By
Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers
The
Manchurian Incident
While for some, the Munich Agreement signaled
the beginning of the Second World War, challenging this standard road to war,
however, one has to go back to the contentious issue of war
guilt, which became divisive and passionately debated as soon as the war had broken out, it
was the "stab in the back" (that Germany didn't lose the
First World War) myth hence the Germans who had signed the Armistice
on 11 November 1918 were stipulated as "November criminals." Today most historians
agree the stab-in-the-back legend contributed to the rise of
National Socialism. We should add that this belief led to Hitler's push
for rearmament and the
revision of Germany's borders parallel with the Manchurian
Incident, a situation aggravated by the empire's invasion of China in 1937
and then brought to a breaking point in 1941 by Japan's advance into southern
Indochina must now be understood as a global event since the Asian and
Pacific theatres were as important as the European ones and possibly more so in
their consequences.
'… in the act of outrageous violence, Chinese soldiers
blew up a section of the Mantetsu track located to
the northwest of Beitaying [military base] and
attacked our railway guards. Our guards immediately returned fire and mobilized
artillery to shell Beitaying. Our forces now occupy a
section of the base …' Asahi, Osaka, 19 September 1931.1
This front-page article in the popular daily newspaper
Asahi presented the Japanese public with an account of Chinese perfidy that
became embedded in Japanese popular perception of who was to blame for the
onset of the subsequent Japanese invasion and occupation of the whole northern
Chinese province of Manchuria. It was a travesty of the truth. A group of
Japanese engineers from the Kwantung Army, stationed in Manchuria to protect
the empire's economic interests in the region, planted the explosives early on
the morning of 18 September 1931 as a flimsy excuse to begin a program of
military expansion into China that was not to end until 1945. It was a minor
incident in global terms, but its ramifications were much more significant. It
was the point in the depths of the world economic crisis when the first step
was taken to create a new imperial and economic order by violence. The shots at
the Beitaying base signaled the onset of what was to
become in the 1930s new imperial age.
The mastermind of the Manchurian Incident is
usually accepted to have been Kanji Ishiwara
(石原 莞爾,1889
–1949) picture below:
The circumstances of what the Japanese government came
to term the 'Manchurian Incident' were shaped by the broader global crisis and
the desperate efforts in Japan to find some solution to mounting poverty and
economic isolation. The Kwantung Army, which took its name from the Japanese
concession area on the Chinese Manchurian coast, known as the Kwantung Leased
Territory, had been plotting to extend the Japanese Empire into mainland China
for some years. Provoked by the scale of the economic crisis and mindful of the
persistent threat of Chinese nationalism, the army commanders finally decided
to act independently of Tokyo. After Japanese soldiers had themselves blown up
the short section of the Japanese-owned South Manchurian Railway (Mantetsu), they stormed the local Chinese garrison in the
port of Mukden. They captured the rest of the town and, in a carefully planned
assault, fanned out from the Leased Territory, first seizing the areas around
the leading rail network, then driving the 330,000 ill-equipped forces of the
local Chinese warlord, Zhang Xueliang, out of the
southern and central regions of Manchuria, completing the occupation of the
province by early 1932. The army deployed 150,000 men, and for the loss of
around 3,000 dead, conquered an area almost the size of Europe. Despite the
flagrant breach of discipline, the Japanese Showā
emperor, Hirohito, approved the action two days later. Almost overnight, the
Japanese Empire was transformed in size and wealth.2
The 'Manchurian Incident' did not directly cause the
world war that broke out eight years later. Still, it inaugurated a decade of
imperial expansion from the pre-1914 world and imperial settlement at the end
of the Great War. None of the three states that eventually defined the new
imperialism began with a definite plan or blueprint for expansion. Each acted
opportunistically in established spheres of interest. They observed each
other's achievements closely and drew courage from their successes. Even though
leaders in all three states hoped a more general war might be avoided for the
moment while their imperial projects were completed, the instabilities provoked
by these three separate programs fuelled the drive to
the global conflict that opened up between 1939 and 1941.
Territory control
The critical factor for Japan, Italy, and Germany was
a territory. Control over a domain, exercised in various formal and informal
ways, lay at the heart of the empire. The model for 'territoriality' was the
forty years of violent territorial expansion and pacification that preceded the
1930s and were still going on. In this more extended context, the decisions
taken in Tokyo, Rome, or Berlin to wage their local wars of aggression make
historical sense. The discourses of 'race and space' that had supported empire
since the late nineteenth century had lost none of their explanatory force for
the generation that came to power in the 1930s. Though this form of imperialism
appears anachronistic, even delusional, the paradigm of empire seemed familiar
and near. The results of the redistribution of territory in 1919–23, or the
consequences of the economic catastrophe after 1929, only strengthened rather
than weakened the belief that seizing more territory and resources was an
indispensable means to save the nation.
Japanese, Italian and German leaders were by no means
the only ones to believe that the era of the empire was not yet over, despite
all the evidence that nationalist ambitions, rising economic costs, and
persistent insecurity marked the gradual decay of the global imperial project.
Rather than drawing the obvious lesson that traditional imperialism was a fading
enterprise, they argued that what they needed was more of it, marked with their
particular character. The other factors usually emphasized in analyzing the
origins of the Second World War – the arms race, diplomatic crises, ideological
conflict – were effects of the new wave of empire-building, not causes. The
major states in the League of Nations might, perhaps
with reluctance, have lived with ideological difference or increases in
military spending if that was all that divided them; the factor that the major
imperial states could not accept was that the new wave of empire-building, in
its raw territorial sense, was now incompatible with their view of empire and
the new language of internationalism they had woven around it.
