By Eric Vandenbroeck
China’s longest lasting dynasty, the Zhou Dynasty lasted from roughly
1000 BC to 221 BC. Initially comparing this with a case study about Rome and France
I traced the evolution of transborder sovereignty over the course of China’s
longest lasting dynasty, the Zhou Dynasty which lasted from roughly 1000 BC to
221 BC. During the course of the Zhou Dynasty as compared with the case studies
about Rome and early Europe, it was shown how feudal
states in China were more autonomous, had no overlapping, cross-cutting
authorities, and had strong territorial markers. And that during the course of
the Zhou Dynasty we see a shift from transbordersovereignty
to absolute sovereignty with the Warring States Period representing a transitional phase to
imperial China. From the age of Confucius onward, the Chinese people
in general and their political thinkers, in particular, began to think about political
matters in terms of the world. And that absolute
sovereignty, as a principle, had existed
prior to the first Qin emperor. The essential structure of
the ideological subsystem at the beginning of the Zhou dynasty was built on a
two-fold distinction. One tenet held the centrality of the king and the Mandate
of Heaven to legitimize his rule. The second tenet held the centrality of law and order
variously derived as the overarching legitimating factor for any given ruler. Thus
ancient China showed us a highly structured feudalism, a territorially bound
state that struggled to develop a bureaucracy to govern it, and a nation rich
in tradition before a state, as
started to be the case during the Qin, could grow powerful enough to govern it.
The Song dynasty (Chinese: 宋朝; pinyin: Sòng
cháo; 960–1279) next was an era of Chinese history
that began in 960 and continued until 1279. It was founded by Emperor Taizu of Song following his usurpation of the throne of
Later Zhou, ending the Five Dynasties and Ten Kingdoms period. The Song often
came into conflict with the contemporary Liao and Western Xia dynasties in the
north and was conquered by the Mongol-led Yuan dynasty. The Song government was
the first in world history to issue banknotes or true paper money nationally
and the first Chinese government to establish a permanent standing navy. This
dynasty also saw the first known use of gunpowder, as well as the first
discernment of true north using a compass.
But while thus the end of Northern Song and the beginning of Southern
Song Dynasty is considered a high point of Chinese innovation in
science and technology, it is also where we will discover, lay the roots of Chinese
Nationalism or the idea Han cosmopolitanism.
Today we know that along
the East-West axis of China, demonstrated a general pattern of
isolation-by-distance among Han Chinese, and reported unique regional signals
of admixture, such as European influences among the Northwestern provinces of
China.
A 12th century Hua Yi Tu map covers China during the Song Dynasty.1 The
map depicts mountains, rivers, lakes, as well as more than 400 administrative
place names of China. It includes Korea in the west of Pamier
area, from north to the Great Wall, northeast to Heilongjiang region, to the
south of Hainan Island. The texts arranged around the edges of the graphic part
of the map provides information from historical and other sources briefly
explaining markers such as the Great Wall, the size of the empire, and the
states to the west. The stele containing the carved map is thought to be stored
at the Stele Forest in Xian, but is not displayed due to the political
sensitivity of not depicting the island of Taiwan on it, which can be
interpreted as Taiwan not belonging to China at the time of the map's
production.
The map was striking for several reasons, first and foremost its chief
objective – to inspire irredentist passions. Historians typically associate
irredentism of this sort more with the world of the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries than with twelfth-century China. To be sure, Huang himself may have
imagined a future emperor as the chief viewer of his map. A few decades later,
however, in 1247, an official serving in Suzhou had the map and colophon carved
onto a stele – a stele that stands to this day – “in
order to maintain its transmission.” Once on a stele,
the map and its message would have circulated via rubbings to a broader
audience. Another noteworthy feature of the map was the colophon's particular
emphasis on the territorial claim to the Sixteen Prefectures. Unlike the lands
south of the Yellow River seized by the Jurchens, the Sixteen Prefectures – a
region straddling the northern extremity of the North China Plain – was lost to
the Khitans before the founding of the Song. Asking
to have it “returned to our possession” made sense only insofar as the pronoun
“our” referred not merely to the Song state, but rather to a political entity
that transcended dynasties.
