For
a general overview
of the Chinese Dynasties see:
An earlier case study traced the evolution of transborder sovereignty over
the course of China’s longest lasting dynasty-the Zhou Dynasty which lasted
from roughly 1000 BC to 221 BC. During the course of the Zhou Dynasty, we see a
shift from transborder sovereignty to absolute
sovereignty with the Warring States Period representing a transitional phase to
imperial China. This was followed by a brief overview first imperial Qin Dynasty.
The Han Empire
It was through the Han expansion that China made its first contacts with
peoples outside of the traditional Chinese sphere, as its emissaries reached as
far as Parthia (in modem Iran), China developed its earliest firsthand
knowledge and understanding of other-particularly Western-cultural worlds.
Second, the triumphant military expeditions implanted the Middle Kingdom idea
firmly and visibly in the Chinese worldview of international relations, in
which China was the center and superpower of the world and other peoples and
countries were referred to only in tributary and subordinate terms. This
replaced the conception of multination equality that had gradually formed
through the pre-expansion Han-Hsiung-nu relations
from 200 to 133 B.C. Third, through the martial merits of Emperor Wu, empire
building and its accompanying military expansion became in Imperial China a
permanent part of the dual criteria of historical judgment of an emperor: wen-chih (civil and cultural merit) and wu-kung
(martial achievements). Without wu-kung, wen-chih was not enough to make an emperor stand out in
history. Many emperors actually became prisoners of such a concept and unwisely
tried too hard to fit the pattern, only to ruin themselves and their empires.
Furthermore, in institutional realms Han Wu-ti's many
new political organizations, intellectual and economic innovations, and legal
measures, which were all instituted to meet needs created by military
expansion, remained as permanent features of traditional China, and some even
survive today.
In dynastic terms, Emperor Wu's reign reached a peak in the Western Han.
His long military expeditions and colonial efforts eventually exhausted the
nation's economic resources and manpower, and hence affected, and even broke in
some cases, the established political, economic, and intellectual balance and
stability of the Western Han empire. In long-range terms, it was Wuti's great expansion that eventually precipitated the
decline of the Western Han dynasty. Han Wu-ti and his
new empire have been a highly controversial topic in Chinese history. On the
one hand, many regarded the emperor as a model ruler and empire builder. But
others considered him the personification of pretentiousness, ruthlessness, and
selfishness and his great empire a project of self-destruction and a symbol of
the misery of the common people. This controversy dates even to Wu-ti's own time. In 89 B.C., he issued an edict deploring his
expansionist adventures and expressing his regret about the sufferings they had
inflicted on the people. All of this has increased the complexity and
variations in historical discourses on the origins, development, and
consequences of Emperor Wu's new empire.
The high degree of centralization in the Han government contributed to
the internal stability necessary for the Han Court to mobilize large military
campaigns. From the time Kao-ti ascended the imperial
throne in 202 to the end of his reign in 195 B.C., practically every year the
Han Court was threatened by the rebellions of feudal states. These states
controlled almost two-thirds of the Han territory, and some of them were
extremely large and powerfull. The Ch'i kingdom
controlled six provinces (chun) with seventy-three
districts (hsien), the Tai kingdom three provinces
with fifty-three districts, the Ch'u kingdom three
provinces with thirty-six districts, and the Wu kingdom three provinces with
fifty-three districts. These kingdoms were virtually independent in every
aspect. Furthermore, they had their own royal courts and governing systems,
independent economic resources and financial institutions, and, most important,
independent armies. The Wu, for example, had an army of over five hundred
thousand men, with an additional three hundred thousand from its ally Nan-yueh in the south. Moreover, the powerful generals who
helped Uu Pang (the later Kao-ti)
create the empire also constituted a threat to the court. The reign of Emperor
Hui (Uu Ying) lasted only seven years (195-188 B.C.).
The emperor was young, and Empress Lii held the real
power. Even though this was a period of consolidation of Han rule, the struggle
for power between the Lii clan and the imperial
family (Uu clan) was already underway. In the next
period, under the reign of Empress Lii (187-180
B.C.), this struggle reached its zenith. The empress ruled through members of
her own family; the important members of the imperial clan were in their
distant kingdoms and marquisates. At the same time, the threat of the powerful
generals continued. The court was in a state of great tension. After Empress Lii's death in 180 B.C., the whole Lii
clan was massacred by a joint force of members of the imperial family and Kaotsu's old loyal henchmen. Emperor Wen (Wen-ti, Liu Heng, 180-157 B.C.) was enthroned, although he had
not been the heir apparent. He was the oldest living son of Kao-tsu and had been the king of Tai (mainly Shansi) before
being chosen, emperor. Moreover, as he stated in an edict in the first year of
his reign, at this time the king of Ch'u (Uu Chiao, Kiangsu) was his youngest uncle, the king of Wu (Uu P'i, Kiangsu and Chekiang) was
his brother (actually a cousin), and the king of Huai-nan
(Liu Chang, Anhui) was his younger brother. There were other strong kingdoms of
the Uu clan in outlying regions of the empire. At one
time, he was even reluctant to accept the throne under these circumstances. The
emperor was not in a position to deal effectively with these feudal states, and
tensions certainly existed between the states and the Imperial Court. Some of
these kings disregarded the orders of the court and plotted rebellion against the
emperor. At least two feudal kings openly rebelled against him: the king of
Chi-pei in 177 B.C. and the king of Huai-nan in 175 B.C. By the beginning of the reign of
Emperor Ching, the conflict between the feudal kings and the Han Court had
reached a climax. While the imperial government was preparing to curtail the
power of the various feudal kings, a rebellion of seven of the strongest
kingdoms-Wu, Ch'u, Chiao-hsi,
Chiao-tung, Tzu-ch'uan, Chi-nan, and Chao-broke out
in 154 B.C. It was the most serious revolt during the former Han period. It
lasted several months and was finally suppressed by the imperial forces under
the generals Chou Ya-fu and Tou
Ying, which killed more than 130,000 rebel troops. The kings of the seven rebel
states all were forced to commit suicide or killed by the imperial forces.
