By Eric Vandenbroeck
Mentioned in our original analyses of how the
First War started, the Matscheko Memorandum,
composed before the assassination of Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo, was adapted
and presented to the German Kaiser on 5 July which resulted in the issuing of
the infamous blank check assurance.
But to understand why the Matscheko memorandum
is so important one needs to take a closer look at two weeks before Franz
Ferdinand was murdered including when the latter and Kaiser Wilhelm II met at Konopischt where he and Franz Ferdinand discussed the
possibility of a future war.
One of the myths about the late Austro-Hungarian Dual Monarchy, promoted
by legions of historians, is that the Habsburg elites, and Archduke Franz
Ferdinand in particular, had seriously considered reforming the Empire in a way
that would tackle both their internal South Slav question and the perceived
external threat from independent Serbia. This supposed project of reform
revolved around so-called "Trialism", the political movement that
aimed to reorganize the bipartite Empire into a tripartite one, creating a
Croatian state equal in status to Austria and Hungary, meaning a third, South
Slav, unit would be established with its centre in
Zagreb, possessing such power of attraction as would neutralize anything that
Belgrade could offer. It has to be said, however, that these were just balloons
of fantasy visualized largely by nationalist Croats at the time. With the
exception of Aehrenthal,
no one of any consequence among the statesmen of the Monarchy had actually
proposed Trialism. And even Aehrenthal quickly gave
up on the idea. Franz Joseph was decidedly against it - his abortive experiment
with Czech Trialism in 1871 had left him allergic to any structural reform of
the Empire. Even more important was the Hungarian opposition to any imperial
restructuring that would entail a loss of lands under the Crown of St Stephen.
Nor can the Heir to the Throne be described as an advocate of Trialism,
He cannot, in fact, be seen as a champion of any meaningful reform. Such
tentative sympathy as Franz Ferdinand may have had for Trialism-related to his
obsession with weakening Hungary and collapsed completely after the
establishment in Croatia-Slavonia, in 1905, of the Croato-Serb alliance - an
alliance favoring the ultra-nationalist Hungarians against Vienna. Both the
Archduke and his associates then considered Trialism a dangerous idea, for they
saw the South Slavs as unreliable. Against the evidence, many historians still
speculate that only the assassination of Franz Ferdinand prevented the
realization of his trialist plans concerning the South Slavs. Some even suggest
that those plans had caused the assassination. Then there are others who write
books in which the Archduke is keen to promote not Trialism, but rather
federalism along national lines. Yet he never even remotely contemplated any kind
of power-sharing system, let alone one based on the principle of nationality.
His vision, in so far as he had one, was that of a strong centralized state in
which historic Habsburg Crown Lands, not national units, would be allowed a
degree of local autonomy. And although he had had many years in which to
prepare for power, his one and only practical post-accession plan in 1914 was
to destroy the hated dualist structure which enabled Budapest to deal with
Vienna on an equal footing.
The man who would be Emperor
It is accepted that in the weeks before he set out on his journey to
Sarajevo, Franz Ferdinand had expected to become Emperor fairly soon. Such
anticipation was not unreasonable. In April, Franz Joseph's serious pneumonia
condition had caused widespread concern both at home and abroad.
Recalling a conversation with Colonel Alexander Brosch, in which the
latter had cited the Hofburg doctor Professor Neusser, Heinrich Lammasch the
constitutional adviser of Franz Ferdinand related that medical opinion in
1910-1911 gave Franz Joseph one or two years at most.1
The Emperor did eventually recover from his illness, but in the light of
his advanced age in 1914 (he being in his eighty-fourth year) the outlook was
justifiably pessimistic. On reaming of his uncle's poor health, Franz Ferdinand
reacted immediately. The "workshop," as Milan Hodza
called the Belvedere circle of associates and advisers, was "hurriedly
summoned to meet and to prepare all details of procedure and action."
Members of the group drafted and revised texts of a manifesto, and also worked
on the wording of an appropriate Bosnian title for the next Emperor. He was to
be "Konig und Herr von Bosnien
und Herzegovina"(King and leader of Bosnien und
Herzegovina).2 Early in May Franz Ferdinand's friend Count Adalbert Sternberg
told Josef Redlich that Franz Joseph's days were "numbered", and that
the Archduke had long ago completed his plans for the succession, but kept them
secret.3 In mid-May Paul Samassa revealed to Redlich
that various drafts of these were held by Baron Johann Eichhoff
The plan was, according to Samassa, to cancel Franz
Ferdinand's crowning in Hungary; replacing it instead with the imposition Wktroyierung) of universal suffrage on the country.4
On 28 May Hans Schlitter noted in his diary that Franz Joseph was
"furious" with Franz Ferdinand because the latter had already begun
to behave as the supreme commander during the Emperor's illness.5 Further
evidence of the take-over fever in those days is provided by Andreas von Morsey in the unpublished sections of his memoir. The young
Morsey was Franz Ferdinand's Dienstedmmerer,
a kind of all-purpose personal secretary and equerry. An employee at the Staatsarchiv in Vienna, he had been allocated to Franz
Ferdinand's office at the beginning of 1914. On 20 June the Archduke and his
entourage moved from Konopischt to his estate in Chlumetz (Chlumec) east of Prague
where they expected, on 23 June, the arrival of Russia's Grand Duke Cyril. This
was to be a secret visit. According to a member of the archduke's staff, Baron Morsey, the Belvedere had received reliable information
about the Russians indicating their wish to move closer to an Austria under
Franz Ferdinand; such a rapprochement was for them out of the question while
Franz Joseph still lived (because of memories stretching back to the Crimean
War), but they had nothing against the person of Franz Ferdinand. "At this
time the old Emperor was dangerously ill," Mosley wrote, "a calamity
was not impossible, and this placed Cyril's arrival in a special light."
The Grand Duke never arrived, however, and there was speculation in Franz
Ferdinand's circle that the visit might have been stopped by an intrigue from
Berlin or by the Pan-Slavists in Russia. 6
Be that as it may, Franz Ferdinand was showing every sign of
anticipating a speedy accession, wondering aloud how Karl, Otto's son, would
manage as his Thronfolger, and telling Morsey that he wanted to get rid of, among others, Prince
Alfred of Montenouvo and Rudolf Sieghart
the governor of the Boden-Creditanstalt. His special
contempt was reserved for the Hungarian Prime Minister István
Tisza who, he said, considered himself "We, by the Grace of God, the
uncrowned King of Hungary." And he raged against his uncle, asking an
embarrassed Morsey whether he thought that under
Franz Joseph any reform in any area, even a modest reform, was imaginable at
all in the "Great Austrian sense." The Emperor had, Franz Ferdinand
thundered, "surrendered, step by step, every power anchor [Machtposition] of the Dynasty." The reference to
reforms "in grossosterreichischem Sinne," together with his concern for the Dynasty, do
incidentally provide the last recorded evidence about where Franz Ferdinand
stood with regard to his internal restructuring plans for the Empire just
before he was killed.7
And whereas the old Emperor was not so well at this time, neither was
the Heir to the Throne himself - at least not according to some observers. A
number of reports and rumors exists about the Archduke's worsening state in 1913-1914,
but there is little agreement on the cause of his condition. In March and again
in April Hans Schlitter was writing in his diary about Franz Ferdinand's
renewed suffering from tuberculosis.8 Early in August 1914 Julius Szeps, editor-in-chief of the semi-official Fremdenblatt, told Sir Maurice de Bunsen, the British
Ambassador to Vienna, that Franz Ferdinand had had something seriously wrong
with his bladder and only one year to live.9 Henry Wickham Steed, until 1913
the Vienna correspondent of The Times, maintained in May of that year that
Franz Ferdinand had contracted syphilis twenty years previously; now leading to
"progressive paralysis which is already so far advanced as to cause grave
doubt whether the brain is not to the point of being affected". The
historian John W Boyer has suggested that Steed's information came from Tomas
Masaryk and others.10 An Austrian study
from 1970, hostile to Steed, also named Masaryk as Steed's source on the
Archduke's state of health.11 In 1913 Franz Ferdinand himself told Kristoffy that he was not well and that he feared he would
not live to ascend the throne.12 In his diary entry for 7 May 1914, Josef
Redlich made only brief mention of the illness of Emperor Franz Joseph,
dwelling instead on the Archduke and the rumors of him as suffering from
paralysis. The Senate President Miroslav Ploj told
Redlich that for the past year and a half the Archduke had been having
"fits of raging madness" and had nearly strangled a servant. "It will be a tragedy," Redlich opined,
'when Franz Ferdinand ascends the Throne, but it will not last long.13
Whatever his future, the Heir to the Throne could hardly complain about
a surfeit of official engagements before the Bosnian maneuvers of June 1914
(and the concluding procession through the city of Sarajevo). In mid-April, he
paid a visit on behalf of Franz Joseph to the Bavarian Court in Munich. Given
his reforming intentions, he was seen there as an "interesting
puzzle," embodying an almost uri-Austrian
toughness. Bavaria's Crown Prince Rupprecht was
apparently skeptical about the Archduke's chances of bringing about an organic
transformation and consolidation of Austria-Hungary. Twenty years earlier Rupprecht had traveled in the south-eastern parts of the
Empire. Now he noted in his diary that there was always a lot being said about
the Habsburg's state-building formula of divide et imperia, but so much was
being divided in Austria-Hungary that there would be little left for imperare. 14
Early on the morning of 29 April, the Thronfolger
arrived in Budapest to address the Delegations on behalf of the
still-recovering Emperor, only to leave the hated Hungarian soil just a few
hours later as fast as he could. Such was his aversion to that country that he
would lower the curtains in the compartment while his train was traveling
through Hungary.15 In the weeks before he left for Bosnia by far the most
important event in Franz Ferdinand's engagements book was his meeting with the
German Kaiser, Wilhelm II, which took place at Konopischt
over two full days, on 12 and 13 June. Given the assassination in Sarajevo soon
after that and the world war which followed several weeks later, the meeting
has figured considerably on the pages of history. There is enough documentation
about it to suggest that even if the assassination had not taken place, the Konopischt episode would still have formed an outstanding
short chapter in international affairs regarding developments in south-eastern
Europe at an important moment: with Russia's Tsar Nicholas expected to visit
the Romanian King at Constanza on 14 June.
