The interregnum between the Rome ’s hierarchical sovereignty and the principles of bartered sovereignty established by Charles Martel, Charlemagne, and the Catholic Church saw a relative decline in literacy and written work. The church became the main repository of knowledge during this period and remained so for centuries afterwards. This is vitally important to understanding politics during the period for two reasons. First, leaders at the time had little tradition to draw from. Important thinkers such as Aristotle were lost to these generations. Second, we have fewer recollections and histories of the period from which to draw an understanding of their political system. The number of extant writings in Rome and ancient China by contrast give us a wealth of sources on which to draw out their principles of rule. However, we can lay out some of the basic problems that existed during this period with some degree of certainty. Even while the Roman Empire retained some influence in the west during the latter stages of the Western Roman Empire, the Merovingian kings began to establish their rule over the Franks and much of Northern Gaul. The Merovingians ruled according to Salic law. The term rule and law are here very dubious. The most important principle of Salic law for this study was the division of property among all of ruler’s sons. This rule ensured that the Merovingian period was characterized by internecine fighting among family members over inheritances. (See Patrick J. Geary, Before France and Germany: the creation and transformation of the Merovingian world, Oxford University Press, 1988).

For example, Clovis—one of the most powerful of the Merovingian kings—gained a relative unprecedented level of power mainly through killing most of those closely related to him that had land or could make claims on his land. But upon his death his kingdom was divided into four for each of his sons. The warring began again. Primat, a chronicler of French history in the thirteenth century, relates the story of Clovis’ wife, Clotild, now a grandmother, being presented the option by her other sons to, “make a choice between two things: either your grandchildren will become clerics and be shorn with the scissors, or they will be killed with [a] sword; one of these two actions must be taken.” (Robert Levine, France before Charlemagne: a translation from the Grandes chroniques, 1990, pg. 68).

Clotild thinking her sons would not be so brutal as to do the latter chose not to send them into the priesthood. When her son Lothar, kills the first of the grandchildren Primat remarks, “Things turned out otherwise, for the treacherour Lothar took the eldest of the children, threw him to the ground, stuck a knife in his ribs and tooks his life and his kingdom.” (Ibid. pg. 69).

The most significant part of this is that the grandson’s very existence was proof of a future kingdom. Lothar’s act on future generations was an act of territorial consolidation. Adding to the problem was the fact that the Franks were not the only tribe in modern-day France. Gaul was divided into five different units: Austrasia,  Neustria, Burgundy, Aquitane, and Provence. (Guy Halsall, Social Identities and Social Relationships in Early Merovingian Gaul. In Franks and Alamanni in the Merovingian period: an ethnographic perspective, edited by I. N. Wood, 1998, pg. 145).

Not only did the Merovingian kings have to contend for the control of the regions among their siblings, but when they lost control of those regions they had to contend with whoever had taken over that territory. Burgundy , in particular, proved to be a lasting problem for Frankish kings. Salic law provided the division of kingdoms among the king’s sons which weakened the descendants of the king vis-à-vis outside challengers and encouraged brutal wars between blood relatives. No sovereign principle existed at this point and the laws that filled the void were decidedly problematic. Lineages among the royal family were strictly controlled, but other social hierarchies were fluid and contingent. (Ibid. pg. 150).

The absence of a rigid social hierarchy reinforced the notion that conflicts could occur at any given time with a number of claims being both legitimate and important. While Frankish identity expanded in scope, Frankish rule was much more hit and miss. (Ibid. pg. 158).

 Paul Fouracre explains that Frankish political institutions were based upon Roman law, but were far more brutal and far less regulated. Kings were expected to consult with other elites, but it was common not to. Law was as much a practical matter of expedience as it was a matter of justice. Killing dissidents and challengers was accepted in the course of business. Brutality of course is not mutually exclusive from a sovereign principle, but the fact that the incidents of brutality were spontaneous and contingent suggests that no real principle existed. It was a profoundly unstable period. (Fouracre, Franks and Alamanni in the Merovingian period: an ethnographic perspective. Edited by I. N. Wood, 1998).

