By Eric Vandenbroeck
"We started
the war."
On the day of the assassination in Sarajevo,
Franz Joseph was enjoying himself at his beloved Kaiservilla
in the spa resort of Bad Ischl, set in the
spectacularly beautiful region of Salzkammergut, east
of Salzburg. He had an interesting neighbor there: Ernst August, the exiled
Crown Prince of Hanover, who, owing to a blood connection with the British
Royal House, also held the title of the 3rd Duke of Cumberland. When he heard
about the assassination, "Herzog von Cumberland" jumped into a car
and was reportedly the first to reach Franz Joseph with the news. Although
according to the Duke, the Emperor expressed his dismay, he remained
"calm" and said that he could draw comfort from the fact that the
Archduke and his wife had been "an embarrassment" for the Imperial
House.1
So much for the uncle's sympathy. Sources are not unanimous on the
identity of the first person to tell Franz Joseph about the assassination, but
most of them agree that his reaction was one of relief "For me", he
told his daughter Marie Valerie, "it is one big worry less".2 Bilinski, who saw Franz Joseph soon after the event,
reported him as being "almost relieved".3 It would seem, from the
account by Count Paar, his Adjutant-General, that the
Emperor also took something of a metaphysical view of the matter: "A
higher power", he murmured to himself, "has re-established that order
which I sadly could not preserve".4 However, it is not the case, as is
often claimed, that Franz Joseph and Prince Montenuovo,
the master of Court ceremonies, had contrived to demean the royal couple,
evincing deliberate pettiness and malevolence with regard to the funeral
arrangements. The coffins holding Franz Ferdinand and Sophie, having been
transported to Trieste by sea on Viribus Unitis, were put on a special train which reached Vienna's Sudbahnhof station on the night of 2 July. They were then
brought to the Hofburgkapelle, the Habsburg family
chapel. Austrian scholarship has exploded the myth that there was anything
disrespectful about the details in these proceedings. On the contrary, what
took place was a "generous interpretation" of a strict royal
protocol. The Duchess was accorded the treatment reserved for members of the
Imperial House. It is simply not true that her coffin, lying in state in the
chapel, was placed lower than that of the Archduke; and the pair of white
gloves, displayed together with a fan in front of her coffin, were not put
there as a reminder of her former status of lady-in-waiting, but rather placed
there as symbols appropriate to a female member of the Imperial House.5
Nevertheless, the occasion did perhaps require more attention and greater
sensitivity; for the impression became current that Franz Ferdinand and Sophie
had been buried "with undeserving haste".6 On 4 July, in accordance
with the Archduke's will, he and the Duchess found their final resting place in
the family vault beneath Schloss Artstetten, Lower
Austria.
As with Franz Joseph, not many people in the Empire were particularly
distressed by the news of the assassination. Sigmund Freud, the celebrated
Viennese founder of psychoanalysis, remarked on 29 June that if Franz Ferdinand
had come to power, there would probably have been a war between Austria and
Russia.7 Ludwig Thalloczy of the Joint Finance
Ministry wrote in his diary on 28 June that the Archduke's death spared the
Monarchy, and Hungary, from the shocks which his ascendance of the Throne would
certainly have entailed.8 War Minister Krobatin
admitted that his ministry now felt "freed" from a certain pressure.9
The Austrian writer Stefan Zweig described how he had on 28 June found himself
in the lovely spa resort of Baden near Vienna, sitting in a park, reading while
listening to music being played by a band nearby. Suddenly, the music stopped.
A crowd gathered around the bandstand to read why for a placard had just been
put up. This announced that Archduke Franz Ferdinand had been assassinated, and
also his wife. "But to be honest," writes Zweig of the crowd,
"there was no particular shock or dismay to be seen on their faces, for
the heir-apparent was not at all well liked." He lacked, according to
Zweig, everything that counted for popularity in Austria: "amiability;
personal charm and easygoingness". The music later resumed. 10
Politically, however, it was a different story. In Sarajevo, the
authorities released the criminals from the prisons and put them under the
command of well-known city ruffians. The resultant mob, mostly Croat, embarked
on a savage anti-Serb pogrom, burning and looting. Ivan Kranjcevic,
a Croat and friend of the Sarajevo assassins, recalled that "a
well-dressed man" walked in front of the "demonstrators,"
holding a list of Serb houses and shops to be attacked and their contents
demolished. Behind them moved the police, tasked with protecting this
"patriotic work."11 Bizarrely, all Roma musicians from Serbia were
arrested by the police and expelled.12 Following the assassination, vicious
anti-Serb violence also took place in Zagreb and elsewhere in Croatia,
Slavonia, and Dalmatia. From the outset, both the Austrian and the Hungarian
press pointed their accusing fingers at Belgrade. In Vienna's 4th Bezirk, there were daily demonstrations around the Serbian
Legation in Paulanergasse, near Favoritenstrasse,
but here the police held off the crowds, though they numbered hundreds, even
thousands. Particularly active were young members of Catholic associations who
blew whistles to make a deafening noise. The revolted crowd burned the Serbian
flag and sang the patriotic repertoire: "Wacht
am Rhein", the "Kaiserlied" and the
"Prinz Eugen-Lied", Showing political awareness, it shouted:
"Long live Bulgaria!" outside the nearby Bulgarian Legation, and
"Down with Russia!" at the Russian Embassy in the neighbouring
3rd Bezirk.13
In the wake of the murders in Sarajevo, the emerging reflex in the
Habsburg establishment was pretty much in tune with the sentiments displayed by
the crowds besieging the Serbian Legation. Following the assassination of the
royal couple, it took less than forty-eight hours for most of the Empire's
small decision-making elite to decide that Austria-Hungary should go to war
against Serbia. Count Alexander ("Alek") Hoyos,
Berchtold's chef de cabinet, related in a private
conversation with Hans Schlitter on 24 July that war had been decided upon
"immediately after the arrival of the news of the assassination".14
This was an exaggeration, but only a slight one. On 28 June Berchtold
was on his estate in Moravia, shooting ducks. On hearing the news, he took the
first train to Vienna. That night he was already holding meetings at the
Ballhausplatz.15 The crucial days, nevertheless, were those from Monday 29 June
to Wednesday 1 July.
Who were the chief players pushing for war? The Emperor himself,
according to Bilinski, was "determined on war
from day one". 16 In fact already in 1913 he had been quite clear that he
would wage war rather than watch Serbia and Montenegro merge into one state. It
is obvious from his conversation with Conrad von Hotzendorf
on 5 July 1914 that he had decided on war and was merely waiting for assurances
of German support.17 Had he wanted to prevent a war against Serbia in July
1914, he could easily have done so, even though the Habsburg establishment was
in July 1914 teeming with combative jingoists. Predictably, one of those most
vehement after 28 June in demanding a war against Serbia was Feldzeugmeister Potiorek in
Sarajevo. Of course, he would have been a hawk in any confrontation with
Belgrade, but now he had even more reason, for the assassination had showed up
his incompetence and he wanted to "wash it off with blood".18 Equally
predictably, Conrad now moved to exploit the new opportunity opened up by
Sarajevo. The Chief of General Staff saw Berchtold on
29 June, to energetically demand action against Serbia. Berchtold,
however, appeared to him undecided. Although he said that the moment had
arrived for "the solution of the Serbian question", he also talked,
to Conrad's horror, about the need to await the results of the enquiry into the
Sarajevo assassination and about the possibility of making certain demands on
Serbia, for example that it should abolish certain associations and dismiss the
Interior Minister.19
But the diplomat Berchtold soon turned into a
most tenacious advocate of the military option. In fact, his declared position
in the crisis proved crucial to the fateful decisions that followed in the
course of July Yet on the face of it, he was the most unlikely of warmongers.