The Konopischt meeting has in the past been
presented as no less than a "war council" by some and vehemently
denied as such by others. Thus in 1925, Robert Seton-Watson described as
"credible" the assumption that, at Konopischt,
"Franz Ferdinand had propounded a scheme for Serbia's overthrow, and that
William II had promised Germany's support'.16 In 1953 Rudolf Kiszling, Franz Ferdinand's deferential biographer
described the whole idea as "the worst slander." 17 What is the
truth?
The alleged informal character
of the occasion
Much has been made in many accounts of the Konopischt
meeting about the informal character of the occasion. Von Jagow;
Germany's Foreign Minister in 1914, wrote soon after the war that Franz
Ferdinand had invited Wilhelm II to Konopischt
because he wanted to show him the rose blooms on his beloved estate - the visit
was of a "purely friendly" nature.18 Such a view has prevailed to
this day. However, Prince Lichnowsky, Germany's Ambassador
to London, recorded in his memoirs: "I do not know whether the plan of an
active policy against Serbia had already been decided on at Konopischt."19
It seems, at the very least, that he did not think the Konopischt
meeting to have been merely about inspecting blooming roses. In his recent work
on the Imperial Austrian Army, Richard Bassett also takes a dissenting view
when he writes that the horticultural theory about the Konopischt
meeting "simply does not stand up to close scrutiny."20
Certainly, Franz Ferdinand's famous rose garden, on which he had spent a
massive amount of money, had been presented in the press as the object of the
visit. Yet Paul Nikitsch-Boulles, Franz Ferdinand's
secretary, clearly remembered that in June 1914 "not a single rose bloomed
in the whole of Konopischt." Nikitsch-Boulles
even spelled out the purpose of the Kaiser's arrival: "to discuss the
important political questions of the day," safely removed from the bustle
of a big city and its prying journalists." True, as Morsey
recorded, artificial means were used to force the roses to bloom, such as
watering them with water warmed to the correct temperature. Morsey
also suggested that Grand Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, accompanying Wilhelm II,
had been invited by the Archduke because he was a well-known lover of flowers,
especially roses. Yet Tirpitz himself recognized the farcical aspect of
whitewashing the rationale for a visit in this way. He could not imagine, he
told Morsey jokingly with regard to the inspection of
roses, "what the English would make of it".22 Indeed. The Admiral
noted a day or so after the visit that Wilhelm II had talked with Franz
Ferdinand about the desirability of moving the whole of the German fleet to the
Mediterranean where, the Kaiser said to his host, "united with the
Austrians and the Italians we can jointly strike."23 There was, clearly,
more to the Konopischt meeting than just a pleasant
stroll through the rose garden. "It is a curious thing," Theodor
Wolff, editor of the Berliner Tageblatt, noted,
"that neither William II in his Erinnerungen nor
Admiral von Tirpitz in his big volumes devotes a single syllable to this last
visit to Franz Ferdinand's palace."14
At least some of what was discussed at the Bohemian castle can be
ascertained from the record in the often quoted Grosse Politik,
Germany's official collection of documents whose purpose was to disseminate the
official government position that Germany was the victim of Allied aggression
in 1914. Carl-Georg von Treutler from the German Foreign
Office had been brought along for the trip by the Kaiser, and he subsequently
wrote a report (in the form of a private letter to Under-Secretary Arthur
Zimmermann), partly on the basis of his brief attendance during one of the
exchanges between Franz Ferdinand and Wilhelm II, and partly on the basis of
what the latter chose to relate to him the following morning.25 Whether Treutler can be seen as a reliable chronicler is very much
open to question. In his fragmentary memoirs he claimed that Ottokar Czernin had also been
present at Konopischt, and that he had seen Czernin walking with Wilhelm II in front of himself and
Franz Ferdinand, who had described Czernin as
"my future minister for foreign affairs".26 All of which is rather
remarkable because Czernin was at this time at his
post in Romania as his telegrams to Vienna from Bucharest-Sinaia
dated 12 and 13 June attest.27
Be that as it may, according to Treutler's
report Franz Ferdinand was sceptical about the
Italians, telling the Kaiser that in the long term a relationship with Italy
was "impossible". He pointed out, for example, that in Albania the
Italians were acting in bad faith, with Baron Carlo Aliotti's
continued presence in Durazzo being a case in point. Wilhelm II, for his part,
tried to put a more positive light on Italy's attachment to the Triple
Alliance. The Archduke further fulminated against the Hungarians, describing
conditions in Hungary as "anachronistic and medieval" - ironically
perhaps, given the absence of any progressive ideas in his own political
outlook. But it was important to Franz Ferdinand that he make his points
against Hungary: for the German Kaiser, despite his pro-Romanian line, had
taken a liking to the Hungarian Prime Minister Tisza. The two had first met a
short time previously, in Vienna on 23 March - and the very fact of this
meeting seems to have greatly upset Franz Ferdinand.28 Indeed, according to
Paul Samassa who was closely involved in the
Archduke's circle, the Konopischt meeting was all
about making sure that the German Kaiser properly understood the situation in
Hungary - since the Archduke, when he ascended the Throne, intended to get rid
of Tisza.29 The relevant report in Grosse Politik
supports this interpretation of the meeting to some extent. Franz Ferdinand
described Tisza to the visiting German Emperor as being "already a
dictator" in Hungary, and aiming to become the same in Vienna. What was
particularly alarming, he went on, was that Tisza made no secret of his view
that a separate Hungarian army was something to be strived for. Wilhelm II,
however, interrupted his host to argue that Tisza should not be thrown
overboard, for he was an "energetic" man whose estimable talents
should be utilized. Undeterred, the Archduke went on to criticize Tisza's
policy of suppressing the Romanians of Hungary at the precise time when it was
necessary to cultivate the neighbouring state of
Romania, and even asked the Kaiser to instruct the German Ambassador to Vienna
to constantly remind the Hungarian Prime Minister about this problem.30
This attempt by Franz Ferdinand to get a foreign power to influence the
internal affairs of the Habsburg Empire evidences the extent of his impotence
with regard to Hungary. But Treutler's report
provides strange reading. One would expect to find references in it to Serbia,
to the rumours about an impending union between
Serbia and Montenegro and, especially, to the speculation about a new,
Russian-backed Balkan alliance directed at Austria-Hungary and thus also at
Germany. There is none of that in the report although these were all hot topics
in june 1914 - at least in Vienna. Most surprising of
all, Russia is only mentioned in one sentence. This in itself is proof that the
Grosse Politik record of what went on at Konopischt is very incomplete. A wider discussion must have
taken place. In fact, that single sentence is the concluding one in Treutler's report and also perhaps the most significant:
"In the opinion of the Archduke Russia is not to be feared; the internal
difficulties are too great to allow an aggressive foreign policy to this
country." 31
Not to be "feared" in what context? Was Franz Ferdinand, a
fortnight before he was killed, contemplating with the German Emperor a war in
the Balkan theatre (with, realistically, only Serbia and Montenegro as possible
targets) and dismissing the chance of a Russian reaction? Of course, the
objection may be raised that something as specific as that should not be
inferred from what would have been a perfectly normal and sensible review of
the general international situation on the part of Franz Ferdinand and Wilhelm
II - during which the position of Russia would inevitably have been discussed.