Kings were expected to consult with other elites, but it was common not to. Law was as much a practical matter of expedience as it was a matter of justice. Killing dissidents and challengers was accepted in the course of business. Brutality of course is not mutually exclusive from a sovereign principle, but the fact that the incidents of brutality were spontaneous and contingent suggests that no real principle existed. It was a profoundly unstable period. Charles Martel entered into this environment as Mayor of the Palace for the last Merovingian king. This title implied the role of chief administrator. By the end of the Merovingian dynasty it had evolved to mean effective ruler.  At this point the Merovingian kings were a fairly pathetic lot given more to avarice, drinking, and whoring than the actual business of rule. Charles Martel established his own authority by defeating the Moors and the Burgundians. His military success led him to ultimately ignore the succession of the Merovingian line and establish his own family as the rulers of the Franks. (Edward James, The origins of France: from Clovis to the Capetians, 500-1000, 1982, pg 152).

So began the Carolingian period. But the essential problem of rule remained. Rather than focus on a decision rule like primogeniture he chose to create a basic set of feudal arrangements. This is perhaps unsurprising; feudal arrangements are more consistent with pre-existing Salic institutions than primogeniture would have been. The political institutions were likewise consistent with Merovingian rule. Independent rulers persisted throughout much of Gaul in the forms of counts. The Carolingian innovation following from Charles Martel was to add another set of authority figures, missi, and bind all of these forms of nobility to the king.(Since the titles are interchangeable, the missi will also be referred to as dukes).The principle, which was entrenched more deeply by Martel’s grandson Charlemagne, can be summarized as, ‘From fealty comes survival; from survival comes advancement.’ The general instability of Merovingian rule encouraged widespread violence. With Carolingian rule came a stable principle. Instead of constantly warring over inheritances—though this would persist in a more limited form throughout the feudal era—a basic negotiation principle became entrenched. The Salic laws which allowed for the distribution of lands among sons and the election of new kings when a family line died out was not truly eliminated until Hugh Capet had his son Robert crowned king, without dividing lands, while he still lived in 987. (François Louis Ganshof, Frankish institutions under Charlemagne. Providence , 1968).
If all local rulers were loyal to the king their bargaining position would be improved vis-à-vis other local rulers. But none had the legitimacy to enforce their claims directly.

Charlemagne was a micromanager. As the most central figure in the formal creation of a Frankish principle of bartered sovereignty Charlemagne created rules which reflected his keen interest in the administration of the kingdom. In a number of Charlemagne’s capitularies—set of rules released by Charlemagne or in his name— he reaffirms the basic logic of bartered sovereignty. In the Capitulare de Villis he reaffirms the basic hierarchy of the fief distinguishing between serfs and freemen, stewards, mayors, and the various tradesmen that keep an estate running. (H. R. Loyn and John Percival, The Reign of Charlemagne: documents on Carolingian government and administration, 1976, pp 64-73).

Other capitularies such as the Capitulare missorum Generale and the Divisio Regnorum dealt more directly with the business of rule. Beyond dealing with issues such as incest, private judgment, corruption and the like Charlemagne specifically outlaws patricide and fratricide. This is an obvious reversal of earlier Merovingian practices. This can be understood at its core as a principle of bartered sovereignty. Instead of creating a stable hierarchy through a rigidly controlled family tree, the basic rules of allegiance and servitude are negotiated as a matter of expedience. All public lands became state lands and were handed out based upon rank and fealty. Fealty among the counts and dukes was regulated by a separate set of ministers called the missi. The fealty oaths taken by local lords prior to Charlemagne’s rule were fairly weak. According to the Chronicle of Fredegar, a contemporaneous account of the period prior to Charlemagne’s rule the oaths were frequently broken and renegotiated. (See Chronicle of Fredegar).

