By Eric Vandenbroeck and
co-workers
Japan And The Idea Of
Regionalization
In our previous case study about Turkey I came to the conclusion that Turkey and the same is also
valid for Japan as we will see below) remained ambivalent to the idea of
regionalization in their non-Western neighborhood. And the answer to this
question lies in their historically shaped and domestically contested national
identities, which impose constraints and ambiguity for their current foreign
policy choices.
The lack of a
national consensus in both countries as regards their sense of belonging to a
geographic location has been caused by an incomplete shift of civilizational
identity and ongoing debates over this shift at the domestic level. The shift
was incomplete in two senses: (1) the Westernizing elites never internalized
the West itself, while detaching themselves from a sense of belonging to the
East; (2) such a shift of identity never became a national consensus, as rival
claims to national identity remained dormant and occasionally rose to the level
of power. This duality of national identities has paved the way for a contested
foreign policy orientation, which continues to influence their European
(Turkey) and Asian (Japan) regional integration processes today. And as we have
shown next, history matters for a country's foreign policy, both as a
constraint and as an opportunity. It may limit or expand foreign policy
options. In both countries, national identity became fragmented and contested
by various sub-national identities with distinct readings of national interests
and security and distinct perceptions of 'Others' of national identity. Foreign
policy decisions thus emerge in the context of this contestation among opposing
identities. Accordingly as we will see below, this demands a modification to
account for these divergent perceptions as domestic informants of foreign
policy decision-making processes.
For a country's
foreign policy as in the case of Turkey and Japan, it may limit or expand choices
available to international actors, and can be made for opposing and
occasionally clashing subnational claims to national identity. These identities
are formed both through external and internal experiences of social and
political actors. Hence domestic identity conflicts in forming foreign policy
choices. Contested national identity however, is an outcome of the process of
modernization, which attempted to create a Western identity and its
de-legitimization due to failure to have the West endorse this Western
identity. Yet, on the appearance, Turkey and Japan are two unrelated cases.
They do not appear to have much in common. Japan is the world's second largest
economic power, a member of the G-8, and aspires to become a permanent member
of the United Nations Security Council. Turkey, however, is a regional power
with an economic and military might that is globally only marginally
significant. They are far away from each other with no common history. Japan is
an island nation with a strong historical background of isolation from the
world. Turkey could never isolate itself from the world. Yet these cases bear aremarkably similar geographical position and historical
experiences, leading to comparable foreign policy challenges and reactions.
Nevertheless, first,
Turkey and Japan share a geographical commonality, being on the two extreme
margins of the Asian continent. Despite the fact that Japan, as an island
nation, is geographically more remote to the West, boundaries of geography are
always drawn through historical memory and common identity rather than
objective criteria. Hence Greek Cyprus is considered a part of Europe by
Europeans themselves, but not Turkey or Morocco. Turkey has always been the
Other to the geography in which it is located in proximity. It has been
rejected as part of Europe; it had always been Europe's historical mission
"to drive the Turk out." Unable to cope with the threat posed by the
West starting from the nineteenth century, Ottoman and Republican Turkey opted
for changing its civilizational identity. Resisting the West was possible only
through a process of Westemization. With its process
of Westemization, which required a parallel process
of de-Orientalization and de-Islamization, Turkey
experienced its own "escape from the East. " Japan faced a similar
dilemma during the late Tokugawa period. The Tokugawa era was a period of peace
and prosperity for Japan. It was, however, aware that the Western colonization
was expanding slowly into Asia. Japan was disappointed to observe how its
civilizational model, China, was defeated so dishonorably at the hands of a
remote island nation, namely, the British, in the Opium Wars. Having valued
sheer power, the Chinese model was discarded as an efficient solution to
Japan's security problems if Japan wanted to avoid a similar fate. The Tokugawa
regime initiated the process of Westernization, but its signing of unequal
treaties led to the uprising of the opposing nationalist domains. The fiercely
nationalist samurai from these domains overthrew the dynasty and restored the
emperor to symbolic power on the promise of ''revere' the emperor, expel the
barbarian." They themselves however understood that to do so required an
intense process of modernization, through building a centralized administrative
system based on close study and adaptation of the European, particularly
Prussian, model. Japanese modernization and Westernation
process then was largely a process implemented at the hands of nationalist
elites. This new pro- Western revolutionaries, intellectually inspired by Fukuzawa's call to detach themselves from the
"archaic" China, proved themselves by defeating their old
civilizational model, China, in 1894, and their archenemy, Russia, in 1905.