The central question is why, given all the evident
drawbacks to possessing empire, the substantial security risks involved and the
growing strength of nationalist sentiment, did these three states decide on
'territoriality' as the principle underlying their challenge to the existing
order in the 1930s? These decisions seem all the more remarkable because,
unlike the wars before 1914 in which territory could be conquered through
large-scale conflict without outside intervention – the South African War or
the Italian–Turkish War are good examples – the objects of imperial aggression
in the 1930s were all sovereign states and members of the League of Nations,
protected, at least on paper, by the principle of collective security. There is
no simple answer to this question, and the exact circumstances differed between
the three regional zones. Still, there are nonetheless striking similarities in
the justifications and explanations given for control over different
territories. It might be added that the generation that grew to political and
military leadership in the 1930s was a generation that grew up with the world
of imperial fantasies, surrounded by a culture that played up the superiority
of modernizing and 'advanced' states as leaders in the march of civilization
against the less developed or primitive peoples they conquered, a generation
that was profoundly affected by the experience of wars and the violent
assertion of modern nationhood. Empire, claimed the Italian Fascist leader
Giuseppe Bottai, briefly, governor in 1936 of the
Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa, had 'worked this desire in me to live war in the
depth of my consciousness. Twenty years or more of my life inside the war.
3
The starting point in explaining the pursuit of
territorial empire is, paradoxically, the nation. In all three states, the goal
of the empire was bound up to achieve national autonomy, which meant in effect
releasing the country from a situation in which its development seemed limited
or framed by the existing international order – 'Great power intervention and
oppression' as one Japanese pamphlet put it.4 Japanese nationalists, a Mantetsu official explained, saw Manchuria as 'a
lifeline...from which it is impossible to retreat if the nation expects to
exist'.5 These forms of what has been called 'catastrophic nationalism'
anticipated the possible extinction of national self-expression and called for
the urgent reassertion of the national mission.6 Mussolini regularly invoked
the idea that Italy's development was strangled by the string of British
possessions in the Mediterranean that allowed Britain 'to encircle, to imprison
Italy’.7 Asserting national interest was regarded as a necessity to protect the
home population by guaranteeing its economic future and its demographic
development, as well as supplying a more secure sense of national identity as
one of the major nation-empires, rather than a subordinate power. 'We want an
empire,' Hermann Göring told an English acquaintance
in 1937 when discussing what was inhibiting Germany's national future.8
In each case, nationalist discourse described the
nation as unique, destined to dominate and lead the region around it. 'One
nation in Europe must assert its authority over the others,' wrote the German
political commentator Wilhelm Stapel. 'Only the
German nation can be the agent of that new imperialism.' 9 In turn, the
national population was supposed to prove itself worthy to participate in the
nation's regeneration. 'We are becoming, and we will become,' declared
Mussolini in 1933, 'ever more a military nation.' 10 In Germany, the 'national
reawakening' in 1933, with the National Socialist revolution, was bound up with
the idea that the national body could now assert its true strength, uncorrupted
by the alleged internationalist and cosmopolitan threats from Jews, Marxists,
and liberals, which might have turned Germany, so Hitler had feared, into a
'second Switzerland.' 11 In Japan, where the military leadership came to
dominate national politics from 1931 onwards, a widespread campaign to raise
national awareness and enthusiasm for territorial expansion was inaugurated –
the 'national defense' campaign – which played on the themes of national honor
and sacrifices for the nation. Criticism of the new direction was stifled, as
it was in Italy and Germany, by the secret police and the censor. As in Europe,
the pursuit of national autonomy justified the new imperialism, creating a bond
between the state and people in constructing a new order.12 Empire was seen as
an essential signal of national virility and racial value and an arena where
conventional moral norms could be set aside, as they had been in the nineteenth
century.
The second factor was more practical. The new
imperialism was bound up with broader economic ambitions. Empire-building was
designed to transcend the limitations imposed by the existing global financial
and territorial structures by acquiring additional 'living space' to cope with
population pressure and land shortages, securing access to resources of raw
materials and food, and establishing an economic bloc where trade and
investment would be controlled by the imperial center rather than the business
community. The three states shared a growing commitment to state planning and
hostility to the Western model of liberal capitalism and the Western values
that sustained it. Capitalism, Hitler told an early party rally, 'has to become
the servant of the state and not its master'; a 'people's economy' served the
community rather than international business interests.13 Economic imperialism
also had to suit the needs of the people. The lure of economic advantage was
evident in all three cases.
For Italy, the conquest of Libya and Ethiopia was
supposed to create new agricultural land for between 1.5 and 6.5 million
Italian peasants, who could settle in the empire rather than migrate to the New
World. Albania, annexed in 1939, was allegedly so underpopulated that it could
absorb 2 million Italians.14 Here was lo spazio vitale (living space), a term common in Italy. Ethiopia was
presented as a land of golden opportunity, an Eldorado teeming with untapped
mineral resources. 15 Japanese aspirations to control Manchuria were rooted in
the hope that at least 5 million poverty-stricken Japanese peasants could be
settled there by the 1950s. At the same time, Manchuria's rich industrial and
raw material resources were regarded as essential to Japan's future in a world
where the development of trade and access to raw materials seemed dangerously
insecure. Between 1926 and 1931, some 90 percent of Japanese overseas
investment went into Manchurian projects. Without secure control of these
assets, so it was argued, Japan could not continue to modernize.
The German case was no different. Here ideas about
securing further Lebensraum, central to Hitler's view of German development,
had wide currency once Germany's economic setbacks in the 1920s and 1930s were
blamed on an absence of adequate resources and secure access to markets.