This self effacing, fabulously rich aristocrat was
above all a bon vivant, with an interest in arts, apparel, horse racing and
women. It was said of him, as Redlich noted in his diary, that he was very much
"in need of love" and was on the lookout everywhere for attractive
prostitutes. 20 Legendary was the meticulous attention Berchtold
paid to his attire. On one occasion, a visitor at the Ballhausplatz
was amazed to spot in the ante-chamber to his office four overcoats, four hats,
four pairs of hand gloves and four canes. The guest was later told that the
Minister always had those ready, so that he could choose when going out,
whatever best suited the weather conditions, the clothes he happened to be
wearing and his own mood. Berchtold had reportedly
also installed a wonderful system of secret bells for dealing with difficult
questions raised by his visitors. Concealed push buttons for different foreign
policy areas were electrically connected to the offices of the relevant
Ministry experts: a Berchtoldian push of the
appropriate button and the specialist official would soon turn up by apparent
chance to help out his Minister.21 Count Berchtold
was "a frivolous aristocrat, but the Foreign Minister of
Austria-Hungary", according to A.J.P. Taylor.22 "Fop, dandy,
la-di-da", is how Winston Churchill described him. Berchtold
was, in the opinion of the British statesman, "one of the smallest men who
ever held a great position".23 In his memoirs, the former German
Chancellor Prince Bulow wrote of "Count Leopold Berchtold,
whose frivolous incapacity far exceeded even Austrian standards". 24
Although he was a competent enough Ambassador at St Petersburg, almost
no one took Berchtold seriously When, however, his
name began to be mentioned among the candidates to succeed the previous Foreign
Minister Count Alois Aehrenthal, some of his
colleagues were suddenly alarmed. Julius Szillasy,
who worked for him in St Petersburg, as well as Pourtales,
the German Ambassador in Russia, thought initially that press speculation about
his candidacy for the post of Foreign Minister was "a bad joke". Szillasy even predicted that if Berchtold
ever became Minister, it "could result in world war".25 Popovic, the
Serbian Minister at St Petersburg, reported in March 1912 that Berchtold's appointment at the Ballhausplatz
had caused great surprise both in Russian society and in the diplomatic corps
because it was considered that he "was not up to the job".26 Early in
1912, as he lay dying, Aehrenthal recommended three
names as his possible successor: Burian, Miklos Szecsen (the Ambassador to France) and Berchtold
- in that order. The first two, however, being genuine Hungarians, differed
from Berchtold who held both Austrian and Hungarian
citizenship. Burian, in particular, could never gain
Franz Ferdinand's approval. The new chief at the Ballhausplatz
would have to be the least objectionable candidate, not necessarily the ablest.
Under pressure from the Heir to the Throne, but also from the Emperor, Berchtold eventually and reluctantly accepted the post.27
Berchtold, indeed, knew his limitations
and became Foreign Minister in February 1912 only out of loyalty to the old
Emperor. As to the extent to which he then formulated foreign policy,
especially in 1914, this remains open to question. For there are just too many
appraisals by contemporaries to the effect that it was actually Janos Forgach who ran the Ballhausplatz
in the first half of that year. After his controversial period as Minister in
Belgrade, from where his Legation sent the forgeries that later led to the Friedjung trial, Forgach had been
moved as Minister to the quiet diplomatic backwater of Dresden, Saxony. Berchtold then brought him back to the Ballhausplatz
in August 1913, and in October promoted him to Second Section Chief (political)
in the Ministry. In this position he was able to influence, as Ludwig Bittner
wrote, "the most important foreign policy decisions".28 This may
actually have been an understatement, for it seems to have been much more a
question of control than mere influence. Count Anton Monts,
the distinguished German diplomat, related in his memoirs that, once Forgach got to the Ballhausplatz,
he in fact "usurped" many functions that should have been managed by
Berchtold.29 Thalloczy noted during the July crisis
that Forgach behaved as if he, not Berchtold, was the Foreign Minister.30 Everybody knew,
according to the Ballhausplatz mandarin Emanuel Urbas, that Berchtold was
"interested only in women", and not in his office business which was
conducted by would-be Foreign Minister Forgach.31 The latter was by all
accounts very adroit and diligent, but also disdainful of his boss and other
colleagues. When a diplomat from the French Embassy mentioned to him a
conversation he had had with Berchtold, Forgach immediately complained: "For God's sake, why
do you go to Berchtold and [Karl von] Macchio, they don't know what they are talking about, you
just come and talk to me."32
The significance of Forgach wielding so much
power at the Ballhausplatz in July 1914 is that he
was very anti-Serbian, telling Szilassy, his fellow
Hungarian, that he would like to see the inscription "delenda est Serbia" hung on the walls of every office at the Ballhausplatz. To Forgach the
destruction of Serbia was the "fundamental condition" for the
continued existence of the Habsburg Monarchy.33 King Carol of Romania, always
well informed, spoke disparagingly of Berchtold at
the height of the July 1914 crisis, accusing him of falling under the influence
of the "mighty" Forgach, whom he described
as Serbia's "personal enemy",34 However, Forgach
was a Slavophobe not just a Serbophobe,
and many historians are quite wrong to see his hostility to the Serbs as
stemming from the period when he was Minister in Belgrade between 1907 and
1911. He did, admittedly, have a difficult time there following the scandal
with the forgeries, but his anti-Slav reputation had been established and
talked about long before that. In January 1907, while serving in Athens, Jovan
Jovanovic found out that Forgach would be the next
Austro-Hungarian Minister in Belgrade, and having known him from their days in
Sofia, he immediately raised the alarm. Describing Forgach
as "very nasty", Jovanovic pleaded that his appointment be prevented
if at all possible, and quoted what the Russian Military Attache
in Bulgaria had told him in 1903 about Forgach:
"Be careful with him. He is the greatest enemy of Slavdom, he is ready for
anything".35 In July 1914, Forgach was not only
ready for anything, he was also supremely confident. "The premier military
power in the world", he told Alexander Spitzmüller,
"is our ally!"36
One of the reasons why Forgach had become so
important at the Ballhausplatz was his friendship
with the Hungarian Prime Minister Tisza. Karl von Macchio,
Berchtold's deputy, emphasized in his short memoir
devoted to the July crisis that "without Tisza, one could not make foreign
policy", and that Forgach for his part was the
"indispensable intermediary" between Vienna and Budapest. Forgach, according to Macchio,
pushed after the Sarajevo assassination for a policy that did not repeat
Austria-Hungary's "inglorious" crisis handling of the Balkan Wars.
This could itself only mean war. Apart from Forgach, Macchio named Alexander von Hoyos
and Alexander von Musulin as the two other Ballhausplatz mandarins forming part of the inner circle of
Berchtold advisers.37 Among the Ballhausplatz
hawks from July 1914, Count Hoyos is perhaps the best
known because he was the man with the mission to
Berlin; a mission crowned by Germany's so-called "blank cheque"
of support to Austria-Hungary. He had as early as October 1913 advocated
marching on Belgrade, and was at the time, according to Emanuel Urbas, "the most resolute" advocate at the Ballhausplatz for an immediate intervention.38 Musulin, for his part, is widely credited for drafting the
notorious Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Serbia of 23 July 1914, a task
entrusted to him because of his stylistic mastery of the French language.39
Always described as a Croat in world literature on the July crisis, he had in
fact a Serb background, his ancestors stemming from the village of Musulinsko near Gomirje, Croatia,
an area settled by Serb families and forming a part of the Militargrenze
against the Turks. But those ancestors had at some stage embraced the Catholic
faith and so their branch of the Musulin tribe became
"Croat". In any case, meeting at the Ballhausplatz
on 29 June, with Forgach and Hoyos
also in attendance, Musulin was already arguing that
this was "the last moment" to win the Croats over to the idea of a
war against Serbia.40
Forgach, Hoyos
and Musulin were by no means the only ones at the Ballhausplatz advocating a settling of accounts with
Serbia. Prince Gottfried Hohenlohe, only recently designated as
Austria-Hungary's next' Ambassador to Berlin, was equally hawkish.41 So was
Count Friedrich ("Fritz") Szapary; the
Ambassador in St Petersburg, who happened to be in Vienna at this time. And so,
too, must have been Macchio who wrote an apologetic
article for the Berliner Monatshefte in 1936, but
who, in 1909, fumed that "the Serbian ulcer" had to be "squeezed
out" either by war or revolution.42 In the 1970S and 1980s, the Austrian
historian Fritz Fellner and the British specialist on
the late Habsburg Empire John Leslie documented how these mostly younger
officials and diplomats, all of them Aehrenthal's
disciples and admirers of his forward foreign policy, worked to steer Berchtold towards war against Serbia.43 They formed a
"fronde of diplomatic cadets" who,
according to Leslie, "welcomed, even deliberately provoked".war.44
Certainly, after the fighting began, while the going was still good, Musulin boasted that he had been the initiator of the war.