Japan's victory over
Russia was very much to the envy of the Ottomans. The Ottomans were defeated by
Russians in almost every battle they fought and started to crumble following
the Treaty of Kaynarca signed in 1774 following the
Ottoman Russian War of 1768-1774. The Ottoman Empire was able to sustain its
integrity only to the extent that the European powers allowed it. The defensive modernization dit not help the
empire from dissolving, but its economic implications made it more dependent
on the West. In contrast to the Rising Sun of Japan, the Ottoman crescent was
fading rapidly. The empire's cultural, ethnic, and religious plurality, which
Ottomans were able to maintain for ages through its millet system, was its
greatest vulnerability, based on recognition of cultural and administrative
autonomy of a set of recognized religions. However, by the nineteenth century,
the waves of nationalism swept through the empire, provoking Ottoman millets to
rise up and declare their independence one after the other. The empire was
crumbling rapidly. It was shocking to observe for the young military officers
how heterogeneity and cultural/ethnic plurality created disintegration. The
Ottoman center responsed back to this through
creation of a liberal Ottoman identity, namely, Ottomanism.
It was an identity that would replace diversity of millets with equal rights
and responsibilities to all citizens. Yet it did not work. Particularly,
non-Muslim subjects of the empire continued to rise up for their independence
and gained them with the backing of external powers. The Ottoman elites reacted
to this through Panislamism, which was based on the
premise of Muslim solidarity both within the empire and outside the empire.
Under Abdulhamid II, this ideology was utilized to
undermine the European colonialism in Muslim territories. It was an attempt to
protect internal unity of Muslim subjects. However, the Albanian and later Arab
revolts de-legitimized these claims of Panislamism.
The young officers in the army under the influence of the Young Turk movement
reacted to these developments with the ideology of Turkism. They began to
aspire for the nation-state of the Turks.
As the collapse of
the empire became unavoidable, the British and the French who contained the
Russian expansion of their sphere of interests reversed their policy and
demanded their own share, particularly in the context of the rise of Germany.
The British and the French aspirations came to an agreement when they signed
the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916 to share the remaining Ottoman tenitory in the Middle East without the involvement of
Germans and Russians. The German defeat in the First World War, in addition to
the Russian Revolution of 1917, enabled them to monopolize shares of the
Ottoman territories through the Treaty of Sevres in 1920. The Treaty of Sevres
opened unreparable wounds in Turkish nationalism by
dividing the remaining territories of the Ottoman Empire into several zones of
occupation. While it allowed a small tenitory for
Turkey in central Anatolia, it asked for the establishment of an independent
Kurdistan in southeast Anatolia. The young Ottoman military officers reacted to
this treaty furiously. They organized a popular resistance movement in Anatolia
against the occupation under the commandership of Mustafa Kemal, who fought
previously in Tripoli, the Balkans, and the Dardanelles battles. What came to
be known as the Turkish War of Independence led to the formation of the Turkish
Parliament in 1920 and eventually the Republic of Turkey in 1923.