Widespread propaganda about other European empires highlighted the vast
disparities between the size of the motherland and the overall area of the
empire – France enlarged by a factor of 22, the Netherlands by a factor of 60,
Belgium by a factor of 80. The territory of the British Empire was calculated
to be 105 times larger than the home islands. On the other hand, after the loss
of national and colonial territory in 1919, Germany was smaller than it had once
been.17 To create and dominate a Central and Eastern European economic bloc,
with controlled trade and self-sufficiency in critical resources and food,
became a central plank of the Hitler regime's economic policy but was a view
widely shared in Germany. 'Economic space [Raum],' Göring claimed in the same 1937 conversation, 'must
simultaneously be our political space.' 18 Hitler himself had a crudely
economic view of empire. Reflecting on British imperialism in 1928 in his
(unpublished) second book, he concluded that for all the rhetoric of exporting
culture and civilization, 'England needed markets and sources of raw materials
for its goods. And it secured these markets through power-political means.' In
the end, national prosperity meant conquest, securing 'the bread of freedom
from the hardship of war. '19
The third factor was the opportunity. The hesitations
and frustrations of the 1920s gave way to a new sense that the crisis of the
post-war order in the 1930s might make it possible to act autonomously in
building a new order, with only a limited risk of provoking a more significant
crisis. These calculations were critical in explaining the timing of the new
wave of imperialism. The failure of the international community to cope with
the effects of the global recession accelerated the drift towards national
solutions to the crisis and a breakdown of collaboration, expressed most
clearly in the failed World Economic Conference in London in June 1933.20 A
consequence of the global crisis was the unwillingness of the major League
states to run risks at a time when they could ill afford the cost of
international policing. The failure of the League to do more than censure Japan
for its occupation of Manchuria was interpreted as a clear message that the
system of collective security did not work when dealing with major League
members. Japanese leaders later boasted that Japan had been 'the herald of the
downfall of the League of Nations,' without whose initiative at exposing the
'incapacity and worthlessness' of the League, Germany and Italy might not have
had the opportunity to pursue their aggressive policies.21 It was confirmed
that the invasion of Ethiopia, which followed four years later, was also not
opposed forcefully, nor was Germany's violation of the Versailles settlement
when rearmament was publicly announced in 1935 or in March 1936 when the
Rhineland frontier zone was remilitarized. Each successful step invited the
belief that Britain and France, as the major empires and League states, would
not obstruct the path to further empire-building. 'We think that Geneva's just
a collection of old women,' an Italian journalist told a British colleague in
Addis Ababa in 1936; 'we all think so, and we have always thought so.' 22 All
three states left the League: Japan in March 1933, Germany in September 1933,
and Italy in December 1937.
The other failure of Britain and France to prevent
German and Italian armed support for General Francisco Franco's nationalist
revolt in Spain between 1936 and 1939, or to oppose the German occupation of
Austria in 1938, or Germany's break up of Czechoslovakia in the same year,
strengthened this conviction, and, above all, persuaded Hitler that Britain and
France would make 'extremely theatrical gestures' about a German invasion of
Poland, but would once again not intervene militarily.23 For all three states,
the critical thing was to act before either the Soviet Union or the United
States were able or willing to play a more significant part in world affairs.
Japan and Germany were well aware that the Soviet Union, building up an
important industrial and military presence in the 1930s under the Five-Year
Plans, was a potential danger to any future imperialism. One of the factors
governing the occupation of Manchuria, despite the long common frontier with
the Soviet Union that resulted, was the need to provide a solid defense against
any risk of a Soviet move against the Japanese Empire and safeguard its
strategic resources.24 Hitler, in the one major strategic document that he penned
during his dictatorship, the so-called Four-Year Plan memorandum, drafted in
August 1936, highlighted the Red Army's threat in fifteen years and the need
for Germany to solve problems of living space well before that.25 The United
States was something of an unknown quantity. Forced back into relative
isolation by the catastrophic effects of the economic depression and reliant
chiefly on its navy for hemisphere defense, it was clear that it posed only a
future threat – but a threat nonetheless. Throughout, the United States
maintained a critical stance towards imperialism of all kinds, even if the
American public was not yet willing to embrace the idea of armed intervention
to prevent it.26 For the imperial world, both old and new, the shadows of Lenin
and Wilson stalked their ambitions: empire had to be built sooner rather than
later.
The sense that building a new order around a renewed
wave of territorial imperialism was possible did not make the decisions to do
so easy. The background to the seizure of Manchuria, or the invasion of
Ethiopia, or the attacks of Czechoslovakia
and Poland, reveals a good deal of hesitation and circumspection on the
part of the political leadership in all three countries, despite the later
post-war view that they formed part of a grand plan to dominate the globe.
Whether they liked it or not, there was still an element of 'permission' needed
from the major League powers. Mussolini finally overcame the anxieties of his
military commanders and some of his Fascist colleagues about invading Ethiopia
by arguing that he had secured, wrongly as it turned out, a verbal agreement
from France and Britain that they would not obstruct him. Before the occupation
of Albania, he dithered over what the other powers might do (though, in this
case, the League registered Albanian protest for the record and did nothing at
all).27 The German occupation of the German-speaking areas of Czechoslovakia
after the Munich Agreement of 30
September 1938 is usually seen as a triumph for Hitler's bullying diplomacy.
Still, it left the German dictator fuming that he had been denied his short war
against the Czechs on the insistence of the Western powers. Before the war
against Poland a year later, he insisted to his entourage that there would be
no second Munich.28
One of the reasons for caution was the much higher visibility
of imperial conflicts by the 1930s, including those in the established empires.
This was thanks principally to the development of modern media – worldwide
newspaper reporting, famous newsreels, and radio – but also to the work of the
League of Nations, which, for all its alleged timidity, gave a public platform
to debate violations of national sovereignty, including very public discussion
of Japan's illegitimate seizure of Manchuria and Mussolini's attack on
Ethiopia.29 International debate forced the aggressors to justify their actions
in all three cases by claiming speciously that invasion was carried out to
protect their interests against failed states. In the League debate over
Manchuria, the Japanese delegation insisted that China was a' fiction' as a
'single organized state. They also indicated that Manchuria was not a colony in
any formal sense but had been set up as an 'independent state of Manchukuo,
under the deposed Manchu Emperor Puyi.30 Mussolini justified the assault on
Ethiopia because the country was nothing more than 'a conglomeration of
barbarous tribes', a 'non-state. '31 Hitler justified extending a German
protectorate over the Czech lands of Bohemia and Moravia because the national
state had ceased to function effectively, even though Czechoslovakia was in
every sense a modern European nation rather than a potential colony. In this
case, too, the 'protectorate,' a term long associated with European imperialism
as a way to disguise actual control, was presented as if it enjoyed some
because32 War against Poland was announced by Hitler on the morning of 1
September 1939 with the assertion that the Poles, too, were not a
state-building people, and that without German rule 'the worst barbarism would
prevail,' unconsciously echoing Mussolini's condemnation of the Ethiopians in
1935.33
Caution was dictated by international circumstances
and the problems of developing any consensus among the political and military
elites at home about future policy. This was the case in Japan, where domestic
politics was shaped by conflict between civilian political parties and the
military, between the army and the navy, and between factions within the
military itself. When army commanders in the Kwantung peninsula launched the
invasion in September 1931, they did so in defiance of the civilian government.
