On 23 March 1947,
standing beneath a huge illuminated map of the continent, Nehru opened the
Asian Relations Conference with the words: 'When the history of our present times
comes to be written, this Conference may well stand out as the landmark which
divides the past of Asia from the future.' From the Levant to China was
represented: there were delegations of Jews and Arabs from Palestine;
commissars from Soviet central Asia; courtiers from the Kingdom of Thailand;
hardened communist guerrillas from Malaya, and polished Kuomintang diplomats.
The greater number of delegates were from the lands of Britain 's imperial
crescent, and the official language of the meeting was English, but the largest
individual contingents were from Southeast Asia. Few of the 200 delegates and
10,000 or so observers were known to each other. Nehru and many other Indian
leaders felt that they had brought Asia to the threshold of a new millennium.1
The closing session
was addressed by Gandhi, who arrived following a tour of Bihar and Bengal,
where he was trying to stem the tide of communal violence. 'He looked',
recalled one witness from Malaya, Philip Hoalim,
'very tired and extremely frail'. The Mahatma was an inspiration, but, in the
words of Abu Hanifah from Sumatra: 'We thought the
idea of turning the other cheek was silly. We had then preferred the ways of
Kemal Ataturk”--the WWI hero of what later came became known as Turkey.2
The regional entity
that was later to emerge, in the shape of the Association of Southeast Asian
Nations in 1967, in fact was much smaller, and next three years Nehru was
plagued with doubts about whether India would survive at all. Lasting well into
coming November 1947, riots and killing continued marked by military precision
and unbelievable sadism: in some cases whole train loads of innocents were
burned alive or disemboweled. In spite of the conspiracy theories that abound
about it; Sir Cyril Radcliffe was dependent on maps and on the evidence given
to him by the local political parties, with all their communal and factional
biases. Whatever he ruled, most Muslims were likely to be outraged and no one
would be entirely satisfied.3
The British boundary
force policing the division ordained by Sir Cyril Radcliffe's commission was
too small and ineffective to make much difference. Also in northeastern India,
members of recently armed and self-aware nationalities such as the Nagas,
Lushai and Chin, sought autonomy and looked with suspicion on the new
nation-states. Local politicians agonized over the fate of what had come to be
called India 's 'Mongolian fringe'.4
Hindu politicians in
Assam felt they had a 'refugee problem' as poor Muslim squatters from eastern
Bengal grew in numbers, allegedly enticed into the province by the local Muslim
League to bolster its case for Assam to be incorporated into East Pakistan.5
Burmese Arakan suffered not only separatist and communist
movements, but also the attempts of Muslim parties to annex their populations
to East Pakistan. Nowhere down the length of the crescent did relinquished or
devolved British authority pass quietly into the hands of homogeneous
nation-states. The divisions of colonial politics were to scarify the region for
two generations. In Bengal people came only slowly to understand the imminence
of partition and even after the event most could not believe that their
homeland had been irrevocably sundered into a crazy geographer's nightmare,
preferring instead to believe that their Hindu or Muslim leaders would see
their error and help to unite the region again. Somewhat surprisingly, support
for this sort of idea came from the leader of the local Muslim-dominated
ministry, H. Suhrawardy. The chief minister, the local Muslim League and allied
politicians were acutely aware that millions of Muslim peasants would suffer if
partition actually came about. They feared, correctly, that any 'East Pakistan'
without Calcutta would be an economic disaster area. The partition agitation,
asserted Suhrawardy, was a move by the 'propertied classes' to serve their own
interests.6
He even managed to
prevail on Jinnah to moderate his demands that Pakistan should include the
whole of Bengal to see whether the unity plan got off the ground. Bose and
Suhrawardy were both to be disappointed. The majority of the middle-class Hindu
politicians opposed any move that would maintain a Muslim preponderance in
Bengal 's politics. Their most vocal leader, Shyama Prasad Mookherjee,
denounced the 'ten year communal raj' that the Muslims were said to have
imposed since the 1935 constitutional reforms. Throughout the early part of
1947 the Hindu middle classes presented petitions and held public meetings to
demand partition. The main Hindu organization, Hindu Mahasabha, the Bengal
Chamber of Commerce, and the vast majority of local associations in which
Hindus predominated pressed for separation. Mookherjee
characterized the Bengali 'paradise to come' promised by Suhrawardy as simply
more of the 'hell that exists in Bengal today', the result, he argued, of the
chief minister's well-documented maladministration and the Muslim League's
'campaign of hatred’.7
Bengal indeed
remained a kind of hell. If the conditions of ordinary people hadnot been so desperate it is possible that the Bengal
assembly might not have voted for partition later in the summer. By now,
though, even the representatives of the poor, low-caste Hindu peasants of the
east of the province who had previously shared interests with the Muslim peasantry
were alarmed and apprehensive. Communist organizers tried to persuade the
peasantry that it was an alliance of bosses, imperialists and landlords who
were fomenting the communal rioting. They had some success in northeast Bengal.