The new regime was
the result of a military campaign led by professional military bureaucrats, and
this ensured subsequently the position of the military as the guardians of the
regime. The new regime implemented a radical process of secularization
reflecting the positivist views prevalent among the military bureaucracy of the
late Ottoman period. The young generals, like the Meiji samurai in Japan,
embarked upon a process of top-down modernization. They perceived themselves as
leaders who thought on behalf of people what was the best for them. However,
despite the attempt to "modernize" the country through
Westernization, the military bureaucrats were always wary of Western designs to
further disintegrate the country. The military elites personally experienced
how the Ottoman Empire collapsed. The perceived cause for this collapse was the
cultural and religious diversity of the empire, a diversity that could not face
up to the challenge of nationalism. Hence, the new Turkey had to be based on
the idea of one nation, one nationalism. Consequently, Turkey, was established
on the imagined concept of national homogeneity in order to prevent any further
territorial disintegration. This was cultural based nationalism that was
comprehensive of all Muslims who happened to live in Anatolia. Kemalist
nationalism adopted Ziya Gokalp's
nationalism, which was less ethnically than culturally defined. Hence
ironically despite the process of Westernization and de-Islamization, Islam was
at the center of new Turkish citizenship. The founders of the Turkish Republic
were members of the Muslim millet and its nationalists. At the Treaty of
Lausanne in 1923, Turkey rejected recognition of Kurds and other Muslim
communities as minorities, while accepting at the same time recognition of
non-Muslim citizens of Turkey, such as Jews, Armenians, and Greeks, as
minorities. Turkey also agreed to exchange the Greek population in Turkey with
the "Muslim" population in Greece. In a way, Turkey identified itself
as the state for the Ottoman Muslim millet, who were simply called as Turks.
With the later outbreak of the Kurdish issues, this had significant implications for its domestic system and foreign policy.
In comparison to
Turkey, Japan had fewer problems to maintain its domestic political stability.
Many scholars question the accuracy of modem Japan's ethnic or cultural
homogeneity, but Tokugawa Japan was anything but homogeneous. The country was
geographically divided into hostile domains that contrained
mobility of their subjects by banning domestic and foreign travel. The country
was also. socially divided into rigid classes, on top of which were proud
samurai, the warrior class. The Meiji system was created by young nationalist
samurai of rival domains, particularly Satsuma. They were dissappointed
with Tokugawa's inability to dispel foreigners, but having failed to do so
themselves, they turned their face to the West for inspiration about how to be
strong. They concluded that a strong nation was the one that was socially
united, becauseit needed professional armies. In this
sense, Japan shared with Turkey an experience that modernization was a military
necessity. Thus, these elites developed an identity of Westernism against their
domestic opponents and their Eastern neighbors and anti
Westernism against the West itself. The primary challenge for the Meiji Empire was therefore less ethnic than social: it had to carve a unified nation of Japan out of the
old social caste system that placed the samurai class on top of all others.
Yet this task was
relatively easier than the challenge that faced the Ottoman Empire to keep its
ethnically and religiously diverse population loyal to the imperial unity.
Japan succeeded in overcoming its question chiefly through its victories
outside. Unlike Turkey, Japan was a Rising Sun; it was young, dynamic, and
expanding. Through a Western-style liberal imperialism, Japan embarked upon an
expansion in Asia in the name of a civilizational mission. Through its
self-appointed role as the teacher of Asia, Japanese claimed Asia as their geoculturalsphere of interest. Japan's victory in the First
World War gave it the right to participate in laying down the international
system after the war. Yet it failed to have the international system endorse
its empire. It failed to have the West recognize Japan as an equal race, which
meant as equally rightful in colonization and imperial expansion. The Japanese
disappointed and turned their face to panAsian
imperialism. They did not give up their claim to teaching Asia, but this claim
was not formulated as bringing civilization but rather organizing resistance
against the West. Now Japan became the champion of Asian civilization for the
defense of which Asia needed Japan even if it did not know it. In other words,
the Meiji project of decoupling Japan from the China-centered Asian order was a
success. Either through a liberal pro- Western or panAsian
anti- Western imperialism, Japan put itself at the center of civilization, a
claim that was not accepted by other Asians. The Second
World War that was fought in Asia had Japan as allied with Germany and Italy on the one
hand and all other Asians and Western powers on the other.
