, like Christians, were placed
under the umma's protection and granted freedom of
worship. This practical arrangement for coexisting with other faiths emerged as
a source of revenue for the Islamic empire as it expanded in the following
centuries. Some scholars argue that the impulse to seek martyrdom in the cause
of Allah and reach paradise may have attracted converts in the early years of
Islam. "The immediate gratification of desires for the comforts and
luxuries of the civilized regions of the Fertile Crescent was just as strong in
the case of many." 17 Interestingly, the warfare of the first imperialist
ruler, Sargon of Akkad, beyond his zone of direct political control was driven
by a search for booty and tribute, not unlike that of Muhammad's some three
thousand years later.
In 637, within five
years of Muhammad's call to arms, an Arab army invaded Mesopotamia and won a
famous victory at al-Qadisiyah, near modern Baghdad,
bringing Islam to Persia. This victory has since inspired the faithful to make
sacrifices for the glory of Islam. Even the secular dictator of Iraq Saddam
Hussein alluded to the victory of al-Qadisiyah to
cheer his troops when they were engaged in a protracted battle in the 1980s with
Iran, modern Persia. Chalking up victory after victory in North Africa, the
Arab army crossed the narrow Strait of Gibraltar and reached Europe. Its
advance to the heart of the Continent was halted at last by the Frankish king
Charles Martel at the Battle of Tours in 732. But the empire continued its
march to the east and south. When the Mongols, who had earlier sacked the
caliphate in Baghdad, converted to Islam, a vast part of the world from the
Atlantic to the Pacific Ocean and most of sub-Saharan Africa came under Islamic
rule, even though the Ottoman Empire was confined to the eastern Mediterranean
and the Middle East. Muslim traders spread the religion to Southeast Asia,
which would eventually boast the largest Islamic nation on earth: Indonesia. Islam
connected the globe and fused culture in a way that changed the world forever.
Of course, the Islamic empire did not automatically mean expansion of the
number of Muslims. Because Islam forbade taxing the faithful and the revenue of
the empire had to h collected from the infidels, pragmatic Islamic rulers
discouraged conversion to Islam. The logic of maintaining the temporal power by
having a large tax base of nonbelievers often trumped over the urge to
convert all humanity to Islam-the original mission laid down by the Prophet.18
The world's largest
contiguous land-empire was not, however, built out of desire to convert or
liberate. It was, instead, accomplished by nomadic Mongol who had no religious
mission other than to rule the world. Between 1190, when Genghis Khan and
next Tamerlane, began unifying the nomadic tribes of Mongolia, and 1258, where
a grandson of Genghis sacked the Islamic caliphate in Baghdad, the Mongol
overran the whole swath of territory from the coasts of southern Siberia t
Hungary and Poland in the West and from the South China Sea to the Persia Gulf.
Although the Mongols believed in one god, the Eternal Blue Sky, the were
remarkably secular until they converted to Islam. The Mongol expansion was thus
motivated by the need to move out of regular grazing areas for foo and other necessities. Historians have advanced many
theories to explain Mongol expansionism. Yale historian Valerie Hansen says one
possible reason could be climatic: a steep and regular decline in the mean
annual temperature in Mongolia between Il75 and 1260 resulted in less grass for
the Mongol herd prompting the Mongols to conquer new territories. 19 According
to some, a tacking and robbing neighbors became a strategy that unified the
Mongol tribes that roamed the steppes of Central Asia.
As one scholar puts
it, Genghis Khan "understood that the road to power went precisely through
unification of the steppe nomads. Only having accomplished this would it be
possible to conquer the settled civilizations. Simultaneously, however, he had
to hold out the prospects of plunder to achieve the unification. The two could
not be separated. Mongol society was a herder ar
hunter society, but it was also a predatory society. "20
As the Prophet
Muhammad had done with Arab tribes, the rising Mong
leader Genghis Khan forbade tribes from attacking each other and instead
advocated unified raids against sedentary neighbors for food and other
essentials at luxuries that nomadic life could not provide. Raiding
well-entrenched powerful neighbors like China, Persia, or the Abbasid caliphate
required large-scale organization. An empire not only offered internal peace
among the various Mongol tribes but held out "an opportunity of enrichment
at the expense of outside, groups."21 As they expanded their raids,
capturing more booty and craftsmen however, the Mongols needed more food and
tools to put their captives to work like other conquerors before him, Genghis
Khan came to view himself anointed by heaven to bring the world under his
control. A contemporary Armenian chronicle quotes Genghis Khan as saying that
"it is the will of god that we take the earth and maintain order" to
impose Mongol law and taxes. He added that the Mongols were obligated to
"slay [their opponents] and destroy their place, so that the others who
hear and see should fear and not act the same."22
Religious fervor
often combined with greed to drive imperial ambition. What was simply the
desire to control minerals and timber in the time of Sargon's Akkadian empire
evolved into greed for gold and other luxuries. Even Alexander the Great-who
aspired to create a civilized universal empire-dispatched a fleet to conquer
the island of Socotra in the Arabian Sea because it produced the most fragrant
resin and aloe.23 The Portuguese and Spanish empires were driven by greed for
spices and gold, not just god and glory. For example, when Henry the Navigator
attacked the Muslim port city of Ceuta on the North African shore, the
unimaginable riches that he found, along with tales of mountains of gold being
exchanged for Moroccan goods in the interior of Africa, inspired him to launch
further expeditions into the continent.24 Crusades against Islam and missions
to convert pagans to Christianity also proved to be a lucrative business. Henry
the Navigator's naval expeditions, launched in the early fifteenth century,
culminated in Vasco da Gama's voyage to India around the Cape of Good Hope and
to the founding of a Portuguese empire that would last four hundred years.
Within a hundred
years of Prince Henry's seminal explorations in the Atlantic, the kingdom's
far-flung empires in Asia and the Americas brought in three-fourths of all
Portuguese government revenue.25 Portugal itself became a coveted object for
Spanish monarch Philip II, who was already the sovereign of an empire spanning
Latin America and Southeast Asia. The creation of the Spanish Empire initiated
by Columbus's serendipitous discovery of the New World was the outcome of the
search for gold, spices, and souls to convert. A year after Columbus's voyage,
the pope granted the Catholic monarchs of Castile, Ferdinand and Isabella,
sovereignty over all non-Christian lands they might discover in the Atlantic,
as well as the duty to evangelize all humans found there. The pope assumed the right
of temporal authority over both Christians and believers in other faiths called
"pagans."26 Conquistadors like Hernando Cortes and Francisco Pizarro,
who helped create the Spanish Empire in South America, were not only interested
in the fame that came from their conquests but intent on enjoying the spoils of
the New World. They positioned themselves as encomenderos,
or patrons, to exploit, usually in brutal fashion, the labor of the Americas.
27
The largest and
longest-enduring empire-Britain's-also arose out of greed and envy. After
Columbus returned from the New World with tales of unbelievable riches, the
British crown, along with individual sailors and merchants, dreamed of gold and
silver in a new continent. In March 1496, four years after Columbus's voyage,
King Henry VII followed in the footsteps of the Castilian monarchs and
sanctioned a journey by the Genoese navigator John Cabot, giving him and his
sons "full and free authority, faculty and power to sail to all parts,
regions and coasts of the eastern, western and northern sea ... to conquer,
occupy and possess, as our vassals and governors, lieutenants and deputies
therein, acquiring for us the dominion, title and jurisdiction of the same
towns, castles, cities, islands and main lands so
discovered."28 In succeeding times, however, as the Industrial Revolution
transformed the British Empire and economic and political liberalism took hold,
high-minded rationale replaced unabashed greed. As the English historian James
Bryce argued in 1901, it seemed as if "a new sort of unity is being
created among mankind." And while marching into Baghdad in 1908, General
Frederick Stanley Maude declared: "Our armies do not come into your cities
and lands as conquerors or enemies, but as liberators."29 The British
venture in Iraq ended quickly, but what had begun centuries earlier with the
innocent landings of adventurous traders carrying the British flag on the
shores of Virginia and Surat, India, grew into a globe-spanning empire. I
witnessed the sunset of that empire in Hong Kong almost exactly five hundred
years later. In the intervening time, the British rationale for empire had
evolved from the civilizing imperative of the "white man's burden" to
the commercial arguments in favor of free trade, liberation from autocracy, and
creation of a humane global community.
After the ancestors
walked out of Africa, their descendants spread to the habitable parts of the
earth and gradually changed their pigmentation and body shape. Humans
demonstrated substantial diversity by the time sedentary agriculture developed.
Interbreeding on a relatively small scale occurred through the diaspora of
traders and missionary activities. Only with the rise of empires were large
numbers of people of varied ethnicity, languages, and religious persuasions
linked under a single authority. Empire thus emerged as history's most Arabs
took the genetic seeds in different directions. Intermarriage with the
subjugated people who were converted to become mawalis,
or clients, of the Arabs altered the genetic landscape of the Middle East. From
Persia to Spain, Arab masters married the locals. In the process, the term Arab
began its gradual transition from the name for a bedouin
nomad of the Arabian Peninsula to its present meaning of anyone whose culture
and language are Arabic.33 However, by the thirteenth century, the original bedouin Arabs were outnumbered by the other subjugated
people and could no longer provide the army that the caliphate needed. The
caliph started importing Central Asian slave boys known as mamluks-from to day's Turkmenistan and training them to be soldiers. The
same mamluks would one day take power themselves and rule part of the Islamic
empire.