On the other hand, the question of Austro-Hungarian and German designs in the
Balkans at this time is a necessary one to raise in the light of what Conrad
disclosed about the Konopischt meeting in the fourth
volume of his memoirs. On 5 July 1914 he had an audience with Franz Joseph. The
Chief of General Staff had come to press for war against Serbia in the wake of
the Sarajevo assassination. "Quite right", Franz Joseph commented,
"but how are we going to wage war if then everybody pounces on us, Russia
in particular?" Conrad protested that Germany provided the backing.
"Are you sure of Germany?", the Emperor asked. He then explained that
he had asked Franz Ferdinand to clarify at Konopischt
with Wilhelm II whether Austria-Hungary could in the future
"unconditionally" reckon with Germany's support. But, according to
Franz Joseph, the German Kaiser "had evaded the question, giving no
answer".32
Needless to say, the inquiry about Germany's unconditional support could
only have related to support for Vienna's intentions in the Balkans -
Austria-Hungary was hardly going to act unilaterally against Italy, let alone
Russia. Since 1878 its 'Great Power' radius had not extended beyond
South-Eastern Europe. Conrad went back to the office after the audience and
informed Colonel Josef Metzger, the head of the Operations Bureau, about his
talk with the Emperor. When he came to the point about Franz Joseph's doubts as
to whether Germany would come along in the event of war "imposed" on
Austria-Hungary, Metzger suddenly remembered something important. Interjecting,
he said that on the evening of 27 June, at the Ilidza
hotel outside Sarajevo, Franz Ferdinand had asserted to him that, at Konopischt, about this particular question the German
Kaiser had said: "If we did not get going Uosgingenl,
the situation would get worse."33 The implication of German backing,
indeed encouragement, of an Austro-Hungarian strike in the Balkans was fairly
clear, and war "imposed" on Austria-Hungary would have been its war
against Serbia.
Why, then, did Franz Joseph tell Conrad on 5 July that Wilhelm II had
been evasive at Konopischt about guaranteeing unconditional
future support to Austria-Hungary? Either the old Emperor had not been
accurately informed by his nephew on what had been said at Konopischt
with regard to German support or, much more likely, he wanted to keep Conrad on
the leash while awaiting news from the mission he had sent to Berlin to extract
a renewed pledge from Germany's Wilhelm II that very day, 5 July. Be that as it
may, the records of the Konopischt meeting appear to
have been heavily censored or destroyed. Robert Seton-Watson concluded that von
Treutler's report 'may be presumed not to be
complete."34 In 1927 historian Hermann Kantorowicz
expressed his incredulity at the idea that, in conversations which had
encompassed all issues relating to the Balkans, not a word had been said about
Serbia. Ironically, Kantorowicz's work on the
question of war guilt was itself suppressed and did not see publication until
1967.35 Meanwhile, Alfred von Wegerer's postwar claim
that von Treutler had written "an extensive
report" was an attempt to convince the world that the talks at Konopischt "involved neither Serbia, nor were any
warlike intentions and plans mentioned".36 Yet at the time, Franz
Ferdinand told Foreign Minister Count Berchtold soon
after the Kaiser had departed that they had "thoroughly" discussed
"all possible questions" and had in every respect found themselves in
full agreement."37 In fact, when Colonel Bardolff
published his memoirs in 1938, he stated, without elaborating, that the German
Kaiser and Franz Ferdinand had discussed at Konopischt
the Monarchy's relations with Serbia and Montenegro.38 This makes it even odder
that there is no mention of it in the available record.
The evidence stemming from the Konopischt
meeting, fragmentary as it is, thus points to the conclusion that three key
players (Franz Joseph, Franz Ferdinand and Wilhelm II) were in mid-June 1914
mulling over the scenario of an Austro-Hungarian move against Serbia. Theodor Sosnosky, Franz Ferdinand's biographer, argued rather
unconvincingly that Colonel Metzger had on 27 June at Ilidza
either "misunderstood" the Archduke, or that the latter had
"wrongly expressed" himself. Interestingly, however, Sosnosky did not try to dispute that Franz Joseph had asked
Franz Ferdinand to quiz Wilhelm II at Konopischt
about the kind of support the Monarchy could expect of Germany.39 Albertini, on
the other hand, maintains that Metzger had probably understood correctly, but
that the Archduke, who did not believe in the desirability of an attack on
Serbia, had not been frank with Franz Joseph. However, Luigi Albertini does not
address the question of why, at this stage, the Emperor and his nephew would
have been interested in ascertaining Wilhelm's position in the first place.40
Sidney Fay relegates the whole Metzger-Conrad episode to a footnote -
merely quoting Conrad, but without even beginning to discuss the
implications.41 Bernadotte Schmitt, by contrast, gives the matter his full
attention, considering it as "evident" that the question of an early
strike had been raised at Konopischt.42 In his 1928 study of the 1914 war
guilt, H.W: Wilson wrote that action against Serbia 'must have been examined'
by Franz Ferdinand and the German Kaiser, 'but Treutler,
in his very incomplete report on the meeting, is entirely silent on the subject."43
Russia could not wage any war,
and we would certainly be able to see the Serbs off
Indeed, Conrad's writings indicate that Franz Joseph and Franz Ferdinand
had undoubtedly conferred on Balkan issues and decided that Wilhelm II should
be sounded out at Konopischt. This step of consulting
the ally was necessary in any case: all the more so because Wilhelm II had in
the past revealed himself to be a highly inconsistent ally. But Franz Joseph
and Franz Ferdinand were now knocking on an open door: Colonel Metzger's talk
with Conrad makes it fairly clear that the German Kaiser was at Konopischt even urging a timely action. Hermann Kantorowicz has chronicled the bewildering swings in a
choice of policy displayed by Wilhelm II when replying to Austria-Hungary's
requests that Berlin back its various Balkan entanglements - from his bombastic
expressions of Nibelungentreue during the Bosnian
annexation crisis to his enthusiastic support for the Balkan League against
Turkey. However, the respected German scholar maintained that, from October
1913, the Kaiser adopted a hostile attitude towards Serbia that was still there
in July 1914.44
This development did not occur as early as October 1913. It may be said
that the German Emperor in fact never had any strong feelings about the Serbs -
except, possibly, that he could not forgive them for being Slavs. What really
concerned him was to ensure that the Serbian Army should not be an opponent in
any future war with Russia. Serbia should, therefore, be tied to the Triple
Alliance - by stick or carrot - preferably the latter. So it was that soon
after declaring support for Austria-Hungary in October 1913 at the time of the
Albanian imbroglio he was telling Berchtold over a
cup of tea at the German Embassy in Vienna that everybody in Serbia, beginning
with King Peter, could be had for money. He also suggested Austria-Hungary
should provide military training to the Serbs and offer trade privileges. In
return, Serbia should be "submissive" and its troops, which had shown
that they were capable, should be placed at the disposal of Austria-Hungary.