On the other hand, just after the war Hoyos seriously
considered suicide because he felt so burdened by his "historic
responsibility".45 Leopold von Andrian-Werburg,
the Austro-Hungarian Consul General in Warsaw who had been summoned to Vienna
in mid-July, left a very revealing short record of his impressions from that
period. "We started the war," he wrote, "not the Germans and
even less the Entente - that I know." Specifically, he thought that it was
his friends Hoyos, Forgach,
Musulin and possibly Szapary
who had "made the war". 46
The Blank Cheque and the Matscheko memorandum
It seems that it did not take Berchtold's
colleagues a very long time to persuade him what needed to be done after the
assassination in Sarajevo. On 1 July the Hungarian Prime Minister Tisza wrote
to Franz Joseph, complaining that he had learned from Berchtold
of his intention to use the Sarajevo outrage as the occasion for settling
accounts with Serbia.47 In other words, some forty-eight hours after the
assassination at the latest, the Foreign Minister of Austria-Hungary was set on
a Balkan collision course. A very important document confirms this. By 1 July a
re-worked, shortened version of the Matscheko
memorandum of 24 June (discussed in part one)
was ready. Together with a handwritten letter from Franz Joseph to Wilhelm II,
dated 2 July, it was to be taken to Berlin to enlighten and warn the German
ally about the impending catastrophe for the Habsburg Empire, and indeed for
Germany, if nothing was done in the Balkans.48 Of course, those two documents,
associated with the so-called Hoyos mission in Berlin
of 5-6 July, were thereby meant to secure Germany's cover for a violent,
military finale to the differences between Austria- Hungary, and Serbia.
The person chosen by the Foreign Minister to liaise with the Germans was
his chef de cabinet Count Alexander Hoyos, an
Englishman on his mother's side. Hoyos was well
connected in Germany, but more importantly, he was one of the principal
warmongers at the Ballhausplatz. In the evening hours
of Saturday, 4 July, he boarded a train for Berlin. Franz Ferdinand and Sophie
had been entombed at Artstetten earlier in the day. Berchtold's emissary carried in his briefcase two documents
prepared at the Ballhausplatz: a letter from Franz
Joseph to Wilhelm II, which Hoyos had drafted
himself, and the Matscheko Memorandum, adapted by Berchtold, Matscheko and himself,
In addition, Hoyos carried in his head Berchtold's verbal instructions which emphasized Vienna's
assessment that the moment for settling scores with Serbia appeared to have
arrived.49 This youngish diplomat, as it turned out, had embarked on a
dramatically fateful diplomatic assignment. The ill-famed result of his journey
was the extraction of a 'blank cheque' from Wilhelm II on 5 July, officially
confirmed on 6 July by his Chancellor Bethmann
Hollweg. Austria-Hungary received, in the words of Konrad Jarausch,
"one of the most momentous assurances in European history".50
Wilhelm II talked to Count Szogyeny; the
serving Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to Berlin, on 5 July over a dejeuner at the
New Palace in Potsdam. Hoyos had previously handed
the Ambassador the paper work from Vienna and was not present at the meeting -
on that day he was conducting informal talks with Under Secretary Zimmermann at
the German Foreign Office. In the evening hours of 5 July Szogyeny
informed the Ballhausplatz that Wilhelm II had in his
presence read "with the greatest attention" the documents brought by Hoyos. This must have taken a while. Franz Joseph's
personal letter to the German Kaiser was admittedly relatively short. But the
new rendition of the Matscheko Memorandum was still a
heavy-going piece of analysis of considerable length: eight densely printed
pages in the Austrian collection of documents as opposed to the ten pages taken
up by the original of 24 June. At any rate, the German Emperor certainly
grasped the gravity of the moment. He told Szogyeny
that he had to bear in mind the possibility of "a serious European
complication" and could therefore not give a definitive answer before
consulting with Chancellor Theobald von Bethmann
Hollweg. However, in his view, Russia was "not remotely" ready for
war and would think twice before resorting to arms. And he would
"regret" it, he said, if Austria-Hungary did not use the existing
favorable moment to proceed against Serbia. As far as Romania was concerned, he
would see to it that King Carol and his advisers behaved correctly. And although
he had not "the slightest confidence" in King Ferdinand of Bulgaria,
he would "not in the least" object to an Austro-Bulgarian pact as
long as it contained nothing directed at Romania.51
"Now or never."
Clearly, the German Emperor was ready to back Austria-Hungary against
Serbia. But then, he had made up his mind even before Hoyos
had arrived. "Now or never," he commented on the margin of a report
his Ambassador Tschirschky had sent to Bethmann Hollweg on 30 June, informing the Chancellor about
the widespread fervor in Vienna to square things with the Serbs. Tschirschky, however, added that he had been warning the
Austrians against taking "hasty steps." Here, Wilhelm II scribbled
what became one of his famous pieces of marginalia: "Who authorized him to
do that? That is very foolish! ... The Serbs must be put away and right
now." Only a few days earlier, on 21 June, the Kaiser talked to the
Hamburg banker Max Warburg, expressing his concern about Russia's rearmament
program and prioritization of its railway construction. He was "more
nervous than usual", anticipating that Russia's preparations might lead to
war by 1916, and wondering whether it would not be better "to strike out,
instead of waiting".53 This was certainly in keeping with his pronouncements
at Konopischt, but if he wanted to take on Russia the
best way was firstly to create security on Germany's south-eastern flank.
The encouragement, however, that Wilhelm II extended to Szogyeny on 5 July was unofficial. As he indicated to the
Ambassador, Bethmann Hollweg would also need to be
consulted. Unfortunately for the peace of Europe, the Reichskanzler now chose
to accept the risk of continental war entailed by an attack on Serbia. In the
afternoon hours of 5 July, Wilhelm II told him about the meeting with Szogyeny By this time Bethmann
Hollweg had already read the two documents brought by Hoyos.
It was not Germany's business, the Emperor said, to be telling the Austrians
how to respond to the bloody deed in Sarajevo; Germany should strive by all available
means to stop the Austro-Serbian quarrel turning into an international
conflict; but Franz Joseph should know that Germany would not abandon
Austria-Hungary in its hour of need, as Germany's vital interest was the
preservation of an intact Austria; finally, the idea of attaching Bulgaria to
the Triple Alliance was 'good', though this should not be done at the cost of
alienating Romania. "These opinions of the Kaiser," the Chancellor
recalled later, "corresponded with my own."54
On 6 July, accompanied by Zimmermann, he met with Szogyeny
and Hoyos to give them the official German position. Hoyos must have been overjoyed as he listened. According to
the report of the meeting bearing Szogyeny's
signature, Bethmann Hollweg accepted the basic
premise of the Matscheko Memorandum: that Russia's
plan to build a Balkan League posed dangers not just to Austria-Hungary but
also to the Triple Alliance itself. He only stipulated that Bulgaria's
adherence to the Triple Alliance should not prejudice obligations towards
Romania. The latest events, he said, made him realize that Austro-Serbian
harmony, which he had previously advocated, was now "virtually
impossible." And "whatever" Austria-Hungary decided to do, it
could rest assured that Germany would stand behind it as friend and ally. An
"immediate intervention" against Serbia was the "most radical
and best solution" to Austria-Hungary's Balkan problems. From the
international point of view, the Chancellor considered the existing moment for
such an intervention as more favorable than a future one.55
This was outright incitement. Not that Berchtold
and his bellicose coterie of Aeherenthal adherents at
the Ballhausplatz needed any real encouragement - all
they needed was assurance of Germany's certain support. That support, however,
was decisive. Hoyos, in his 1922 booklet, referring
to this mission in Berlin, claimed that Berchtold
would have been prepared to pull back from a confrontation with Serbia had
Germany advised him to do so.56 There is every reason to believe him:
Austria-Hungary was simply too weak to risk a war against Russia without
Germany's secondment. Little did the Ballhausplatz
think that the Germans would, in the end, be so forthcoming. In a brief memoir
dealing specifically with his Berlin assignment (first published by Fritz Fellner in 1976) Hoyos further
disclosed a remarkable detail from his meeting with Bethmann
Hollweg on 6 July. On this occasion, he told the Chancellor that, although
Austria-Hungary considered a military clash with Serbia unavoidable sooner or
later, it was prepared to content itself for the time being with closer ties to
Bulgaria - "in case Germany believed that a later moment would be more
favorable from a European point of view." Hoyos
was thereby passing on the message of the Austro- Hungarian leadership that it
would not attack Serbia without German approval. This would have meant no war
at all, local or otherwise, in the summer of 1914, but Bethmann
Hollweg reacted immediately to squash this option, promising Germany's
"entire might" if Austria-Hungary deemed it necessary to proceed
against Serbia.57 It was the moment when one person, and one person alone, Bethmann Hollweg, could have stopped the war from breaking
out, but chose not to, indeed chose to encourage it instead. Clearly, then,
although there was no shortage of war enthusiasm in Vienna, the German leaders
were dashing ahead. Hoyos later told Luigi Albertini
that Bethmann Hollweg had on 6 July "twice
over" urged "immediate action against Serbia, the international situation
being "entirely in our favor".58
The Calculations of the German
Chancellor
Bethmann Hollweg gained much notoriety
after he had, on 4 August 1914, declared the Belgian neutrality treaty to be
just a "scrap of paper".59 And his shocking September 1914 program,
envisaged a sweeping reshuffle of the existing European system to make way for
German hegemony.60 But his pre-war reputation was that of a responsible
statesman. The British in particular had a good opinion of him. At the height
of the July crisis, Hoyos sent a long letter to Lord
Haldane, whom he knew from the period when he had served at the
Austro-Hungarian Embassy in London. The letter, sent with Berchtold's
approval, suggested that Russian intrigues stood behind the Sarajevo
assassination. "Englishmen should realize," Hoyos
wrote, "what the whole world would look like ... if Russia held the
Balkans and Constantinople." For good measure, Hoyos
warned that Russia might turn its eyes "towards India." Haldane noted
that the letter "is an attempt to scare us into neutrality with the
Russian bogey. The one hope is that Bethmann-Hollweg's influence in Berlin will
prevail."61
This hope, as it turned out, was utterly misplaced. A little earlier
that year the Chancellor would probably have been a good receptacle for it.