The subsequent stand-off between the army and the politicians brought the
resignation of the Minseitō cabinet and a virtual end
to civilian supervision of the army's imperialism, but army factionalism persisted
until the mid-1930s.34 Arguments between the navy and the army hinged around
the competing claims of the northern or southern advance: the navy wanted to
prioritize defense in the Pacific and a possible seizure of the resource-rich
European colonies in South East Asia, which was to prove a disastrous choice;
the army looked north to the Soviet threat and wanted to consolidate its
continental strategy in northern China first, by building a strong,
self-sufficient industrial and trading bloc to make possible the further
expansion of Japanese military power and to defend the empire. These arguments
were suspended rather than resolved with the publication on 7 August 1936 of
the 'Fundamentals of National Policy' that endorsed both a strong empire-defense
on the Asian continent and naval preparation for extending the empire
southwards.35
Whatever the arguments for strategic caution, Japanese
expansion into mainland China continued remorselessly throughout the 1930s. The
Manchurian invasion proved impossible to reverse and, indeed, became the
springboard for further Japanese territorial aggression, partly to stabilize
the frontier with Nationalist China, partly to secure additional resources and
communication hubs, and partly because the Japanese army and its political
supporters in Tokyo developed an unanticipated appetite for further empire. The
spread of Japanese territorial control never attracted the same international
attention in the 1930s as Manchuria had done (or the attention of many
modern-day historians). On 17 February 1933, 20,000 troops invaded and occupied
Rehe province, south of Manchuria and Inner Mongolia.
The invasion brought the Kwantung Army within striking distance of the Chinese
capital, Beijing. From March to May 1933, the army fought the 'Great Wall'
campaign, seizing more territory south as far as the Great Wall and occupying
the Chinese city of Tanggu, which subsequently became
a major Japanese-controlled port, the largest in China. In 1935 Japanese forces
moved on into other Inner Mongolian provinces, and in June, forced an agreement
on the local Chinese commander to vacate Hebei province, the area surrounding
Beijing. Occupation of more of Inner Mongolia allowed the Japanese to sponsor a
second 'independent' state of Mengkukuo, a Mongol
homeland ruled nominally by Prince Demchugdongrub but
dominated, like Manchukuo, by the Japanese army. In January 1936, the Tokyo
government finally approved a strategy to establish control over northern
China. The army could cut Chinese nationalist forces off entirely from the most
prosperous regions of China and be the primary source of Chinese revenues.
Within four years of the seizure of Manchuria, Japanese expansion had extended
over a vast area of mainland Asia, transforming in the process the nature of
Japan's imperial economy.36
The acquisition of Manchuria and other regions of
northern China made it possible for Japan, at last, to challenge the existing
economic order in Asia with some prospect of success. The object was to reduce
the contribution of the other major trading powers to the whole region and to
redirect resources to support Japanese industry. The key was the economic
development of resources in Manchukuo and north China. Manchuria had been the
industrial heart of China, supplying 90 percent of China's oil, 70 percent of
its iron, 55 percent of its gold supplies, and so on.37 Between 1932 and 1938,
Japan invested 1.9 billion yen in the region. The army and government
insisted on state economic planning and direction to ensure that its goals were
met. The Manchukuo Economic Construction Plan was published in March 1933, and
eventually, twenty-six corporations were set up for individual products.
Chinese banks were taken over or co-ordinated with
Japanese banks, a yen currency bloc was established, and the railway network
doubled in length. In 1937 a North China Development Company was set up to
ensure that the region would serve planned Japanese interests. North China, too
was incorporated into the yen bloc.38 With the resources now available from the
new territory, Japanese steel output rose from 2 million tons in 1930 to 5.6
million tons in 1938; coal increased over the same period from 31 million to 49
million tons.
Military demands swallowed up the economic expansion.
In the Outline Plan of 1937, the army raised its sights to a 55-division army
by the early 1940s; defense spending was 14 percent of state spending in 1934,
but 41 percent by 1938. The new economic bloc was declared in 1934 a zone of
special interest only to Japan – the so-called Amau
doctrine – and in 1938, the prime minister, Prince Konoe
Fumimaro, issued a warning that a new economic order
had been born in East Asia from which third parties were excluded. According to
the army's Outline Plan, the industrial boom was to supply all the necessary
resources for the empire's defense by 1941 and 'strengthen our ability to lead
East Asia.'39 Japanese military strategy in China was nevertheless ill-defined.
The restless border with Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalist China and his warlord
partners in the north invited further military encroachment. Yet, more
territory would be difficult to control with relatively limited forces. It
would not solve the problem of establishing a stable context for exploiting the
region already acquired. The priority was to control north China politically
and militarily rather than embark on a major war against the Nationalist south.
No plans were made for the Sino-Japanese war that finally erupted in July and
August 1937. The Chinese for once took the initiative. Chiang's strategy to
establish national unity first before confronting Japanese encroachment – which
meant, in effect, destroying Chinese communism – faced growing opposition by
late 1936. On a visit to the city of Xi'an in the northern province of Shaanxi,
Chiang was kidnapped by General Zhang Xueliang, the
erstwhile local warlord, who wanted him to lead a national campaign against the
Japanese in co-operation with the communists. After widespread national and
international pressure for his release, most significantly from Stalin, Chiang
returned to his capital, Nanjing, where he claimed to have had a vision during
his brief captivity that it was his destiny to save China from Japan.40
As we have seen earlier, the war transformed
institutional Buddhism and its social environment in China, and a new form of
Buddhism gradually developed. Inspired by general nationalistic
and patriotic ideas throughout China at the time and urged on by the
Nationalist government, Chinese clergy transcended the discipline of
non-killing and non-association with the military; they reinterpreted the
Mahayana doctrines of compassion and skillful means to reinvent the Buddhist
tradition of national protection.