The East Asian World Order
Throughout the period under consideration here, Song China coexisted
with several other important East Asian powers, though not all were of equal
concern to Song policymakers. Contact with states in Korea, Japan, and maritime
Southeast Asia was generally limited to trade (often under the guise of tribute
missions), although, due to its shared border with the Khitan
Liao empire – to be examined in some detail below – the Koryō
Kingdom in Korea would come to play an important ancillary role in Song– Liao
relations. To the south, the two most significant states, the Kingdom of Dali
(937– 1253) in Yunnan and the Ly Dynasty (1009– 1225) in Vietnam, remained
separated from China by a buffer region inhabited by autonomous tribes. During
the Song, Chinese colonists spread relentlessly southward, recurrently
provoking armed opposition from tribal groups in their path. Some of these
tribes were held under a “haltered-and-bridled” system, whereby in exchange for
maintaining their de facto independence their chiefs accepted Chinese
bureaucratic titles and other symbols of subordination to the Chinese throne. 2
Contact with Dali, however, was restricted to an important trade that supplied
horses for Song China’s northern campaigns.3 Military confrontations with
Vietnam broke out only after the destruction of one of the intervening tribal
regimes in the late eleventh century.4 In sum, due to the relatively limited
scale of direct political interaction or military confrontation, the southern
and maritime frontiers were never the main focus of attention at the Song
court.
By contrast, the steppe-based regimes on the northern and northwestern
frontiers were understood to be an immediate threat to the Song’s very
existence. In the words of one mid-eleventh-century statesman, in response to a
policy question from the emperor regarding unrest in the south, “How are these
trifles worth exhausting imperial power and intruding on the emperor’s
concerns? … The most significant border issues lie in the west and the north!”5
Indeed, in the 1120s, the Jurchens, precursors to the Manchus of the Qing
Dynasty, would sweep down from Manchuria to conquer the whole of North China,
forcing the Song court to flee southward and establish a new regime – the
Southern Song – based beyond the Yangzi River. In the next century, the Mongols
descended from the Eurasian steppe, first destroying the Jin
Dynasty (1113– 1234) of the Jurchens, and then overrunning the Song four
decades later. But long before the Jurchens and Mongols arrived on the scene,
China already faced two major steppe powers.
To the northwest were the Tanguts and their state of Xi (Western) Xia (982–
1227). In the early decades of the Song Dynasty, the court paid little
attention to this state, which was generally seen as posing no substantial
military threat. A peace agreement in 1006 ushered in three decades of good
relations. By the 1030s, however, the Xia Kingdom had expanded significantly,
mostly by seizing territories further west from various Uighur and Tibetan
tribes and chieftaincies. The first significant war with China broke out in
1038, when the Tangut ruler had gained enough confidence to proclaim himself
emperor, thereby undermining the symbolic superiority of the Chinese monarch.
During the subsequent years of warfare, the Tangut regime amply demonstrated
its military might. After a temporary peace treaty in 1044, hostilities broke out
again two decades later following repeated Tangut incursions – exacerbated by
the military adventurism of Song frontier commanders, and the simultaneous
disintegration of Song China’s Tibetan client state based in Hehuang (in modern-day Qinghai). Thereafter, the Song
emperor Shenzong (r. 1067– 85), guided by his hawkish
advisors, embarked on a series of large-scale military campaigns. Over the next
sixty years, under Shenzong and his successors, this
irredentist agenda fueled repeated wars, leading to crippling losses of men and
resources on both sides. Nevertheless, by the 1120s, Song China had managed to
capture large swathes of Tangut territory, while simultaneously annexing
Hehuang.6
The Northern Song’s most formidable neighbor, however, was undoubtedly
the Liao empire (916– 1122), established by nomadic Khitans
in the early tenth century. Even before the founding of the Song, during the
Later Jin Dynasty (936– 47), the Liao had obtained
sixteen prefectures in northern Hebei and Hedong that
had been traditionally under the control of Chinese regimes. The result was an
unusual geopolitical situation, whereby the Song– Liao border cut directly
across the North China Plain. Song China’s second emperor, Taizong
(r. 976– 98), twice attempted to recapture this territory – in 979 and again in
986 – but both military campaigns failed miserably. The next two decades saw
nearly continuous border skirmishes, culminating in a massive Liao invasion in
1004 that brought Khitan troops to within a hundred
miles of the Song capital of Kaifeng. The Khitan
invasion was halted only after the Song emperor Zhenzong
(r. 998– 1023) personally led his troops into battle. At this point, realizing
that their army was precariously over-extended, the Khitans
agreed to a peace settlement. Thus, in January 1005, Zhenzong
and his Liao counterpart exchanged oath letters at Chanyuan
on the northern banks of the Yellow River.7 Thereafter, there were two
significant confrontations, first in 1042, when the Khitans
took advantage of the Song– Xia war to claim ten counties in Hebei that they
had controlled prior to the founding of the Song Dynasty; and second in the
mid-1070s, when the Song and Liao courts had a heated disagreement over the
proper course of the border in Hedong to the west.