Like "Wilhelm II, Bethmann Hollweg had not long
previously been counseling Vienna to be nice to the Serbs, warning Berchtold in February 1913 in very sharp terms that if
Austria-Hungary waged war on Serbia, he would consider it "a mistake of
immeasurable consequence." But Bethmann Hollweg
was only urging restraint for tactical reasons: out of a belief that cracks had
begun to appear in the Triple Entente and that Britain was slowly moving away
from it. He, therefore, wanted this process to be given a chance to
"ripen".62 The subsequent course of British policy, however, was to
disappoint his expectations. By July 1914 he was highly pessimistic about
Germany's overall international position and worried, in particular, by recent
Anglo-Russian naval discussions. He considered Russia's military strength to be
"growing fast," whereas Austria-Hungary was increasingly "weak
and inert."63 Russia, in fact, was his obsession. The German Chancellor
perceived it as the main enemy and, together with other Slavonic nations, as
the greatest future threat.64
On 8 July Bethmann Hollweg's private secretary
Kurt Riezler noted in his diary some details in the
Chancellor's thinking: "If war does not come about, if the Tsar does not
want it or if France, dismayed, counsels peace, so we still have the prospect
of taking apart the Entente."65 What was on the Chancellor's mind? Serbia
abandoned by Russia really meant Russia abandoned by France. For one would not
wage war without the other and differing views on whether to defend Serbia
could split the unity of their alliance. And if it were the Tsar himself who
desisted from war, Russia would still end up humiliated. Indeed, Bethmann Hollweg allowed himself to imagine that, by
unleashing the Austrians against Serbia, he could pick up major winnings on the
cheap. Riezler related in 1915 that his boss believed
Russia might "swallow a slap in the face," namely the occupation by
Austria-Hungary of Belgrade together with a part of the Serbian state.66 This
was the concept of the so-called "limited war" - one limited to
Serbia. V.R. Berghahn's account of the July crisis
points out that the advantages of the plan to proceed against Serbia seemed
eminently obvious to the Chancellor: "the strengthening of the Central
Powers, the weakening of Russia and of Pan-Slavism, the soothing of the Right
at home".67
Bethmann Hollweg's name will forever
be associated with the premise of "calculated risk". Interestingly
enough, in spring of 1914 his right-hand man Riezler
published a book which elaborated this concept within a theory of deterrence.
To Riezler, wars in modern times were on their way
out because they had become "an antiquated form of fighting". By
contrast to the not so expensive conflicts in previous centuries, modern states
would now; if they wished to wage wars, have to incur massive financial
expenditure and set in motion armies numbering millions. "The risk",
according to Riezler, "has become greater than
the benefit." In these circumstances, wars would be conducted only if the
chances of success were very high, and the risk of defeat was very low. Wars
would "no longer be fought but calculated". Armaments thus served an
important purpose: "Guns do not fire, but they have a say in the
negotiations." However, Riezler also pointed out
that the element of bluff had become "the chief requisite of the
diplomatic method": if two parties confront each other, the victor will
not always be the one who is the more powerful, but rather the one who can
longer sustain his claim that he will strike out.68
The whole point, however, about Bethmann
Hollweg in July 1914 is that he was not bluffing. On 7 July he told Riezler: "An action against Serbia could lead to a
world war." Then on the following day he opined: "Should war come
from the east, so that, namely, we fight for Austria-Hungary and not
Austria-Hungary for us, we have a chance of winning it."69 He meant that,
in a war against Serbia started by Austria-Hungary and provoking a Russian
response, Germany could at least count on the support of its ally. In other
words, the scenario of a wider war had been taken into account by the
Reichskanzler. Even with France at Russia's side, he thought, the Central
Powers were in a good position, for he and those surrounding him were convinced
that "England did not want war".70 In 1917 the newspaper editor
Theodor Wolff, critical of the Chancellor's conduct in 1914, put it to him that
an arrangement to prevent war would have been possible at Austria's cost. But Bethmann Hollweg snapped back: "Who can say that? And
if war had come after Russia had rearmed where would have that left us?"71
In 1916, Riezler related to Wolff the estimate of the
German General Staff in 1914 that the war against France would last 40 days.
"Bethmann", Riezler
said, "had pondered the risk very carefully."72
Bethmann Hollweg's musings on the
relationship between Germany and Austria-Hungary, related to Riezler on 7 July, focused on "our old dilemma"
whenever Austria conducted an action in the Balkans: "If we encourage
them, they say we pushed them into it; if we discourage them, they say we let
them down. Then they draw closer to the open arms of the Western powers and we
lose our last passable ally."73 As it transpired, it was the Chancellor's
own "open arms", extended towards Vienna, which made all the
difference between war and peace - at least in the Balkans. He must have been
excited by the panorama that opened up after the Sarajevo assassination.
Certainly, he wanted to be in charge of it, making sure, on 6 July, to send
Wilhelm II on a cruise off Norway, for he did not want to risk any interference
from the bumbling Emperor.
Quite possibly, Bethmann Hollweg may have
believed that Russia would not act in the event of an Austrian step against
Serbia. In a letter to Theodor Wolff, written in 1930, Riezler
pointed out that the German military had in 1914 underestimated Russian
preparedness for war, and that the German political leadership could only have
based its policy on those military assessments. If so, the First World War
broke out because of the failure of German military intelligence. A realistic
assessment of Russian military capabilities in the summer of 1914 might have persuaded
Germany not to issue its "blank cheque" to Austria-Hungary Be that as
it may, the hoped for scenario in which Russia did not intervene still
required, from the German point of view, a swift Austro- Hungarian action
against Serbia. As Bethmann Hollweg explained to Riezler, he needed "a quick fait accompli" in
Serbia. Once this "shock" had passed, the Entente could be talked to
in a 'friendly' way 75 No one knew, of course, how the situation would develop
- whether Russia and Britain would go to war - and in mid-July Bethmann Hollweg himself confined to Riezler
that he saw the whole action as "a leap in the dark".76 Under
Secretary Zimmermann, however, apparently had a much clearer picture. He told Hoyos on 5 July that there was a 90 per cent chance of
"a European war" if Austria-Hungary moved against Serbia.77 It is
difficult to believe that he was the only policy-maker in Berlin with such an
assessment.
Thus it is clear that in the case of Germany a preventive war was very
much contemplated, there would be no bluffing a la Riezler.