The opportunity to adopt a new course came
unexpectedly with a trivial incident near Beijing between Japanese and Chinese
soldiers, one of many such frictions but one that Chiang took as the moment to
confront Japan's continued violation of Chinese sovereignty finally. The
so-called 'Marco Polo Bridge incident (the English name for Lugouqiao,
an ancient bridge on the outskirts of Beijing) began on 7 July 1937 when a
company of the Japanese China Garrison Army undertook night exercises near the
bridge. They came briefly under fire, lost contact with one soldier from the
unit, and demanded the right to search the small fortress city of Wanping to find him. When access was refused, Japanese
troops stormed the city, killing 200 Chinese soldiers in the process. Local
commanders on both sides quickly searched for a ceasefire in an incident that
scarcely qualified as a casus belli.41 The crisis nevertheless swiftly
escalated, reflecting the more profound issues at stake between China and Japan
in the 1930s. In Tokyo, the army minister Sugiyama Hajime overrode the more
cautious attitude of Konoe's cabinet to order the
transfer of three divisions to seize complete control of the region. On 16
July, Beijing itself was surrounded; Japanese army operations began on 26 July,
and within two days, the former capital was captured. The nearby port city of
Tianjin fell on 30 July. Japanese plans now broadened out to a final settlement
of the 'North China Incident' with the destruction of Chiang's main armies and,
if possible, the overthrow of his regime. This did not yet mean a major war,
but Chiang chose to 'nationalize' the Marco Polo Bridge Incident as a threat to
the very survival of the Chinese nation. In his diary, shortly after 7 July, he
wrote: 'This is the time for the determination to fight,' and a few days later
added that the crisis was 'the turning point for existence or obliteration.'42
Following the fall of Beijing, he summoned on 7 August a 'Joint National Defence Meeting' of all the leading political and military
figures in Nationalist China to ask for their support in a significant war
against the Japanese enemy. The meeting reacted with unanimity. Chiang
broadcast the news of war – 'Japan's limitless expansion impels China, gives it
no choice, but to act in self-defense – and his best army units were sent to
Shanghai, where Chiang judged that the first critical confrontation should take
place.43
The Japanese armed forces expected a lightning
campaign, 'a quick victory after a short war', first with the destruction of
Chiang's primary military resources then Japanese occupation of China as far
south as the lower Yangtze River. Army leaders hoped to secure Japanese aims
within a month; others predicted three months at most. The plans have much in
common with the later German Operation 'Barbarossa,' where military hubris
prevailed against military and geographical reality. The Japanese army was
numerically inferior but much better armed, better trained, and more mobile
than its Chinese adversary. Yet, the plans for military advance took little
account of the enormous space and varied geography of the regions now targeted.
The passage soon slowed down; Japanese forces could not inflict decisive
victory against an enemy that could retreat and regroup in the vast Chinese
hinterland. From a few divisions in summer 1937, the Japanese army had to
expand to twenty-one divisions by the end of the year, thirty-four divisions a
year later, and fifty-one divisions by 1941.44 The further Japanese forces were
drawn into central China, the more complex became logistical supply; the more
significant the territory to control, the more fragmented the Japanese army
became. Chiang's stature grew with what he called the 'war of resistance.' The
brutal nature of much Japanese war-making in China, including poison gas and
germ warfare (anthrax, plague, cholera), only inflamed Chinese hatred of the
invader and consolidated a sense of national unity that Chiang had tried in
vain to create earlier in the 1930s. Chiang's resolve also hardened, in
contrast to Japanese expectations that he would give up faced with military
reality. In 1938 alone, eleven efforts were made to get him to accept peace
terms, and all were rejected.
Chinese resistance nevertheless proved fragile
wherever it was tested. The Japanese armed forces renamed the North China Area
Army in August 1937, fanned out from the conquest of Beijing west and south
along the main rail routes, whose capture was essential to maintain mobility
and supply. Together with a section of the Kwantung Army in Manchuria, Japanese
forces advanced towards Chahar and Shanxi provinces
to the west and soon captured the vital railroad hub at Nankou
from nationalist forces under General Tang Enbo, sent
there by Chiang early in August.45 Because the Nationalist regime depended on
local warlord allies on the northern front line, including Song Zheyuan, whose forces at Tianjin and Beijing had soon
abandoned the battle in July, Chiang decided that it would be a better strategy
to attack the Japanese in a more vulnerable area closer to his armed forces,
the Guomindang Central Army. His choice of Shanghai as the primary battleground
would eliminate the Japanese threat to a significant source of revenue and
deliver an adequate response to the seizure of Beijing; it might even involve
outside powers in support, but his principal aim, he told army leaders, was to
conduct a long war of attrition, the opposite of Japan's intention. As Chiang's
forces converged on Shanghai, the Japanese army and navy expanded to five
divisions and stationed thirty-two naval vessels in the port. On 14 August, the
small Chinese air force began the campaign with a disastrous air raid aimed at
the Japanese flagship, destroying local hotels and a gaming room, killing and
injuring more than 1,300 civilians. The sizeable Chinese ground force initially
pressed the Japanese back towards the seafront, but the assault stalled. Japan
poured in additional troops, the Japanese navy blockaded the China coast. The
Japanese naval air force began on 15 August to become a prolonged bombing
offensive against Chinese bases, ports, and cities.
In the last week of August, the Japanese undertook an
ambitious amphibious operation to land divisions near Shanghai, strongly
supported by naval gunfire. By 13 September, Japanese forces were ready for a
counter-offensive across rugged terrain, crisscrossed with water obstacles and
improvised Chinese lines of defense. It took until 12 November to achieve
victory, with high casualties on both sides: 40,300 Japanese, 187,000 Chinese
(including three-quarters of Chiang's young officer corps).46 Japan's imperial
headquarters wanted the whole area captured, now including Chiang's capital at
Nanjing, hoping that this would bring a decisive end to the war. The victors at
Shanghai scrambled along the route to the capital to pursue a demoralized and
disorganized enemy, burning villages and slaughtering their inhabitants. Chiang
had already ordered the government to retreat to Chongqing, far to the west,
while transferring his military headquarters to Wuhan, further to the south. A
token force was left to defend Nanjing, but it was swept aside by a wave of
Japanese violence against soldiers and civilians alike. The capital fell on 13
December to the forces of General Matsui Iwane. His
deputy, Prince Asaka, and Japanese troops embarked on
days of pillage, rape, and murder.47 By the end of 1937, the Japanese occupiers
had secured a large area of central and eastern China at a high cost but were
still far from securing the quick victory anticipated in July. On 16 January
1938, Prince Konoe announced that Japan would no
longer have any contact with Chiang's regime – in effect a formal, if belated,
state of war.