One instructive sequence of events was when Charlemagne’s father, Pippin III, restored a fortress and gave it to Remistanius a local lord in order to oppose another, Waiofar. Later Remistanius would defect and pledge loyalty to Waoifar. In order to deal with this betrayal Pippin plotted with the Saracens, traditional Frankish enemies, to capture Remistanius and hand him over for judgement by Pippin. By hanging Remistanius Pippin was able to gain the fealty of most of  Waiofar’s supporters. (J. M. Wallace-Hadrill, The fourth book of the Chronicle of Fredegar. London , 1960, Ch. 46 – 51 pp 114-119).

Only occasionally was a broken oath cause in itself for cutting off future diplomatic ties. The missi were only marginally capable of asserting the king’s over-lordship in relation to these fealty oaths. After Charlemagne came to power the local struggles were mostly suppressed and most of the wars took place on the outer bounds of the Frankish kingdom among the Saracens, the Burgundians, and the Saxons. A separate principle bound slaves and freemen alike to their local land. In the Double Capitulary of Thionville Charlemagne sets out the principle that all owe fealty to the king unless they owe fealty to somebody else. Specifically he states, “Concerning the swearing of oaths, that fealty should not be sworn to anyone except to us, and by each man to his [own] lord with a view to our interest and that of the lord himself; excepted are those oaths which are rightly owed by one man to another One instructive sequence of events was when Charlemagne’s father, Pippin III, restored a fortress and gave it to Remistanius a local lord in order to oppose another, Waiofar. Later Remistanius would defect and pledge loyalty to Waoifar. In order to deal with this betrayal Pippin plotted with the Saracens, traditional Frankish enemies, to capture Remistanius and hand him over for judgement by Pippin. By hanging Remistanius Pippin was able to gain the fealty of most of Waiofar’s supporters. (Wallace-Hadrill, J. M. 1960. The fourth book of the Chronicle of Fredegar. London: Nelson. Ch. 46 – 51 pp 114-119).

Yet all of the kingdom was ultimately bound to Charlemagne’s judgment. In the original state of bartered sovereignty there were provisions balancing the appetites of the nobles with the poverty of the masses. The missi were responsible for administering this basic level of justice and Charlemagne was remarkably involved in the entire process. At this level bartered sovereignty is incredibly effective and stable. The problem is that as a sovereign principle it relies almost entirely upon the skill of those involved in the bartering. The commonly accepted notion of feudalism flowed from the flaws of Charlemagne’s successors. Nobles became more elitist and control over them weakened. Local nobles were able to form their own petty kingdoms. Bartered sovereignty from the end of Charlemagne’s rule in 813 AD to the issuance of the Edict of Nantes in 1598 shifted power back and forth between the king—when there was one—and the local nobility. Bargaining ability would prove to be central throughout much of this period. Given these constraints the interpersonal bonds of bartered sovereignty became an impersonal institution. North and Thomas recognized this fact some time ago, noting that as far as the fief went the input negotiations between lord and serf— as opposed to slavery, fixed wages, or fixed rents—were the optimal arrangement given the limitations at the time. (Douglass Cecil North and Robert Paul Thomas, The rise of the Western world; a new economic history. Cambridge [ Eng. ] 1973).

Between elites the responsibilities of a vassal to his lord and a lord to the church varied on an as needed basis. Where the church and the ideological subsystem were relatively dominant they arbitrated the competing claims of various lords. The church was the only dominant structure over most of the European world order at the time and so was often the case that the Church was involved in arbitrating claims. However, the church was weak in one fundamental manner: it had no army of its own. It had its own vassals, but could not organize its own army. Thus the relative power of the lords provided a bargaining position wherein they could secure both the stamp of legitimacy and the authority to undertake whatever campaigns they saw as necessary. After all, it is easy to claim that the internecine violence of the time was caused by brigands and marauders, but it was equally attributable to the competing land claims of lords and vassals among each other. Violence during this period was a fact of life. The relative zone of peace provided by Christendom merely made this violence more predictable.The social subsystems of the feudal period presented an interesting set of problems and  led to the Origins and Evolution of Bartered Sovereignty. At the beginning of the Carolingian period Christianity had split into a number of variants. The center of the Catholic Church remained in Rome, but the emperor had moved to Constantinople. The Byzantine Empire formed another center of religion and it was one which tried to exert control over the Catholic Church, but with limited effect. Arianism, which had developed in Alexandria during the decline of the Western Roman Empire, had persisted among the Germanic tribes. (Michel R. Barnes and Daniel H. Williams, Arianism after Arius: essays on the development of the fourth century Trinitarian conflicts, 1993).