Discussing German policy in July 1914, Christopher Clark contends that there
was 'nothing' in the reaction of the German leaders to suggest that they
"viewed the crisis as the welcome opportunity to set in train a long-laid
plan to unleash a preventive war on Germany's neighbors". Their own
contribution to the unfolding of the crisis, according to Clark, was
"their blithe confidence in the feasibility of localization." It may
reasonably be argued, however, that even such a "localization," i.e.,
a war limited to the Balkans, was entirely within Germany's power to prevent -
what was the point of the Hoyos mission if not to get
permission from Berlin to start a local war? The smoking gun, denied by Clark,
in the story of July 1914 is to be found in Bethmann
Hollweg's refusal even to consider the scenario put to him by Count Hoyos that Austria-Hungary would desist from attacking
Serbia if Germany considered the moment to be unfavorable.79
In that fateful month of July 1914, as Professor John C. G. Röhl has argued, Germany pursued a "twin-track
policy." Its minimum aim was the elimination of Serbia, "thereby
improving the starting position for the Triple Alliance in a war that might be
brought about against Russia later"; its maximum aim was "the
immediate unleashing of a continental war" against Russia and France in
conditions deemed to be favorable.80 Everything in July 1914, however, stemmed
from Bethmann Hollweg's blank cheque to Vienna. In
the words of Professor Hew Strachan, "it was indeed blank." The
crisis was not made in Germany, but Germany's role was decisive given that it
had a de facto veto over Austria-Hungary's proposed course of action. The
Habsburg lap dog was unleashed on 6 July 1914.
Tisza and the War
One of the most powerful persons in the Dual Monarchy did not appear
particularly enthusiastic about a war in the Balkans. As has been seen, Tisza
wrote to Franz Joseph on 1 July to denounce Berchtold's
plan for a reckoning with Serbia. His initial opposition to the war option
forms a prominent chapter in the mammoth historiography of the July crisis.
Historians are fascinated by this strong man who was both constitutionally and
politically in a position to prevent what became the greatest bloodbath in
human history Wilhelm Fraknoi, who wrote a short
study of Tisza just after the Great War, levelled a charge against him for not
having resigned and continued his 'peace policy' as a leader of a mighty
opposition.82 In fact, Tisza, despite being a Calvinist and a "deeply religious
man,"83 never had a genuine peace policy, only a refined grasp of tactics.
Franz Ferdinand's death must have come as welcome news to the Hungarian
Prime Minister who, soon after the assassination, told the Bosnian Serb
politician Danilo Dimovic: Dear God has so willed it,
and we must be grateful to dear God for everything." He had, Dimovic wrote, emphasized the last words "in a strange
way".84 Prince Ludwig Windischgraetz, who
arrived in Budapest on the day of the Sarajevo assassination, recalled soon
after the war: "I found the whole political world of Buda Pesth as though freed from an incubus. Tisza's party made
no attempt to conceal their joy."85 In keeping with this, one of Tisza's
main concerns immediately after the assassination was to prevent members of
Franz Ferdinand's military chancellery from connecting with Archduke Karl, the
new Heir to the Throne.86 The Hungarian Prime Minister wanted no polluted
ideological legacy bequeathed to the new Heir to the Throne. But no sooner had
Franz Ferdinand, the greatest threat to Hungary's privileged position in the
Habsburg Empire, been eliminated, Tisza now also found himself opposing the
settling of accounts with Serbia because he could see in the proposed action a
new threat to Hungary- not from Serbia, but rather from Romania. As he told Berchtold on 30 June, his fear was that a war against
Serbia would invite a Romanian invasion of Siebenburgen
(Transylvania), an area of east Hungary heavily populated by ethnic Romanians.
The Hungarian historian Galantai lays great emphasis
on this point in Tisza's calculations.87
Nevertheless, in July 1914 Tisza was not against the war as such, only
against its proposed timing. When he objected to a military solution, in his
appeal to Franz Joseph on 1 July, he drew attention to what he saw as a very unfavourable regional picture: Romania was as good as lost,
and Bulgaria, the only state in the Balkans which could be counted on, was
"exhausted". What Tisza wanted to see was a more favourable
"diplomatic constellation" whereby Bulgaria would be drawn to the
Triple Alliance without, however, such a development antagonizing Romania.
Bulgaria was to Tisza the key state in the Balkans. He argued that if Germany
could not ensure an open declaration of loyalty by Romania to the Triple
Alliance, then at least Bulgaria should be secured, something that should not
be put off "out of love for Romania". This ambiguous regional picture
was the only thing Tisza wanted to clear up before proceeding against Serbia.
"In the present Balkan situation", he wrote candidly to Franz Joseph,
"it would be my least bother to find a convenient casus belli". 88
Indeed. Back in October 1913, at the height of the crisis over the
Serbian Army's operation in Albania, Tisza spoke of "inflicting a military
defeat" on Serbia, should the latter not withdraw its forces from Albania.
"One must here not waiver or prolongate", he said at the Ministerial
Council meeting on 3 October.89 In chapter thirteen mention was made of Tisza's
pronouncement to Baron Julius Szilassy in December
1913, that a war with Serbia was unavoidable and that Russia would for internal
reasons not intervene under any circumstances. Historians of the July crisis,
however, have generally paid much more attention to Tisza's fear of the consequences
of annexing Serbia, that is to say, of the ensuing increase in the number of
Slavs in the Monarchy. Yet the historian Jozsef Galantai believes this much discussed aspect of his conduct
during the July crisis played only a secondary role for the Hungarian
statesman. What really concerned him was the risk of a Romanian incursion into
Hungary, and he argued against war merely because he believed that a later
juncture would be more favourable for the Central
Powers."? This point is also stressed by Tisza's biographer Gabor Vermes:
in early July 1914 the dividing line in the Habsburg establishment "lay
not between hawks and doves in a sharply polarized sense", but rather
between those, like Berchtold and Conrad, who pushed
for immediate action, and those, like Tisza and Burian,
who wanted to delay it in order to manoeuvre
diplomatically.91
The meeting of the Joint Ministerial Council on 7 July is one of the
most discussed episodes in the run up to the outbreak of the First World War
-largely because Tisza stood alone against a united front of Habsburg ministers
clamouring for war. But it was something of a
non-event. By this time, of course, the "Hoyos
mission" had secured the backing of Germany for an Austro- Hungarian
attack on Serbia. Indeed Hoyos was also present,
entrusted with the task of recording the minutes of the proceedings. Berchtold, presiding, advocated making Serbia "forever
harmless"; the Austrian Prime Minister Karl von Stürgkh
thought that any action against Serbia should end up in war; the Joint Finance
Minister Bilinski opined that a Serb understood
"only force"; and the Joint War Minister Krobatin
asserted that if nothing was done the South Slav provinces would see it as a
sign of weakness. Tisza tried cleverly to exploit the success of the Hoyos mission - one aspect of it, that is. Surely, he
argued, now that Germany had agreed to the idea of drawing Bulgaria into the
Triple Alliance, one could follow up by creating a Bulgarian-Turkish
counterweight to Romania and Serbia which could force Romania to return to the
fold. But he also barked against Germany: "It is none of Germany's
business to judge whether or not we should strike out at Serbia now;" He
proposed that Serbia should be presented with tough (but not "unacceptable")
demands and then with an ultimatum if those demands were not fulfilled. What he
wanted to see was a diplomatic effort that would lead to Serbia's "heavy
humiliation". Berchtold, however, along with the
other ministers, dismissed a purely diplomatic victory over Serbia as
"worthless". The meeting thus ended inconclusively. 92
Of course, in permitting the idea of an ultimatum to Serbia, the logic
of Tisza's position had begun to move towards war. Indeed, once he learned over
the next few days that Romania would in all likelihood remain neutral and,
moreover, that Germany considered the moment for war as being possibly the best
from the point of view of the prevailing power relations in Europe, his
position evolved accordingly.93 As Galantai remarked,
had Tisza been fundamentally against war, there would have been nothing for him
to adjust his attitude.vs John Leslie suggests that
it was Forgach and, even more decisively, Burian, who helped to move Tisza to the immediate war
option.95 By 14 July, in a meeting with Berchtold, Stürgkh and Burian, Tisza was no
longer an opponent of war, insisting only that there should be no acquisition
of Serbian land save for minor frontier modifications. He even boasted to
Ambassador Tschirschky that he had sharpened some
points in the ultimatum to Serbia which was being prepared. The explanation he
gave to Tschirschky - that he had found the
pronouncements of the Serbian diplomats and the Serbian press