But both disputes were resolved diplomatically. Peaceful relations broke down
only in the late 1110s when Song China embarked on a misguided alliance with
the Jurchens against the Liao, an alliance that went sour and led both to the
fall of the Khitan state and to the Song’s loss of
all of North China.
The Chanyuan
peace
Two important consequences of the Chanyuan
peace are worth stressing. First, the many years of diplomatic exchanges,
spanning the eleventh century and lasting over a hundred years, spurred a new
form of cosmopolitanism, whereby Song political elites acquired firsthand
experiences traveling into the steppe and socializing with Liao diplomats.
Second, the unusual geopolitical configuration of the Song– Liao border brought
a large ethnically Han population under the control of the Liao state. These
Han people were recruited in large numbers to staff the Liao civil
administration at all levels, even as the Liao state sought actively to
preserve the sharp ethnic divide between them and the Liao Khitans.
The significant presence of ethnic Chinese in influential governmental
positions undoubtedly contributed to Liao's unique relationship with Song
China.
The century of peace between Song and Liao also played a critical role
in the evolution of the structures and norms of traditional Chinese diplomacy.
An influential thesis, put forward three decades ago in a volume edited by
Morris Rossabi, emphasized the pragmatism and innovation evident in Song
China's relationship with Liao. According to Rossabi, the diplomatic parity
that existed between the two states – whereby the monarchs of both Song and
Liao recognized each other as an “emperor” equal in status – discredited once
and for all the notion of a “Chinese world order,” formulated by John King
Fairbank, an interpretation holding that external regimes could interact with
China only on China's terms, by accepting their subordination and offering
regular tribute to the Chinese ruler. To the extent that Song– Liao relations
took on certain characteristics of the post-eighteenth-century European state
system, Rossabi's thesis seems to underline yet another area in which Song
China was ahead of its time.8
It is possible to expand on the implications of Song– Liao diplomacy by
exploring the cultural dimensions of inter-state systems. The contemporary
world order does not, of course, constitute the only legitimate mode of
inter-state relations. One might argue that a maximally rational system of
inter-state relations is any system in which all participants generally agree
to a single set of rules.9 These rules may well develop over time as different
regimes, perhaps with very different linguistic and cultural backgrounds, are
compelled to find ways to coexist. Prior to the arrival in East Asia of large
numbers of Europeans,10 those East Asian regimes that came into frequent
contact with one another had already developed their own set of arrangements
for inter-state interactions, arrangements that I refer to here as the “East
Asian world order.” Such an understanding differs from Fairbank's original
thesis. First, it does not assume that China had exclusive control over how the
inter-state system developed. Second, it does not consider inter-state dynamics
to have been fixed and unchanging. As is true of the modern world order, the
East Asian world order was a constantly evolving system, developing at the
interface between the political cultures of several coexisting East Asian
states.11 Indeed, as we shall see below, Song foreign relations contained
elements of earlier inter-state dynamics, even as they would also include
important new developments.
How then can one characterize the East Asian world order as it existed
by the beginning of the Song period? In the first place, it was clearly
hierarchical. Not surprisingly, the hierarchy in question generally reflected
the relative political and military might of the various constituent states. It
was made explicit in the language of diplomatic correspondence, in the titles
given to envoys, in the “appointment” edicts sent to the rulers of subordinate
states, in the choice of whose calendar was used in dating documents, and, of
course, in the symbolic tribute offered by smaller states to their larger
neighbors. Because it was largely expressed symbolically, hierarchy did not
preclude pragmatic negotiations between nominally unequal regimes. In fact, in
some sense, it expanded the flexibility of diplomacy, allowing one state to
accept a putative subordination as a concession for some other gain that it
might consider more valuable. In general, it was unusual for any two states to
acknowledge equality, but the Song– Liao example makes it clear that parity was
not impossible. Though tributary states were expected to subordinate themselves
to only one other state, instances of “multiple sovereignty” – whereby one
small regime simultaneously offered tribute to and recognized the suzerainty of
more than one larger neighboring state – were probably quite common.12
In the second place, communication between regimes within the East Asian
inter-state system was generally embodied in formal missives written in
classical Chinese, dispatched to the court of a neighboring state via an
ambassador and his retinue. With no tradition of permanent diplomatic
representation, premodern East Asian regimes relied on traveling embassies for
inter-state communication. Ambassadors were dispatched to neighboring states
bearing “state letters” or other types of diplomatic correspondence,13 along
with a large number of valuable gifts.14 These embassies did not stay abroad
long, returning home soon after delivery of the letter. Thus, there were no
ambassadors based permanently or semi-permanently at foreign capitals. A
variety of additional protocols developed over time, including, for example,
restrictions on the sending of envoys whose given name violated the “taboo”
name of the host country's ruler.15
The Chanyuan Oath seems to have spurred
further developments in this East Asian inter-state system. The oath letters
exchanged between the Song and Liao emperors provided the language used in
subsequent inter-state agreements, notably between the Song and the Jin, and between the Song and the Xia.16 There is also
evidence that, in the century after Chanyuan,
agreements between states were increasingly seen both as contractual in nature
and as built upon an accumulation of precedents. But it was only in the late
eleventh century that the Song central government began insisting upon the
consistent archiving of all past agreements. These archives provided the late Northern
Song government with what one might call “archival authority.” After convincing
its neighbors to accept the principle that countries should abide by past
agreements, the Song regime began to benefit directly from the relative
comprehensiveness of its own archives. Its ability to produce agreements from a
past generation helped it maintain a degree of hegemony on the world stage.