The Cold War: Identity Politics in the Bipolar
International System
Despite the fact that
Turkey did not fight the war and thus was neither a defeated nor a victorious
power, both Turkey and Japan were in a similar position when the Second World
War ended and the Cold War started. Although Turkey and Japan are unrelated
countries, geopolitically they shared a similar Russian/Soviet threat. In the
Cold War context, they were both locked into an alliance with the United
States. Arguably, Japan used this context to the best of its ability, whereas
Turkey had to give more concessions. Rather than the inexperience of its
diplomacy, this was arguably because of higher credibility of Soviet
expansionary dreams into the Straits and Turkey's eastern borders. Thus, there
was little possibility for Turkey to adapt the Yoshida Doctrine, the doctrine
that allowed Japan to concentrate on its economy by minimizing its military contributions
to the United States. During the Cold War, Turkish foreign policy was
characterized by a strong commitment to the United States. However, there was
still a visible difference between Kemalist foreign policy approach, which was
characterized more by nationalism than by Westernism, and conservative center
right, which enjoyed the support of lslamic cemaat groups but nevertheless followed a more West-centric
foreign policy. In comparison, the center-right leaders Menderes and Demirel were willing to work more closely with the United
States than CHP prime ministers of Ismet and Billent
Ecevit. This was also because of the need for center right to support its
political base with an external legitimacy source. The CHP, a political party
that was established by Atatturk and claimed to
represent his legacy, felt itself more at the center of military-dominated Turkish politics. In contrast, center-right political parties suffered
from constant military interventions, which led to the execution of
democratically elected Prime Minister Adnan Menderes and twice overthrowing
governments of Stlleyman Demirel
by the military. A similar dilemma influenced foreign policy of later
center-right prime ministers such as Turgut Ozal and
currently Tayyip Erdogan.
Thus, what one sees
here is that power struggle among contending national identities at the
domestic level reflects upon their positions on foreign policy. In comparison
to Japan, Turkey has been marked by intense domestic identity debate as well as
richer ethnic diversity, factors that have had significant implications for
foreign policy; Although it was frequently argued that there was little room
for identity to play a role during the Cold War, one can easily see a clash in
Japan as well. The conflict was between Yoshida Shigeru and Kishi
Nobusuke, which later extended into a conflict
between the Yoshida School and the Kishi School. The
conflict was not on whether the alliance with the United States was necessary.
In this regard, Yoshida and Kishi agreed. The
conflict was rather to what orientation this alliance could be utilized.
Yoshida utilized very tactfully the alliance with the United States as an
opportunity to minimize Japan's military commitment. He embraced the initial
American policies of disarmament and purging of the old elites, most notably Kishi. Reportedly Yoshida opposed Kishi's
de-purging later. Japan had to concentrate on economic development. Because
rearmament was not only costly but also risky to worsen relations with Asia.
History was in the mind of Yoshida, and he liked the idea of using history as a
pretext to convince Americans that Japan could not militarize. Americans liked
Yoshida and other liberals of the 1920s and early 1930s during the initial
stages of occupation.
However, it soon
became clear to the United States that Japan was not the enemy to tackle.
Yesterday's friend became today's enemy, and the United Stated entered into a
conflict of influence in the Pacific with the Soviet Union. Having lost the
conflict over China. The United States needed Japan badly. The liberals were
too good to be equivalents of Japan's McCarty. They needed to bring in more
genuine anticommunists: the old guards of the imperial Japan who fought the war
against the United States. They were ideologically more fanatically
anticommunist than the Americans. Americans reversed their policies and
de-purged a number of key politicians, including Kishi
Nobusuke. Kishi was an astute
politician. He escaped legal repercussions after the Second World War to work
with the United States. Soon after released from prison, he became a friend of
the United States, indeed their most trustable friend. Kishi
renegotiated the terms of the San Francisco Treaty, terms of which reflected
early American calculations. Japanese public opinion reacted strongly to his
authoritarian and militaristic tendencies and eventually forced him to resign.