But if the Serbs refused, Belgrade should be "bombarded" and held
until the will of the Austrian Emperor was fulfilled.45
According to Heinrich von Tschirschky's report
to Bethmann Hollweg on this meeting between Berchtold and Wilhelm II, the latter stated that:
"Austria-Hungary must do everything to establish, if at all possible it l'amiable, an economic and political understanding with
Serbia, but if that could not be achieved by peaceful means more energetic
methods must be employed. Somehow or other Serbia must in all circumstances be
made to join forces with the Monarchy, particularly in the military sphere; so
that in case of a conflict with Russia the Monarchy will not have the Serb army
against it but on its side."46
And this was not just Wilhelm II advocating an Austro-Serbian
rapprochement - it was official German policy. For example, in November 1913
both Behmann Hollweg and Arthur Zimmermann,
Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, were insistently telling the
Austro-Hungarian Ambassador in Berlin that it would be to Vienna's great
advantage if the differences with Serbia could be somehow ironed out.47 And it
has to be said that the German Emperor himself was consistent in backing such
an approach to Serbia. In December 1913, in Munich, he continued on this theme
to Ludwig Velics, the Austro-Hungarian Minister in
Bavaria. One way or another, Serbia had to be attached to the Monarchy, he
said, and then suggested eminently sensible policies: for example major
financial investment in Serbia, and opening to the Serbs ('wide open')
Austria's academies and institutes, including the leading secondary school in
Central Europe, Vienna's Theresianum Gymnasium. The
Germans, he explained, meaning also the Austrian Germans, could not be
unconcerned about whether or not in the event of a conflict (he meant a
European war), "twenty of their divisions" were earmarked to march
against South Slavdom.48
The Kaiser's position was to change dramatically, however, not very long
before the Konopischt meeting. On 23 May he announced
to Szogyeny, the Austro- Hungarian Ambassador to
Berlin, a stunning aboutface. Though he considered
the establishment of friendly neighbor relations with Serbia "extremely
desirable", he said he fully realized that the attitude of Serbia's
Government, and public opinion, was causing Austria-Hungary "virtually
insuperable difficulties" in this regard. Szogyeny
provided no elaboration in his report to Vienna, and perhaps there was nothing
too elaborate. Suddenly, Wilhelm II had adopted a point of view on relations
with Serbia practically identical to that held by Berchtold
and his mandarins. Only a few weeks earlier, at the beginning of April, he had
still insisted that: "For Serbia, a tempting modus vivendi with the Dual
Monarchy must be found."49
The German Emperor's change of direction was extraordinary, but what is
also notable is the curious fact that historiography has paid it no attention
whatsoever.50 After all, the support extended by Germany to Austria-Hungary at
the beginning of the July Crisis was to entirely determine its outcome, i.e., a
Balkan war leading to a European one, and the importance of Wilhelm's personal
role in this cannot be exaggerated. Quite simply, Austria-Hungary would never
have declared war on Serbia in 1914 had it not been sure of the support of the
German Kaiser and his Government. The question of how and why he had come to
view Austro-Serbian relations from the Ballhausplatz
perspective is in fact one of the more interesting regarding the immediate
origins of the war of 1914. Within some three months, he had transformed
himself from an impatient advocate of Austro-Serbian rapprochement to a
protagonist, early in July, of a confrontation with Serbia. The question of why
will probably remain an unresolved one. Certainly, the reasons given by the
Kaiser (the attitude of the Serbian Government and Serbian public opinion)
could not possibly have played a role, for, as seen in previous chapters, the
Serbian Government was at the time at its most conciliatory towards Vienna and,
in any case from spring 1914, entirely absorbed with the Army and the Black
Hand over the so-called Priority Decree. It is true that Serbian public opinion
had always been hostile, but no more so than that of Romania, and nothing had
occurred in the spring of 1914 to make it raise its voice in a manner louder
than usual.
It is possible, on the other hand, that the Kaiser's new line of thought
reflected the influence which Istvan Tisza had recently begun to exert on him.
The Hungarian Prime Minister had by all accounts captivated Wilhelm II at their
meeting in Vienna on 23 March. Tschirschky wrote two
days after the meeting that the Kaiser "now stands completely under
Tisza's impact". A member of his entourage noted that "Count Tisza
had made an extraordinary impression on His Majesty". For the first time,
according to this report, the Kaiser had heard in Vienna 'a positive programme, instead of complaints and resignation'. In
reality, he had been the subject of a highly successful brainwashing operation.
What Tisza had done in that meeting was to carefully guide the German Emperor
towards the Austro-Hungarian, and more specifically Hungarian, understanding of
the Balkans, making sure all the time not to challenge any of his well-known
views on the region. The key here was to take into account Wilhelm's soft spot
for Romania. Thus Tisza lied shamelessly about progress being made in the talks
with the Romanians of Hungary - despite the fact that, as has been seen, those
negotiations had already broken down in February. Pursuing his pro-Bulgarian
line and knowing what his interlocutor thought about the Bulgarian King,
Ferdinand, he stated judiciously that he did not wish to draw the King's person
into the debate, but was arguing that the Bulgarians were a "strong people"
whose future had to be reckoned with. Cleverly, he painted a bleak picture of a
devious Russian plan for the Balkans: to build up an anti-Austrian grouping of
Serbia, Bulgaria and Romania. Whether by guessing or by knowing Wilhelm's view,
Tisza additionally asserted what Wilhelm also believed in: that the union of
Serbia and Montenegro was 'inevitable'. But here he employed Berchtold's argument that Serbia, as an outpost of Russia,
should be kept away from the Adriatic, and if the union did materialize then
the Montenegrin littoral should be assigned to Albania. Amazingly, he added
that, 'as a compensation to Bulgaria', the latter should be given the
Serbian-held districts of Ischtip (Stip) and Kotschana (Kocani) in eastern Macedonia - presumably as a compensation
for the enlargement of Albania. For good measure, the Hungarian Prime Minister
emphasized that the Balkan policy of the Monarchy had to be conducted in mutual
understanding with Romania.51
What is surprising is that Wilhelm II bought into this scenario. As noted
above, at the beginning of April he was still insisting that a modus vivendi be
found between Austria-Hungary and Serbia - this was after his meeting with
Tisza. He had apparently been upset by what he heard in Vienna from Berchtold and Franz Joseph about not letting Serbia unite
with Montenegro even at the price of war. On 5 April, anticipating that Vienna
would make such bellicose noises at first and then accept a Serbo-Montenegrin
union anyway, with the inevitable loss of prestige, he backed Tisza's
suggestion that the Montenegrin coast be allotted to Albania as compensation,
arguing that Tisza's 'sensible estimation' should be adopted." Yet the
implementation of Tisza's proposals would have meant provoking major trouble in
the Balkans anyway - one war or more. For it is inconceivable that Montenegro
and Serbia would have stood idly by as some of their territories were grabbed
up; and horrendous complications would assuredly have arisen with Italy and
Russia, creating an accompanying European diplomatic crisis of the first order.
The Kaiser had clearly been mesmerized by Tisza. At their meeting in March he
told him that Hungary had every reason to stand fast with 'Germanentum'
against the "Slavonic tide". The best way to combat the latter was,
he said, "a German Austria and a Magyar Hungary".53 No wonder Tisza
was delighted. "In an East European war", he wrote subsequently,
"we can reckon with almost half of German armed forces."54
Whoever or whatever it was that influenced the German Emperor to consider
Austro-Serbian differences as irreconcilable may remain a matter of debate. But
there can be little doubt that by the time he arrived in Konopischt
to meet Franz Ferdinand he was no longer preaching rapprochement between Vienna
and Belgrade. It is also important to emphasize that the Kaiser did not fear
that Balkan adventures might lead to a European war since, in his view, Russia
was still weak. Thus in March 1914 he assured the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador
to Berlin that Russia could not think about a war "for some considerable
time.55 In October 1913 he had been very specific regarding this length of
time, telling Berchtold that one did not need to
worry about Russia for the next six years.56 His Foreign Minister von Jagow was also convinced of this, telling the former
minister in Belgrade Janos Forgach in September 1913
that the power of Russia was "in every respect overrated". 57
Austro- Hungarian statesmen, diplomats, and soldiers also thought along
such lines. The idea that an opportunity for action against Serbia existed as
Russia was still weak was already being expressed at the beginning of 1914 by a
person well placed to make such an assessment: Count Friedrich von Szapary, the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to St Petersburg.
On 17 January, in Vienna, Szapary talked privately
with Hans Schlitter, who noted Szapary's words in his
diary: "Russia could not wage any war, and we would certainly be able to
see the Serbs off."58 Only a few weeks earlier, in December 1913, Baron
Julius Szilassy, the Austro-Hungarian Minister in
Athens, had visited Prime Minister Tisza who told him that "war with
Serbia was unavoidable, but on account of internal reasons Russia would not and
could not intervene under any circumstances."59 Franz Ferdinand,
evidently, was not isolated in his view about Russia's weakness. It is
noteworthy that both Szapary and Tisza talked about
it in the context of envisaging a war against Serbia. This belief that Russia
was fragile was in any case widely shared in 1914 at the top of the Austro-Hungarian
state. In August 1914, shortly after the war broke out, finance minister Leon
von Biliński maintained that it was wrong to
overestimate Russia as its Empire was politically "in complete
disintegration".60 Soon after the Sarajevo assassination, Prince Franz von
Hohenlohe, the Austro-Hungarian Military Attache in
St Petersburg, told Nicolas de Basily of the Russian
Foreign Office: "Do you understand that you cannot go to war? If you do,
you will expose yourself to revolution and the ruin of your power."61
Already in February 1913, Conrad questioned, in a letter to Berchtold,
whether an action against Serbia would necessarily involve a Russian
intervention.62
There may have been an element of wishful thinking in such prognoses and
calculations. Yet it cannot be said that either the Kaiser or the Archduke had
at Konopischt completely dismissed the danger of a
general conflict. A European war had been anticipated by them, though they
talked about it in rather hypothetical terms and also differed in their predictions.