No empire, however,
had as direct an effect on genetic blending by violence as did the Mongol
Empire. "To have caused the dispersion of Turkic peoples to three corners
of the earth-China, India and the Middle East-is thought by one historian to
have been the principal outcome of the empire."34 Genghis Khan has been
quoted as saying that his supreme joy was "to cut my enemies to pieces,
drive them before me, seize their possessions, witness the tears of those dear
to them, and embrace their wives and daughters."35 The mass murder of men
and children and the large numbers of concubines amassed by Genghis and his
successors have left their mark on the region's genetic landscape. The extent
of their impact has been revealed in a remarkable study of population genetics
in the areas that once formed part of the Mongol Empire. A team of scientists
has found the Y chromosome that belonged to Genghis Khan in the DNA of 8
percent of the males of a large part of Asia. They estimate that the
proportional percentage DNA inheritance would correspond to some sixteen
million people allover the world.36
Forced migration also
played a role. Because the nomadic Mongols knew nothing other than hunting and
herding, they captured professionals and craft workers of all types from the
conquered territories. As historian Jack Weatherford writes: "The Mongol
armies rounded up translators, scribes, doctors, astronomers, and
mathematicians to be parceled out among the families in the same shares that
they parceled out musicians, cooks, goldsmiths, acrobats, and painters. The
authorities divided these knowledge workers, together with all the other
craftsmen, the animals, and other goods for transportation via a long caravan
trek or sea journey to the various parts of the family."37 For instance,
Kublai Khan imported Persian translators and doctors, as well as some ten thousand
Russian soldiers, to settle them on land north of present-day Beijing. The
Russians stayed as permanent residents for nearly a hundred years before they
vanished from the official Chinese chronicles.38
With the emergence of
ocean-based European empires in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, there
began the most far-reaching interbreeding in history. According to one
estimate, every year in the sixteenth century between three and four thousand
young men left Portugal bound for Portuguese India. By 1709, population levels
in Portugal's northern provinces had fallen so drastically that King John V
reiterated earlier orders requiring travelers to obtain passports before they
departed. Meanwhile, the gold rush in Brazil saw the number of Portuguese settlers
there leap from around two thousand a year in the late seventeenth century to
five to six thousand annually between 1700 and 1720. To this influx was added a
higher number of African slaves to work in the plantations and mines. In 1818,
Brazil's population stood at about 3.8 million. Of these, only an estimated
250,000 were Indians. This means that over 93 percent of Brazil's population
was the product of migration from Europe and Africa over the previous three
centuries.39
Like the Mongols, the
Spanish conquistadors killed male American Indians and took their women as
concubines, an action that was attributable, in part, to the scant number of
female voyagers accompanying them. Partial records kept in Seville suggest that
less than 5 percent of people sailing to the New World were women. The
consequent effects on the colonial population became a source of concern to the
monarchy, and in 1514 King Ferdinand gave his approval for the intermarriage of
Native Americans and Spaniards, saying that nothing "should impede
marriage between Indians and Spaniards, and all should have complete liberty to
marry whomever they please. "40
The migration of
other Europeans to the Spanish colonies was even more pronounced. As the
population of Spain started to decline by the end of the sixteenth century, a
law passed in 1590 in New Spain (present-day Mexico), allowed
non-Spaniards-including Portuguese, Germans, Flemings, Italians, Greeks, and
English-to settle. The result was the creation of a huge mestizo, or "mixed,"
population. The Spanish colony in the Philippines also heralded the arrival of
Asians to the New World. Some six thousand "Orientals" were believed
to have entered New Spain from Manila during each decade of the early
seventeenth century.41 Although reliable data are scarce, the import of African
slaves into the Spanish Empire also visibly affected Latin American demography.
In Lima in 1795, for instance, free blacks and slaves made up 45 percent of the
city's population. AB historian Henry Kamen has noted, "Though they had
been brought in simply to work and serve, Africans transformed the society and
economy of vast tracts of America, and firmly implanted their race and culture
wherever they went."42
While the African
presence among today's South American population is evident to casual
observers, the deep impact of European migration is less so. A genetic study in
Colombia offers a glimpse of the overwhelming preponderance of European male
DNA in the Spanish colonies of South and Central America. That research showed
that approximately 94 percent of the Y chromosomes-transmitted from the
father-are European in origin. When viewed against a variety of Amerindian mtDNA-maternal DNA-found in Colombia, James D. Watson, one
of the fathers of modern genetics, sees a clear explanation: "The invading
Spaniards, who were men, took local women for their wives. The virtual absence
of Amerindian Y chromosome types reveals the tragic story of colonial genocide:
indigenous men were eliminated, while local women were sexually 'assimilated'
by the conquistadors."43
The British trading
diaspora of the seventeenth century morphed into the British Empire, and its
legacy set the stage for to day's multiethnic
globalized world.44 From the British landings in North America and the
Caribbean to the development of the dominions of Australia, New Zealand, and
Canada, the empire produced a steady flow of emigration from "the mother
country" to the new territories, boosted by convicts from home and slaves fmm Africa. All through the nineteenth century, and
continuing into the twentieth, especially after World War I, voluntary
emigration was supported by state-funded inducements, including assisted
passages and a ten-pound subsidy for travel and settlement in Canada. As a
senior British official explained, "Empire migration" was designed to
give "fuller opportunities for individual human beings" -meaning
British citizens who could improve their life in the colonies.45 Between the
early 1600s and the 1950S, more than twenty million people left Britain to
begin new lives in the colonies. As Niall Ferguson puts it, "The Britannic
exodus changed the world. It turned whole continents white. "46 In the
century before World War I, some fifty million Europeans emigrated, the vast
majority of them, about forty-six million, leaving for the New World. The
British Empire also contributed to diversifying the American continent. Between
1807 and 1882, British ships transported nearly 3.5 million Africans to the New
World as slaves. That figure is more than three times the number of white
migrants making the journey west over the same period.
'Decolonized history'
has cut Europe down to size. And this has made it harder to assume unthinkingly
that European societies were inherently progressive, or that they were
necessarily more efficient than other peoples in Eurasia - or on other
continents. European definitions of 'progress', like European observations on
the rest of the world, have lost their once unchallenged authority. Indeed,
some modern writers reject the validity of any comparison between different
cultures (because no one can be an insider in more than one culture), in the
curious belief that a much-jumbled world is really composed of distinct and
original cultures. Post-colonial history takes a generally skeptical view of
the European impact and an even more skeptical view of the 'improvements' once
claimed for colonial rule. It treats 'colonial' history as myopic and biased,
perhaps even delusory, and its claims as so much propaganda aimed at opinion at
home. Indeed, closer inspection has suggested an ironic reversal of the
colonialist case. Far from dragging backward peoples towards European-style
modernity, colonial rule was more likely to impose a form of 'anti-modernity'.
Caste in India symbolized Indian backwardness. Yet British rulers, for their
own convenience, struck a bargain with Brahmins to harden caste status into an
administrative system (formalized in the census). In colonial Africa a
parallel process took place as clans and followings were reinvented as
'tribes', with chiefly rulers as their ancestral leaders. Here, as in India, a
political gambit was carefully packaged as an act of respect to local
tradition. In the colonial version of history, caste and tribe were inscribed
as immemorial features of the Indian and African past. In imperial propaganda,
they became the genetic flaws that made self-rule for Indians and Africans
impossible. But in 'decolonized history' the expansion of Europe appears as a
vast conspiracy to reorder the non-Western world along pseudo-traditional
lines, the better to hold it in check and exploit its resources - indefinitely.
On these and other
grounds, Europe's place in world history now looks rather different from that
in conventional accounts written a few decades ago. But histories that aim to
'provincialize' Europe still leave a lot to explain. The European states were
the main force that created the 'globalized' world of the late nineteenth
century. They were the chief authors of the two great transformations that were
locked together in the 'modern world' of the I870s to the I940s. The first was
the making of a world economy not just of long-distance trade in high-value
luxuries but of the global exchange of manufactures, raw materials and
foodstuffs, in huge volumes and values, with the accompanying flows of people
and money. This was an economic revolution that was chiefly managed (not always
well) from Europe or by Europeans, and fashioned to suit their particular
interests. The second transformation was closely connected. This was the
extension of European rule, overt and covert, across huge swathes of the non-European
world - a process under way before 1800, but accelerating sharply in the
nineteenth century. It was strikingly visible in the colonial partitions of
Africa, South East Asia, the South Pacific and (later) the Middle East; in the
great ventures of empire-building in North Asia (by Russia) and South Asia (by
Britain); in the subjection of much of maritime China to foreign controls; and
in the European occupation (by demographic imperialism) of the Americas,
Australasia and parts of South Central Africa. In Africa, the Middle East, much
of South East Asia, the Pacific, Australasia and even the Americas, it created
the territorial units that provide the state structure of the contemporary
world.
Europe thus engaged
in a double expansion. The outward signs of the first were the spread of
railways and steamships, building a vast web of connections much faster and
more certain than in earlier times and capable of pouring a huge stream of
goods into once inaccessible places. Harbour works,
railway stations, telegraph lines, warehouses, banks, insurance companies,
shops, hotels (like Shepheards' in Cairo or Raffles'
in Singapore), clubs and even churches formed the global grid of Europe's
commercial empire, allowing free passage to European merchants and trade and
easing their access to a mass of new customers. The second mode was
territorial. It meant the acquisition of forts and bases from which soldiers
and warships could be sent to coerce or conquer.
It meant the control
of key zones astride the maritime highways that ran between Europe and the rest
of the world: the classic case was Egypt, occupied by Britain in 1882. It meant
a pattern of rule through which the products and revenues of colonial regions
could be diverted at will to imperial purposes. Once their Raj was in place,
the British taxed Indians to pay for the military power - a sepoy army - that
they needed in Asia. Europe's commercial empire and its territorial empires did
not overlap completely. But the crucial point about this double expansion was
its interdependence. Territorial imperialism was a battering ram. It could
break open markets that resisted free trade, or (as in India) conscript local
resources to build the railways and roads that European traders demanded. It
could promise protection to European entrepreneurs, or (as happened often in
Africa) make them a free gift of local land and labour.
But it also relied on the technological, industrial and financial assets that
Europe could deploy. These might be decisive when it came to fighting -
steam-powered ships and superior weaponry helped win Britain's first war in
China in 1839-42 - though certainly not in all places.18 The real advantage of
industrial imperialism lay in scale and speed. Industrial technique and the
supply of capital allowed Europeans to stage a series of blitzkrieg conquests.
They could lay down railways at breakneck speed to bring their force to bear
hundreds of miles from the sea. They could flood a new zone with European
settlers and transform its demography almost overnight, disorienting indigenous
peoples and making resistance seem futile. They could transform alien
environments with amazing completeness into a familiar European-style habitat:
introducing wild animals, birds, fish, trees and flowers as well as crops and
livestock. Above all, they could turn even the remotest parts of the globe into
suppliers of the everyday goods like butter, meat or cheese once reserved for
local producers at home. The gaunt freezing works with their grimy smokestacks
that sprang up round the coasts of New Zealand after I880 were the industrial
face of colonization.