Subsequently it was the Yoshida Doctrine that shaped Japanese foreign policy
orientation during much of the Cold War. However, Kishi
established an enduring presence and influence in Japanese politics through his
faction in the Liberal Democratic Party. Unlike Yoshida, Kishi
wanted to utilize alliance with the United States to bring Japan back to its
former status as an empire. His followers in politics trom
Nakasone to Mori and Koizumi wanted to do the same. Although they lost the
battle to the Yoshida School during much of the Cold War, when the Yoshida
Doctrine became Japan's grand consensus, it was clear that the doctrine could
not hold by the end of the Cold War. The first person to recognize this was
Nakasone in the 1980s. Nakasone recognized that although the Yoshida Doctrine
helped Japan to develop economically, Japan came to a point when it needed more
identity than money. His solution was the restoration of Japanese pride in
history and culture. For this aim, he made a controversial visit to the
Yasukuni Shrine. He desired to establish Japan as an
international power through
increased militarization and internationalization.
At the end, Nakasone
did not bring substantial change in policy. He backtracked his Yasukuni Shrine
policies, never repeating the visits again. He could not convince other LDP
politicians to increase spending cap of more than 1 percent of the GDP.
However, he understood that Japan needed an identity for the post-Cold War
period, and the Yoshida Doctrine could no longer serve this function.
The Quest for Identity after the Cold War
The end of the Cold
War removed on Turkey the pressure of the fear of Soviet expansionism.
Meanwhile, the fall of the Soviet system in Central Asia, the Caucasia, and the
Balkans significantly brought the Kemalist model of national homogeneity under
question. Particularly, the Bosnian War of 1992 reminded Turkey of its Ottoman
origins, putting its long sense of isolation trom
history in question. The Kurdish refugee problem in the aftermath of the Gulf
War was also a significant reminder of ethnic issues surrounding Turkey. The
image of Turkey as an isolated, monolithic, and homogeneous nation was being
shattered. These events, coupled by domestic crisis following unexpected death
of Turgut Ozal in 1993, provided a fertile ground for
the rise of challengers to Kemalist identity, most specifically political
Islamism. In the 1995 general elections, the Islamically leaning Welfare Party
emerged as the first. After a year of political maneuvering by the political
establishment, the party leader, Necmettin Erbakan, became Turkey's first Islamistprime minister in a coalition government. After a year long initial toleration, the secularist
establishment's reaction to this development came in the form of a soft
military/bureaucratic coup, which came to be known as the 28th February
process, ousting Erbakan from power and leading to a period of political instability.
In Japan, the Gulf
War was also a significant point. Despite the fact that Japan covered an enormous sum
of the war cost, it failed to win ''the respect" of not only the United
States but arguably equally important, oil-rich Arab regimes. The Yoshida
Doctrine shaped Japan's policy during the Gulf War. Yet the nationalist
opponents within the LDP utilized this opportunity to strike against the
liberals and come back from behind the shadow of the Cold War. However, the LDP
itself was losing its political control due to repeated corruption scandals. In
1993, in an unprecedented event, the LDP lost the general elections. A
coalition government formed, comprising smaller parties, including the Japan
Socialist Party (JSP) and the conservative Liberal Party headed by former LDp-member Ozawa Ichire. The
coalition did not survive more than a year. Ozawa's insistence for a assertive foreign policy met the resistence
of the socialists, Ozawa asked for a stronger political and military role for
Japan, and the socialists demanded a minimal one. When the JSP decided to scrap
the deal and turn to the LDP for a coalition, the first and the last non-LDP
government collapsed in 1994. In the same year, the LDP returned to power as
the junior partner in a coalition government under a deal that made JSP leader
Murayama prime minister. Socialists utilized this opportunity to implement
their "German way" policy orientation, namely, Japan assuming
responsibility for its past imperial policies.