It is clear that during the period from 202 to 154 B.C. the Han empire
was not politically stable. The court was frequently threatened by various
unruly groups and rebellions. It was impossible for the court to concentrate on
external problems or launch all-out military campaigns against the Hsiung-nu and others while the constant threat of internal
rebellions continued. For instance, during the reign of Emperor Wen the Hsiung-nu menace became more serious, and so did the threat
of the feudal kings. In 177 B.C., the Hsiung-nu's
Worthy (Wise) King of the Right invaded the regions south of the Yellow River
and northern Pei-ti (in modem Ninghsia).
But when Emperor Wen went to Tai (in northern Hopei) and prepared to lead a
campaign against the Hsiung-nu the king of Chi-pei (in southern Shantung) immediately took the opportunity
afforded by the emperor's absence from the capital to start a rebellion. The
emperor was forced to call off the expedition and order his forces to attack
the rebellious king.
After 154 B.C., the feudal kingdoms were never again a major threat to
the Han Court. From this year to the last quarter of the second century B.C.,
the Han Court used various means to render the existence of feudal kingdoms
merely nominal, and its effort to eliminate more feudal kingdoms continued:
three more were destroyed early in Wu-ti's reign.
After the Rebellion of the Seven Kingdoms, Emperor Ching also undertook special
measures to change the structure of the feudal kingdoms. First, he took away
the independence of their political system. He eliminated the position of yu-shih tai-fu (the imperial secretary or deputy chancellor
in the royal court) in 147 B.C. and degraded the status of the chancellor in
the royal court by changing its title from ch' eng-hsiang to hsiang (chief
adviser) in 145 B.C. The next year he changed the governing system in the
kingdoms by drastically reducing the number of officials and assigning new
titles to them, showing their inferior status compared to officials in the
central government. To further eliminate any possible regional division, the
emperor even ordered in 142 B.C. all marquises (ch'e-hou)
not to assume their posts in their respective marquisates. Second, starting in
147 B.C. the emperor gradually eliminated the feudal kings' economic
independence by nationalizing mintage and the currency system and imposing a
monopoly on various essential material goods. Third, Emperor Ching broadened
the base of entrance into officialdom to include the common people in order to
reduce the monopoly of official positions by the hereditary aristocrats and
their wealthy followers. In 142 B.C., he reduced the long-established financial
requirement for official appointments by 60 percent, from one hundred thousand
to forty thousand in cash (copper coins). In the same year, he decreed that
merchants, who were usually required to register with the government and were
the allies and supporters of the ambitious feudal kings, be prohibited to serve
as officials either by merit or by open purchase. With all these aggressive
measures, the possibility of any successful challenge to the Imperial Court by
the feudal kingdoms and their local supporters was almost completely eradicated
under Emperor Ching.
At the same time, there were conscious efforts to transfer the
administrative power from regular cabinet members to officials close to the
emperor, as symbolized by the rise of the Inner Court (Nei-t'ing
or Nei-ch'ao) to usurp the power of the Chancellery
and the Imperial Secretariat. All these measures plus other formal and informal
means of control and inspection brought fundamental changes in the power
structure and distribution of the Han government. The power of the emperor and
the centralization of the government reached their highest degree during the
reign of Emperor Wu. The long struggle for power between such powerful pressure
groups as the imperial in-laws, the imperial family, and those who were
instrumental in the founding of the empire was finally ended during Wu-ti's reign.
Basic changes in the relationship between the central political power
and local society also took place. Before Emperor Wu, the monarchy was without
real and close ties to local society. Kao-ti, founder
of the dynasty, followed a Ch'in practice of moving the rich local elites and
the powerful aristocratic families, which numbered more than one hundred
thousand, from the eastern regions to the Kuan-chung
area (Shensi) under the direct supervision of the central government so that
these people could not induce tension and disturbances with their wealth and
influence. At the same time, families of his meritorious assistants, who were
given high-ranking positions in the government, were moved to the district
where his tomb was constructed, which was hence named Ch'angling.