According to Jaroslav Thun, the German Emperor said: "If - God forbid we
should ever have a war against France and Russia, then Italy will be with
us." Predictably, Franz Ferdinand commented: "If-God forbid - we
should ever have a war against Russia, then Italy will be against us.!"63
One particular scenario leading to a European war was definitely discussed at Konopischt. In the unpublished part of his memoir, Andreas
von Morsey relates what he had heard being discussed
by the Archduke and his guest: "As a result of the turmoil in Albania, one
feared that there would be a Serbo-Greek attack on Albania, which would then
make Bulgaria march and without fail also Romania, leading inevitably to the
outbreak of a European conflagration."64 Just how this would have worked
out to such a culmination is not explained by Morsey,
but presumably he meant that Austria-Hungary and Germany would at some stage
intervene. It is at least clear that Franz Ferdinand and Wilhelm II had been
considering worst-case eventualities.
The Konopischt meeting, Samuel Williamson
insisted in 1991, had been "quite prosaic and humdrum"65 Curiously,
some historians have been hard at work even quite recently to deny that
anything of any importance happened at Konopischt.66 "It had all been very
innocent", maintains another book about Franz Ferdinand.67 However, it is
worth noting how Franz Ferdinand's Slovak adviser at the Belvedere, Milan Hodza, recollected Konopischt:
"It was not an improvised exchange of views. Carefully prepared memoranda
had been dispatched from Belvedere and Berlin, and were treated on the same
level as certain Austro- Hungarian military problems which at that time
attracted the attention of Berlin and Vienna." 68 Baron Eichhoff wrote in 1926 that, two months before the Kaiser's
arrival in Konopischt, Franz Ferdinand (staying at Miramare near Trieste at the time) was already busy
preparing for the visit.69 The fact that the Konopischt
meeting was no ordinary social get-together of royals is also confirmed in Burian's diary. Burian was at the
time Tisza's official representative in Vienna and would make it his business
to pry into everything. He recorded (on 17 June) his disappointment at what he
saw as the "very weak" result of the meeting: "weak
interrogation [of Wilhelm Il], unsatisfactory answer on Romania and Bulgaria,
pussyfooting around'. It would appear that Burian
(intensely disliked by Franz Ferdinand) had only heard a watered-down account
of the meeting - for if Conrad von Hötzendorf, who
had himself admittedly fallen out of Archducal favour
by this time, only found out from Colonel Metzger on 5 July that Wilhelm II had
at Konopischt recommended speedy action, there is no
reason to suppose that Burian would have been better
informed. But his diary observations do at least demonstrate that there had
been high expectations surrounding the German Emperor's visit.70
Was, then, the mid-june 1914 meeting at a
Bohemian castle meant to coordinate sinister plans for war? The thesis that Konopischt was a "council of war" for a general
European conflict is certainly incorrect. Even Fritz Fischer, proponent of
German guilt for World War One, rejected this thesis about Konopischt.
He maintained, however, that "it is correct as far as the preparations for
a war between Austria and Serbia were concerned".71 That is to say, for a localised European war. Graydon Tunstall, a noted authority
on Austro-Hungarian and German military planning before 1914, notes briefly
that the Konopischt meeting was meant "to
reaffirm Germany's unconditional support for Austria-Hungary".71 An
obvious question arises here: why would Franz Ferdinand, given his known
preference for sorting out domestic matters before embarking on an aggressive
foreign policy, contemplate a hostile action against Serbia in June 1914? After
all, as he so vigorously stated to Berchtold in a
letter of 1 February 1913, the first thing was "to put one's own house in
order". He wanted external peace in order to be able to carry out "an
energetic internal clean-up", and only then "the time will come to
pursue a vigorous foreign policy".73 For the Archduke, this concern over
domestic affairs meant above all the abolition of Dualism. But the Emperor,
after what the Belvedere circle had in spring assumed to be his last days, continued
stubbornly to live on. Franz Ferdinand thus had to postpone his showdown with
the Hungarians. Would he therefore not oppose rather than support a risky
foreign adventure given that nothing had yet changed at home?
As discussed in the preceding pages, however, by mid-1914 much had
changed for the worse in Austria-Hungary's Balkan position. And some impetus
for an active Balkan engagement may well have come from Franz Joseph himself
rather than his nephew: According to the testimony of Geza
von Daruvary who had worked in the Emperor's cabinet,
Franz Joseph had since the Balkan War of 1912 become increasingly convinced
that it would come to an armed conflict with Serbia." It was seen in a
previous chapter that during the October 1913 crisis concerning Serbian troops
in Albania he was prepared to go all the way along a military path and that he
even envisaged circumstances in which he would initiate a war against Serbia
(i.e., that he would not allow a Serbo-Montenegrin union). Certainly, Franz
Joseph was by mid-1914 highly concerned about the Balkan situation in general. Burian's diary supplies evidence that he was especially
worried about Romania. On 8 June Burian had a long
meeting with the Emperor who told him that he had "lost all confidence in
Romania".75 His instruction to Franz Ferdinand to investigate with Wilhelm
II at Konopischt whether Austria-Hungary could count
on Germany reflected these concerns and could only have been related to the
idea of a pre-emptive strike.
Some experts, it should be emphasized, have emphatically argued that no Konopischt scheme against Serbia existed in the first
place. Thus Samuel Williamson: "At no point, however, had the archduke and
the German Kaiser discussed any military action against Serbia." But
Williamson does not address some relevant points made by Jozsef
Galantai, the Hungarian historian on whose work he
does sometimes rely. In 1979 Galantai published, in
German, his book on Austria-Hungary and the World War, an oeuvre which stands
out because of its mastery of important Hungarian sources. About Konopischt, Galantai notes the
position agreed there by Franz Ferdinand and Wilhelm II, whereby
"Austria-Hungary should stand up to Serbia - the sooner, the better - even
if that provokes Russia's intervention which Kaiser Wilhelm guaranteed to
shield." And then Galantai continues with
reference to the Archduke's well-known fondness for an alliance of the three
conservative Empires (Austria-Hungary, Germany, Russia): "At this time
Franz Ferdinand's preferred foreign policy conception had already been shaken,
and he no longer believed that a revival of the Three Emperors' League was
still relevant to actual situation."77 If so, and if the Archduke, as will
be seen below; had also come round to the Ballhausplatz
(and Hungarian) view that Romania was defecting and that Bulgaria should be
cultivated instead, then the idea of crushing Serbia must have become quite
appealing to him.
For with one blow the regional strategic picture could be enormously
altered to the advantage of Austria-Hungary. Serbia was the military strategic
key to the whole of the Balkans: with Serbia out of the way, Romania's Balkan
position would collapse in the face of a revisionist Bulgaria to the south and
a Dual Monarchy threatening from the west. And if, as everyone in Vienna and
Budapest reckoned, a war with Russia was inevitable at some point, proceeding
against Serbia certainly made a great deal of sense in order to secure the
all-important south-eastern flank before any such general conflict became
reality. Franz Ferdinand's view; expressed to the German Kaiser at Konopischt, that Russia would for the time being remain
inactive on account of internal exigencies, underlined the need for timeliness
in such bold forward planning. A regional strike at Serbia therefore carried
wider geostrategic benefits for Germany and Austria-Hungary in terms of the
overall European balance of power.
From Konopischt
to the Matscheko Memorandum
While a historiographical consensus about what took place at Konopischt may never emerge, one particular vignette spun
about the meeting at the Bohemian castle and relating to the idea of a general
war is no longer seriously discussed, as historians generally agree that it
rested on fiction. The matter in question is a startling article published in
1916 by Henry Wickham Steed, the former Vienna correspondent of The Times. Here
he quoted information that he had received to the effect that the Kaiser had
come to Konopischt proposing a dramatic
transformation of Europe after a European war that Germany would begin by
provoking Russia: following a German victory, the old Polish state, also
comprising Lithuania and the Ukraine, would come to life again - a kingdom for
Franz Ferdinand, to be inherited by his eldest son, Maximilian; whereas the
Archduke's second son, Ernst, would become the king of a new realm that would
include Bohemia, Hungary, most of Austria's Southern Slav lands, Serbia and
Salonika. German-Austria would come under Archduke's Otto's son, Karl, but it
would be, with Trieste, brought into the German Reich so Germany would become
an Adriatic power. This enlarged Germany would enter into a close and perpetual
military and economic alliance with the proposed two new states, making the new
power constellation "the arbiter of Europe," commanding the Balkans
and the route to the East. Berlin could look then at will bring, say, Holland
and Belgium, into "the Great Confederated German Empire."