This period again is
a good case to analyze how different views of history and identity influence
foreign policy debates and decisions. Socialists pressed for a parliamentary
apology but failed to gain what they wanted in terms of actual text, due to
pressure from nationalists in the LDP. In 1996, the LDP returned to power as
the senior coalition partner, assuming the post of prime minister. Hashimoto
Ryutaro, a student of the Yoshida School, was Japan's prime minister.
Hashimoto's short tenure as prime minister was largely due to domestic
scandals. However, it was also the case that the Yoshida School, came under
increasing questioning from more nationalist elements within the LDP. Intra-LDP
foreign policy debates focused on whether Japan reasserts itself as a political actor in world affairs.
Two significant
developments signify the rise of identity politics in Turkey and Japan: the
coming to power of the AKP and its leader Erdogan in Turkey and the rise of
nationalists, including Koizumi and Abe, in Japanese politics. The AKP's
landslide victory in the 2002 general elections was significant in regard to
the fact that it was the first political party with Islamist roots capturing
the center of Turkish politics. Yet Turkey has experienced many times -in
recent history how similarly popular political parties melt away because of
pressures from these powerful sources. Cognizant of this fact, the AKP has
attempted to build strong coalitions with international powers. In other words,
identity politics in domestic politics influenced foreign policy positions of
these actors and forced them to. shift their perceptions of the international
system. In this regard, the AKP's pro-European outlook and its desire to
maintain close relations with the United States was an outcome of domestic
identity conflicts. However, it would be mistaken to consider AKP's position in
foreign policy simply as tactical. The party also reflects its increasingly
better educated and globally mobile social forces such as the rise of
Anatolian-based business groups. These social groups are increasingly more
exposed to and demand participation in relations with the outside world, in the
form of educational and business opportunities. In an ironic way, then, what
one sees in Turkey is a process of Islamization of politics by means of
participation of practicing young Muslim elite who seek close integration with
the outside world. In contrast to increasingly closed-minded and nationalist
attitudes of the secularist establishment, these Muslims consider globalization
as an opportunity-expanding process and demand better use of it. One important
difference between Japan and Turkey is that Japan's national identity conflict
takes place primarily within the political establishment rather than between
the political center and the periphery.
In Turkey, the
political establishment has faced numerous challenges ftom
the periphery in the form of electoral victories by conservative political
parties. Since the 1950's when Turkey held its first democratic elections,
there has been an intense conflict between the conservative political parties
that dominated electoral politics and the political center who resisted
challenges to its hegemony through militaristic measures. The Japanese
political elite, however, have remained unchallenged since the 1868 Meiji
restoration. With minor exceptions, members of a few large families have ruled
Japan since then. In the absence of a conflict between the center and the
periphery, Japanese identity conflict is primarily shaped by differences over
foreign policy orientation. With the increasing ascendancy of nationalists in
Japanese politics, Japan indicated its willingness to question its
traditionally pacifist foreign policy orientation. The former Prime Minister
Koizumi moved to position Japan away from the Yoshida Doctrine more decisively
than ever. Koizumi asserted his foreign policy outlook through increasing
Japan's participation in international conflicts such as the Afghan War and the
Iraq War, in addition to paying controversial visits to the Yasukuni Shrine.
There are some important points of difference as regards Japanese and Turkish
identity politics. Despite the criticism of these visits from liberal circles
in Japan because they violate the principle of secularism, Koizumi was not
regarded. as a religious fundamentalist. Unlike Turkey, the debate in Japan is
not centered on the role of religion per se. It is rather on the role of Japan
in international politics. Members of the younger LDP leadership generation
desire to return a normal power status, meaning combining Japan's economic
power with a parallel military power and influence. They believe that they can
do so only by getting rid of the guilt of history. Thus, in Japan history
rather than religion is at the center of debate. Second, Koizumi did not
represent a challenge to the center of the political establishment in Japan.