In addition, the large number of embassy missions traveling between Song
and Liao over the course of the eleventh and early twelfth centuries, brought
about the routinization of procedures governing how foreign ambassadors were
accompanied from the border to the capital, how they were received at court,
the seating arrangements at diplomatic banquets, and the type and number of
gifts exchanged.17 One can contrast this routinization with the much more ad
hoc diplomatic ceremonies of earlier times, such as the late eighth-century
oath ceremony between Tibet and Tang China.18
During the same period, several East Asian regimes seemed to move toward
a common model for legitimating rulership, evident in the circulation and
widespread influence of certain specific texts. Although the “Confucian”
classics remained popular throughout East Asia, new works on political
philosophy gained currency in the eleventh century, notably the early
eighth-century Zhenguan zhengyao
(The Essentials of Government of the Zhenguan Era).
Perhaps deemed more practical and up-to-date, this text – which provided advice
on statecraft in the form of dialogues between the early Tang emperor Taizong (r. 626– 49) and his ministers – became influential
at the Khitan, Tangut, Koryō,
Jurchen, and Mongol courts.19
Diplomatic cosmopolitanism
Finally, the Song– Liao border demarcation prompted by the Chanyuan Oath led to a systematization of techniques for
designating inter-state boundaries. Clearly, for the demarcation to be
effective, the frontier had to be marked onto the landscape in a way that was
recognizable by neighboring populations. The fact that a particular combination
of trenches and tumuli was used to indicate both the Song– Liao and the Song–
Xia frontiers suggests that the populations of multiple states had come to
accept and recognize this particular means of territorial demarcation.
How did the eleventh-century multi-state system influence the emerging
Chinese sense of self? In response to this question, most historians of the
period focus on the combined military threat of the Tanguts and the Khitans, which are said to have compelled the Song Chinese
to reimagine their place in the world. But the annals of Chinese history are
filled with instances of great nomadic confederations developing on the
Eurasian steppe, threatening China's existence, and even – on occasion –
invading the Chinese heartland.20 The mere existence of powerful neighbors on
the frontiers, then, is insufficient to explain developments that date
specifically to the eleventh century. Moreover, Northern Song policymakers were
not nearly as concerned about the threat of a northern invasion as has
sometimes been imagined. The impact on Chinese mentalities of the new East
Asian world order of the eleventh century was complex. The military threat from
the north did play a role in forcing Song statesmen to reassess the limits of
imperial power, but so did the formal recognition of a second emperor – the
ruler of Liao – within that world order. Perhaps even more significant, was the
diplomatic “cosmopolitanism” emerging in the era, a cosmopolitanism that
involved both new forms of sociability and new travel experiences to lands
beyond the frontier. This and more we explain in the next part.
Case study about the Qin Empire
1. For images of Huang's map, see Cao Wanru et
al. (eds.), Zhongguo gudai ditu ji, pls. 70– 72; for a study and transcription of the
colophon, see Qian and Yao, “Dili tu bei.”
2. Von Glahn, Country of Streams and Grottoes;
Von Glahn, “Conquest of Hunan”; An Guolou, Songchao zhoubian minzu, 54– 62.