"unbearable" - is hardly credible.96 What may have swayed him, in
addition to the attitude of Germany, was the fear that the substantial Serb
population in southern Hungary could, with Serbia's backing, pose a significant
threat sooner rather than later. More importantly perhaps, he must also have
realized that Serbia's defeat would bring Romania back into line and thereby
remove the support which the Romanians of Transylvania had hitherto been
receiving from their brethren. As for his opposition to annexing Serbian
territory, he was, by November 1914, proposing, because of "very important
strategic concerns", the annexation of north-western Serbia (Macva), Belgrade, and the area around Negotin
in north-eastern Serbia. These were, as Marvin Fried has observed, "by no
means minor frontier rectifications". In the final analysis, Tisza's
change of direction at the end of the second week of July should be ascribed to
his Hungarian nationalist instinct. He knew; as Gustav Erenyi
wrote in 1935, that the notions of "Great Hungary" and the
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy' were inseparable.98
The way was now clear for an attack on Serbia. In mid-July Tisza told
Danilo Dimovic: "We are heading for very
eventful times!" 99 Of course, the Ballhausplatz
had anticipated this somewhat earlier. Already on 11 July Karl von Macchio went to see Hans Schlitter, the Director of the
State Archive, with a "strongly confidential" request for copies of
the war manifestos of 1859 and 1866, which he needed as models. 100 On that
same day the text of the ultimatum to Serbia was also being discussed in
Vienna, with Burian present as Tisza's
representative. Present, too, was Conrad who argued that Serbia should be given
a maximum of forty-eight hours to reply to the ultimatum. On 14 July, at the
meeting in Berchtold's "Strudlhof"
Vienna residence which saw Tisza line up behind the Ballhausplatz
position, the Hungarian Prime Minister also endorsed a draft of the ultimatum
containing several deliberately "unacceptable" points which moreover
imposed a forty-eight hour time limit for the reply. At Burian's
suggestion it was agreed at the same time that the ultimatum should be
delivered only after the French President Poincare had ended his visit to the
Tsar at St Petersburg.101 Later that day Tisza talked to the German Ambassador,
informing him that the ultimatum would be formulated in such a way as to make
its acceptance as good as "impossible".102 On the following day, 15
July, Tisza spoke in the Hungarian Parliament. "War", he said,
"is a very sad ultima ratio." However, he then added that every
nation and state, provided it wished to remain a nation and a state, must be
able and willing to resort to war after all other possibilities of solution had
been exhausted. 103 As will be seen, Tisza's speech would be noted with great
apprehension by the Serbian Prime Minister.
The Wiesner Report
Although everybody now wanted war, finding a good excuse for it proved
somewhat elusive. On 13 July Berchtold made a
remarkable admission while meeting Ludwig Thalloczy;
one of Bilinski's closest associates at the Joint
Finance Ministry. Talking to this Balkan expert, the Austro-Hungarian Foreign
Minister complained: "that only scant information exists in the records
about the Great Serbian movement." For his part, the Balkan specialist was
unable to help. Thalloczy could only assuage the
Foreign Minister that the Great Serbian idea lived "in the souls" of
the Serbs. 104 Nothing, it may be observed, better illustrates the weakness and
absurdity of the Austro- Hungarian case against Serbia on July 1914 than this
exchange between Berchtold and Thalloczy.
The person at the Ballhausplatz who had been charged
on behalf of Berchtold with the task of searching the
documentation to establish a connection between Great Serbian propaganda and
the assassination was the legal expert Friedrich von Wiesner. He had commenced
work on this over a week earlier, on 4 and 5 July, in the Foreign Ministry, but
been unable to find "much useful material." On 7 July Wiesner found
himself digging away in the Joint Finance Ministry, but here too the materials
were "sketchy and inadequate." Having found nothing terribly helpful
on the Great Serbian movement in either the records of the Ballhausplatz
or the Joint Finance Ministry, he was then ordered, on 9 July, to travel to
Sarajevo in order to liaise with the local authorities there and, as he
understood it, to look for "conclusive evidence" of a linkage between
the murders in Sarajevo and the Serbian Government.
But this was a hurried exercise, meant to follow the timetable already
set in Vienna. Wiesner was given until 13 July to complete his work. He arrived
in Sarajevo on the 11th and duly reported on the 13th, the day of Berchtold's conversation with Thalloczy
As Wiesner himself wrote in 1928, "time was pressing", since the
ultimatum to Serbia would probably have to be delivered on 25 July: by which
day, the Ballhausplatz "itinerary" (as
Wiesner called it) foresaw that the French President would end his visit to St
Petersburg. This meant that Austria-Hungary's missions abroad would have to be
instructed by 20 July "at the latest" to make diplomatic
preparations; and this, in turn, made 19 July the last possible date to hold
the next Joint Ministerial Council meeting. Before then, however, a few days
had to be allowed for the Foreign Minister to hammer out a consensus between
the Austrian and Hungarian prime ministers, beginning with an initial meeting
due to be held on 14 July. So it was that Wiesner had to file his report by 13
July.105
If this is what Berchtold meant by an
"enquiry into the Sarajevo assassination" - which, as seen above, he
mentioned to Conrad on 29 June then it was a complete farce, designed to
produce a specific conclusion to fit in with and underpin the whole mechanism
of steps already taken to confront Serbia - for the "itinerary" of
the road to war had been set in motion, with the clock already ticking away.
Unfortunately for this scenario, the conscientious lawyer Wiesner, who had
worked very intensively in Sarajevo, failed spectacularly to provide the
appropriate decorum for this exercise. His report of 13 July on the result of
his efforts spelled out with a devastating pithiness that: "There is
nothing to show the complicity of the Serbian Government in the directing of
the assassination or in its preparation or in the supplying of weapons. Nor is
there anything to lead one even to conjecture such a thing. On the contrary,
there is evidence that would appear to show that such complicity is out of the
question."106
Wiesner subsequently complained that this paragraph had been "torn
out of its context" when used at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference to saddle
Austria-Hungary with the responsibility for the war. But was it? In his rather
brief report, he wrote of the "conviction" of the authorities in
Bosnia-Herzegovina that "Pan-Serbian propaganda" was taking place
with the encouragement of the Serbian Government. But such a
"conviction," as he knew, was, of course, no proof of anything. His
report frankly admitted that the pre-assassination material contained "no
evidence" of propaganda being encouraged by the Serbian Government. So
what was the "context" of his report? Presumably, his remark that
"sparse" but sufficient material existed to show that propaganda
efforts had proceeded "with the toleration of the Serbian
Government." And his statement that a Serbian state official, Ciganovic, and a Serbian officer, Major Tankosic,
had provided the bombs, ammunition, and cyanide. But he was careful to observe
that the bombs may have belonged to irregulars rather than have come straight
out of a Serbian state armory. He did also add that three assassins were
secretly smuggled from Serbia into Bosnia with the assistance of Serbian
frontier officers who may or may not have been aware of "the purpose of
the journey," but who must "surely" have been cognizant of the
"mysterious nature of the mission." Finally, Wiesner described the
material on the Narodna Odbrana
organization as "valuable," although it had yet to be "carefully
examined".107
Such, then, was the "context" of the Wiesner report:
propaganda had been taking place with the "toleration" of the Serbian
Government, and some Serbian officers and state officials were involved in the
arming and smuggling of the assassins. The report's key point, however, was
that there was nothing to show or even hint at the complicity of the Serbian
Government in the Sarajevo assassination. Of course, this main conclusion of
his investigations into Sarajevo was never going to be taken into account by
the Ballhausplatz which was for its part preparing,
as has been seen, an "impossible" ultimatum to Serbia. "I never
believed," Hoyos admitted in his 1922 memoir,
"that the murder of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand had been prepared or
intended by authorities in Belgrade or Petersburg."108 Presumably, in July
1914 Hoyos must also have conveyed this belief to his
colleagues and his boss Berchtold. In a sense,
therefore, Wiesner had been sent on a wild-goose chase. To establish some
connection between the Belgrade Government and the Sarajevo assassination would
have been nice to have, but ultimately this did not matter given that the
decision for war had already been taken.
1 Kielmansegg,
Kaiserhaus, Staatsmänner und Politiker. Aufzeichnungen des k. k. Statthalters
Erich Graf Kielmansegg,1966, pp.97-98.