Christianity was pervasive in Europe at the time, but there was no unified hierarchy by which all belonged and all believed similarly. At the same time military tactics had shifted fundamentally away from massive infantry wars. Small armies and roving bands ofcavalry  had become the norm. Cities had collapsed in favor of the massive patronage networks of latifundia, but the latifundia could not sustain the other major benefits of cities as centers of learning and exchange. Markets became itinerant and illiteracy became commonplace. Given these limitations forming a cohesive world order becomes incredibly difficult.
Charlemagne’s rule proved to be central not only in creating new principles of rule, but in creating the space in which these principles could become dominant. As indicated above, the principles of bartered sovereignty created by Charlemagne and his grandfather, Charles Martel were of a limited variety. All fealties were focused on one central figure, the king. They responded to the basic infrastructural limitations of their immediate kingdoms. Charles Martel could not control all of the various nobles in the territories he had conquered personally, he  therefore created the missi to administrate in his name while he granted the counts and dukes their various fiefs. The problem became pronounced as Charlemagne began to conquer outlying kingdoms and to build the Frankish Empire. One thing aided him greatly in this endeavor: his close relations with the Catholic Church in Rome.

A central part of Charlemagne’s wars was the elimination of heretical Christians in Gaul. Charlemagne was generally considered to be a benevolent ruler, but the punishments meted out to Arians and other heretical sects were almost always brutal and almost always ended with death. While brutal this had the long-term effect of rapidly expanding the scope of the Catholic ideological subsystem through Western Europe. The pope remained weak in relation to the Byzantine Emperor however. The coronation of Charlemagne as Emperor of the Romans on Christmas day in the year 800 had the lasting effect of giving the power of legitimizing future emperors to the pope. Einhard in The Life of Charlemagne The Medieval Sourcebook(2005), notes that, “It was then that he received the titles of Emperor and Augustus [Dec 25, 800], to which he at first had such an aversion that he declared that he would not have set foot in the Church the day that they were conferred, although it was a great feast-day, if he could have foreseen the design of the Pope.” (See also: http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/source/einhard1.html).

Furthermore in proclaiming Charlemagne Holy Roman Emperor it effectively made the Frankish Empire the proxy for Christendom. Other portions of the Mediterranean world remained within the Catholic scope, but were less subordinate to Catholic rule. The wax and wane of this power over time proves crucial to explaining the feudal world order. It was the legitimizing force of faith mapped onto the impressive military conquests of Charlemagne that defined what Christendom could be. (Donald A. Bullough, Carolingian renewal : sources and heritage, 1991, pg. 146).

It was for later leaders to wrestle over what it was. While the power to crown the Holy Roman Emperor remained a powerful tool in the pope’s arsenal it was another associated tool that proved to be most important: excommunication. In Charlemagne’s campaigns he was able to extend and unify Christendom, but the pope’s power to excommunicate provided an important counterbalance to the power of the Frankish kings and, the Holy Roman Emperor. In France this had the long-term effect of creating a unified area in which ideological hierarchies were rather static, but which remained outside the direct control of the French kings. There has been a debate about the precise nature of warfare and war-making in early feudal period. Accounts of Charles Martel’s victory over the Moors at Poitiers in 732 suggest that the Moors fought on horseback while the Franks may have ridden to the site of the battle, but battled on foot. Similarly, there is some evidence that the stirrup—which was one of the more crucial inventions in history— was becoming prevalent during the period of Charlemagne’s rule. However, one cannot say for certain that cavalry was the central tool of war until after the turn of the millennium. (Lynn Townsend White, Medieval technology and social change, Oxford University Press, 1966).