Following this latter practice, succeeding rulers moved the families of
officials with an annual salary of 2,000 bushels (shih) of grain and local rich
elites, merchants and stalwarts to districts and towns of their tombs (ling-i), located in the capital area and constructed in their
own times. This measure evidently combined the control of certain potentially
dangerous segments of population in the case of local elites and stalwarts-and
the traditional system of hostage taking in the case of high-ranking
officials. All of these practices,
however, were not strictly enforced on a large scale until Wu-ti's time. Moreover, even if they were, they would have
achieved only one goal-social stability through population control-and that
alone would not be effective enough to enable the central government to fully
mobilize the massive manpower and economic resources needed for long and
large-scale military expeditions against the Hsiung-nu.
Two basic measures were undertaken in the early period of Wu-ti's long reign. The first was the reinforcement of the
practice of population migration. In 139 B.C., the second year of his reign,
the emperor first established his tomb in Mou County,
which was later called Mou-ling. Next year, for the
sake of positive encouragement, he granted to those who moved to Mou-ling two hundred thousand ch'ien
in cash to each household and 200 mu (or mou, Han
acres) of land. In 127 B.C., two years after his new military offensives had
begun, Emperor Wu ordered that stalwarts from provinces and kingdoms and those
whose property was worth 3 million ch'ien in cash or
more be moved to Mouling. The purpose was to increase
the population of the capital area and at the same time prevent the spread of
evil and vicious elements in the provinces and kingdoms. The second measure
that Emperor Wu undertook to exert thorough control over local conditions was
to gradually incorporate leaders of local pressure groups not moved to the
capital area into governmental institutions as bureaucrats. This policy was
usually carried out by the provincial governors. But their efforts were
directed and controlled by the central government.
Another measure in the imperial government's quest for internal
political and social control and stability was the use of "harsh
officials" (k'u-li). These officials believed in
strict legal order as the basis of good government, in the use of cruel
measures against unlawful conduct, and in the equality of all people commoners,
noblemen and officials-before the law. They held positions of various types and
ranks, such as governor (t'ai-shou or chun-shou), regional military commandant (tu-wei or chun-wei, chief
commandant), capital commandant (chung-wei), prefect
or governor of the capital (nei-shih), palace
counselor (chung ta-fu), commandant of justice (t'ing-wei), general, clerks in offices of different levels,
and others. They often employed tricky and vicious investigators to look for
unlawful activities. Their main targets of investigation and persecution were
members of the rich elite, the nobility, corrupt officials, stalwarts and men
of evil influence, and racketeers and vicious merchants. With only one
exception in Kao-ti's time, officials with such
political and legal philosophies did not gain influence and prominence until
late in Ching-ti's reign-after the Rebellion of the
Seven Kingdoms was crushed in 154 B.C. Emperor Ching was the first Han ruler to
send an official with a harsh reputation to a specific region. In about 151-150
B.C., the famous Chih Tu was appointed the governor
of Chi-nan (in central Shantung) to restrain the Hsien clan. This clan
consisted of over three hundred households and was so notorious for its power
and lawlessness that none of the two thousand officials in the area could do
anything to control it. Chi executed the worst offenders of the Hsien clan,
along w!th their families, and the rest were
overwhelmed with fear. After a year or so under Chih
T u's rule, no one in the province dared even to pick up belongings that had
been dropped on the streets and roads. Other harsh officials operated in much
the same way and at times employed even harsher measures. Among the people they
arrested, prosecuted, and executed in the provinces and kingdoms, as well as in
the capital area, were court ladies, feudal kings, high-ranking officials,
local elites, rich merchants, and commoners. Such officials became more
dominant early in Wu-ti's reign. They reached the
highest echelon of the bureaucracy, and their measures became even crueler. The
governor of Ting-Hsiang (in southern Suiyuan)
executed four hundred people in one day. The governor of Ho-nei
(eastern Honan) executed over one thousand families. Their blood is said to
have flowed over ten Ii (Han miles). In the inquest
of conspiracy for rebellion conducted by the feudal kings of Huai-nan (mainly Anhui), Heng-shan
(in Anhui), and Chiang-tu (central Kiangsu), Chang T'ang-the most influential harsh official of early Han
times-was in charge of investigations and judgments. He put to death tens of
thousands, at times merely on circumstantial evidence. These officials became
so notorious that they were given such nicknames as Vicious Hawk, Vicious
Killer, and the like.
Furthermore, in 130 B.G Chao Yii and Chang
Tang, two of the most notorious and influential harsh officials at the time,
were empowered by Emperor Wu to draw up various new statutes and ordinances.
Among these were the laws that anyone who knowingly allowed a criminal act to
go unreported was as guilty as the criminal and that officials could be
prosecuted for the offenses of their inferiors or superiors in the same bureau.
From this time on, the laws became more complicated, and they were applied with
increasing strictness. This was a pronounced departure from earlier Han practice,
which in general stressed simpler laws and lenient applications. In the earlier
reigns of Emperors Kao and Hui and Empress Lii, as
recently discovered Han era documents show, there were only twenty-eight sets
of statutes and ordinances and a number of cases and precedents for reference
and comparison. The principal legal philosophy was "following the
established tradition."20 The clear intent of this change was to impose
strict political and social order by means of harsh legal institutions and enforcement.