Despite exceptional military losses and a severe
shortage of adequate armament, Chiang and his generals, now supported by forces
loyal to the independent Guangxi Clique from the far south, prepared for other
major campaigns. The first, and one of the largest of the war, took place
around the major rail junction at Xuzhou to the north of Nanjing, involving
more than 600,000 troops. Japanese forces approached in a pincer movement from
the north and south. The victorious armies at Shanghai were now organized into
the Central China Expeditionary Force and, together with the North China Area
Army, they captured Xuzhou in May 1938 but failed to spring the trap on forty
Chinese divisions, whose soldiers retreated in small groups under cover of a
dust storm and fog. In early April, during the approach to Xuzhou, Chinese
armies had inflicted one of the few tactical defeats on the Japanese when
troops drove out an outnumbered force at the town of Taierzhuang
north of Xuzhou under the command of the Guangxi leaders, generals Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi. Still,
it was not enough to halt the tide. The fall of Xuzhou was a significant
defeat, and it opened the way to Wuhan and controlled the whole central Chinese
plain along the Yangtze River. Japanese planners hoped that the seizure of
Wuhan and consolidation of Japanese control over north-central China would
'bring the war to an end,' produce a new pro-Japanese government and make it
possible for Japan 'to control China.' Victory would also free Japan from
facing what was regarded as the more severe threat in the far north from the
Soviet Union, now supplying Chiang's armies and air force with their only
modern weapons.48 Chiang reacted to the threat by an act of extraordinary
callousness. He ordered the dykes of the Yellow River to be opened to create a
vast flooded area to keep the Japanese away from Wuhan and the south. His
motives were crudely strategic, 'to use water as a substitute for soldiers.'
Still, the cost to the local Chinese population was disastrous, as was the
general Nationalist scorched-earth policy to deny the Japanese resources. No
warning was given, and 54,000 square kilometers of low-lying farmland were
inundated; post-war estimates claimed 800–900,000 died (recent research
suggests the figure was closer to half a million). More than 4 million became
refugees from the flooded plain.49
As seen above and in the next parts, the conventional
chronology of WWII as from 1939–45 is no longer useful and that the war must be
understood as a global event since the Asian and Pacific theatres were as
important as the European one, and possibly more so in their consequences.
It is not clear when Hitler decided that living space
in the East could be found more usefully in Poland. Until 1938, the Poles were
regarded as potential allies in a German-dominated anti-Soviet bloc. They would
hand back the German lands they were granted at Versailles and voluntarily
became a German satellite. Only when the Polish government repeatedly refused
the German request for an extra-territorial rail and road link across the
Polish Corridor and the incorporation of the League-run Free City of Danzig
back into Germany did Hitler decide to launch against the Poles the small war
he had been denied in 1938, and to take Polish resources by force. Poland now
contained the vast former German coal and steel region in Silesia and promised
vast areas for German settlement and an agricultural surplus to feed the German
population. At the meeting on 23 May 1939, when Hitler presented to the
military leadership his intentions against Poland, he claimed that 'Danzig is
not the object in this case. For us, it involves rounding off our living space
in the East and securing our food supplies.' Food supply could only come from
the East because it was sparsely populated, continued Hitler. German
agricultural proficiency would raise the productivity of the region many times
over. From
the Manchurian Incident to Word War II, part two.
The calculation that Hitler would be deterred by the
sight of the rapidly rearming British and French empires or by the wave of
anti-fascist sentiment washing across the democracies was not entirely
misplaced. A weaker hand had forced Hitler to climb down from war in 1938.
Intelligence sources suggested a severe economic crisis in Germany, even the
possibility of an anti-Hitler coup. Even after the German invasion of Poland on
1 September, Chamberlain allowed him to withdraw his forces rather than face a
world war. The idea of a conference was briefly mooted by the Italian
leadership on 2 September, echoing Mussolini's intervention in September 1938.
Still, the foreign secretary Lord Halifax told his Italian counterpart Ciano
that the British condition was 'the withdrawal of German troops from Polish
soil,' which ended any prospect of peace.60 Historians have searched for
convincing evidence that Chamberlain wanted to wriggle out of his commitment
even at this late stage, but there is none. Only a complete German capitulation
to British and French demands for an end to the violence would have averted
world war, and by 1 September, that was the least likely outcome. Neither
containment nor deterrence had in this case worked. Chamberlain announced a
state of war on the radio at 11.15 on the morning of 3 September; Daladier
announced a state of war at 5 p.m. that afternoon. A temporary alliance of
imperial elites and democratic anti-fascists had made possible a new world war.
'We can't lose,' observed the British army chief of staff in his diary. When the war of empires
started in Manchuria not included Western Europe.
While the collapse of resistance on the northeast
front continued in late May, the significant Allies began to consider the awful
capitulation scenario unthinkable two weeks before. Weygand, despite his
apparent resilience and energy, told the French Cabinet on 25 May to think
about abandoning the fight, and Reynaud was the first to pronounce the word
'armistice,' though it was an ambiguous term, as the Germans had discovered in
November 1918. According to a commitment made on 25 March 1940, this had to be
agreed with the British that neither ally would create a separate peace. On 26
May, Reynaud flew to London to explain to Churchill that France might consider
giving up. Unknown to him, the British War Cabinet had begun to discuss a
proposal from the foreign secretary, Halifax, presented to him by the Italian
ambassador, for a possible conference convened by Mussolini. Italian motives
remain unclear since, by now, Mussolini was also preparing to declare war to
profit from what seemed to the Italian leadership a ripe opportunity for
exploiting the imminent conquest of France. After three days of debate, the
British decided against any initiative. Though often seen as a turning point at
which the appeasers might nearly have triumphed, some discussion of the
consequences of a comprehensive defeat was inevitable, and not even Halifax had
favored any settlement that compromised Britain's primary interests. Eventually
winning support from Chamberlain, who kept a seat in the War Cabinet, Churchill
carried the debate to reject any approach to Mussolini. British leaders were
already contemplating war without France. 'If France could not defend herself,'
Churchill told his colleagues, 'it was better that she should get out of the
war. The
war in the West deepens while at the same time it spread further into the
western colonies.