Curfews were regularly imposed on Calcutta and other cities while magistrates
banned groups marching in shirts of 'a certain color', presumably a reference
to the green and saffron hues favored by Muslim and Hindu agitators,
respectively.8
By 1947 probably a
majority of Nagas were Christian, and American Baptist missionaries protected
them against the British civil administration and encouraged them to evolve an
identity as a chosen people of God, distinct from the pagans of the Assam
valley. An excellent account of this can be found in Julian Jacobs with Alan
Macfarlane, Sarah Harrison and Anita Herle, Hill
peoples of northeast India, the Nagas: society, culture and the colonial
Encounter.9
This sense of
separate identity had been strengthened during the war when many of them had
fought against the Japanese on the Allied side. British officers had armed them
and taught them that they were independent people and owed nothing to the
seditious nationalists of the plains. Naga political associations gradually
came into being, some pressing for local autonomy, some for outright
independence. In July 1947, a delegation came to meet the Congress leadership
and seek guarantees for an independent Nagaland. Initially Gandhi seemed to
accept this, stating that Congress wanted no one to be forced into the Indian
Union. But by August the Congress leaders were rattled by the prospect that
riot and secession would fragment the whole subcontinent. Their position
hardened, provoking some Naga leaders to declare their own declaration of independence
on 14 August. In contrast to the wild celebrations elsewhere in India, very few
attended the flag hoisting in Nagaland. The messianic prophetess Gaidiliu, who had led a Naga rebellion against the British
in 1930, remained in prison until 1948 at the behest of the suspicious Indian
authorities.
In the northeast
meanwhile Dacca was designated the capital of East Pakistan. Already tense from
minor communal incidents, the town was sadly lacking in facilities for the
large number of Muslim clerks and officials who were congregating there from
all over Bengal. The residence of the former Nawab of Dacca was commandeered as
Government House while a British army barracks became the secretariat building
and dormitory home for 3,500 disgruntled clerks.
Independence in
Bengal was an even more shambolic affair than it was in Delhi. A few days
before 15 August the Calcutta Corporation renamed three streets in the city centre 'Netaji Subhas Bose Street', souring the occasion
for the British. C. Rajagopalachari, the moderate Madras Congressman who had
been nominated governor of West Bengal, also showed little inclination to
respect British traditions. He entered the splendor of the throne room of
Government House for his swearing-in dressed simply in homespun dhoti and cap.
Perhaps it was just as well. On 15 August a huge crowd waving Congress flags
and shouting 'Jai Hind!' invaded the building, stirred to action, it was
rumored, by Sarat Bose. They swarmed through the
governor's quarters seizing everything from door handles to table ornaments as
mementos. The police removed them only after several hours by throwing tear-gas
canisters into the building. In the meantime, the outgoing governor and his
family beat a hasty and ignominious retreat. As Arthur Dash recalled it,
'someone who recognized him jammed a Gandhi cap on his head and the last
British Governor went out of Government House by a side door so crowned and
with his wife waving the new Dominion (late Congress Party) flag.10
Historian Tapan Raychaudhuri related that out in the district town of
Barishal his father had kept awake throughout the
night of 14 August with a gun in his hand. The disturbances he feared did not
come that night, but they came soon enough.11
On his way to London, Aung
San flew on ahead of the delegation to meet Indian leaders and stayed at
Nehru's house in Delhi between 2 and 6 January. Nehru and Aung San had struck
up a friendship when the RAF 'reds' had flown the Indian leader into Rangoon on
his way to meet Mountbatten. Nehru eulogized Aung San to the Indian press.