Steed presented his information in the context of the parental concern
felt by Franz Ferdinand and Sophie for the future position of their children.
Whatever scheme that may have entailed for the post-accession period, the
second person in line to the Habsburg succession could not be ignored:
Karl, born in 1887 to Otto and a certain unfortunate Maria Josepha. In
1911 he married Zita von Bourbon-Parma who in the following year gave birth to
their son Franz Josef Otto (later known as Otto von Habsburg) - thus
strengthening the legitimate line of succession. This was the background to Steed's
sensational wartime account which, he admitted, was merely a "remarkable
hypothesis." Though he did not suggest in his article that Franz Ferdinand
had accepted the Kaiser's proposals, Steed nevertheless christened the episode
"The Pact of Konopisht".78
Quite a few historians have enjoyed attacking Steed, seeing his 1916
article as a piece of wartime propaganda. There was "not a shred of
evidence," thundered Sidney Fay, that the Archduke was plotting at Konopischt. Similarly, Luigi Albertini maintained that
Steed's story "is not authenticated and finds no credence among
historians." Interestingly, however, Alfred Dumaine, France's Ambassador
to Vienna in 1914, did not question in his memoirs the credibility of Steed's
account.79 In 1916 Robert Seton-Watson thought that Steed's article was
"extremely important," deserving of "the most serious
consideration," though he was to adopt a more guarded attitude after the
war.80 Bernadotte Schmitt, in his major work on the origins of the war, noted
that Steed's account was "discredited", and yet added: "But the
fact that it is not mentioned in the official reports of the Konopischt conversations proves nothing, as is often
asserted to the contrary, for if the two August persons did discuss any such
wild scheme as that alleged, they would in all probability keep the secret to
themselves." 81 Steed himself summarized his article again in 1924,
revealing that his source had been an Austro-Polish aristocrat and that the
Vatican had initially got hold of the sensational Konopischt
story via the Papal Nunciature at Vienna. Its contents did not seem inherently
impossible to him "given the semi-madness of the Archduke and the
ambitions of the German Emperor."82
Also in 2009 the memoirs of Vasily Strandtmann were published after lying neglected for
decades at the University of Columbia. Strandtmann
was the Russian Charge d'Affaires in Belgrade in
1914, who had in June that year gone to Venice for a health cure. Much of the
diplomatic corps from Rome was also in Venice at that time of the year, and Strandtmann naturally tried to obtain political information
from those sources. Intrigued by the news about the visit of Wilhelm II to Konopischt, he mentioned the subject to
"Baroness" Ambrozy (she was, in fact, a
Countess), the wife of Count Ludwig Ambrozy, a
counselor at the Austro-Hungarian Embassy in Rome. Smiling, she told him that
the Konopischt meeting had to do with a covert
"plot" against Serbia. Strandtmann allowed
himself a show of surprise, after that, the Countess added that the talk had
also been about "the creation of an independent Poland, as well as about
wider plans for a re-composition of Europe." Strandtmann
concluded this brief paragraph in his memoirs: Sensing that her openness had
gone too far, my interlocutor added that these were rumors without any
foundation since they emanate from people who are very skeptical towards the
Duchess of Hohenberg.83
Strandtmann does not give the precise
date of the conversation, but it is clear from the context that it took place
several days before the assassination in Sarajevo. The casual manner in which
he mentions this encounter with the Countess, and the otherwise reliability of
his memoir, remove grounds to imagine that he might have wanted to fabricate
evidence to support Steed's disclosures. If the Konopischt
story (as recounted by the Countess and by Steed) indeed originated in circles
hostile to Franz Ferdinand's wife, it could demonstrate that those circles were
on permanent alert to identify and expose any conniving by the royal couple.
And while Countess Ambrozy's
talking about some "plot" might have been unfounded rumors generated
by the enemies of the Duchess of Hohenberg, but the simultaneous mention of a Konopischt plan regarding Serbia tallies, intriguingly,
with the sketchy and yet compelling evidence presented by Conrad. 84
Wilhelm II was racing in his yacht Meteor at Kiel when the news reached
him that the Archduke and his wife had been assassinated. Prince Lichnowsky, Germany's Ambassador to London, was staying
with Wilhelm II on his yacht on the day of the Sarajevo assassination, and
related the Kaiser's reaction to the event: "His Majesty regretted that
his efforts to win the Archduke over to his political ideas had thus been
rendered in vain."85 Edward Goschen, the British
Ambassador to Berlin, was also one of Wilhelm's guests. On Monday 29 June Goschen was at the railway station as the Emperor was
departing from Kiel. The Ambassador recorded him in his diary as saying what a
"dreadful blow" the assassination had been to him: "both because
it was only a fortnight ago that he had been staying with them and seen their
happy family life - and because it was such an upset of everything they had
planned and arranged together."86
The German Kaiser left Konopischt late on 13
June. Just a day later, Foreign Minister Berchtold
arrived at the Bohemian castle. Morsey speculates
that Berchtold may have been kept away during
Wilhelm's stay because the Emperor was supposed to dislike him. But Morsey also gives what was probably a more important
reason: "Berchtold's presence would have sent
alarm signals to the outside world, and one did not wish to 'make Europe
twitchy".87 The Foreign Minister came accompanied by his wife, Nandine. Again, however, this was to be more than a social
occasion. True, Berchtold did have the opportunity to
inspect the rose garden and look at the Archduke's weapons and art collections,
but the two men then got down to a "confidential talk."88 This must
have been very confidential indeed, because when on 17 June Berchtold
talked to Tschirschky, the German Ambassador to
Vienna, the latter was told next to nothing about the Konopischt
meeting. Franz Ferdinand, Berchtold said, had been
"supremely" satisfied by Wilhelm's visit. But the only matter specifically
mentioned by the Foreign Minister, as reported by Tschirschky
to Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg in Berlin, was the
Archduke's complaint to the Kaiser about Tisza and his treatment of Romanians
in Hungary. Significantly, however, Berchtold did say
that the Royals had "thoroughly" discussed "all possible
questions," and that they had reached full accord "in every
respect".89
Now, the fact that Berchtold had been briefed
by Franz Ferdinand immediately after the meeting with Wilhelm II has been
linked by some historians with the genesis of a famous document produced in
Vienna on the eve of the July Crisis, named after Franz von Matscheko,
the Ballhausplatz mandarin who had drafted it.
Following the assassination in Sarajevo the revised version of this so-called
"Matscheko Memorandum," sent to Berlin,
became famous as part and parcel of the so-called "Hoyos Mission" that was to obtain
Germany's notorious "blank cheque" for action against Serbia. It is,
therefore, a paradox that the analyses and recommendations of the original,
pre-assassination version of the document, which dealt with issues in the
Balkans, are alleged, at times emphatically, to constitute proof of Austria-
Hungary's peaceful foreign policy intentions. If for no other reason,
therefore, this document requires a detailed examination.
According to Manfried Rauchensteiner,
it was Franz Ferdinand who had suggested to Berchtold
during the latter's visit to Konopischt that a
detailed memorandum is prepared on the Balkan situation, and that this Austrian
assessment should then be used for an intensive exchange of views with Berlin.
"The Ballhausplatz," Rauchensteiner
writes, "went to work immediately." 90 Whether the idea to produce a
thorough appraisal of challenges facing Austria-Hungary in South Eastern Europe
had indeed come from the Archduke cannot be established with certainty. But
given that Franz Ferdinand had just had wideranging
talks with the Emperor of Germany on precisely that subject, that he had
summoned Berchtold to Konopischt
immediately thereafter, and that a draft memorandum lay completed in the Ballhausplatz by 24 June, it is entirely feasible that the
whole exercise had originated during Berchtold's
meeting with Franz Ferdinand on 14 June. Berchtold's
biographer Hugo Hantsch implies strongly that this
was indeed the case. A memorandum was needed since it was not really certain
whether, as Hantsch suggests, the Archduke had
managed to educate the Kaiser about "the importance of Balkan problems for
the Monarchy" - problems important also for the alliance between
Austria-Hungary and Germany. 91 It is also entirely possible, however, that the
Kaiser required no further education or convincing. As Berchtold
had made clear to Tschirschky, the full accord had
been established at Konopischt "in every
respect, skeptics" and the Archduke had pronounced himself extremely happy
about the visit. If so, the Kaiser did not need a Ballhausplatz
memorandum, but his advisers presumably did - people like Chancellor Bethmann Hollweg, and Jagow; the
Foreign Secretary - especially if a forward policy in the Balkans had been
agreed on at Konopischt. For this reason, it could at
Konopischt quite possibly have been Wilhelm II who
suggested to Franz Ferdinand that such a memorandum be put together for the
benefit of his Government - which could account for Berchtold's
presence in Konopischt so soon after the German
guests had departed. In other words, complete agreement regarding Balkan policy
had yet to be reached. What became known as the "Matscheko
Memorandum" was certainly supposed to lead the way, that is, to convert
Berlin's skeptics into supporters of Vienna's vision of what needed to be done
in the Balkans.