Despite. the fact that the Yoshida School is particularly strong among Japanese
bureaucrats, Koizumi represented continuity with the political system predating
Second World War rather than representing a break from it. To a great extent,
Japan's difference from Germany stemmed from the fact that the system was
largely kept intact after the war. Despite the rise to hegemonic status of the
Yoshida Doctrine, Kishi and his students had a strong
influence in Japanese politics. With the election of Abe Shinzo to replace
Koizumi in September 2006 as LDP president and Japan's prime minister, the
nationalistic fonner Mori faction had three prime
ministers in row which would correspond to the first decade of the twenty-first
century by the end of Abe's term. This allows me to conclude that the return of
the Kishi line to power has been largely
consolidated.
The twin rewards of
autonomy and prestige are
within Japan's grasp for the first time in living memory. To reduce
associated risks, Japan will be cautious. It will be normal. It will hedge. The
security strategy and institutions abetting this hedge will be neither too hard
nor too soft.
The Western
orientation of Japanese foreign policy thus was established for Japan by the
Meiji Westernization, symbolized by Fukuzawa Yukichi's call to break away from Asia. The national LDP
faction that Koizumi and Abe represent reflects the influence of this
mentality. They have resisted liberals at home who demanded closer integration
with the East. In contrast, they maintained the old tradition of seeking
cooperation with the West (the United States) against the East (North Korea and
China). Japan's controversial participation in the Iraq War was a price for
this policy; yet, it has not led to any real gain for Japan in regard to its corifrontation with North Korea. With the further rise of China to a hegemonic position in Asia and globally,
Japan faces a dilemma of
either "subjugating" itself to China and Chinese demands or
continuing to resist the Chinese hegemony through external support. The first
option appears to be out of question given the rise of nationalists to power.
However, the difficulty of sustaining the second position depends on the
availability of an outsider support for Japan's regional ambitions. Throughout
the twentieth century, there was always an outsider power for Japan to build
alliance with. However, with the rise of China as a world power, this may be
more complicated. The liberals in Japan argue for a re-Asianization
of Japan by means of self-questioning of national identity and history. They
may gain power in the future to the extent to change Japan's policy
orientation. Yet as long as the LDP continues to be the hegemonic party in
Japanese politics, it will not steer Japan away from its traditionally
Western-centric orientation. Hence, Japan will continue to tackle this dilemma.
Similarly, the course for Turkey was established by a century of Westernization
with strong domestic institutions and institutionalized integration within the
West through NATO and the EU. The AKP's further Westernization of Turkey
through the process of EU membership appears as a confirmation of the country's
long established foreign policy tradition. Yet the AKP has modified the traditional
Kemalist view of Westernization and reformulated it as a meeting of two
civilizations by asserting Turkey's civilizational authenticity. The AKP also fmds itself in need of building coalitions against its
domestic identity rivals or at least neutralizing their influence. In this
regard, the only tangible and reliable powers and source oflegitimacy
were the Western powers rather than the Islamic neighbors in the East, who
themselves were under influence of the West.
Despite the rise of
Islamism, or perhaps because of it, the Western foreign policy orientation of
Turkey continues. What appeared to be the case in Turkey at the start of 2007,
is that Islamism cannot be the challenge to this orientation because of the Islamist
need and demand for international (Western) legitimacy as well as because of
the rapid globalization of the Islamic social and business interests.
Interestingly the only strong opposition to the Euprocess
appears to come from the Kemalist movement which ironically used to claim
the ideological monopoly of modernization and Westernization in the country.Anti-Western nationalist movement led by the
Kemalist intellectual and political establishment is gaining strength in the
context of the increasingly more apparent European rejection of Turkey.
However, this issue is more complicated for them than it appears the end
of the EU membership process with an outcome less than full membership. Hence Kemalists nationalists are likely to lose
their prestige and power as a result of a failure to obtain full membership in
the EC. In the same token, the Islamist discourse is poised to gain from such
an outcome despite the AKP's sincere and genuine efforts to enter the EU. Hence
the AKP or any other party representing that line of politics is in a position
to gain both from the success and failure of the process depending on the
tactical abilities of its leadership.
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