Small wonder, then, that of the fifteen notorious harsh officials of Former Han
times whose biographies appear in the Shih-chi (Historical Records) and Han-shu (History of the Former Han Dynasty), ten flourished in
Wu-ti's time. All were extremely influential in
decision making at the highest level, and a majority of them were instrumental
in the formulation of the most important new political and economic measures
undertaken during Wu-ti's reign.
During the seven years of the Ch'in-Han transition from 208 to 202 B.C.,
the main force of production in the economy, the population of able bodies, was
drastically reduced because of the continuing war destruction and carnage.
There were at least eighty large-scale battles and over one hundred fifty of a
lesser scale. However, the casualties in each of these bloody conflicts ranged
from several thousand to tens of thousands and even hundreds of thousands. In
207 B.C., for example, over two hundred thousand Ch'in soldiers were buried
alive by the rebel leader Hsiang Yii (232-202 B.C.)
in Hsin-an (east of modern Mien-ch'ih
in western Honan). Overall, the Chinese population at the beginning of the Han
dynasty was reduced to less than one-half of the former Ch'in figure of 28
million by the end of the dynasty. In many regions, the loss was even greater. Chii-ni District (in Hopei), for example, had only
one-sixth of the Ch'in era population left, down from thirty thousand
households to five thousand. The large cities generally, retained only 20 to 30
percent of their former populations due to war deaths and flight. The great T'ang historian Tu Yu (A.D. 735-812) estimated that the
population of the Han dynasty at its founding was less than one-third of the
population of China in the Warring States period (404-222 B.c.).
The modem scholar Liang Ch'i-ch'ao (1873-1929)
estimated the Han population in Emperor Kao-tsu's
time at only about 5 or 6 million, but more recently others have estimated it
to have been in the range of 8.8 to 18 million; my own estimate is 12 to 16
million.
The founders of the Han took special measures to revitalize the bleak
economic and social conditions. The government first instituted a general
policy of economic relaxation and reduction of governmental spending. The
theory was that government should interfere in the people's lives as little as
possible. This was intended to correct the Ch'in policy of working the people
so hard in public works and military expeditions that they eventually rebelled.
At the same time, the Han Court also initiated various measures for economic
recovery in different realms of concern. During the early Former Han,
industrial and commercial growth was noticeable. But Han industry and commerce
did not begin their full development in the first three reigns, 202-180 B.C.,
of the new dynasty, since the primary concern of the Han leaders then was full
recovery of the agricultural sector. As it was in the Ch'in dynasty, the main
economic concern of the Han founders was agriculturalism (nung-pen),
with commerce and industry being regarded as "nonessential" economic
pursuits (mo-yeh). During the reigns of Emperors Wen
and Ching, 180-141 B.C., commerce and industry gradually achieved significant
growth, as the empire's agricultural production had reached a very high level,
the population had increased by four times, and living standards (consumption
of goods) had risen significantly. On the average, the minimum annual rate of
business profits was 20 percent and higher. In fact, the profits of certain
industries and businesses were so huge that later in the next reign, Han Wu-ti's time, they were channeled into a well-organized new
system of government monopolies in order to finance the large-scale military
campaigns and eliminate the economic threat to the imperial government posed by
the tremendous wealth of the industrialists and merchants.
There were, according to Su-ma Ch'ien (145-86 B.C.), forty-six notable types of
commodities of great value-major sources of industrial and commercial wealth-in
market towns and commercial metropolises, and twenty-two of these were produced
through industrial processes of varying degrees of sophistication. Regional
specialization emerged and with it the rise of prosperous interregional trade.
Major industrial enterprises were those of iron, salt, and textiles. The
centers of the textile and clothing industries (silks, silken fabrics, textiles
made of vegetable fibers, and so on) were mainly in Ch'i and Lu (modern
Shantung), Ch'en-liu (in modern Honan), and Shu (in
modern Szechwan). Lin-tzu (Lin-tse) of Ch'i and
Hsiang-i of Ch'en-liu were
the two largest centers. Lin-tse was famous for
garments and Hsiang-i for fine embroideries. The
specialty of Shu was hemp cloth. Information on the size of these industries in
early Former Han times is not available. But in 48 B.C. each of the three
government garments offices (San-fu) in Ch'i alone generally employed two to
three thousand men. Together with the fact that textiles were a major source of
industrial and commercial wealth, this leads us to assume that a large pre
expansion textile factory could easily have employed over a thousand men.
The iron and salt industries were spread over various regions of the
empire, with the largest centers located in what are modern Shantung,
Szechwan,' Kiangsu, Chekiang, Anhui, and Hopei. From 120 to 110 B.C., the Han
government reorganized its system of salt and iron monopolies. It established
special offices for supervision and management in areas where salt and iron
production and profits were concentrated. In early Han times, there were forty
iron offices in forty chun (provinces) and kuo (feudal kingdoms), and thirty-eight salt offices in
thirty chun and kuo.
Excluding regions that were acquired during Wu-ti's
expansion, forty-five iron offices and thirty-one salt offices were in Han
regions of the pre expansion period. These regions most likely were centers-or,
in some cases potential centers-of salt and iron production in the
pre-expansion period. The chun and kuo where these Han offices were located are listed in
table I, together with their modern geographical locations. The wide
geographical range of salt and iron production is clearly shown in the table.