It would be wrong to
suppose that Europeans lacked the support of allies and helpers; but they
played the critical role in remaking the world. But how do we explain the
extraordinary shift, which seemed all but complete by I9I4, from a world of
Eurasian 'connectedness' to a global-imperial world? Despite the libraries of
writing that deal with the subject, much remains puzzling. Those magical dates
I492 (when Columbus crossed the Atlantic) and I498 (when Vasco da Gama arrived
in India) may have signaled the start of Europe's new era. But the pace of
advance was spasmodic at best. Three centuries after Columbus had made
landfall, most of the North American mainland remained unoccupied and virtually
unexplored by Europeans. It took nearly three hundred years for the corner of
India where Vasco da Gama had landed to fall under European rule (Calicut was
annexed by the British in I792). The rush started only at the turn of the
nineteenth century. Not just the timing, but the form and direction of Europe's
expansion need more explanation. Why did the Ottoman Empire and Iran preserve
their autonomy long after India, which was much further away? Why was India
subjected to colonial rule while China was able to keep its sovereign status,
though much hedged about, and Japan had become a colonial power by 1914? If
industrial capitalism was the key to the spread of European influence, why did
its impact take so long to be felt across so much of the world, and with such
variable consequences? Why were Europe's own divisions, periodically unleashed
with such lethal effect, not more destructive of (and some writers did so) that
history itself was an alien enterprise that forced knowledge of the past into
the concepts and categories invented in (and for) Europe.
Few intelligent
people accepted the logical conclusion of this postmodern extremism - that
nothing could be known and that all inquiry was hopeless. But the broader point
held good: that European depictions of other parts of the world needed very
careful decoding. The Saidian critique was part of a
great sea change, a conscious attempt to 'de-centre'
Europe or even to 'provincialize' it. European accounts of other cultures and
peoples should no longer be treated as the 'authorized version', however full
or persuasive. Europe should no longer be seen as the pivot of change, or as
the agent acting on the passive civilizations of the non-Western world. Above
all, perhaps, the European path to the modern world should no longer be treated
as natural or 'normal', the standard against which historical change in other
parts of the world should always be measured. Europeans had forged their own
kind of modernity, but there were other modernities -
indeed, many modernities.
But for the moment at
least it is widely acknowledged that we live in an age that is strikingly
different in many essentials from the world as it was even a generation ago. In
ordinary language, we sum up the features that have been most influential in a
catch-all term: 'globalization'. Globalization is an ambiguous word. It sounds
like a process but we often use it to describe a state - the terminal point
after period of change. All the signs are that, in economic relations at least
the pace of change in the world (in the distribution of wealth and productive
activity between different regions and continents) is likely to grow. But we
can, nonetheless, sketch the general features of the 'globalized world' - the
stage which globalization has now reached in a recognizable form. These
features can be briefly summarized as follows:
1. the appearance of a single global market - not for all but
for most widely used products, and also for the supply of capital, credit an
(financial services;
2. the
intense interaction between states that may be geographically very distant but
whose interests (even in the case of very small states) have become global, not
regional;
3. the
deep penetration of most cultures by globally organized media whose commercial
and cultural messages (especially through the language of 'brands') have become
almost inseparable;
4. the
huge scale of migrations and diasporas (forced and free), creating networks and
connections that rival the impact of the European out-migration of the
nineteenth century or the Atlantic slave trade;
5. the
emergence from the wreck of the 'bipolar age' (I945-89).
the dramatic
resurgence of China and India as manufacturing powers. In hugely increasing
world output and shifting the balance of the world economy, the economic
mobilization of their vast populations (I.3 billion and 1 billion respectively)
has been likened to the opening of vast new lands in the nineteenth century.
This list ought to
provoke a series of questions. Why, in a globalized world, should one state
have attained such exceptional power? Why has the economic revival of China and
India been such a recent development? Why until recently have the countries of
the West (now including Japan) enjoyed such a long lead in technological skills
and in their standards of living? Why do the products of Westernized culture
(in science, medicine, literature and the arts) still command for the most part
the highest prestige? Why does the international states system, with its laws
and norms, reflect the concepts and practice of European statecraft, and
territorial formatting on the European model? The globalized world of the late
twentieth century was not the predictable outcome of a global free market. Nor
could we deduce it from the state of the world five centuries ago. It was the
product of a long, confused and often violent history, of sudden reversals of
fortune and unexpected defeats. Its roots stretch back (so it is widely
believed) to the 'Age of Discovery' - back, indeed, to the death of Tamerlane.
Toward the beginning
of the twentieth century, colonial empires began to see a reverse flow-of
natives coming to the metropolitan countries in large numbers. In their West
African colonies, the French converted former slaves into infantrymen known as
tirailleurs Senegalais to serve further colonial
expansion. The region of Mali was one such conquest, which was later turned, in
the memorable phrase of Lieutenant Colonel Charles Mangin,
into a "reservoir of men." Mangin argued
for using the tirailleurs to fight against the Germans in World War I, and as
many as 160,000 West Africans did so.47 After demobilization, a large number
opted not to return to Africa, thus forming the core of France's African
immigrant community. Along with North African Berbers who migrated to France
after the loss of the French colony in the Maghreb, these immigrants, whose
numbers would swell to five million by 2005, would prove to be an unintegrated,
explosive component of French society.
At the end of World
War II, the momentum of ex-colonial subjects returning to the metropole picked
up, beginning with the celebrated case of the Empire Windrush. Reverse
migration to the empires and prosperous former colonies like the United States
would eventually emerge as one of the strongest currents of global population
movements, laying ever-thickening webs of connection. Before the last British
governor left Hong Kong, tens of thousands of former subjects fled the colony
for safe havens in Britain, Canada, Australia, and the United States.
The U.S. global
involvement in wars in foreign lands during the past century has had the effect
of bringing migrants from those countries. The Vietnam War's legacy was more
than a million Vietnamese, Cambodian, Lao, and Hmong settling in the United
States. In an echo of the Roman Empire's granting of citizenships to elites in
the Balkans, the Middle East, and North Africa to strengthen the armed forces
in the second century, the Bush administration has expedited the naturalization
of twenty thousand resident aliens in the U.S. Armed Forces.48 Employing
mercenaries in war is a longstanding practice, bur today's closely integrated
world has made it a global phenomenon. In recent years, Pentagon contractors
have recruited some thirty-five thousand foreigners to serve the American
forces in Iraq. The realization that a global village could be a lethal place
came in 2005 to farming families in a remote place in Nepal.
Some families, who
may not have known where Iraq was until a few weeks earlier, woke up to the
news that their children had been killed by insurgents in Iraq. Those
desperately poor young men were lured by manpower supply agencies to go to the
Middle East to work as cooks and kitchen hands.49
The relocation of peoples
forced by empires brought in new languages, foods, dress, customs, and
cultures, a skein that would grow into an interconnected world. In that sense,
genetic diffusion that resulted from empires was like the first lines of text
on the palimpsests of history that would be written over and over again in the
ensuing centuries to create to day's globalized
world.
By promoting trade
over vast areas, empires enriched local languages. For example, Malay is the
traditional lingua franca of island Southeast Asia, but over time it has been
overlaid with the expressions and vocabulary of the Arab or Indian principal
traders. Portuguese and Dutch colonial rule introduced new vocabulary, but at
the same time, pidgin or bazaar Malay spoken in different parts of the region
was revitalized by the traders' expressions and vocabulary.
Likewise, in East Africa, both the spread of Islam and the influence of
European colonial powers enriched a similar bazaar language, Swahili.50
Of course, long
before ambitious rulers began marching with their soldiers, people of
Mesopotamia and the Indus Valley had begun exchanging goods, making use of
elements of language common to them.51 Koine, for
instance, became the common speech among the elites and traders throughout the
empire left behind by Alexander the Great.52 Even after Latin became the
official language of the Roman Empire, Greek remained the lingua franca. Latin,
originally spoken by small groups of people in the lower Tiber River Valley,
traveled with Roman political power, spreading from Italy to western and
southern Europe and to the north shores of the Mediterranean and coastal
regions of Africa. Later modern Romance languages grew out of the spoken Latin
in territories under the Roman Empire.53
No language, however,
spread as fast and over as vast a territory as Arabic. As the Prophet Muhammad
and his successors carried Islam to Mesopotamia, Persia, and the North African
Maghreb countries, the language of the Koran overwhelmed existing
tongues-Kurdish, Berber, Aramaic, and Coptic. 54 By the beginning of the eighth
century, Arabic had evolved into the official imperial language. As Michael
Cook has noted: ''A new elite culture was established, centered on the Islamic
religion and the Arabic language; Arabic became the classical language of a
civilization in the manner of classical Chinese or Latin, and everything that
an educated elite might want to read became available in Arabic."55 The
language and culture of the Persians survived their conquest by the Arabs and their
acceptance of the Islamic faith, but both were deeply transformed. By adopting
Arabic script and extensively borrowing Arabic vocabulary, Persian Farsi
emerged as a second great literary language and spread far afield, especially
toward India and, much later, throughout the Ottoman Empire.56
Although the Turks
were not conquered by the Arabs, their conversion to Islam in the tenth century
brought in significant Arabic vocabulary, and Turkish came to be written in the
Arabic script.57 Most important, the adoption of the Arabic language by all the
conquered peoples-Iranians, Syrians, Greeks, Copts, Berbers, Jews, and
Christians-opened up their stores oflearning, art,
science, history, and technology to scholars throughout the empire. The
foundation was thus laid for the emergence of a dazzling Islamic civilization.
Thanks to the Arabic translation of Greek classics, including Aristotle and
Plato, a world intellectual heritage was preserved.