The British Empire did not collapse or accept defeat
in 1940, but the year was a turning point in the long history of European
imperialism. Failure and occupation in Europe undermined the claims of the
other metropolitan powers, France, Belgium fatally, and the Netherlands.
Fatally undermined For the British Empire, the crisis raised awkward questions
about the future. Nevertheless, the British government refused to confront the
paradox of emphasizing the value of the empire to Britain's war effort while at
the same time using force to stifle demands for greater political autonomy in
India and running Egypt under virtual martial law. The priority was the
survival of the home islands. Neither side, German nor British, could find a
strategy capable of undermining the other's war willingness or achieving a
decisive military result. Still, it seems almost certain that with an army of
180 divisions and the spoils of much of continental Europe, Germany would have
found a way in 1941 of bringing the war in the West to an end if Hitler had not
turned to the East. Britain, by contrast, had no way of achieving victory over
Germany. Expelled from Europe twice in Norway and France, facing a crisis in
Africa, economically weakened, desperately defending its access to the broader
world economy, Britain faced strategic bankruptcy. The war Britain waged for a
year after the fall of France was the one prepared for in the 1930s – air
defense, a powerful navy, and lesser imperial conflicts. This was the war
Chamberlain had prepared for, but Churchill was the one forced to wage it. War almost lost.
The two major campaigns against British Malaya and the
American Philippines protectorate began on 8 December. Pilots with specialized
training for extended overseas flights attacked the Philippines, flying from
Japanese Empire bases on Taiwan; as in Oahu, they found American aircraft lined
up on the tarmac at Clark Field and destroyed half the B-17s and one-third of
the fighters. Amphibious landings began on the 10th on the main island of Luzon
and made rapid progress towards the capital, Manila, which surrendered on 3
January. The United States commander, General Douglas MacArthur, appointed
earlier in the year, withdrew his mixed American–Filipino force south to the
Bataan peninsula. The staff was doomed with no air cover and only 1,000 tons of
supplies shipped by an American submarine. MacArthur was evacuated to Australia
on 12 March to fight another day. Bataan was surrendered on 9 April. On 6 May,
after a grueling and tenacious defense of the island fortress of Corregidor,
the surviving American commander, General Jonathan Wainwright, gave up the
fight.
The Japanese
Fourteenth Army captured almost 70,000 soldiers, 10,000 of them American. They
were marched along the Bataan Peninsula to an improvised camp; ill, exhausted,
and hungry, they suffered beatings, killings, and humiliation from Japanese
Empire forces. The
geopolitical transformation of Asia and the Pacific.
In 1942 the new Fair Employment agency was absorbed by
the War Manpower Commission, limiting the prospects for using the agency to
combat racial inequality. In the South, the administration offered subsidies
and training programs to help raise the productivity of white farms while
turning a blind eye to the increased control over black workers that wartime
reforms made possible. The president remained largely silent on the paradox
presented by his rhetoric of freedom and the survival of racial segregation and
discrimination at home. The same held for Roosevelt’s view of racism in the
British Empire, which was prudently cautious about undermining the wartime
alliance, despite his private view that the colonial empires were morally
bankrupt and ought to be brought under international trusteeship or granted
independence. When the British authorities arrested Gandhi in August 1942 and
thousands of other Indian supporters of his ‘Quit India’ campaign, Roosevelt
made no public statement condemning the decision or the violence. Walter White,
secretary of the NAACP, canceled a speech he was to make on behalf of the
Office of War Information in protest and sent a telegram to Roosevelt linking
the civil rights movement to the broader world struggle for emancipation from
Western imperialism: ‘One billion brown and yellow people in the Pacific will
without question consider ruthless treatment of Indian leaders and peoples
typical of what white people will do to colored people if United Nations win. How the various
countries justified WWII.
1. Cited in Louise Young, Japan’s Total Empire:
Manchuria and the Culture of Wartime Imperialism (Berkeley, Calif., 1998),
57–8.
2. Ibid., 39–41; Sarah Paine, The Wars for Asia,
1911–1949 (Cambridge, 2012), 13–15; Edward Drea,
Japan’s Imperial Army: Its Rise and Fall, 1853–1945 (Lawrence, Kans, 2009), 167–9.
3. A. de Grand, ‘Mussolini’s follies: fascism and its
imperial and racist phase’, Contemporary European History, 13 (2004), 137.
4. Young, Japan’s Total Empire, 146–7.
5. Nicholas Tarling, A Sudden Rampage: The Japanese
Occupation of Southeast Asia, 1941–1945 (London, 2001), 28.
6. See Michael Geyer, ‘“There is a land where
everything is pure: its name is land of death”: some observations on
catastrophic nationalism’, in Greg Eghigian and
Matthew Berg (eds.), Sacrifice and National Belonging in Twentieth-Century
Germany (College Station, Tex., 2002), 120–41.
7. Steven Morewood, The
British Defence of Egypt 1935–1940: Conflict and
Crisis in the Eastern Mediterranean (London, 2005), 25–6.
8. CCAC, Christie Papers, 180/1/4, ‘Notes of a
conversation with Göring’ by Malcolm Christie (former
British air attaché, Berlin): ‘Wir wollen ein Reich’ [Christie’s
emphasis].
9. Aurel Kolnai,
The War against the West (London, 1938), 609.
10. De Grand, ‘Mussolini’s follies’, 136; Davide Rodogno, Fascism’s European Empire: Italian Occupation
during the Second World War (Cambridge, 2006), 44–6.
11. Gerhard Weinberg (ed.), Hitler’s Second Book (New
York, 2003), 174.
12. Young, Japan’s Total Empire, 101–6, 116–32.
13. Rainer Zitelmann,
Hitler: The Politics of Seduction (London, 1999), 206–7; on anti-Westernism see
Heinrich Winkler, The Age of Catastrophe: A History of the West, 1914–1945 (New
Haven, Conn., 2015), 909–12.
14. Patrick Bernhard, ‘Borrowing from Mussolini: Nazi
Germany’s colonial aspirations in the shadow of Italian expansionism’, Journal
of Imperial and Commonwealth History, 41 (2013), 617–18; Ray Moseley,
Mussolini’s Shadow: The Double Life of Count Galeazzo
Ciano (New Haven, Conn., 1999), 52.