3. Yang Bin, Between Winds and Clouds, chap. 3, paras. 59– 69.
4. J. Anderson, “Treacherous Factions.”
5. Zeng Zaozhuang and Liu Lin (eds.). Quan
Song wen. Shanghai cishu chubanshe,
2006. 38: 24.
6. For more on Song– Xia relations, see Dunnell,
“Hsi Hsia,” esp. 168– 97; P. J. Smith, “Irredentism
as Political Capital”; P. J. Smith, “Crisis in the Literati State”; Lamouroux, “Militaires et bureaucrates”; Li Huarui, Song
Xia guanxi shi.
7. For a good summary of Song– Liao relations up until the Oath of Chanyuan, see Lau and Huang, “Founding and Consolidation of
the Sung Dynasty,” 247– 51, 262– 70.
8. Rossabi (ed.), China Among Equals; Fairbank (ed.), Chinese World
Order.
9. Though such an ideal-type inter-state system is stable in the sense
that all participants agree to the rules, stability did not preclude the
possibility of war. Throughout the late imperial period, Chinese regimes fought
wars with their neighbors to the north and to the south. The violent conquests
of Yunnan, Guizhou, and other parts of the south should not be treated as
“internal” conflicts – as a nationalist might insist – but rather as wars of
conquest against established neighboring polities.
10. The earliest Europeans arriving in East Asia were willing to
integrate into the East Asian inter-state system. Thus, e.g., when the
Portuguese reached Southeast Asia, they agreed to receive the tribute that the
Malaysian sultan had once sent to China. See Santos Alves, “Voix de la prophétie,” 43.
11. On the role of non-Chinese regimes in
defining East Asian diplomatic practices during the Tang, see Skaff, Sui-Tang China; Wang Zhenping,
Tang China in Multi-Polar Asia.
12. For a discussion of “multiple sovereignty” in Southeast Asia, where
it seems to have been a common practice, see Thongchai, Siam Mapped, 81– 94. A
comparison of Tibetan and Chinese chronicles reveals that, already in the
eighth century, the Yunnan-based state of Nanzhao
simultaneously accepted the suzerainty of both the Tang and Tibet (unbeknownst
to the Chinese). See Backus, Nan-chao Kingdom, 40– 45.
13. Franke, “Sung Embassies,” 119– 21. In fact, the term “state letter”
(guoshu or guoxin) was only
used for Song– Liao correspondence; “edict” or “decree” was used in the case of
letters sent to Koryō and the Xia, which were not
treated by the Song as diplomatic equals.
14. Ibid., 130– 31.
15. E.g., the powerful Song minister Sima Guang (1019– 86) could not serve as ambassador to Liao
because his given name coincided with part of the name of the second Liao
emperor, Yelü Deguang. See
QSW 55: 123.
16. Franke, “Sung Embassies,” 119. E.g., the oaths with Liao, Jin, and Xia all included nearly verbatim clauses regarding
the repatriation of cross-border fugitives. See XCB 58.1299; Yuwen Maozhao, Da Jinguo zhi jiaozheng,
37.527– 28; XCB 80.2022.
17. For descriptions of proper ritual protocols for the reception of
envoys and of the choreography of diplomatic visits to the Song and Liao
courts, see SS 119.2804– 10, 328.10565; Li Xinchuan, Jianyan yilai chaoye
zaji, vol. 1, 3.97– 98; Ye Longli,
Qidan guo zhi, 21.200– 03; Zeng Zaozhuang
and Liu Lin (eds.). Quan Song wen. Shanghai cishu chubanshe, 2006 (henceforth QSW) 27: 104– 06; QSW 50: 228–
37.
18. To sanctify the oath, the Tibetans and Chinese had initially agreed
to sacrifice an ox and a horse, respectively. But the Chinese representative
had second thoughts “as Chinese cannot farm without oxen, and Tibetans cannot
travel without horses.” He proposed sacrificing sheep, pigs, and dogs in their
stead. His Tibetan counterpart agreed to the idea, but no pigs were available,
so the diplomats had once more to change plans. Eventually, the Tibetans
settled on a ram, and the Chinese on a sheep and a dog. See Liu Xu et al. Jiu
Tang shu. Beijing: Zhonghua
shuju, 1975.
196b. 5247.
19. Franke and Twitchett, “Introduction,” 33,
34; Franke, “Chinese Historiography,” 20, 21, 22; Bol, “Seeking Common Ground,”
503; Lee, Sourcebook, 1: 273– 74.
20. For a history of sino-steppe encounters
over the longue durée, see Barfield, Perilous Frontier.
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