The Mongol
conquerors, who lacked a written language, were transformed by their imperial
experience. Despite its linguistic shortcomings, the Mongol Empire served as a
diffuser of other languages. To rule such a vast empire, the Mongols needed
administrators and clerks who spoke local languages. As Jack Weatherford notes,
''After executing the soldiers, the Mongol officers sent clerks to divide the
civilian population by profession. Professional people included anyone who
could read and write in any language-clerks, doctors, astronomers, judges,
soothsayers, engineers, teachers, imams, rabbis, or priests. The Mongols
particularly needed merchants, cameleers, and people who spoke multiple
languages, as well as craftsmen."58
European empires,
starting with the Portuguese and Spanish and later the Dutch, French, and
English, took the legacy of the Roman Empire across the oceans. Today nearly a
third of the world population speaks European languages spread by colonial
rule. After Mandarin Chinese and Hindi, English is the most widely spoken
language in the world. Not surprisingly, the bulk of the speakers of this
global lingua franca reside in the former British Empire. In his famous minute
on education in India written in 2 February 1835, Lord Macaulay, a member of
Britain's Supreme Council of India, wrote: " [English] is like[ly] to become the language of commerce throughout the seas
of the East. It is the language of two great European communities which are
raising, the one in south of Africa, the other in Australasia .... We must at
present do our best to form a class who may be interpreters between us and the
millions whom we govern; a class of persons, Indian in blood and color, but
English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect."59
A month later, on 7
March 1835, Governor-General William Bentinck issued an order supporting
Macaulay's position. That historic decision to put the empire's resources to
the teaching of English would have a far-reaching consequence in integrating
the world. India became the largest English-speaking country in the world, and
by the beginning of the twenty-first century, the nation's language was a
principal source of attraction for the outsourcing of service jobs and foreign
investment.
The differing impact
of colonial education policies can be seen in the New World. Thanks to
Britain's liberal education policy, at the time of America's war of
independence there were nine universities for two and a half million people,
and the thirteen colonies had an intellectual elite-the likes of John Adams,
Benjamin Franklin, and Thomas Jefferson-who were thoroughly engaged with the
world. But in the Spanish colonies, Brazil, and the Caribbean, where more than
seventeen million people lived, there were just two universities, in Mexico
City and Guadalajara, which concentrated on theology and law. We have seen that
the inspiration that gods have given to create empires, but empires that were
not expressly created for theological reasons nevertheless played a role in the
diffusion of religion.
In the third century
BCE, India's Mauryan emperor Asoka became the first ruler in history to devote
imperial authority to the spread of religious faith. By the time Asoka was
converted to Buddhism, founded three centuries earlier, he had already built a
huge empire covering northern India. After Asoka won the Battle of Kalinga, a
monk converted him to the religion of nonviolence and compassion. The emperor
not only set up rock inscriptions-akin to public billboards-laying down a
Buddhist code of conduct, he also launched a campaign of religious conquest by
dispatching missionaries allover the Indian
subcontinent, as well as to Sri Lanka, Burma, and Hellenistic and Central Asian
kingdoms.60 Thanks to Asoka's power and influence, missionaries gained access
to the courts and the people and succeeded in converting many to Buddhism. One
of the most successful of such missions was led by Asoka's son, Mahinda, to Sri
Lanka.61 From there the religion later spread to Southeast Asia. Other rulers
carried on Asoka's missionary work, notably the Kushan ruler Kanishka (second
century CE). Thanks to Kanishka's efforts, Afghanistan, Bactria, eastern Iran,
and Central Asia all became Buddhist and provided a pathway for the religion to
reach China, which it did in the first century CE.62
The Roman emperor
Constantine played a role, not unlike that of ASoka,
in promoting the diffusion of Christianity. After years of persecuting the
Christians, Constantine converted in 312 to the faith propagated by Jesus,
dramatically turning the religion's fortunes. Constantine diverted the massive
state resources that had been lavished on pagan temples to Christianity, making
it "the most-favored recipient of the near-limitless resources of imperial
favor."63 In 325 he and the pope convened a gathering of around three
hundred bishops from all the corners of the empire. Clad in gold and sitting on
a gold throne, Constantine presided over the first Council of Nicaea, marking
the imperial launch of the church.64 A historian summed up the result of
Constantine's conversion: "A clergy recruited from the people and modestly
sustained by member contributions suddenly gained immense power, status, and
wealth as part of the imperial civil service."65
After the fall of Rome,
the church had to revive its missionary spirit to dispatch monks to preach in
non-Christian territories. An early success came in the late fifth century,
when the great Frankish king Clovis converted to Christianity and immediately
baptized three thousand of his armed followers. The Christianizing mission was
carried out with zeal by Clovis's successors, so much
so that Charlemagne was crowned Holy Roman Emperor by the pope in 800.
Charlemagne took both his title and task seriously and sought the immediate
conversion of all territories he conquered. As one historian notes, "Each
victory was followed by forced mass baptisms, and thousands of captives who
showed reluctance were beheaded."66 Nearly 730 years later, in 1532,
Spanish conquistadors subjugated native peoples in South America in the name of
Christ. In one celebrated event, Francisco Pizarro killed two thousand Incas
and took their emperor to protect Christian honor.67 Violent conversion of
native peoples continued, and despite a papal injunction against abusing
natives, the Spaniards carried on destroying their temples and building
churches in their stead. Backed by economic and military power, Portuguese and
French colonial rulers, too, continued converting native peoples throughout
their domains. Portugal claimed to have converted some 1.2 million people to
Christianity from Mozambique to Japan.68
Even the British
commercial empire took on religious duty as a Christian nation. As Niall
Ferguson notes, "The English sense of empire envy only grew more acute
after the Reformation, when proponents of war against Catholic Spain began to
argue that England had a religious duty to build a Protestant empire to match
the 'Popish' empires of the Spanish and Portuguese."69 The British took
care to place Christian evangelists in the highest positions of government in
India, including at all levels of the army. With aid from London, missionaries
ran almost half of all the subcontinent's schools.
The short-lived
American colonial venture in Asia also promoted Christianity in the region. The
U.S. seizure of the Philippines from the defeated Spaniards was justified as a
civilizing mission thrust on the nation. As President William McKinley told
Methodist clergymen: "There was nothing left for us to do but to take them
all, and educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them,
and by God's grace do the very best we could by them as our fellow-men for whom
Christ also died."70
Beginning with the
conquest of the Philippines until 1917, the United States tied the Atlantic to
the Pacific through the purchase and military acquisition of territories, the
forcible opening of markets (witness Commodore Matthew Perry's naval expedition
to Japan in the 1850s), the setting up of naval bases, and the digging of the
Panama Canal. Proselytizing, trade, and investment followed.
France's emperor
Napoleon III sent an expeditionary force to Vietnam and eventually occupied the
country, supposedly as retribution for Vietnam's persecution of Catholic
missionaries.71 Today Catholics constitute a significant minority in Vietnam
and serve as an important institutional link with the world outside. A third of
the world's population today is Christian, and the vast majority of Catholics
among this group can be found in former Spanish, Portuguese, and French
colonies.
But ironically, the
European colonial empire that sought to win Christian converts unwittingly
reinforced the sense of unity of the Islamic umma. The opening of the Suez
Canal in 1869 and the introduction of regular shipping from India and Southeast
Asia to Europe and the Mediterranean, for example, saw a dramatic rise in the
number of Islamic pilgrims going for hajj in Mecca. A shorr-lived
movement among Muslims in India to restore the caliphate in the early twentieth
century was a reminder of the close linkage forged among Muslims dispersed over
a wide territory. "Though separated from Turkey by thousands of miles,
they were determined to fight Turkey's battle from India," a Pakistani
historian proudly noted.72
The reach of the
Ottoman Empire and the caliphate that was the House of Islam (Dar-al-Islam) and
the subsequent rise of non-Islamic powers in the House of War (Dar-al-Harb) continue to haunt many. The sorry state of many of
the successor Islamic states today has incited generations ofIslamist
radicals from the Egyptian Sayyid Qutb to the Saudi
Osama bin Laden, all seeking to restore Islam to its pristine glory and power.
A British-based Islamic group supports the establishment of a new caliphate,
and terrorists who blew up trains in Spain were likewise intent on reclaiming
the country for the caliphate. Bin Laden calls on Muslims the world over to
"resist the current Zionist-Crusader campaign against the umma, or Islamic
super-nation, since it threatens the entire umma, its religion, and its very
existence."73
Along with language,
religion, food, and customs, imperial powers brought their legal systems to
their new territories. The practice of enacting legislation and then using the
coercive power of the state to enforce laws was first systematized by the Roman
Empire. Roman jurists assembled two reference works containing collections of
past laws and the opinions of the great Roman jurists. The codes also contained
elementary outlines of the law and a collection of the emperor Justinian's own
new laws.
Roman law, modified
by the Germanic tribe that succeeded to the Roman throne in the late fifth
century, was eventually adopted by all of Europe, amplified by a legal category
called the Law of Nations, which applied to both Romans and foreigners. Anthony
Pagden notes that this concept was to have a
prolonged and powerful impact on all subsequent European legal thinking. As the
European powers reached outward into other areas of the globe, many of which
the Romans had never ever imagined, it became the basis for what is now called
"public international law," and it still governs all the actions, in
theory if never consistently in practice, of the "international
community." ... The conqueror's right to possession lay merely in his
success in battle. The Romans, however, introduced a complex distinction, which
still governs the conduct of most modern conflicts, between "just"
and "unjust" wars.74
The emerging global
British Empire presented itself as a return to the lofty notions of the Roman
Empire built on "a thought of a World-State, the universal law of nature,
the brotherhood and the equality of men."75 British customary law and the
French Napoleonic code spread to the colonies in Africa and Asia, providing the
basis for legal systems that have since emerged in the decolonized states.
The rule of the
Islamic caliphate and the spread of Islam also introduced the Koran-based
sharia and hadiths that now officially or unofficially govern the lives of some
two billion people in the world. The struggle between the proponents of the
national and secular civil law of European origin and the supporters of sharia
has emerged as a major issue of global contention. The imperial legacy that
initially brought large populations together under similar laws is now
perceived as threatening to divide populations and pit communities against one
another. The Nigerian government's threat to execute a Muslim woman for
adultery under sharia in 2004 brought international condemnation and isolation
of the nation, prompting authorities to reverse their ruling. But demands for
the replacement of British customary law with sharia in many African and Asian
countries continue to raise political tension.