Regardless, what is apparent about warfare in Europe at the time was that it had become the pursuit of the elites. This is not to suggest that only the elites fought, but that it was organized according to elite status. This is in contrast to formal status built through military service. The days of massive legions had long since passed. The absence of a large, organized army severely limited the designs of any king. Armies were built indirectly through local nobles and their vassals and serfs instead of through a direct method of conscription. When a campaign was over the army disbanded. Enforcing borders and protecting frontiers with this sort of military force was limited at best. The limitations were pervasive, but the social hierarchies were localized. The specific nature of the lord-vassal relationship became more and more particularized after Charlemagne’s death. Dunbabin notes that: The quality of lordship symbolized by the fidelity or vassalage varied markedly. Princes, counts, and also kings, could always afford to make heavy demands on their own armed warriors; they could sometimes impose the characteristics of vassalage on their relations with their subordinate aristocrats, whether officers or not, but often had to be content simply with Bullough notes that the increasing power of the French court and the resurgence of centers of learning in France supported the assertion of Frankish power in ecclesiastical issues when the monarchs in Constantinople were either uninterested or powerless to stop this accretion of authority. The difference between fidelity oaths and vassalage was the difference between non-interference agreements and mutual-aid obligations respectively. (Jean Dunbabin,  France in the making, 843-1180, 2000, pg 115).

Furthermore vassals often had multiple obligations. Because of the limitations in warfare there were significant limitations in the types of territories that could be built. Even the frontiers of the Frankish Empire during the height of Charlemagne’s power were merely nominal and were frequently nonexistent. The security subsystem was constrained both by technology and by the nature of the lord-vassal relationship. There is more to this era than simply the negotiations of French elites however. This feudal arrangement allowed for what Michael Mann calls, “the extraction of surplus labor through ground rent by a class of landlords from a dependent peasantry” (Mann,The sources of social power: Volume 1: A history of power from the beginning to AD 1760. pg . 375).
Though Charlemange was able to stretch out the boundaries of the French kingdom he was hamstrung by the weakness and poverty of the cities. Charlemagne was generally generous with the church, but his chief advisor and biographer, Einhard, was occasionally forced to demand gifts from local bishops in order to fund the state. (Ganshof). The revenues from state production and limited taxation were not sufficient to keep the state solvent. The amount of capital available for investment and its fluidity were severely limited; the economy as a whole was forced to move from gold to silver coinage. Charlemagne was able to establish standards of coinage and weight, but was limited in his ability to enforce those standards. (James).

Transporting currency was also a dangerous undertaking. Extending credit for long distance purchases was limited in scope because of church rules against usury and was therefore limited small Jewish populations throughout Europe. The net result of these limitations was to limit the size of cities and the scope of markets. Towns remained small and relatively disconnected save for religious pilgrims, nomads, and traveling fairs. The fairs themselves which represented the widest ranging of the markets were itinerant and somewhat unpredictable. The process of ruralization that had begun in the late Roman era continued through the Carolingian dynasty despite the numerous innovations undertaken by Charlemagne.The European world order by the time of Charlemagne’s death thus, was for all purposes a Frankish world order. The initial structure of the European world order in the immediate aftermath of the decline of the Roman Empire is often characterized as fragmented as well as highly personalized. Joseph Strayer says of the period that, “The Roman idea of the state was quickly forgotten in the troubled period of invasions and migrations . . . In the early Middle Ages the dominant form of political organization in Western Europe was the Germanic kingdom, and the Germanic Kingdom was in some ways the complete antithesis of a modern state. It was based on loyalties to persons, not to abstract concepts or impersonal institutions.” (Joseph Reese Strayer, On the medieval origins of the modern state, 1970, Pg 13).