Information on the total workforce of salt and iron laborers in the
early Former Han period is not available. But certain sources indicate that
salt and iron magnates often employed more than a thousand men to manufacture
salt and process iron. Kung Yii (123-43 B.C.)
observed in 44 B.C. that the various iron offices employed an annual workforce
of over one hundred thousand men, mainly slaves, to gather iron and copper. It
seems that the salt and iron monopoly implemented in the years 120-110 B.C. was
mainly a new attempt to control these businesses, not a rapid expansion of the
existing enterprises. Judging from our examination of salt and iron offices,
about 88 percent of the production facilities of salt and iron probably existed
in the pre expansion period. If this is the case, then very likely the total
annual workforce of salt and iron laborers in the early Former Han was around
eighty-eight thousand men.
Salt and iron businesses were evidently the most profitable enterprises
in early Former Han times. They produced such wealthy and powerful families as
the Cho and Cheng of Shu, the K'ung of Wan (in modern
Honan), and the Ping of Ts'ao (in modern Shantung),
all in the iron enterprise; and the Tiao Hsien of Ch'i in the salt enterprise.
The Chos and Chengs grew so
rich that they each owned a thousand young slaves. Their pleasures in
possessing lands and in fishing, archery, and hunting were comparable to those
of great feudal lords. The K'ung family's fortune
reached several thousand catties of gold, and its head resembled the young men
of princely rank in his behavior, disposition, and activities. The wealth of
the Ping family amounted to 100 million in cash. The Tiao Hsien's wealth grew
to several tens of millions in cash. Needless to say, all of these families
engaged in diverse trading and other commercial activities and employed every
possible means-including lending money, skillful use of slaves, and political
contacts with feudal lords, provincial governors, and prime ministers of feudal
kingdoms-to increase their fortunes. Their wealth and power exerted great
influence on the lifestyles and thinking of people in various walks of life.
The traders in Nan-yang (modem Hopei) all imitated the K'ung
family's lordly and openhanded ways. In Tsou and Lu (in modem Shantung), many
people abandoned scholarly pursuits and, following the model of the Ping
family, turned to the quest for profits. Various feudal states, particularly Wu
in the south and Chao (in Hopei) in the north, engaged in the production of
iron and salt for huge profits and at times became the largest producers of
these commodities. In fact, the tremendous financial strength derived from iron
and salt production enabled these states to threaten the central government and
invited it to take them over.
Copper, the source of coins, was another profitable industry. It usually
went with the iron manufacture. A considerable number of the iron manufacturers
also engaged in copper mining and casting. Shu and Tan-yang (in modern Anhui)
and part of the Wu kingdom (the lower Yangtze Valley), among others, were the
well-known copper-producing regions. At the time of the emperors Wen and Ching
(180-141 B.C.), the two most productive copper mines were located in mountains
in Yen-tao of Shu (modem lung-ching
of Szechwan) and Ch'angshan of Yii-chang
(modem An-chi of Chekiang). The former was granted to the high official Teng
Tung by Emperor Wen; the latter was in the territory of the king of Wu (Uu P'i, 213-154 B.C.). Both Teng
and the king of Wu minted coins from copper mined from the two mountains by
tremendous numbers of workers. The result was that the coins of Wu and of Teng
spread all over the empire. Teng accumulated wealth that exceeded that of a
vassal king. For the king of Wu, the mintage of coins, together with his salt
enterprise, produced so much revenue that he not only dispensed with taxation
but was economically confident enough to start a rebellion against the imperial
government.
But Han expansionism would also become their downfall, because the Han
needed nomads to join the army, yet they were never fully incorporated into the
military hierarchy. Instead, the Han government relied on the standing frontier
commands to keep them under control. As more and more tribes moved inside the
frontiers, this burden proved too great for the relatively small armies in the
frontier camps. Loyalty was also weak among the convicts and professionals who
spent their lives at the frontier and were linked to the Han state only through
the person of their commander. Another reason for the failure of the Eastern
Han army in the second century was its success in the first. Just as the armies
of the Warring States and early Western Han had been designed to fight Sinitic
rivals, so those of the Eastern Han had been aimed at the northern Xiongnu. With their defeat, many of the "inner
barbarians" who had helped the Han in the first century turned against it.
The Southern Xiongnu, Wuhuan,
and Xianbei lost their chief motive for submission to
the Han, as well as their chief source of bonuses for military service. So the Wuhuan and Southern Xiongnu
turned increasingly to internal pillage for income, while the Xianbei replaced the Xiongnu as
the chief external threat. To the west, the problem was even more severe, for
this area suffered through the disastrous Qiang wars.