Foreign policy, as
well as the legal infrastructure that undergirds life and transactions in
today's interconnected world, directed the development of new transportation
routes by empires. The Roman Empire offered a huge boost to trading and
communications by building roads and setting up a piracy-free transportation
system that stretched from the Atlantic Ocean to Arabia. The Roman annexation
of Egypt, and the subsequent campaign against Red Sea pirates, revived the
ocean link between India and Southeast Asia. The trading often began with diplomatic
missions to foreign capitals. In 25 BeE, an Indian
king sent a mission to Rome that sailed from Barygaza,
an ancient port near present-day Surat, and presumably transferred to caravans
across Mesopotamia to make the journey to Rome in four years. The king's gifts
included a strange assortment of men and animals: tigers, pheasants, snakes,
tortoises, a monk, and an armless boy who could shoot arrows with his toes.76
The Islamic empire,
founded by a spice merchant turned prophet, was particularly trade-friendly
from the outset. "With the Arabs, Egyptians, and Persians newly unified
under the common rule and ideology of Islam, the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea
ceased to be rival routes but became two arms of the same sea as they had been
in the age of Alexander."77 In fact, the unity of the Islamic empire in
the West and that of the trader-friendly Tang dynasty of China (618907)
produced a conjuncture that encouraged intercontinental trade. The transfer of
the caliphate from Damascus to Baghdad moved the center of gravity eastward. As
Peter Mansfield notes, Baghdad emerged as "the center of a vast and
increasingly prosperous free-trade area in which most sections of the
population had the opportunity to engage in vigorous commercial activity. Arab
ships sailed to China, Sumatra, India and southwards along the east coast of
Africa as far as Madagascar. "78
Europe and the
Mediterranean trade with China reached a peak under the Mongol Empire. The
unification of the central Eurasian landmass by the Mon gols
in the thirteenth century, writes Janet L. Abu-Lughod, put the termini of
Europe and China in direct contact with each other for the first time in a
thousand years and opened up the northern route between China and the Black
Sea.79 Insecurity on the road, combined with the uncertainty of finding water
and shelter along some of the most inhospitable terrain of Central Asia,
limited Silk Road trade. Mongols-who produced only wool and meat and otherwise
relied on merchandise from foreign countries-encouraged trade in every possible
way, from setting up and maintaining shelters and wells to maintaining stations
to provide transport animals. The Mongols even issued gerege
or paiza, a tablet of gold or silver-what has been
called a combined passport and credit card. It allowed the holder to travel
throughout the Mongol Empire assured of protection, accommodation, and
exemption from local taxes or duties.80
It is ironic that the
Mongol army emerged as a great champion of trade that intensified China's
commercial links with Europe and prepared the terrain for the flowering of the
Renaissance. Pax Mongolica exacted a terrible price
in innocent lives but also contributed to an increasingly interconnected world.
Although contemporaries experienced only devastation, misfortune, and terror, a
French historian of the Mongols wrote that "later generations were able to
enjoy the advantages bequeathed by the worldwide empire. To them came the
fruits of the fertilizing contact between the great national cultures, which was
perhaps the most outstanding requisite for extensive changes and the
unanticipated impetus of Europe during the next few centuries."81 Mongol
traders introduced Chinese porcelain to Persia, from where they imported cobalt
into China, thus allowing Chinese kilns to develop their famous blue-and-white
porcelain. Chinese even took to calling the blue made from cobalt Huihuiqing or Muhammadan blue. From horsehair steppe bows
to play the stringed instruments to trousers and new foods, the impact of
Mongol contact with Europe was felt in every sphere oflife.
Europeans even picked up the Mongol exclamation "Hurray!" as a cry of
bravado and encouragement.82
After the Mongol
Empire fell apart and the Islamic Ottoman Empire took control of the Indian
Ocean trade, seafaring in the Atlantic became imperative for the Europeans. As
we noted earlier, Henry the Navigator of Portugal pioneered the development of
new vessels and ocean routes. From his base in Sagres,
he presided over an elaborate effort to develop technology that would allow
safe long-distance travel. He designed light but sturdy four-masted ships, and
his team developed navigational charts and maps that enabled Vasco da Gama to
round the Cape of Good Hope and reach India in 1498, ushering in the age of
European empires in Asia.
Empire building
required not only military might to conquer others but the means to conquer
distance. The roads that the Romans built, the routes that the Mongols
developed for horse and camel journeys, and the pathways that the Incas built
for controlling population and resources laid the basis for both future
invasion and global trading.
Two of the three
ships used by Columbus were caravels, or light ships, the likes of which were
designed at Prince Henry's ocean-research station at Sagres.
The technology spread, and in 1514, a ship built for King Henry VIII of England
pioneered a design that allowed vessels to carry a row of cannons on each side.
At a time when piracy was customary, the double-sided gunboat gave the English
fleet the upper hand.83
With the Industrial
Revolution and the rise of steam power, ocean liners and railway trains were
mobilized for war and for peacetime commercial uses. The first railway that the
British built in India, in 1853, linked Bombay to a suburb twenty-one miles
away. The Indian railways eventually expanded into a robust
twenty-four-thousand-mile network, allowing agricultural and mineral resources
to be brought to ports and enabling the greater penetration of British
manufactured products into the subcontinent. 84
Empires not only
developed trade routes and helped build ltliable
transportation to carry out commercial activity, they also provided the
lubricant for transactions-namely, currencies that faraway countries and people
would accept and honor. Alexander the Great started the trend by issuing
international coinages. The Phoenicians in Egypt issued another currency, so by
the third century BeE, the Mediterranean world was
divided into two main currency spheres.85 Roman and Byzantine gold and silver
coins continued to be the legal tender for international trading for a long
time until the Italian city-states of Florence, Venice, Genoa issued their own
coins. Currencies minted by the Ottoman Empire dominated Levantine trade, but
with less clout than coins issued by the Italian city-states.
Global trade reached
unprecedented heights beginning in the sixteenth century, when the Portuguese
and Spanish empires in South America began pumping huge quantities of silver
bullion into the market. In the first half of the seventeenth century, Spanish
coins became the effective international currency of Southeast Asia, prompting
one Filipino official to comment that "the king of China could build a
palace with the silver bars from Peru which have been carried to his
country."86
The Spanish also
promoted paper IODs to replace precious metals as a means of immediate
settlement of payments due. For instance, the Spanish government had difficulty
financing its increasing military enterprises. To make payments to its troops,
financiers, and suppliers, Spain began issuing "bills of credit,"
pieces of paper that kept the wheels of the empire turning. And as trade
expanded, Spanish, British, and Dutch empires emerged as a vast emporia of
world goods.87
By the sheer necessity
of traveling far to conquer other peoples and control vast spaces, empires
often emerged as transmission belts for technology and their fusion. Genghis
Khan, leader of a band of armed nomadic cattle herders, had more need than any
other emperor to secure technology from others. He recruited his first
engineers among the other nomadic tribes who had learned the Chinese technology
of warfare using gunpowder-one of the earliest technologies for storing,
transporting, and applying energy.88 When Genghis took these men westward with
him, he brought about a cross-stimulation of Chinese and Iranian engineering
and technology, which almost certainly led to the eventual development of the
cannon.89 Chinese iron-smelting technology and gunpowder, combined with Persian
and Arab engineering skill, gave the Mongols sophisticated weapons to defeat
the powerful Song dynasty. Arnold Pacey, a technology historian, says that the
siege engine used by the Mongols was of Arab design, with Chinese gunpowder
that launched missiles and bombs much farther.90 Not long after the victory in
the thirteenth century, the same technology instigated a revolution in European
warfare. As Alfred W. Crosby writes, "Europe took gunpowder to its bosom
like a lover's bouquet."91 Firearms assisted in the English conquest of
Normandy and the Spanish Catholic victory against the Moors.92 Eventually
ship-deck cannons gave the Europeans a decisive edge in expanding their control
to Asia and the New World.
Even during the twentieth century, with tanks and aircraft replacing horses,
military planners in Britain and Germany continued to study Mongol strategy.
During World War II,
two of the leading exponents of mechanized combat, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel
and General George S. Patton, were keen students of Mongol tactics.93 The
bureaucratic-military power that allowed empires to promulgate and enforce laws
also gave them the ability to introduce new crops and animals. Humans had long
collected and traded animals and crops, but on a small scale, with limited
impact on local agricultural development or animal husbandry. But imperial
conquests and the expansion of administrative power led to a biological
unification that Crosby has called "ecological imperialism." Imperial
expansion broadened the horizon of biological knowledge. The Greek historian Aristobolus, who accompanied Alexander the Great's invasion
of India in 327 BeE, may have been the first in the
West to learn about rice: "a strange plant, standing in water and sown in
beds ... , [which] has many ears and yields a large produce."94 Despite
this discovery early on, rice did not reach the dinner tables of Europe until
the Renaissance.95
The Song emperor Zhenzong (998-1022) learned about drought-resistant and
quick-maturing rice from Champa, today's central
Vietnam, and sent envoys to bring seeds back to China. This variety of rice had
a marked impact on the food supply, spurring a dramatic population boom.