2 Caesar Corti, Egon und
Hans Sokol, Der alte Kaiser,1966, p.413
3 Ludwig Thallóczy; Tagebucher,
diary entry for 29 June 1914 (addendum), p.13
4 Albert Margutti (Général., Freiherr
von), Kaiser Franz Joseph,1924, pp.138-139
5 Margit Silber, Obersthofmeister
Alfred Furst von Montenuovo,
pp..780-781, 787 and 789.
6 Rudolf Sieghart, Die
letzten Jahrzehnte einer Grossmacht,1932, p.242.
7 Muriel Gardiner, The case of the Wolf-Man by Sigmund Freud, London,
1972, p.91.
8 Ludwig Thallóczy, Tagebücher,
diary entry for 28 June 1914, p.6.
9 Ibid., diary entry for 4 July 1914, p.29
10 Stefan Zweig, The World of Yesterday, London, 1943, pp.168-169
11 Danilo Dimovic, Iz
mojih uspomena: Grof Stevan Tisa', Pre porod, Beograd, 10 September 1922, P.7; Kranjcevic,
Uspomene, p.62.
12 Der heutige Tag in
Sarajevo, Neue Freie Presse, Wien, 2 July 1914
(Abendblatt), p.2.
13 See reports in the Neue Freie Presse:
Die Demonstrationen gegen die Serben in Wien, 2 July
1914 (Morgenblatt), p.6; Die Demonstrationen gegen die Serben in Wien, 3 July 1914 (Morgenblatt), pp. 4-5
14 Kanja
Kraler, Gott schütze Österreich! Vor seinen
Staatsmännern, aber auch vor seinen Freunden. Das Tagebuch des Hanns Schlitter, Diss. Innsbruck
2009,diary entry for 24 July 1914, p.252.
15 Hugo Hantsch, Leopold Graf Berchtold, vol.2, 1963, pp.551-552;
Ernest U. Cormons [Emanuel Urbas],
Schicksale und Schatten. Eine osterreichische
Autobiographie, Salzburg, 1951, p.157.
16 Robert A. Kann,
Kaiser Franz Joseph und der Ausbruch des Weltkrieges, Wien, 1971, p.16.
17 Conrad von Hötzendorf, Aus meiner Dienstzeit, 1921, vol.4, p.36.
18 Rudolf Jeřábek, Potiorek. General im
Schatten von Sarajevo, p.95; Thallóczy; Tagebücher, diary entry for
July 1914, p.44.
19 Conrad, Aus meiner
Dienstzeit, vol.4, pp.-33-34.
20 Josef Redlich,
Schicksalsjahre Österreichs 1908–19: Das Politische Tagebuch Josef
Redlichs,1953, Vol. I, diary entry
for 17 May 1913, p.543.
21 Kanner, Kaiserliche Katastropben:
Politik, pp.88-89.
22 Taylor, Europe: Grandeur and Decline, p.186.
23 Winston S. Churchill, The Eastern Front, London, 1931, P.53.
24 Prince von Bulow, Memoirs 1909-1919, London-New York, 1932, p.138.
25 Szilassy, Der Untergang,
p.208.
26 DSPKS, vol.5/I, no.150, report Popovic, 7 March 1912.
27 Solomon Wank, The Appointment of Count Berchtold
as Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister, Journal of Central European Affairs,
vol.23, July 1963, pp.147-148; Hantsch, Leopold Graf Berchtold, vol I, pp.246-248. Hantsch
denies that Franz Ferdinand had directly tried to influence Berchtold
to accept the post of Foreign Minister, but admits that Berchtold's
name was not the first on the list of the contemplated successors to Aehrenthal (see p.242 and n.2 on pp.241-242). Karl von Macchio, who was under Berchtold
the First Section Chief at the Ballhausplatz, cast
doubts as to whether Berchtold's name had been put
forward by Aehrenthal in the first place. See Karl Freiherr von Macchio,
Momentbilder aus der Julikrise 1914, Berliner Monatshefte, October
1936, p.768.
28 Ludwig Bittner, Graf
Johann Forgach, Berliner Monatshefte, November 1935,
pp.955-956.
29 Karl Friedrich Nowak
und Friedrich Thimme - Erinnerungen und Gedanken des
Botschafters Anton Graf Monts,1932, p.249.
30 Thallóczy, Tagebucher,
diary entry for 7 July 1914, p.36.
31 Redlich, Schicksalsjahre, vol I, diary
entry for 3 May 1914, p.599.
32 Jovanovic, Dnevnik, diary entry for 31
August 1916, p. 156. This episode was related to Jovanovic by Alfred Dumaine,
the French Ambassador in Vienna from 1912 to 1914.
33 Julius de Szilassy. Der Untergang der Donau-Monarchie,1921, p.254.
34 Hutten-Czapski, Sechzig Jahre Politik und Gesellschaft, 1936,
p.138.
35 Vladimir Dedijer, The road to Sarajevo,
1967, vol.2/2/2, no.542, report jovanovic, 13 January
1907.
36 Alexander Bernhard Spitzmüller-Harmersbach, Und hat auch Ursach,1955, p.114.
37 Karl von Macchio, “Momentbilder aus der Julikrise 1914”, Berliner
Monatshefte 14,1936, p.731.
38 Ernest U. Cormons, Schicksale und Schatten: Eine osterreichische
Autobiographie,1951 p.143.
39 It seems clear, however, that Musulin was
by no means the only author of the ultimatum. Redlich recorded in his diary
that Hoyos and Forgach were
the principal contributors (Schicksalsjahre, vol.I, diary entry for 23-24 July 1914, p.615). Thallóczy, on the other hand, claims that the ultimatum was
drafted "entirely" by Burian (Tagebucher, diary entry for 23 July 1914, P.55).
Circumstantial evidence suggests that Berchtold, too,
had been involved. Musulin, certainly, would have
translated the German draft into the French.
40 Fritz Fellner, Die
Mission Hoyos, in Heidrun Maschl and Heidrun Maschl and Brigitte Mazohl-Wallnig,
eds. Vom Dreibund zum Völkerbund: Studien zur
Geschichte der internationalen Beziehungen,1994, p.135.
41 Österreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik von der Bosnischen Krise 1908 bis zum
Kriegsausbruch 1914 (ÖUA), ed. L. Bittner, A. F. Pribram, H. Srbik and H. Uebersberger, vol.8, no.100006, report Berchtold
on a conversation with the German Ambassador, 3 July 1914.
42 Heinrich Friedjung,
Franz Adlgasser, Margret Friedrich, Geschichte in
Gesprächen, vol.2, p.196.
43 F. Fellner, Die
Mission "Hoyos", in Fellner, Vom Dreibund zum Volkerbund;
John Leslie, Osterreich-Ungarn vor dem Kriegsausbruch, in Ralph Melville, Claus
Scharf, Martin Vogt and Ulrich Wengenroth (eds.),
Deutschland und Europa in der Neuzeit. Festschrift fur
Karl Otmar Freiherr von Aretin zum 65. Geburtstag, Stuttgart, 1988, vol.2.
44 Fellner, Austria-Hungary in K. Wilson, ed., Decisions for war,
1914,1995,pp.11-12; John Leslie, The Antecedents of Austria- Hungary's War Aims in Elisabeth Springer and Leopold Kammerhofer (eds.), Wiener Beiträge zur Geschichte der Neuzeit, vol.zo, Archiv und Forschung, Munchen,
1993, p.309.
45 Leslie,
Osterreich-Ungarn vor dem Kriegsausbruch, p.680; Cormons,
Schicksale und Schatten, p.163.
46 Cited in Fellner, Austria-Hungary, p.14. The text of
Andrian-werburg's memoir is appended to
Leslie, Osterreich-Ungarn vor dem Kriegsausbruch, pp.675-684.
47 ÖUA, vol.8, no.9978.
48 ÖUA, vol.8, no.9984. Both documents are included under this number.
49 Fellner, Die Mission
Hoyos, p.126.
50 Konrad H. Jarausch, The Enigmatic
Chancellor: Bethmann Hollweg and the Hubris of
Imperial Germany, New Haven-London, 1973, P.156.
51 ÖUA, vol.8, no.10058, telegram Szogyeny 5
July 1914.