Historiography, however, has pointed out some deeper roots regarding the
provenance of the Memorandum. Some scholars have traced it back to Tisza's own
"Denkschrift" of mid-March 1914. Sidney Fay
called this "Tisza's Peace Program," and AJP. Taylor maintained that
the Ballhausplatz memorandum of 24 June 1914
"had originated with Tisza". Fritz Fischer went so far as to assert
that the Memorandum handed to the Germans on 5 July had been "compiled by
Tisza".92 So what had Tisza been urging? In his analysis of 15 March, he
attacked the 1913 Peace of Bucharest for having created a situation which could
not bring genuine, lasting peace. His concern related primarily to the danger,
as he saw it, of Bulgaria coming to terms with Romania, Serbia, and Greece -
under Russian patronage. This, he argued, would tilt the military balance in
Europe and provide the Russian-French combination with the necessary
superiority to attack Germany. Europe's center of gravity should thus be seen
as lying in the Balkans, and Germany should understand that the region was of
decisive importance to its interests and not just those of Austria-Hungary.
"The Triple Alliance," Tisza warned, "could not make a greater
fatal error than to push Bulgaria away." His analysis assumed throughout
that Serbia was an enemy. Without offering any concrete proposals to placate
Romania, he saw an improvement in relations with the latter only as a
consequence of a stronger Austro-German affiliation. The task of
Austria-Hungary was to work, together with Germany, on disentangling Romania
and Greece from Serbia and getting those two reconciled with Bulgaria, which
should be enlarged at Serbia's expense.93 Implying a war against Serbia, this
was hardly a peace program. Tisza's biographer Gabor Vermes has observed that,
although the memorandum did not mention territorial conquest, its goals
"carried serious implications, because they involved reversing dominant
trends in the Balkan peninsula."94
As will be seen next; a great deal of Tisza's reasoning would indeed be
echoed in the Matscheko Memorandum of 24 June. To be continued
in the next part...
1. Heinrich Lammasch. Seine Aufzeichnungen, sein Wirken und seine
Politik. Edited by Marga Lammasch and Hans Sperl, 1922, p.81.
2. Milan Hodža, Federation in central Europe:
reflections and reminiscences, 1942, p.51-52.
3. Josef Redlich,
Schicksalsjahre Österreichs 1908–19: Das politische Tagebuch Josef
Redlichs,1953, vol.I, diary
entry for 6 May 1914,
p.599.
4. Ibid., diary entry for 13 May 1914, p.602.
5. Kanja
Kraler, Gott schütze Österreich! Vor seinen
,Staatsmännern', aber auch vor seinen ‚Freunden'. Das Tagebuch des Hanns Schlitter, Diss. Innsbruck 2009.,
diary entry for 28 May 1914, p.228.
6. Andreas von Morsey in personalia. (Pisarna c. kr. nižje gimnazije) pp.53-54
7. Ibid., PP.55-56. In the 1920's and 1930's Morsey
produced several versions of his memoir, one of which was published in a
drastically abridged form: "Konopischt und Sarajewo. Erinnerungen",
Berliner Monatshefte, June 1934
8. Kraler,
"Schlitter", diary
entries for 26 March 1914
and 2 April 1914, pp.131 and 145
9. Christopher H.D. Howard, The Vienna Diary of Berta de Bunsen, 28
June-17 August 1914, Bulletin of the Institute of Historical Research, London,
51 (1978), p.222.
10. Boyer, Culture and Political Crisis, P.597, n.136, and p.365. Boyer
criticizes Rudolf Kiszling, one of Franz Ferdinand's
biographers, for skirting this issue. Rumors about Franz Ferdinand's health
already began to emerge in the first half of 1913. At the beginning of April, Count Hardegg told Schlitter, the Director of Staatsarchiv,
that the Heir of the Throne was ill, but stated the cause of illness as
tuberculosis. See Kraler,
"Schlitter", P.145, diary
entry for 2 April
1913.
11. Schuster, Henry Wickham Steed und die Habsburgermonarchie, P.114. On Steed see also Harry Hanak, Great Britain and Austria-Hungary During the First
World War, London, 1962.
12. Redlich, Schicksalsjahre, vol.2, diary
entry for I4 January 1917, p.259.
13. Ibid., vol.1, diary entry for 7 May 1914, p.599
14. Kurt Sendtner, Rupprecht von Wittelsbach. Kronprinz von Bayern, Munchen, 1954, pp.75-176
15. A. von Morsey MS, Personalia, P.40.
16. Robert William Seton-Watson, Sarajevo, a study in the origins of the
Great War, 1926, p.100.
17. Rudolf Kiszling, Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand,1953 p.280.
18. G. von Jagow, Ursachen und Ausbruch des Weltkrieges, Berlin, 1919,
p.
19. Prince Lichnowsky; Heading for the Abyss:
Reminiscences, London, 1928, p.71.
20. Richard Bassett, For God and Kaiser: The Imperial Austrian Army from
1619 to 1916, New Haven-London, 2015, p.427.
21. Paul Nikitsch-Boulles, Vor dem Sturm,1925, p.82.
22. A. von Morsey MS, Personalia, pp.48-49.
23. "Der Tag von
Sarajevo. Konopischt", Die Kriegsschuldfrage:
Berliner Monatshefte, Berlin, no.8, August 1925, p.562. The note by Tirpitz was dated
"mid-June 1914" and was first published in Darmstadter
Tageblatt on 28 June 1925.
24. Theodor Wolff, The Eve of 1914, 1936, p.391.
25. Die Große Politik der
europäischen Kabinette 1871–1914, vol.39, 1926, no.15736, private letter Treutler to Zimmermann, 15
June 1914.
26. Karl-Heinz Janssen (ed.),
Die graue Exzellenz. Aus den Papieren Karl Georg von Treutlers, Frankfurt/Main
- Berlin, 1971, p.156.
27. Österreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik
von der Bosnischen Krise 1908 bis zum Kriegsausbruch 1914 (ÖUA), ed. L. Bittner, A. F. Pribram,
H. Srbik and H. Uebersberger
(9 vols., Vienna and Leipzig, 1930), vol.8, nos. 9845, 9846, 9847, 9852 and
9863.
28. Redlich, Schicksalsjahre, vol.I, diary entry for 28 April 1914, P.597.
29. Ibid., diary entry for 13 June 1914, p.606.
30. Große Politik,
vol.39, no.15736.
31. Ibid.
32. Conrad von Hötzendorf, Aus meiner Dienstzeit, 1921, vol.4, P.36.
33. Ibid., pp.38-39.
34. Seton-Watson, Sarajevo, p.97
35. Hermann Kantorowicz,Gutachten zur Kriegsschuldfrage 1914,1967,
p.223.
36. Alfred von Wegerer, Die Widerlegung der Versailler Kriegsschuldthese,
Berlin, 1928, p.207.
37. Große Politik,
vol.39, no.15737, letter Tschirschkyto
Bethmann Hollweg, 17 June 1914.
38. Karl Freiherr von Bardolff, Soldat im alten Osterreich,1938, P.179.
39. Th.v.
Sosnosky, Erzherzog Franz Ferdinand, 1929, p.166. Andreas Morsey
was evidently also upset by Metzger's revelation and wrote that he then checked
with several witnesses who, just like Morsey, were
present in the Ilidza hotel on 27 June 1914. Those
witnesses reassured him that it was all "an absolute
misunderstanding". But Morsey does not inform
his readers how it had come to such a misunderstanding, nor does he name his
witnesses. See Morsey, Konopischt
und Sarajewo, Berliner Monatshefte
(June 1934) p.48.
40. Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the war of 1914, vol.2, pp.17-18.
41. Sidney Bradshaw Fay, The Origins of the World War,1928, vol.2, n-49,
p.41.
42. Bernadotte E. Schmitt Schmitt, The Coming
of the war 1914,1930, vol.I, p.169
43. H.W Wilson, The war Guilt, London,1928, p.169.
44. Kantorowicz, Gutachten,
pp.225-226.