Historian Jerry Bentley notes that the population of China almost doubled
during the course of two centuries, from sixty million in the year 1000 to one
hundred million a century later and 115 million by 1200.96
The eastern provinces
of the Arab empire became the gateway for the entry of plants, medicines, and
pharmacological knowledge to the western Mediterranean. As historian Andrew
Watson has demonstrated, under th~ patronage of the
Islamic rulers a great variety of major crops-cotton and sugarcane, as well as
rice, hard wheat, sorghum, citrus fruits, the coconut, banana, artichoke,
spinach, and eggplant-were diffused from the eastern margins of the empire in
India all the way to Morocco and Spain. As Watson puts it, "Over this eastwest route moved not only most of the new crops, the
farming practices and the irrigation technology that were the main components
of the agricultural revolution, but much else that was to shape the world of
classical Islam: higher learning, industrial technology, fashions of dress, art
forms, architecture, music, dance, culinary arts, etiquette, games and so
forth. The end result of so much diffusion through this medium was at once to
strengthen the unity, begun by the conquests, of this vast world and to set it
apart from both its predecessors and its neighbors."97
The Mongol rulers
were interested in crops like cotton that they themselves did not grow but
could grow throughout their empire. Cotton was introduced to China during the
tenth century but was promoted by the Mongols. The Mongol emperor created a Cotfbn Promotion Bureau in 1289 and dispersed
representatives throughout the newly conquered Chinese provinces.98 The Mongol
empire also provided channels that allowed the mixing and comparison of Indian,
Chinese, and Persian pharmacology, enabling each to enrich the others. The
Mongols recognized that simply transporting medicinal herbs was not enough; the
herbs had to be accompanied by detailed instructions for their use. The Mongol
court imported Persian, Indian, and Arab doctors into China to run hospitals,
and Kublai Khan founded a department for the study of Western medicine under
the direction of a Christian scholar. 99
Some imperial
ventures into foreign lands unintentionally introduced new crops or species,
perhaps the most important of which for Asia's taste buds was chili pepper from
the New World, found by Columbus. The Aztec name for the piquant fruit, chili,
which was believed to be a cousin of familiar peppercorn, was combined to call
it "chili pepper." Asians are surprised to discover that the hot
chili that defines their regional culinary identity arrived just 450 years ago,
thanks to European adventureres and traders-that
there would be no hot curry without Columbus. In the case of Koreans, the
surprise can be even worse. Some modern Koreans, proud and nationalistic, might
have difficulty acknowledging that they owe their fiery kimchi-fermented
cabbage pickled in garlic and chilies-to the hated Japanese samurai Toyotomi Hideyoshi, who invaded
Korea in the late sixteenth century. Chili pepper, originally: introduced to
Japan by Portuguese traders from the New World, was left behind in Korea by
Japanese soldiers who had carried its seeds along with their food rations.
Until the arrival of this red pepper, kimchi was bland garlic and cabbage. With
an eye to the antiglobalization movement in South
Korea spawned by the 1997 economic crisis, one writer commented: "It would
not be the last time in the history of Korean food that globalization was
associated with suffering, for the Japanese left behind not only red pepper in
their 16th century incursions but widespread destruction as well."100
India's Mughal
emperor Jahangir was curious about the new flora and fauna that the Portuguese galleons
had brought to Goa from the New World and sent a representative to Goa every
two weeks to look for novelties. Thus, pineapples were procured from a
Portuguese ship, as immortalized by a court painter in Delhi, and thousands of
"fruit of the European port," as the emperor would later proudly
note, grew in the imperial gardens in Agra.101
The Portuguese
domination of the seas, linking continents, made Portuguese vessels the
principal carriers of plants an~ vegetables from one clime and soil to another.
The huge price fetched by spices was a big incentive for the Portuguese to grow
spices in lands under their own control. Legend has it that in 1498, when Vasco
da Gama requested pepper stock for replanting, the ruler of Malabar, Zamorin,
issued a calm response: "You can take our pepper, but you will never be
able to take our rains." With the acquisition of Brazil, however, the
Portuguese acquired enough sun and rain to make a go of it-and no longer had to
request permission to transfer a pepper plant. 102
Imperial Britain
introduced one Amazon plant to the world and changed industrial history. The
Native Americans called it caoutchouc, the same word as in French, and used it
to make waterproof boots and bouncing balls. In 1755, King Joseph I of Portugal
sent several pairs of his royal boots to Brazil to be coated with latex-the
white secretion that natives tapped from trees. 103 The latex was carried back
to Europe for experiments, and in the early nineteenth century, the rubber
raincoat was born-named Mackintosh after the Scottish scientist Charles
Mackintosh, who succeeded in making a waterproof fabric with rubber. Rubber
soon became the substance on which the automobile revolution would run. With
demand for rubber skyrocketing, the British Empire stepped in. In 1876, at the
request of the government and of British citizens living in Brazil, Henry
Alexander Wickham smuggled out seventy thousand rubber seeds.
Botanists at the
Royal Botanical Gardens at Kew successfully grew seedlings, which were then shipped
to the British tropical colonies of Ceylon and Malaysia. As Henry Ford's
assembly line for the Model- T revved up, a rush for "white gold"
swept Malaysia, with large acres put qnder rubber
plantations. By 1924, as the ten-millionth Ford hit the road, Malaya, as it was
called then, was exporting more than two hundred thousand tons of rubber each
year-accounting for more than half of global production. In the process, some
1.2 million Indian indentured workers were brought into the country, changing
Malaysian demography forever. Today, 10 percent of the country's population is
of Indian origin, many the descendants of the original rubber tappers. 104
Under Spanish
encouragement the Philippines was turned into the world's major coconut
producer at the end of the nineteenth century. The Philippine coconut
plantations got a further boost when the U.S. company Proctor and Gamble,
hurting from a shortage of beef fat and tallow resulting from a series ofblizzards and droughts, turned to the new American colony
for a substitute. By 1930 nearly 13 percent of the country's arable land was
turned into coconut plantations to meet the surging demand for coconut oil.
Eventually, less expensive soybeans and cottonseed supplanted coconuts as
sources for oil, and worldwide demand for coconut oil fell, leaving a third of
Filipino peasants trapped in poverty. 105
The Spanish
colonizers took their domesticated animals with them to the Americas, hoping to
re-create the homes they had left behind. Horses, dogs, sheep, pigs, goats,
cattle, and chickens were all new to the New World, but they quickly adapted.
As Henry Kamen puts it, "Some vessels crossed the Atlantic as veritable
arks of Noah."106 American Indians took to horses as if they were made for
each other. The Plains Indians culture of North America was transformed by the
horse, and in South America, Argentina-with its vast grazing lands for cattle
and sheep-eventually emerged as a major world supplier of beef and wool.
When Captain James
Cook left for the Pacific on his first voyage in 1768, his explicit but
confidential task was to cultivate diplomatic and trade relations with the
natives and to pursue biological exchange: he was "to bring home Specimens
of the Seeds of such Trees, Shrubs, Plants, Fruits, and Grains, peculiar to
those Places, as you may be able to collect."107 His right-hand man for
the job was Joseph Banks, honorary director of the Royal Botanical Gardens at
Kew. As one scholar has written, Banks was "the leading exponent of the
'gospel of plant interchange.'"108
Empires played a
significant role in building up human knowledge about the world. It is hard to
overestimate the role played by the Islamic caliphate in gathering, protecting,
and diffusing knowledge. At the court of the early Abbasid caliphs in Baghdad,
manuscripts from allover the world were collected and
scholars were invited. Books from Greek, Persian, Sanskrit, and other languages
were translated, and because many of the originals have since disappeared, the
Arabic translations made in Baghdad often remain the only extant copies. The
Umayyad rulers of Spain regularly sent agents to Baghdad, Damascus, and Cairo
to attract scholars and buy rare books. 109 The European Renaissance would have
been impossible without the rich libraries of Islamic Spain.
The gathering of
knowledge continued hand in hand with the search for profitable plants and
resources in European colonies. Plant and animal exchanges across continents~promoted by the Portuguese, Spanish, Dutch, and
British empires-were followed by the establishment of various societies in
European capitals, with specialties ranging from exploration and geography to
botany and history. These institutions provided a justification for colonial
expansion-the "civilizing mission" -and thickened the web of
connections through knowledge. Adventurers of the past morphed into explorers
and researchers in the employ of the colonial powers. No individual did more to
es tablish the interconnected and interdependent
nature oflife than British naturalist Charles Darwin.
The journey that he took as member of a British science team in 1831-36 aboard
HMS Beaglis expedition around the world brought him
to the Galapagos Islands in the Pacific Ocean. His research and observation
there and in many remote places led Darwin to his theory on
evolution, set out in his seminal work On the Origin of Species by Means of
Natural Selection (1859).
To send soldiers on
horses, camels, and elephants to subjugate other peoples
far away from home was both costly and difficult. But imperial rulers found out
that they had an even more serious long-term problem: to conquer what historian
Fernand Braudel has called "space, the enemy number one." To rule and
maintain control over people across vast distances required an organized
information network. Information had to be recorded on clay tablets, papyrus,
parchment, and a variety of other media and dispatched with messengers. The
Roman Empire, with its elaborate road network and horse carriages, developed
the first information network. Under Roman occupation, the cattle-rich
Anatolian city of Pergamum, with its tradition of parchment-making, emerged as
the supplier par excellence of parchment to the world (the word is a
vulgarization of the name Pergamum). 110 Parchment, made from animal skins,
remained Europe's main medium of storing and transferring information before
Europeans learned paper-making technology from the Chinese via the Arabs.
Information written
on parchment or paper still had to be transmitted over physical distance. Alexander,
Hannibal, and Caesar each developed an elaborate system of relays, by which
messages were carried from one post to another by mounted messengers. The
system was further developed in China's Tang dynasty and later in the Mongol
Empire. In the days of Genghis Khan, a communication network consisting of rest
stops and relay horse riders allowed messengers to travel a hundred miles a day
for weeks on end. III The system was copied by the Egyptian Mamluk sultan, who
had observed it in the Mongol domain, and from there it reached Latin
Christendom and eventually the Habsburg Empire, where a full-blown postal
service emerged. 112 Then, in the middle of the nineteenth century came the
revolutionary telegraph. The first application of the telegraph in wartime was
made by the British during the Crimean War in 1854. Four years later, undersea
cables laid across the Atlantic allowed Queen Victoria to send the first
telegraphic message to President James Buchanan. It may have taken sixteen and
a half hours to decode the message in Morse code, but its arrival was greeted
by a huge celebration accompanied by fireworks, which inadvertently resulted in
New York's City Hall burning down. By 1880, some 97,568 miles of cables had
been laid across the world's oceans, linking Britain to its colonies in Asia,
Canada, Africa, and Australia. Queen Victoria celebrated her Jubilee by sending
something akin to a mass e-mail. As James Morris describes it: "On the
morning of June 22,1897, Queen Victoria of England went to the telegraph room
at Buckingham palace .... It was a few minutes after eleven o'clock, she
pressed an electric button; an impulse was transmitted to the Central Telegraph
Office; in a matter of seconds her jubilee message was on its way to every
corner of her Empire. The message simply said: 'Thank my beloved people. May
God bless them.' "113
Almost like one
billion Internet users today, who can walk to their home or office computers
every morning to check e-mail, Queen Victoria could simply walk to the
telegraph room in her palace basement and read the cables from the far corners
of her empire. By the early twentieth century London had emerged as the capital
of the industrial world, and the economist John Maynard Keynes could write
these words, which sound familiar today: "The inhabitant of London could
order by telephone, sipping his morning tea in bed, the various products of the
whole earth in such quantity as he might see fit, and reasonably expect their
early delivery upon his doorstep; he could at the same moment and by the same
means adventure his wealth in the natural resources and new enterprises of any
quarter of the world, and share, without exertion or wen trouble, in their
prospective fruits and advantages."114
Private entrepreneurs
and companies played a key role in the development of the telegraph arid
telephone, but the imperial authorities' need for secure communication acted as
a prime mover in developing what has been called "the world's system of
electrical nerves."115 The rise of the Internet, foreshadowed by the
telegraph network, was itself initiated by the Pentagon, concerned about losing
command and control in the event of a nuclear war.