52 Karl Kautsky, Max Montgelas
and Walter Schiicking (eds.), Die Deutschen
Dokumente zum Kriegsausbruch (DD) 194,
Berlin, 1922, no.7, marginal comments by
Wilhelm II on report Tschirschky to Bethmann Hollweg, 30
June 1914- Emphases in the original. The Kaiser wrote his comments on 4 July.
Hereafter cited as DD.
53 Egmont Zechlin, Krieg
und Kriegsrisiko. Zur deutschen Politik im Ersten Weltkrieg, Dusseldorf, 1979, p.69
54 Th. von Bethmann
Hollweg, Betrachtungen zum Weltkriege, Berlin, 1919, vol.I,
pp.135- 136.
55 ÖUA, vol.8, no.10076, telegram Szogyeny; 6
July 1914.
56 Alexander von Hoyos,
Der deutsch-englische Gegensatz und sein Einfluss auf die Balkanpolitik
Österreich Ungarns,1922, p.79.
57 Fellner, Die Mission
Hoyos, p.138.
58 Luigi Albertini, The Origins of the war of 1914, Vo.2, P.145. Hoyos also told Albertini that he had composed the telegram
of 6 July, sent to Vienna after the meeting with Bethmann
Hollweg.
59 Jarausch, The Enigmatic Chancellor, p.176.
60 Fritz Fischer, Germany's Aims in the First World War, New York, 1967,
pp.103-106.
61 Frederick Maurice, The Life of Viscount Haldane of Cloan, London, 1937, vol.1, pp.349-352. Hoyos
wrote the letter to Haldane around 15 July, but intended it to be delivered on
the day of the war declaration on Serbia. See Redlich, Schicksalsjahre,
vol.I, diary entry for 15 July 1914, p.613.
62 Die Große Politik der
europäischen Kabinette 1871–1914, vol.34/1, no.12818, private letter Bethmann Hollweg to
Berchtold, 1O February 1913.
63 Dietrich Erdmann (ed.), Kurt Riezler. Tagebucher; Aufsatze, Dokumente, Gottingen,
2008, diary entry for 7 July 1914, p.182. Hereafter cited as Riezler, Tagebucher.
64 Karl Alexander von Müller,Mars und Venus: Erinnerungen, 1914-1919,1954, p.35.
65 Kurt Riezler,
Tagebücher, Aufsätze und Dokumente, 1972, diary entry for 8 July,
1914, p.184
66 Muller, Mars und
Venus, p.37.
67 V.R. Berghahn, Germany and the Approach of
war in 1914, New York, 1993, p.200.
68 II Ruedorffer [Kurt Riezler], Grundzuge der Weltpolitik in der
Gegenwart, Stuttgart- Berlin, 1914, pp.214-216, 219 and 221.
69 Kurt Riezler, Tagebucher, diary entries for 7 and 8 July, 1914, pp.183-184.
70 Muller, Mars und
Venus, p.38.
71 Bernd Sosernann (ed.), Theodor Wolff Tagebucher 1914-1919, Boppard am Rhein, 1984, vol.1, diary entry for
19 July 1917, pp.521- 522. Hereafter cited as Wolff, Tagebucher.
72 Ibid., diary entry for 24 May 1916, p.385.
73 Ibid., diary entry for 7 July 1914, p.183.
74 Wolff, Tagebiicber, vol.z, letter Riezler to Wolff, 21 March 1930, pp.950-951.
75 Riezler, Tagebucber,
diary entry for II July 1914, p.185
76 Ibid., diary entry for 14 July 1914, p.185.
77 Fellner, Die Mission
Hoyos, p.137.
78 Christopher Clark, The Sleepwalkers, pp.519-520.
79 Clark writes in his Conclusion (ibid, P.561): "The outbreak of
war in 1914 is not an Agatha Christie drama at the end of which we will
discover the culprit standing over a corpse in the conservatory with a smoking
pistol"
80 John C. G. Röhl, Wilhelm II: Into the Abyss
of War and Exile 1900-1941, Cambridge, 2014, p.1026.
81 Hew Strachan, The Outbreak of the First Warld
War, Oxford, 2004, p.91.
82 Wilhelm Frank, Die
ungarische Regierung und die Entstehung des Weltkrieges, Wien, 1919, pp.60-61.
83 Gabor Vermes, The Liberal Vision and Conservative Statecraft of A
Magyar Nationalist. Columbia University Press, New York 1985, p.230.
84 Danilo Dimovic, Iz
mojih uspomena: Grof Stevan Tisa, Pre porod, Beograd,
1O September 1922, P.7.
85 Ludwig Windischgraetz, My Memoirs, London,
1921, P.49.
86 Thallóczy, Tagebucher,
diary entry for 3 July 1914, p.22.
87 Josef Galantai, Stefan Tisza und der
Erste Weltkrieg, Osterreich in Geschichte und Literatur, Wien, Volio, 1964, pp.465-477.
88 ÖUA, vol.8, no.9978.
89 ÖUA, vol.7, no.8779.
90 Galanrai,
Stefan Tisza und der Erste Weltkrieg, pp.473 and 476.
91 Vermes, Istvan Tisza,
p.220.
92 ÖUA, vol.8, no.10118.
93 Galantai,
Stefan Tisza und der Erste Weltkrieg, p.475.
94 ÖUA, vol.8, no.10272,
Berchtold to the Emperor,
14 July 1914; GaIantai, Die
Osterreichisch-Ungarische Monarchie und der
Weltkrieg, p.273.
95 Leslie, The Antecedents of Austria-Hungary's War Aims, pp.342-343.
96 DD, no.50, report Tschirschky to Bethmann Hollweg, 14 July 1914; no.49, report Tschirschky to Bethmann Hollweg,
14 July 1914.
97 Marvin Benjamin Fried, A Life and Death Question: Austro-Hungarian
War Aims in the First World War in Holger Afflerbach
(ed.), The Purpose of the First World War: War Aims and Military Strategies,
Berlin-Boston, 2015, p.119.
98 Gustav Erényi, Graf Stefan Tisza,1935,
p.112.
99 Dimovic, Iz mojih uspomena: Grof Stevan Tisa, Pre porod, Beograd, 1O September 1922, p.7.
100 Kraler, Schlitter, diary entry for 11 July
1914, p.247
101 Galantai,
Die Osterreichisch-Ungarische Monarchie und der
Weltkrieg, pp..267 and 274; I. Dioszegi: Aussenminiiter Stephan GrafBurian,
Biographie und Tagebuchstelle.,1966, diary entries for 8 and 14 July 1914.
102 DD, no.49, Tschirschky to
Bethmann-Hollweg, 14 July 1914.
103 "Die
Interpellationen tiber Serbien und Bosnien", Pester Lloyd, Budapest, 16 July
1914 (Morgenblatt), P-3.
104 Thallóczy, Tagebucher,
diary entry for 13 July 1914, p.43.
105 Friedrich Ritter von
Wiesner, "Meine Depesche vom 13. Juli 1914" in Eduard Ritter von
Steinitz (ed.), Ringsum Sasonow,
Berlin, 1928, pp.173 and 175-176; Friedrich Ritter von Wiesner, Das Memoire
Osterreich-Ungarns über die großserbische Propaganda und deren Zusammenhänge
mit dem Sarajevo Attentat, Die Kriegsschuldfrage, June 1927, p.499.
106 The translation is taken from Friedrich R. von Wiesner, The Forged
and the Genuine Text of the Wiesner Documents, Die Kriegsschuldfrage,
October 1925, p.653. Full text of the report is included in this article which
is also published in German (Die verfälschte und der echte Text des Dokument Wiesner)
in the same issue of Die Kriegsschuldfrage,
pp.641-648. The 13 July 1914 Wiesner report from Sarajevo likewise appears in
ÖUA, vol.8, no.10252 and no.10253 (its continuation and end).
107 Wiesner, The Forged and the Genuine Text of the Wiesner Documents,
pp.653-654.
108 Hoyos, Der
deutsch-englische Gegensatz und sein Einfluss auf die Balkanpolitik Österreich
Ungarns, p.109 Williamson, Austria-Hungary and the Origins of the First World War, p.193. Williamson, admittedly, has a
long footnote (no, p.246), but the sources he lists to deal with the Sarajevo
assassination plot and do not provide any backing whatsoever for his assertion
about the involvement of "some elements of the Serbian government".
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