Every army is intended to fight a certain type of war or counter a
particular kind of threat. The entire Eastern Han defense faced north,
providing a screen against small-scale raids and a warning in case of
invasions. Its large cavalry forces were assembled for offensive expeditions
against a united foe with substantial armies. Such dispositions were of little
use against the Qiang, located to the west beyond the
Han's border defenses. These nomads lacked any overarching political order and
did not form large confederacies. The consequences of any defeat were thus
limited, and victories, however small, soon led to major rebellions as
scattered groups assembled under a successful leader. For the same reasons,
peace agreements with the Qiang could not last for
long. Moreover, scattered groups of Qiang lived
throughout the western and northwestern territories, as well as beyond the
frontier. There was no clear geographic boundary between the Qiang and the Han, and under the Eastern Han the Qiang were resettled in the old capital region. The only
defense against such an adversary was to move Han farmers and soldiers into the
provinces so that no settlements were left exposed to low-level attacks and the
Qiang could be absorbed into the Han economy and
polity.
But whenever the Han attempted such a policy, it ended in failure. In 61
B.C. Zhao Chongguo propose founding military colonies
in the west (Honan), Ho-nei (Honan), Chi-nan
(Shantung), T'ai-shan (Shantung), and Shu and Kuang-Han (Szechwan). In addition, shipbuilding, weaponry,
and lumber were profitable industries, particularly in regions such as Lu-chiang, Nan (Hupei), and Shu. Animal husbandry was an
important enterprise in northern and northwestern border territories. Pottery
and lacquerware also were prosperous industries in certain regions.
With these commercial and industrial developments, the cities rapidly
expanded. In Wu-ti's time, there were twenty Han
cities with populations ranging from 50,000 to 650,000 people, and sixty cities
of 20,000 to 56,000. The two largest cities in the population were Ch'ang-an, the imperial capital built only in Hui-ti's reign (especially in 192-189 B.C.), and Lin-tzu (in
Shantung); the former had a population over 500,000 in a walled city of 13.5
square miles, and the latter had 650,000 in a walled city of 9.31 square miles.
The next five largest were Yuan (in Nan-yang, Honan), with 400,000; Ch'eng-tu (in Chengtu, Szechwan),
with 380,000; Han-tan (Han-tan, Hopei), with 270,000; La-yang (Loyang, Honan),
with 260,000; and Lu (Ch'ii-fu, southern Shantung),
with 230,000. These seven cities were the major Han commercial and industrial
hubs and were located in the key economic regions in the west, central,
northeast, east, and southwest. They were the distribution centers of special
regional products such as iron, gold, copper, textiles, lacquerware, and
agricultural goods. In essence, they were the nerve centers of the Han economic
and business world. The cities were naturally the centers of political command
and economic and military mobilization to support longtime war efforts.
Considering the fact that at the beginning of the Han dynasty these major urban
centers had only 20 to 30 percent of the surviving Ch'in population, their
tremendous growth and size certainly informed the stupendous increase of the
Han population in the sixty some years before Wu-ti's
reign. At the same time, it was also recorded that all earlier Han reigns had
made special and aggressive efforts to promote population growth. Emperor Kao,
for example, decreed in 200 B.C. that all taxes be forgiven for a family with a
newborn baby. Under Emperor Hui, the court even ordered that a woman's whole
family be levied taxes five times higher than normal if she was not married by
the age of twenty-nine (thirty sui). Under these aggressive population policies
and favorable economic conditions, it is reasonable to assume that the
population would have increased over time. In fact, the Han population is
estimated, in different primary sources and later references, to have reached
the range of 40 to 50 million before 150 B.C. and increased to the range of 50
million by Wu-ti's early reign, almost five times the
early Han total.
Throughout the Eastern Han, particularly in the second century the
population of Guanzhong and the old capital region wa under the continuous pressure of Qiang
onslaughts . Even in the early decades of the first century, the northwest
regions had been seriously depopulated. The policies of resetting barbarians
inside China and sending convicts to the frontier may have been in part an
attempt to repopulate these regions. However, these measures did little to
check the demographic decline of the frontier. Census evidence shows that, with
one exception, all commanderies in the west and northwest suffered significant
losses, many of them more than 80 or 90 percent. While the figures are
unreliable, a change of this magnitude, especially when contrasted with the
relative stability and even some increases in inner provinces, probably
indicates an actual decline in the Han population in the border regions.
Contemporary observations support these statistics. Wang Fu (ca. 90-165
A.D.) noted: "Now in the border commanderies for every thousand li there
are two districts, and these have only a few hundred households. The Grand
Administrator travels about for ten thousand li, and it is empty. Fine soil is
abandoned and not cultivated. In the central provinces and inner commanderies
cultivated landfills the borders to bursting and one cannot be alone. The
population is in the millions and the land is completely used. People are numerous
and land scarce, and there is not even room to set down one's foot."
Writing several decades later, Cui Shi described a situation that was virtually
identical.
The Eastern Han government made futile attempts to prevent people from
leaving the frontier regions and to encourage those who had left to return. The
Book of the Later Han (Hou Han shu) states,
"Under the old system [under the Han] frontier people were not allowed to
move inward." In 62 A.D. Emperor Ming offered a payment of twenty thousand
cash to any refugee from the frontier who returned to his old home. As clear
evidence for this ban on inward movement, Zhang Huan, who came from Dunhuang in
the far northwest, was allowed to move to an inner commandery in 67 A.D. only
as a special reward for meritorious service.
But these attempts to stabilize the frontier population failed. Between
92 and 94 A.D., Emperor He proclaimed geographic quotas to correlate the number
of people recommended as "filially pious and incorrupt" (the primary
route to office) with the population of a region. For every twenty thousand
registered people, a commandery would be allowed to recommend one man per year.