Wavell, now in his final weeks as viceroy, invited him to lunch. He was less
complimentary: 'He struck me as a suspicious, ignorant but determined little
tough.'12
This underestimated
Aung San's growing political sophistication. Passing through Karachi, he had
arranged to meet Jinnah. In fact Aung San remained suspicious of British
intentions, replying in a non-committal way to Indian journalists' questions
about whether he would resort to non-violent or armed rebellion should the
London talks fail. He also alluded to the contemporary situation in Indo-China,
where Ho Chi Minh's Vietnamese republic was fighting for its life against
French reaction.13
The end of the war
had revived the Burmese fear of being 'swarmed' by Indian immigrants, as one of
their delegates later put it. At his press conference, Aung San declared that
'Indian vested interests -like any vested interests - are not in favor of
independence.'14
The critical point
during the India-Burma Committee Cabinet meeting on 22 January 1947 in London
according to Kyaw Nyein, was not so much British commercial interests in Burma
as the status of the hill areas. It was no use getting independence unless
these territories and peoples were firmly welded to the new state. Three
generations of British officials, commercial agents and missionaries had sought
to deny it - control over the ethnic minorities. As with the Indian princes,
though not the Indian Muslims, the British simply abandoned their long-term
clients in the face of political reality. Aung San was deeply suspicious of the
British Frontier Service officers and Tom Driberg
increased his alarm by saying that even one British government representative
at Panglong might encourage the more recalcitrant sawbwas
or minority tribal leaders to hold out for too much.15
Economic
disagreements were significant, too, even though they seemed less pressing than
the security issues. The AFPFL wanted a full-blown nationalization plan as any
compromise on this might hand the communists a propaganda victory. The British
cabinet wanted enterprises such as Burmah Oil to
remain private. Apart from the question of profits, ministers noted that Burmah Oil was currently dependent on another British
company, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, for marketing and distribution. The
last thing anyone needed that bitter winter in a shivering and malnourished
Britain and Europe was an interruption of fuel supplies.16
Nationalization was
to remain a contentious issue between the British and the Burmese for several
years. Nationalization was to remain a contentious issue between the British
and the Burmese for several years. Thakin Nu even
complained to Rance that the British were dropping
arms to the Karens as a preliminary to a full-scale
revolt, a rumour that Rance
had explicitly to deny. On 27 January, the British government announced the
successful conclusion of the negotiations for Burmese independence. A smiling
Aung San, accompanied by Attlee and Tin Tut, emerged onto the steps of 10
Downing Street to speak to the world's press. Burma would be independent in
January 1948.17
The night before he
returned to Burma Aung San had met Tom Driberg who
said that it would be best to slay in the Commonwealth, and Aung apparently
answered that he could not persuade his people.18
1. T.A. Keenleyside,
'Nationalist Indian attitudes towards Asia: a troublesome legacy for
post-Independence Indian foreign policy', Pacific Affairs, 55, 2,1982, pp.
210-30.
2. Abu Hanifah, Tales of a revolution: a leader of the Indonesian
revolution looks back, Sydney, 1972, p. 236.
3. Joya Chatterji, 'The fashioning of a frontier: the Radcliffe
line and Bengal 's border landscape, 1947-52', Modern Asian Studies, 33, I
,1999, pp. 185-243.
4. Statesman, Calcutta,
5 May 1947.
5. Statesman, 10 May
1947.
6. Statesman,1 May
1947.
7. Statesman, 2 May
1947.
8. People's Age,
Bombay, 20 April, 18 May 1947.
9. Stuttgart, 1990, pp. 151-70.
10. Dash, Bengal Diary, vol. IX, p. 106, Centre of South Asian Studies, Cambridge.
11. Quoted in Romonthon Atharba Bhimratipraptar paracharit cllarcha, Calcutta, 1993, p.98.
12. Angelene Naw, Aung San and the
struggle for Burmese independence (Copenhagen, 2001), p.186.
13. Dawn, Karachi, 6
January 1947.
14. New York Times, 6
January 1947.
15. Hugh Tinker
(ed.), Burma. The struggle for independence 1944-48, vol.II:
From general strike to independence, 31 August 1946 to 4 January 1948, London,
1984, pp. 271-84.
16. Tinker, Burma, vol. II, pp. 242-3.
17. Naw, Aung San, pp. 188-9.
18. Tom Driberg, Ruling passions, London, 1978, p.217.
For updates
click homepage here