It was perhaps fitting that the worldwide system of "electrical
nerves" that the British Empire helped create would be used at the
empire's final moment. As the royal yacht Britannia pulled out of Hong Kong
harbor in the wee hours of 1 July 1997, Britain's last governor, Chris Patten,
sent a terse cable from the ship:
"I have
relinquished the administration of this government. God Save the
Queen."116 As the Britannia melted into the darkness, the globally
interconnected, multicultural world-that the British and others had done so
much to create-continued to spin and pulsate, as if indifferent to the passing
of empire. Buchanan. It may have taken sixteen and a half hours to decode the
message in .1orse code, but its arrival was greeted by a huge celebration
accompanied by fireworks, which inadvertently resulted in New York's City Hall
burning down. Iy 1880, some 97,568 miles of cables
had been laid across the world's oceans, inking Britain to its colonies in
Asia, Canada, Africa, and Australia. Queen Tictoria
celebrated her Jubilee by sending something akin to a mass e-mail. As ames Morris describes it: "On the morning of June 22,
1897, Queen Victoria of ~ngland went to the telegraph
room at Buckingham palace .... It was a few ninutes
after eleven o'clock, she pressed an electric button; an impulse was ransmitted to the Central Telegraph Office; in a matter of
seconds her jubilee nessage was on its way to every
corner of her Empire. The message simply said: Thank my beloved people. May God
bless them.'"113
Almost like one
billion Internet users today, who can walk to their home or office computers
every morning to check e-mail, Queen Victoria could simply ;valk
to the telegraph room in her palace basement and read the cables from the :ar corners of her empire. By the early twentieth century
London had emerged lS the capital of the industrial
world, and the economist John Maynard Keynes :ould
write these words, which sound familiar today: "The inhabitant of Lonion could order by telephone, sipping his morning tea in
bed, the various Jroducts of the whole earth in such
quantity as he might see fit, and reasonably ~xpect
their early delivery upon his doorstep; he could at the same moment and Jy the
same means adventure his wealth in the natural resources and new enterprises of
any quarter of the world, and share, without exertion or even trqpDIe, in their prospective fruits and advantages."
114
Private entrepreneurs
and companies played a key role in the development of the telegraph arid
telephone, but the imperial authorities' need for secure communication acted as
a prime mover in developing what has been called "the world's system of
electrical nerves."115 The rise of the Internet, foreshadowed by the
telegraph network, was itself initiated by the Pentagon, concerned about losing
command and control in the event of a nuclear war.
It was perhaps fitting that the worldwide system of "electrical
nerves" that the British Empire helped create would be used at the
empire's final moment. As the royal yacht Britannia pulled out of Hong Kong
harbor in the wee hours of I July 1997, Britain's last governor, Chris Patten,
sent a terse cable from the ship:
"I have
relinquished the administration of this government. God Save the Queen." 1
16 As the Britannia melted into the darkness, the globally interconnected,
multicultural world-that the British and others had done so much to create-continued
to spin and pulsate, as if indifferent to the passing of empire.
1) For a
more in depth approach then Wikipedia see Justin Marozzi,
Tamerlane: Sword of Islam, Conqueror of the World (2007); for a critical
on-line article by jihad specialist Andrew G. Bostom
see. http://www.americanthinker.com/2005/10/killing_from_quranic_piety_tam.html
1.
Egyptian Islamisr wrirer
Sayyid Qurb, quoted by Efraim Karsh, Islamic
Imperialism: A History (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2006), 212.
2. Anthony Pagden, Peoples
and Empires: A Short History of European Migration, Exploration, and Conquest,from Greece to the Present (New York: Modern
Library, 2001), 12-13.
3. William W. Tarn, "Alexander the Great and the
Unity of Mankind," Raleigh Lecture on History, British Academy, IO May
1933, 4.
4. Ibid., 27·
5. Plutarch quoted in Pagden,
Peoples and Empires, 13.
6. Ibid., 31.
7. President Theodore Roosevelt announced that
"chronic wrongdoing, or an~mpotence which results
in a general loosening of the ties of civilized society, may in America, as
elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in the
Western Hemisphere .... The Monroe Doctrine may force the United States,
however, reluctantly, in flagrant cases of wrongdoing or impotence, to the
exercise of an international police power." Niall Ferguson, Colossus: The
Price of America's Empire (New York: Penguin, 2004), 52-53.
8. Cesare Polengh, "Hideyoshi and Korea," 25 April 2003, Samurai Archives,
http://www. samurai-archives.com/hak.html.
9. Ferguson, Colossus,80.
10. There are more than thirty thousand McDonald's restaurants in 120
countries.
11. Robert Kaplan, "Empire by Stealth," Atlantic Monthly,
July-August 2003,66.
12. Cited by Ferguson, Colossus, 68.
13. Geoffrey W. Conrad and Arthur A. Demarest, Religion and Empire: The
Dynamics of Aztec and Inca Expansionism (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1984), I, quotation at 129.
14. Ibid., 129.
15. Albert Hourani, A History of the Arab Peoples (London: Faber and
Faber, 1991), 19.
16. Michael Cook, A Brief History of the Human Race (New York: W. W.
Norton 2003), 28184·
17. Ronald Findlay and Mats Lundahl,
"Demographic Shocks and the Factor Proportions Model: From the Plague ofJustinian to the Black Death," typescript, Columbia
University, University Seminar in Economic History, 28, available at
http://www.econ. barnard.columbia.edu/ ~econhist/
papers/FindlaY%20 Justinian. pd£
18. Karsh, Islamic Imperialism, 34.
19. Valerie Hansen, The Open Empire: A History of China to I600, 6th rev.
ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000), 337.
20. Jack Weatherford, Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World
(New York: Crown, 2004), 101.
21. Ronald Findlay and Mats Lundahl, "The
First Globalization Episode: The Creation of the Mongol Empire, or the
Economics of Chinggis Khan," 14, available at http://
yaleglobal.yale.edu/about/pdfs/mongol.pd£ See also
Nicholas Wade, "Scientists Link a Prolific Gene Tree to the Manchu Conquerors
of China," New York Times, I November 2005·
22. Weatherford, Genghis Khan,111.
23. According to a later account, when Alexander set out for Syria,
Aristotle wrote to him advising hitn to seize Socotra
and send a group of Greeks to settle there for the sake of alqatir
(resin) and aloe. Vitaly Naumkin, "Fieldwork in
Socotra," Bulletin of the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies 16,
no. 2 (1989): 133-42.
24. Daniel J. Boorstin, The Discoverers (New York: Random House, 1983),
160- 61.
25. Henry Kamen, Spain's Road to Empire: The Making ofa
WorldPower, I492-I763 (London: Penguin, 2002), 301.
26. Anthony Pagden, Spanish Imperialism and the
Political Imagination: Studies in European and Spanish-American Social and
Political Theory, I5I3-I830 Yale University Press,1998), 14.
27. Robert Tignor, "Colonial Africa
through the Lens of Colonial Latin America," in Jeremy Adelman, ed.,
Colonial Legacies: The Problem of Persistence in Latin American History (New
York: Routledge, 1999), 35.
28. Niall Ferguson, Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World
Order and the Lessons for Global Power (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 7.
29. James Bryce and General Stanley Maude quoted by Tony Judt, "Dreams of Empire," New York Review of
Books, 4 November 2004.
30. Pagden, Peoples and Empires, xxiii-xxiv.
31. Sir William Tarn, Hellenistic Civilisation
(London: Edward Arnold, 1927), 4.
32. Pagden, Peoples and Empires, 25.
33. Peter Mansfield, A History of the Middle East (London: Penguin,
2003), 17.
34. John Keegan, A History of Waifare (New
York: Vintage, 1994), 212.
35. Findlay and Lundahl, "First
Globalization Episode," 21.
36. Tatiana Zerjal et al., "The Genetic
Legacy of the Mongols," American Journal of Human Genetics 72 (20°3):
717-21.
37. Weatherford, Genghis Khan, 227.
16. Ibid., 221. Michael Cook, A Brief History of the Human Race (New
York: W. W. Norton 2003), 28184·
17. Ronald Findlay and Mats Lundahl,
"Demographic Shocks and the Factor Proportions Model: From the Plague ofJustinian to the Black Death," typescript, Columbia
University, University Seminar in Economic History, 28, available at
http://www.econ. barnard.columbia.edu/ ~econhist/
papers/FindlaY%20 Justinian. pd£
18. Karsh, Islamic Imperialism, 34.
19. Valerie Hansen, The Open Empire: A History of China to I600, 6th rev.
ed. (New York: W. W. Norton, 2000), 337.
20. Jack Weatherford, Genghis Khan and the Making of the Modern World
(New York: Crown, 2004), 101.
21. Nicholas Wade, "Scientists Link a Prolific Gene Tree to the
Manchu Conquerors of China," New York Times, 1 November 2005.
22. Weatherford, Genghis Khan,111.
23. According to a later account, when Alexander set out for Syria,
Aristotle wrote to him advising hitn to seize Socotra
and send a group of Greeks to settle there for the sake of alqatir
(resin) and aloe. Vitaly Naumkin, "Fieldwork in
Socotra," Bulletin of the British Society for Middle Eastern Studies 16,
no. 2 (1989): 133-42.