For a population between ten thousand and twenty thousand, a commandery was
granted one recommendation every three years. But frontier commanderies with a
population of between ten thousand and twenty thousand were allowed to
recommend one man every year. Those with a population of between five thousand
and ten thousand could recommend one every other year. And those with fewer
than five thousand were granted one every three years. This change shows that
the populations of frontier districts were low and declining. Even the reduced
limits were too high for many commanderies. Wang Fu observed that because of
low population, the commanderies in his region had been unable to recommend
even a single man for more than a decade. An examination of the geographic
origins of the "filially pious and incorrupt" recorded in the Book of
the Later Han and on stone inscriptions bears out his complaint.
The conduct of the Eastern Han government in the Qiang
wars demonstrates a fundamental weakness of the regime: its single-minded focus
on the Guandong region. The scale of the Qiang disasters and the collapse of Han civilization in the
west and northwest were direct consequences of the eastern government's
ultimate decision to leave the frontier commanderies defenseless and to remove
population from the region. This lack of interest in the security of the west
and northwest, which can be observed throughout the Eastern Han, stems from the
shift of power to the new capital in the east.
When the Western Han capital was based in Guanzhong,
the government pursued a policy of forcibly resettling population into new
towns for the maintenance of imperial tombs. Through resettlement, powerful
provincial families lost their local basis of influence and fell under the sway
of the imperial court. Grain and other foodstuffs were eventually imported from
the more productive Guandong region to maintain the
demographic and economic well-being of Guanzhong.
The Western court regarded the area "east of the passes" with
a mixture of suspicion and contempt. Jia Yi (201-169 B.C.) observed to the
emperor: "The reason for which you have established the Wu, Hangu, and Jin passes is largely
to guard against the enfeoffed nobles east of the mountains." In the
Discourses on Salt and Iron (Yan tie lun) Sang Hongyang (executed 80 B.C.) remarked: "People have a
saying, 'A provincial pedant is not as good as a capital official.' These
literati all come from east of the mountains and seldom participate in the
great discussions of state affairs." Although men from Guandong
played a larger role in Western Han government after Emperor Wu's death, only
when the capital moved to Luoyang did the situation truly change.
The Eastern Han founder Guangwu and most of
his followers came from just south of Luoyang, and the rest of his closest
adherents came from the great families of Guandong.
Moving the capital from Guanzhong to Guandong transferred political power to their region.~ This
break with the past was made self-consciously and deliberately, without regard
to strategic considerations, particularly the fact that the newly reunited Xiongnu were drawing near Luoyang. Throughout the Eastern
Han the court entertained many proposals to abandon territory in the north or
west, leaving the old capital region vulnerable. In 35 A.D. officials urged
that everything to the west of the Gansu corridor be abandoned, but this was
blocked by Ma Yuan, a man from the northwest. In 11O A.D., in the wake of the Qiang uprisings, a proposal called for the abandonment of
all of Liang province (from the western end of the Gansu corridor at Dunhuang
east to the borders of the capital region around Chang'ang
and even some of the old imperial tombs. Opponents of this idea argued that the
warrior traditions of the western people were essential to the security of the
empire, and that moving them toward the interior would incite rebellion. By the
end of the Western Han the office of provincial governor has grown from a mere
inspector into the chief local administrator.
As the governors' power increased under the Eastern Han, they were able
to appoint and dismiss officials within their provinces without the approval of
the court. Holders of the office thus became autonomous regional lords who,
though subject to dismissal, held sway within their own jurisdiction. Their
powers included military duties, and in the second century A.D., when barbarian
incursions and banditry led to constant combat, the governor replaced the grand
administrator as the person in command of the state's emergency levies. As
civil order decayed and provincial forces spent more time in the field, they
took on the characteristics of semiprivate standing armies.
This development was a major change in Han local administration and an
important step in the fall of the Eastern Han. The Han dynasty had based its administration
on the commandery and the district-a two-tier structure that fragmented local
power into small units to avoid threats to the central government. The
provincial governor, however, became a third tier, with command of large
populations, great wealth, and significantly armed forces-resources that could
challenge the authority of the imperial government. In the second half of the
second century A.D., governors became semi-independent warlords. When Liu Yan
took office as governor of Yi province, he massacred important local families,
gave his own sons major positions, recruited personal followers from among
refugees, and defied imperial commands. In similar fashion, Liu Yu established
his own little kingdom as governor of You province. He pacified local
barbarians, sheltered refugees, encouraged crafts, and gathered armies. Liu
Biao pursued an identical course of action in Jing province.
By the late Eastern Han, governors had obtained the power to recruit
troops on their own initiative. This in effect recognized their right to
command private armies. In 178 A.D. when the provinces of Jiaozhi
and Nanhai (in southern Guangdong and Vietnam)
rebelled, Zhu Jun was sent out as governor and empowered to recruit
"household troops" (one of the earliest uses of the term) to form an
army. The commentary identifies these troops as his servants and slaves. In 189
A.D. He Jin sent Bao Xin to his home near Mount Tai
to recruit troops for the purge of the eunuchs. By the time Bao Xin returned,
He Jin had been slain. Bao Xin went back to Mount
Tai, recruited twenty thousand men, and joined forces with Cao Cao, the warlord who ultimately conquered the Yellow River
Valley and whose son formally brought the Han dynasty to an end. The delegation
of individuals of the power to recruit private armies in their home regions
shows that the central government had lost its ability to rule the population.