In Frankish Gaul, which was on the fringes of the empire to begin with rule certainly was highly personalized. The beginning of the Carolingian dynasty saw Frankish Gaul become the center of the Western European world order. In conquest Charlemagne was able to define the frontiers of that world order and in death he left a legacy of fragmented deterritorialized polities. While the economic and security systems collapsed precipitously the Church did rise up to replace the fading embers of Roman identity. By the time that Charlemagne was crowned Holy Roman Emperor by Pope Leo Christianity had effectively formed a cohesive ideological system over much of Europe . The invasions and migrations had—as far as was possible during the time—largely ceased. Europe emerged from centuries of turmoil as a Catholic continent. In so doing one cannot underestimate the importance of that faith. The common creed that united the Frankish world order enabled other important relationships including those bonds of kith and kin that were central to bartered sovereignty. Various secular and religious norms bound Europe together. The pope held the power to excommunicate and crown kings. Used wisely these powers expanded the scope of Christendom and created some degree of conformity within it. Similarly, the power of kings to grant vassalage created the means to protect their vast land holdings while at the same time defending Christendom where necessary. In the wake of Charlemagne’s death the Frankish Empire began to fragment. This happened partly because Salic tradition remained and competing claims to inheritances would come to divide the kingdom, and partly because his sons lacked the basic acumen for rule that he possessed. By the time Charlemagne died, his son Louis, the sole remaining direct heir, was known more for acumen in piety than in politics. He lacked any skill at mediating the rising conflicts among the nobility. (Dunbabin).

During his reign numerous civil wars began to rend the empire and upon his death the empire was finally divided between his three sons, who warred among themselves over the remains until the Treaty of Verdun in 843. It was these remnants, constantly divided, that created the basis for the characteristic heteronomy of the medieval era.

The Frankish world order was at once bound together by the ideological subsystem, Christendom and the Holy Roman Empire , and was progressively fragmenting as another part of ideological subsystem, Salic law, continued to carve up feudal lands.

As the kingdom began to fragment the other subsystems were limited in scope and capacity; the elites were incapable of abetting the fragmentation. Cities in this period were as much a part of the negotiations as anything else with the bishoprics autonomy traded for right of investiture given to the kings. The autonomy of the cities was traded for the right of the kings to appoint the bishops. There was no secular authority during this phase of bartered sovereignty.
To suggest otherwise is problematic for a number of reasons, but it is most important as regards that lord-serf relationship. From serfs to lords and bishops, from lords and bishops to the pope loyalty and suffering were inherently intertwined. And from the pope down to the meanest serf they were in turn bound to the land given the meager production that was possible at the time. Serfs themselves retained a bargaining position simply because agricultural production and technology had declined so markedly from the end of the Roman Empire . The entire arrangement was open to frequent renegotiation based upon the exigencies of the moment. Thus bartered sovereignty was the logical outcome given the spatial constraints of the time with each linked together by common beliefs, but too weak to enforce any lasting hierarchy upon each other and too impoverished to escape. The Frankish kingdom continued to dwindle, but the Frankish world order persisted in much of Europe. The limited scope of the trade and security subsystems continued to divide Europe , while Christendom continued to hold it together. The shift from a wholly unstable system into a prolonged period of bartered sovereignty is thus somewhat easy to explain. What remains more difficult to explain is the second phase of this European transformation: from bartered sovereignty to administrative sovereignty. The Carolingian Dynasty died in 967 AD with death of Louis V. Without a male heir to inherit the kingdom it fell to a council to appoint the new king. After some debate Hugh Capet was elected king. The kingdom that he accepted was by this point divided by not only by fief, but by currency and language. Capet himself was notable not so much for how he lived, but how he died. Nearing death he oversaw the coronation of his son, Robert II, as King of France. This had a profound effect upon the Frankish world order. Capet’s desire to ensure his family’s power had the long term effect of undermining Salic law.Primogeniture would not become common in France for some time, but a stable line of succession for the kingship did become more or less accepted practice.At the turn of the millennium the French social and economic environment began to improve rapidly. The kingdoms would continue to fragment and the principle of bartered sovereignty would persist, but numerous changes began to substantially affect the course of French history. The changes in technology and wealth were not, in and of themselves, the proximate causes of change in the sovereign principles of the European world order. In fact, the end of the Carolingian line had a profound affect on the stability of the Frankish— now becoming French—world order. Set loose from its moorings the various nobles continued to assert their authority through a principle of bartered sovereignty, but that authority came to define smaller and smaller territories. Regino of Prüm, noted in the tenth century, that: After Charles [the Fat’s] death, the kingdoms which had obeyed his will, as if devoid of a legitimate heir, were loosened from their bodily structure into parts and now awaited no lord or hereditary descent, but each set out to create a king for itself from its own inner parts. This event roused many impulses towards war, not because Frankish princes, who in nobility, strength, and wisdom were able to rule kingdoms, were lacking, but because among themselves an equality of generosity, dignity, and power increased discord. No one surpassed the others that they considered it fitting to submit themselves to follow his rule. Indeed Francia would given rise to many princes fit to govern the kingdom had not fortune in the pursuit of power armed them for mutual destruction. (Paul Edward Dutton, Carolingian civilization: a reader, 1993, pg 507).