15. Nicola Labanca, Oltremare: Storia dell’espansione
coloniale Italiana
(Bologna, 2002), 328–9; De Grand, ‘Mussolini’s follies’, 133–4. By 1935 Italy’s
empire provided only 4.8 per cent of Italy’s imports. On Albania see Bernd
Fischer, Albania at War, 1939–1945 (London, 1999), 5–6.
16. Ramon Myers, ‘Creating a modern enclave economy:
the economic integration of Japan, Manchuria and North China, 1932–1945’, in
Peter Duus, Ramon Myers and Mark Peattie (eds.), The
Japanese Wartime Empire, 1931–1945 (Princeton, NJ, 1996), 148; Paine, Wars for
Asia, 13–15, 23; Tarling, A Sudden Rampage, 27–8.
17. Karsten Linne, Deutschland
jenseits des Äquators? Die NS-Kolonialplanungen für Afrika (Berlin, 2008),
39.
18. CCAC, Christie Papers, 180/1/5, ‘Notes from a
conversation with Göring’, 3 Feb. 1937, p. 51.
19. Weinberg (ed.),
Hitler’s Second Book, 16–18, 162. On the change in German economic thinking see Horst Kahrs, ‘Von der “Grossraumwirtschaft”
zur “Neuen Ordnung”’, in Kahrs et al., Modelle für ein deutsches Europa:
Ökonomie und Herrschaft im Grosswirtschaftsraum
(Berlin, 1992), 9–10, 12–14; E. Teichert, Autarkie und Grossraumwirtschaft
in Deutschland, 1930–1939 (Munich, 1984), 261–8. On Hitler’s
economic thinking see Rainer Zitelmann, Hitler: Selbstverständnis eines
Revolutionärs (Hamburg, 1989), 195–215.
20. On this see Patricia Clavin,
The Failure of Economic Diplomacy: Britain, Germany, France and the United
States, 1931–1936 (London, 1996), chs. 6–7.
21. Otto Tolischus, Tokyo
Record (London, 1943), 32.
22. George Steer, Caesar in Abyssinia (London, 1936),
401.
23. Malcolm Muggeridge (ed.), Ciano’s Diplomatic
Papers (London, 1948), 301–2.
24. Drea,
Japan’s Imperial Army,
182–6.
25. Wilhelm Treue, ‘Denkschrift
Hitlers über die Aufgaben eines Vierjarhresplan’,
Vierteljahreshefte für Zeitgeschichte, 3 (1954), 204–6.
26. Kathleen Burke, ‘The lineaments of foreign policy:
the United States and a “New World Order”, 1919–1939’, Journal of American
Studies, 26 (1992), 377–91.
27. G. Bruce Strang, ‘Imperial dreams: the
Mussolini–Laval Accords of January 1935’, The Historical Journal, 44 (2001),
807–9.
28. Richard Overy, ‘Germany
and the Munich Crisis: a mutilated victory?’, Diplomacy & Statecraft, 10
(1999), 208–11.
29. Susan Pedersen, The Guardians: The League of
Nations and the Crisis of Empire (Oxford, 2015), 289–90, 291–2.
30. Paine, Wars for Asia, 25.
31. Benito Mussolini, ‘Politica
di vita’ [Il popolo d’Italia,
11 Oct. 1935] in Opera Omnia di Benito Mussolini: vol. XXVII (Florence, 1959),
163–4.
32. Chad Bryant, Prague in Black: Nazi Rule and Czech
Nationalism (Cambridge, Mass., 2007), 41–4.
33. Kristin Kopp, ‘Arguing the case for a colonial
Poland’, in Volker Langbehn and Mohammad Salama (eds.), German Colonialism:
Race, the Holocaust and Postwar Germany (New York, 2011), 150–51; David Furber, ‘Near as far in the colonies: the Nazi occupation
of Poland’, International History Review, 26 (2004), 541–51.
34. James Crowley, ‘Japanese army factionalism in the
early 1930s’, Journal of Asian Studies, 21 (1962), 309–26.
35. Drea, Japan’s Imperial
Army, 183–6; Tarling, A Sudden Rampage, 40–43.
36. Details from Paine, Wars for Asia, 34–40; Takafusa Nakamura, ‘The yen bloc, 1931–1941’, in Duus, Myers and Peattie (eds.), Japanese Wartime Empire,
1789.
37. Paine, Wars for Asia, 15.
38. Takafusa Nakamura and Kōnosuke Odaka (eds.), Economic
History of Japan 1914–1945 (Oxford, 1999), 49–51; Paine, Wars for Asia, 24–30;
Myers, ‘Creating a modern enclave economy’, 160.
39. Yoshiro Miwa, Japan’s Economic Planning and
Mobilization in Wartime, 1930s–1940s (Cambridge, 2015), 62–4; Nakamura and Odaka (eds.), Economic History of Japan, 47–51; Akira Hari,
‘Japan: guns before rice’, in Mark Harrison (ed.), The Economics of World War
II: Six Great Powers in International Comparison (Cambridge, 1998),
283–7.
40. Hans van de Ven, China at War: Triumph and Tragedy
in the Emergence of the New China 1937–1952 (London, 2017), 58–64.
41. Ibid., 66–70; Paine, Wars for Asia, 128–9.
42. Rana Mitter, China’s War
with Japan 1937–1945: The Struggle for Survival (London, 2013), 73–4.
43. Van de Ven, China at War, 68–76; Odd Arne Westad, Restless Empire: China and the World since 1750
(London, 2012), 256–7.
44. Paine, Wars for Asia, 128–9.
45. Hans van de Ven, War and Nationalism in China,
1925–1945 (New York, 2003), 194–5.
46. Paine, Wars for Asia, 181–2.
47. Mitter, China’s War with
Japan, 128–35; on the massacres see Iris Chang, The Rape of Nanking: The
Forgotten Holocaust of World War II (New York, 1997), chs.
3–4.
48. Van de Ven, War and Nationalism, 221–6.
49. Diana Lary, The Chinese
People at War: Human Suffering and Social Transformation, 1937–1945 (Cambridge,
2010), 60–62; Mitter, China’s War with Japan,
158–61.
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