Only through the personal networks of eminent families in their home regions
could the state mobilize a military force.
Recruits in the provinces developed strong ties to those who recruited
them. In 88 A.D. a certain Deng Xun had recruited Xiongnu soldiers to act as guards against the Qiang. Contrary to normal practice, he allowed these
tribesmen and their families to live in his fortress, and he even let them into
his own garden. They swore personal loyalty to Deng Xun
and allowed him to raise several hundred of their children as his personal
followers. This was an exceptional case at the time, but by the end of the
dynasty, such ties between recruits and their commanders were common.
In 189 A.D., when Dong Zhuo declined to leave
his army at the northwestern frontier and take up an appointment at court, he
wrote: "The righteous followers from Huangzhong
and the Han and barbarian troops under my command all came to me and said, 'Our
rations and wages have not yet been completely paid, and now our provisions
will be cut off, and our wives and children will die of hunger and cold.'
Pulling back my carriage, they would not let me go." When the court
attempted to have him yield his command to Huangfu
Song, he replied: "Though I have no skill in planning and no great
strength, I have without cause received your divine favor and for ten years
have commanded the army. My soldiers both great and small have grown familiar
with me over a long time, and cherishing my sustaining bounty they will lay
down their lives for me. I ask to lead them to Beizhou,
that I may render service at the frontier."
This second passage points out another feature of the Eastern Han's
collapse: the proliferation of long-term commands in the field. In the Western
Han, generals had been appointed to command an expedition, after which the army
was disbanded and the general returned to his regular post. The "Monograph
on Officials" of the Book of the Later Han states, "Generals are not
permanently established." However, the Eastern Han created permanent
armies stationed at fixed camps. Although in the first century A.D. the size of
armies was kept small and commanders were regularly rotated, prolonged crises
on the frontier required generals to remain with their armies in the field for
years. These armies-which now were composed of barbarians, convicts, and
long-term recruits-became the loyal creatures of their commanders. Such men had
no place in Han society and no home or family to which they could return.
Instead, they formed families at the frontier, and their lives centered on the
person who was, as Dong Zhuo observed, the source of
their livelihood. TheHan court never acknowledged
this shift. In Dong Zhuo's biography, his title
changed frequently in the ten years prior to 189 A.D., but his own testimony
shows that he and his army stayed together for the entire period.
Another path leading to private armies was the development of a
dependent tenantry. The absorption of the old category of "clients"
into this new servile group meant that labor and military service were largely
transferred from the state to great families. In the early Eastern Han, Ma Yuan
commanded the services of several hundred families attached to him as clients.
Military service was probably included in these obligations. Drawing from these
service-providing dependents, the great families were able to assemble armies
of hundreds or thousands of men. Such armies of tenants had overthrown Wang Mang at the end of the Western Han, and the military
capacity of dependent populations existed, as a latent possibility, right up to
the Eastern Han dynasty's collapse. Like the government's commandery troops, they
could be raised in times of emergency. With the decay of internal order and the
outbreak of civil war, these dependents began to form full-time private armies
recruited from what was becoming a hereditary soldiery. At the same time the
dwellings of the great families became fortified compounds with walls and
watchtowers.
The Eastern Han government gave up all attempts to restrict the rise of
a dependent tenantry, and in so doing abandoned direct administration of the
countryside. Furthermore, as power shifted to the inner court of affines and eunuchs, the imperial house became separated
from the great families who controlled the outer court. This steady
implosion" of imperial power ruptured the ties that bound the court to the
countryside. As social order steadily deteriorated in the second century A.D.,
the court discovered that it had lost the ability to mobilize armies and
enforce its own rule.
To counter the threat of rebellious "inner barbarians" and
ultimately the millenarian rebel movements, the imperial government required
military resources that only those who had developed personal ties to the
soldiery could muster: provincial governors, generals on the frontier,
resettled tribal chieftains, great landlords, and, in a few cases, leaders of
religious rebels. While each type of commander had secured support in a
different way, all of them had one thing in common: in an age of general social
breakdown, they could call upon their own armed followers for security. These
various warlords were key political actors in the long centuries of disunion
that would follow the demise of the Han.
As the Chinese are quick to point out, the Han leadership has almost
exclusively focused on defense on the international front (even while it
suppresses ethnic minorities in the buffer zones). When China did reach out,
aside from during the time of Mongol domination, it was largely along the Silk
Road through Central Asia and into the Middle East, where China sought to
acquire luxury goods more than vital resources. Even the famed treasure fleets of Zeng He in the early 15th century
were more an expression of China's confidence in its own defensive position and
its desire for frivolities than a strategic imperative -- and as threats of
invasion from the north increased, China quickly abandoned its oceangoing
enterprises, considering them expensive and distracting from real priorities.
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