With the end of the Carolingian line at hand the stabilizing force of a strong king loosed upon France an anarchy of contending powers intent on asserting their legitimate claims, but lacking the power or charisma to insist on fealty. The emerging French polity was stabilized by the accession of Hugh Capet, but was still wracked with the competing claims of local lords. Hugh Capet, himself was only safe in region nearest the Île de France. Two major events during this period began to change the violent status quo that defined medieval France: the resurgence of French agricultural production and the economy, and the diminishing power of the Catholic Church in Europe . The next two sections will explore the import of these events in the evolution of the French state. Cities reemerged in the period between 1000 AD and the beginning of the Hundred Years War (1336 AD), characterized by increasing competition over the growing resources of the continent. From this point the French state grew in fits and starts. “The transformative story of the eleventh and twelfth centuries was the economic and governmental colonization of formerly underdeveloped and undergoverned internal spaces. In counties, castellanies, and fiefs of all sorts, the number of towns, villages, and parishes increased, forests were cleared, new fields planted, and markets founded.” (Geoffrey Koziol, Political Culture. In France in the central Middle Ages: ages 900-1200, edited by M. Bull, 2002, pg 59).

The increasing wealth did not make bartered sovereignty obsolete, but reversed the process fragmentation that followed from the Treaty of Verdun and highlighted the integrative possibilities of bartered sovereignty rather than the disintegrative capacity which had been dominant. Wealthier lords began to assert their dominance over weaker ones. Fealty became more stable as lords gained the ability to punish defectors. Cities and agricultural production became central to the increasing power of lords rather than islands of resistance to feudal capriciousness. Under Pope Urban II we see the beginning of the European Crusades to liberate Jerusalem. The Crusades did have the ultimate effect of breaking Europe out of a period of profound isolation while simultaneously distracting the pope from the more general affairs of Europe. With the end of this isolationism trade began to reemerge. This happened first and foremost in Italy . But France held some of the more fertile land in Western Europe and together with Flanders was able to begin to produce surplus product. The trade that developed between Flanders and England around this time was crucial to world history. The growth of industry and trade around this period led the nobles to view their fiefs as more than simple land grants whereby they would pay their debts to the king. They became profitable endeavors. The basic feudal arrangement remained, but the units which they described began to change fundamentally. The fief became an estate, the town became a center of production rather than a refuge of the meek, and the church shifted from dominating presence to mediator, teacher, and landholder. Cities over time became more than mere vessels of opposition to the feudal structure; they became alternatives to that structure. The bishoprics and independent cities survived the expansion of feudalism precisely because they were a part of the feudal structure.(Strayer).Their relative autonomy was bartered between elites as a matter of course. Autonomy was not assumed, but was merely guaranteed temporarily as a function of force or diplomacy. Their power in this instance flowed not from counter-balancing the king and his vassals, but by providing leverage to them or to the church. The long-term effect of this of course was to instill a true sense of independence within the cities. Regardless of their position within the system their own beliefs created the impetus for change.