45. ÖUA, Vol.7, no.8934, report Berchtold,
dated 28 October 1913, on a conversation with the German Emperor held in
Vienna, on 26 October 1913.
46. Cited in Fritz Fischer, War of Illusions, 1975 p.225. Emphases in
the original.
47. ÖUA, Vol.7, no.9009, private letter Szogyeny
to Berchtold, 19 November 1913.
48. ÖUA, vol.y, nO.9096, private letter Velics to Berchtold, 16 December
1913.
49. ÖUA, vol.8, nO.9739, telegram Szogyeny; 25
May 1914; GP, vol.jx, nO.15541, Beth¬mann
Hollweg to Tschirschky, 6 April 1914.
50. In known essay, Professor John Rohl argues
that in November 1912 Wilhelm II gave Austria-Hungary a "blank
cheque" for a war of aggression against Serbia, and that, ever since, this
was "the settled policy of the entire Berlin leadership". Rohl does not mention the German Kaiser's efforts in 1913
and 1914 to push Vienna towards reaching a rapprochement with Serbia in order
to ease the burden of the anticipated war with Russia. See John C.G. Rohl, "Jetzt oder nie. The Resurgence of
Serbia and Germany's first "blank cheque" of November 1912' in
Dragoljub R. Živojinović, (ed.), The Serbs and the
First World War, Belgrade, 2015, pp.57-77.
51. Große Politik,
vol.39, no.15715, Tschirschky to
Bethmann Hollweg, 23 March 1914; no, 15716, telegram Treutler, 24 March 1914.
52. Telegram
Treutler, 5 April 1914, contained in Große Politik,
vol.38, no.15541, Bethmann Bollweg to Tschirschky, 6 April 1914.
53. Große Politik,
vol.39, no.15716, telegram Treutler, 24 March 1914.
54. Cited
in Galantai, Die Osterreichisch-Ungarische
Monarchie und der Weltkrieg, p.197.
55. ÖUA, vol.7, no.9470, report Szogyeny; 12
March 1914.
56. ÖUA, vol.7, no.8934, Berchtold's account,
dated 28 October 1913, of a conversation with Wilhelm II on 26 October 1913.
57. ÖUA, vol.7,no.8708, record of a meeting in Berlin between Jagow and Forgach, 25 September
1913.
58. Kraler, 'Schlitter', diary entry for 17
January 1914, P.194.
59. Szilassy,
Der Untergang, p.259.
60. Somary,
Erinnerungen, p.113.
61. Nicolas de Basily, Diplomat of Imperial
Russia 1903-1917: Memoirs, Stanford, 1973, p.90.
62. Conrad, Aus meiner
Dienstzeit, vol.3, p.119.
63. Kraler, "Schlitter", diary entry
for 5 August 1914, p. 259.
64. Morsey, Personalia, pp.51-52.
65. Williamson, Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First 1Vorld war,
p.164.
66. See, for example, Ales Skrrvan, Schwierige Partner. Deutschland
und Osterreich-Ungarn in der europeischen Politik der
Jahre 1906-1914, Bamburg, 1999, pp.377-379. In his book on Franz
Ferdinand, Jean-Paul Bled also dismisses the Konopischt
meeting, arguing that the talks were mainly about Romania and that the subject
of Serbia was hardly broached. See Bled, Franz Ferdinand, p.274.
67. Greg King and Sue Woolmans, The
Assassination of the Archduke: Sarajevo 1914 and the Murder that Changed the
World, London, 2013, p.151.
68. Hodza,
Federation in Central Europe, p.58
69. Reichspost, Wien, 28
March 1926, p.1.
70. István Diószegi (ed.), Aussenminister Stephan Graf Burian. Biographie und
Tagebuchstelle, Annales Universitatis, Sectio historica, 8, p. 169-208, 1966.
71. Fischer, War of
Illusions, p.419.
72. Graydon A. Tunstall, Jr., Planning for War Against Russia and
Serbia: Austro-Hungarian and German Military Strategies, 1871-1914, Boulder,
1993, p.139.
73. Cited in Robert A. Kann, Stanley B.
Winters. Archduke Franz Ferdinand And Count Berchtold
During His Term As Foreign Minister, 1912-1914, pp..122-123.
74. Heinrich Friedjung, Franz Adlgasser, Margret Friedrich, Geschichte in Gesprächen,
vol.2, p.449
75. István Diószegi,
Burian. Biographie und Tagebuchstelle, diary entry for 8 June 1914,
76. Williamson, Austria-Hungary
and the Origins of the First.World War, p.165.
77. Galantai, Die Osterreichisch-Ungarische Monarchie und der Weltkrieg,
p.203
78. Henry Wickham Steed, The Pact of Konopisht,
The Nineteenth Century and After, vol.79, February 1916, pp.253-273.
79. Fay, The Origins of the World war, vol.2, P.36; Luigi Albertini, The
Origins of the war of 1914, Oxford, 1952, vol.2, p.18; Alfred Dumaine, La dernière ambassade de France en
Autriche,1921, p.127. The United States diplomat Charles Vopicka,
who served at the time as the envoy to Romania, Serbia and Bulgaria, provided
in his memoirs a slight variation to the Konopischt
story related by Steed (without mentioning Steed) in that he asserted Sophie's
personal involvement in plotting with the Kaiser against Serbia and also
discussing with him war with Russia. Unlikely as this sounds, one should
nevertheless bear in mind Sophie's general interest in political matters. See
Charles J. Vopicka, Secrets of the Balkans: Seven
Years of a Dilomatist's Life in the Storm Centre of
Europe, Chicago, 1921, pp.46-47.
80. R.W Seton-Watson, German, Slav, and Magyar: A Study in the Origins of
the Great war, London, 1916, pp.111-112; Seton-Watson, Sarajevo, pp.98-99.
81. Schmitt, The Coming of the war, vol.I,
p.170.
82. Steed, Through Thirty Years, vol. I, pp.396- 199.
83. Strandman, Balkanske
uspomene [Balkan Memoirs] Knjiga
I.,Zagor Beograd, 2009, pp.254-
84. At this point, it should perhaps be noted that Kaiser Wilhelm II did
have a predilection for suggesting grand re-arrangements of the continental
order. In March 1914 the European press was speculating about an interview
given to Novoe Vremya by an
unnamed Russian source, generally assumed to have been Count de Witte, the
former Finance Minister. The paper's interlocutor revealed a sensational plan
which had been broached: the concluding of an alliance between Germany and
Russia, to partition the Habsburg Empire, and the subsequent establishment of a
political coalition of Russia, France, Germany, and Britain as a guarantor of
European peace and general disarmament. In fact, according to official Serbian
documents, it was General Vladimir Sukhomlinov, the
Russian War Minister, not de Witte, who had divulged this information to Novoe Vremya. And Sukhomlinov, in turn, had been told about the whole thing
in 1913 by no less a person than Kaiser Wilhelm II. Spalajkovic,
the Serbian Minister at St Petersburg, was informed in the editorial offices of
Novoe Vremya that the
Kaiser had suggested the following to Sukhomlinov:
that the burgeoning armaments race was intolerable; that the conclusion of an
alliance between Germany, Russia, France and Britain should put an end to it;
and that this should be accompanied by a settlement of the Alsace- Lorraine
question, as well as by a division of "Austria" (i.e., the Habsburg
Empire) between Russia, Germany, the Czech lands, Hungary and the "Yugoslav
states". For the reaction in Austria-Hungary see, for example, Die Wahrheit über die Enthüllungen der Nowoje Wremja, Pester Lloyd, Budapest, 29 March 1914 (Morgenblatt).
85. Lichnowsky, Heading for the Abyss, p.71
86. Howard, The Diary of Edward Goschen, p.
289.
87. Morsey MS, Personalia, p.52
88. Hugo Hantsch, Leopold Graf Berchtold, 1963, vol.,2 p.544.
89. Große Politik,
vol.39, no.15737, letter Tschirschky
to Bethmann Hollweg, 17 June 1914.
90. Manfried
Rauchensteiner, Der erste Weltkrieg, 2013, p.33.
91. Hantsch, Leopold Graf Berchtold,
vol.2, p.545.
92. Fay; The Origins of the World war, vol.2,p.189; A.J.P. Taylor, The
Struggle for Mastery in Europe, Oxford, 1954, p.516; Fritz Fischer, Germany's
Aims in the First World War, New York, 1967, p.53.
93. ÖUA, vol.7, no.9482, memorandum Tisza, 15 March 1914.
94. Gabor Peter Vermes,
Istvan Tisza,1966, p.212.
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