24. Daniel J. Boorstin, The Discoverers (New York: Random House, 1983),
160- 61.
25. Henry Kamen, Spain's Road to Empire: The Making ofa
WorldPower, I492-I763 (London: Penguin, 2002), 301.
26. Anthony Pagden, Spanish Imperialism and the
Political Imagination: Studies in European and Spanish-American Social and
Political Theory, I5I3-I830 (New Hayen and London:
Yale University Press, 1998), 14.
27. Robert 1. Tignor, "Colonial Africa
through the Lens of Colonial Latin America," in Jeremy Adelman, ed.,
Colonial Legacies: The Problem of Persistence in Latin American History (New
York: Routledge, 1999), 35.
28. Niall Ferguson, Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World
Order and the Lessons for Global Power (New York: Basic Books, 2002), 7.
29. James Bryce and General Stanley Maude quoted by Tony Judt, "Dreams of Empire," New York Review of
Books, 4 November 2004.
30. Pagden, Peoples and Empires, xxiii-xxiv.
31. Sir William Tarn, Hellenistic Civilisation
(London: Edward Arnold, 1927), 4.
32. Pagden, Peoples and Empires, 25.
33. Peter Mansfield, A History of the Middle East (London: Penguin,
2003), 17.
34. John Keegan, A History of Waifare (New
York: Vintage, 1994), 212.
35. Findlay and Lundahl, "First
Globalization Episode," 21.
36. Tatiana Zerjal et al., "The Genetic
Legacy of the Mongols," American Journal of Human Genetics 72 (2003):
717-21.
37. Weatherford, Genghis Khan, 227.
38. Ibid.,221.
39. A. J. R. Russell-Wood, The Portuguese Empire, I4I5-I808: A
World on the Move (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992), 60-62.
40. Kamen, Spain's Road to Empire, 354-
41. Ibid., 345.
42. Ibid., 355.
43. James D. Watson, DNA: The Secret of Lift (New York: Alfred A. Knopf,
2003), 250-51.
44. "Britishers do not land on the shores of other people's states
to become ethnic minorities and parricularistic
lobbies. They create states: the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand,
South Mrica. When the ancient Greeks emigrated, they
ipso facto left the polis city-state; when British people emigrated, they took
the state with them." Engseng Ho, "Empire
through Diasporic Eyes: A View from the Other Boat," Comparative Studies
in Society and History 46, no. 2 (2004): 2IO-46.
45. Stuart Mole, "From Empire to Equality? Migration and the
Commonwealth," Round Table 358 (2001): 89.
46. Ferguson, Empire, 60.
47. Gregory Mann, "Immigrants and Arguments in France and West Mrica," Comparative Studies in Society and History 45
(2003): 362-85, quotation at 364.
48. Claudia Zequeira, ''A Petty Officer and
Now, a U.S. Citizen," Orlando Sentinel 30 July 2006.
49. Cam Simpson, "U.S. to Probe Claims of Human Trafficking,"
Chicago Tribune, 19 January2006.
50. Hopkins, ed., Globalization in World History, 155.
51. Henry the Navigator heard a story of "the silent trade" in
North Africa designed for people who did not know each other's language. As
Daniel Boorstin tells it: "Muslim caravans that went southward from
Morocco across the Atlas mountains arrived after twenty days at the shores of
the Senegal River. The Moroccan traders laid out sepalfte
piles of salt, of beads from tan coral, and cheap manufactured goods. Then they
retreated out of sight. The local tribesmen, who lived in the strip mines where
they dug their gold, came to the shore and put a heap of gold beside each pile
of Moroccan's. Then they, in turn, went out of view, leaving the Moroccan
traders either to take the gold offered for a particular pile or to reduce the
pile of their merchandise to suit the offered price in gold. Once again the
Moroccan traders withdrew, and the process went on." Boorstin,
Discoverers, 161.
52. Sir William Tarn, Hellenistic Civilisation
(London: Edward Arnold, 1927), 2.
53. Pagden, Peoples and Empires, 36.
54. Mansfield, History of the Middle East, 15-16. 55
55. Cook, Brief History, 279
56. Fernand Braude!, A History of
Civilizations, trans. Richard Mayne (New York: Penguin, 1993), 79·
57. Mansfield, History of the Middle East, 16.
58. Wearherford, Genghis Khan, II2.
59. Macaulay's speech is available at
http://www.languageinindia.com/april2003 / macaulay.
html
60. Romila Thapar, A History of India: vol. I
(London: Penguin, 1966), 86.
61. Romila Thapar, Asoka and the Decline of the
Mauryas (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1997),
46-49.
62. Priyatosh Banerjee, "The Spread ofIndian Art and Culture to Central Asia and China,"
Indian Horizons 43, nos. 1-2 (1994), available at
http://ignca.nic.in/pbo0I3.htm.
63. Richard Fletcher, The Barbarian Conversion: From Paganism to
Christianity (New York: Henry Holt, 1997), 19·
64. Catholic Encyclopaedia, s.v.
"The First Council of Nicaea."
65. Rodney Stark, "Efforts to Christianize Europe, 400-2000,"
Journal of Contemporary Religion 16, no. I (January 2001): 109.
66. Ibid.
67. Michael Wood, Conquistadors (Berkeley: University of California Press,
2002), 133-35.
68. Russell-Wood, Portuguese Empire, 201.
69. Ferguson, Colossus, 7.
70. Ibid., 49.
71. U Thanh Kh6i, Histoire du Viet Nam: des origines it I858 (Paris: Sudestasie,
1981), 37I.
72. Story of Pakistan, "Khilafat Movement [1919-1924],"
http://www.storyofpakistan. coml articletext.asp?artid
= A033&Pg= 2.
73. Bruce B. Lawrence, "In Bin Laden's Words," Chronicle of
Higher Education, 4 November 2005.
74. Pagden, Peoples and Empires, 28.
75. Ernest Barker, quoted in ibid., 32.
76. Romila Thapar, Early India from the Origins
to A.D. I300 (New Delhi: Allen Lane, 2002), 255
77. Janet 1. Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony: The World System, A.D.
I250-I350 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 198.
78. Mansfield, History of the Middle East, 18.
79. Abu-Lughod, Before European Hegemony, 170.
80. Weatherford, Genghis Khan, 22l.
81. Michael Prawdin, The Mongol Empire: Its
Rise and Legacy, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul (New York: Free Press, 1967), 507.
82. Weatherford, Genghis Khan, xxiv.
83. William H. McNeill, The Age of Gunpowder Empires, I450-I800
(Washington, DC: American Historical Association, 1989),14.
84. Ferguson, Empire, 17l.
85. Tarn, Hellenistic Civilisation, 250-5I.
86. Kamen, Spain's Road to Empire, 295.
87. Ibid., 295.
88. Wood and coal store energy that can be transported, but until the
discovery of the steam engine, that energy could not be used for any other
purpose than heating. The crossbow and trebuchet could not store energy
transferred from muscle. Gunpowder-combining saltpeter, sulfur, and
charcoal-was thus the first invention in which energy could be stored,
transported, and applied. Kenneth Chase, Firearms: A Global History to I700
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 3I.
89. Findlay and Lundahl, "First
Globalization Episode," 32.
90. Arnold Pacey, Technology in World Civilization (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 2001),46.
91. Alfred W. Crosby, Throwing Fire: Projectile Technology through
History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 1I8.
92. Chase, Firearms, 71-72.
93. Giancarlo Casale, "The Ottoman
'Discovery' of the Indian Ocean in the Sixteenth Century: The Age of
Exploration from an Islamic Perspective," paper presented at Seascapes,
Littoral Cultures, and Trans-Oceanic Exchanges, Library of Congress,
Washington, DC, 12-15 February 2003, available at
http://www.historycooperative. org/ proceedings/ seascapes/ casale.html.
94. K. T. Achaya, A Historical Dictionary of
Indian Food (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999), 209
95. Alfred W. Crosby, Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of
Europe, 900-I900 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1986), 136.
96. Jerry H. Bentley, "Hemispheric Integration, 500-1500 C.E.,"
Journal of World History 9, no. 2, citing Ho Ping-ti,
"Early-ripening Rice in Chinese History," Economic History Review,
2nd ser., 9 (1956): 200-218.
97. Andrew M. Watson, "The Arab Agricultural Revolution and Its
Diffusion, 700- 1I00," Journal of Economic History 34 (1974): 22.
98. Weatherford, Genghis Khan, 229.
99. Ibid., 229·
100. Choe Yong-shik, "Historians Unearth Secret
Past of Kimchi," Korea Herald, 3 October 2001. See also Amal Naj, Peppers: Story of Hot Pursuits (New York: Vintage
Books, 1992), 8.
101.Achaya, Historical Dictionary of Indian Food, 188.
102.Russell-Wood, Portuguese Empire, 154. 103
103. Ibid., 172.
104.Murray Hiebert, "Tin Cans and Tyres,"
Far Eastern Economic Review, 15 April 1999.
105.Rigoberro Tiglao, "Roots of Poverty," Far Eastern Economic
Review, 10 June 1999.
106.Kamen, Spain's Road to Empire, 270.
107.Wade Graham, "Traffick According to Their
Own Caprice: Trade and Biological Exchange in the Making of the Pacific World,
1766-1825," paper presented at Seascapes, Littoral Cultures, and
Trans-Oceanic Exchanges, Library of Congress, Washington, DC, 12-15 February
2003, available at http://www.historycooperative.org/ proceedings/ seascapes/
graham.html.
108.Tony Ballantyne in Hopkins, ed., Globalization in World History, 135- 36.
109.Watson, "Arab Agricultural Revolution," 21.
110.Tarn, Hellenistic Civilisation, 168.
111.William H. McNeill, Plagues and Peoples (New York: Anchor, 1977), 162.
112. Quoted by S. A. M. Adshead, Tang China: The Rise
of the East in World History (New York: Palgrave, 2004), 183.
113. James Morris, Pax Britannica: The Climax of an Empire (London: Penguin,
1968).
114.Cited in Ferguson, Empire, 171.
115. Ibid.
116. Nisid Hajari, "A
Most Dignified Retreat with Bagpipers," Time (International), 14 July
1997, 22.
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