By Eric Vandenbroeck
In 2003 the American historian Richard C. Hall perceptively pointed out
that, by themselves, the killings of Archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife in
Sarajevo had "caused nothing" - that what brought the war about was
"the use made of this event", initially by Austria-Hungary "The
key event", according to Hall, "was the delivery of the Austro-
Hungarian note to Serbia on 23 July."1 Officially; Vienna insisted on
calling its note a "demarche with a time limit", but everyone else
was to designate it as an "ultimatum" precisely because of the
forty-eight hour time limit that accompanied it. In internal discussions, both
at the Ballhausplatz and elsewhere, moreover, it was
invariably referred to as "ultimatum". Not least because of the
conciliatory Serbian reply to it, this document was to become one of the most
notorious in twentieth-century diplomatic history: a document designed to
produce, indeed guarantee, a war against Serbia, it also led to a world war.
Lord Vansittart, at the time a junior official at the Foreign Office, described
the ultimatum as "a real stinker which left little prospect of
independence", and which "no country with a spark of spirit could
accept".2 Winston Churchill who, as the First Lord of the Admiralty had
attended the British Cabinet meeting on 24 July which discussed the ultimatum,
held much the same opinion: "This note was clearly an ultimatum, but it
was an ultimatum such as had never been penned in modern times. As the reading
proceeded it seemed absolutely impossible that any State in the world could
accept it".3 In Italy; the text of the ultimatum was on 24 July read
together by Antonio Salandra, the Prime Minister, and
San Giuliano, the Foreign Minister. Present, too, was Hans von Flotow; the
German Ambassador. "It is no exaggeration to say that our faces
blanched", Salandra recalled. Even Flotow; who
had turned "pale", exclaimed: "Vraiment!
c'est un peu fort!"4
Prince Bulow; the former German Chancellor, declared in 1916 that no land,
"not even the Republic of San Marino", could have accepted the
contentious paragraphs of the ultimatum.5
The exacting nature of Austria- Hungary's final terms to Serbia are
examined below. But could those terms, nonetheless, have been accepted
unreservedly by the Government in Belgrade, thus halting Europe's descent into
cataclysm? After all, it seemed obvious even then, as international tensions
grew rapidly following the presentation of the ultimatum on 23 July, that only
an unequivocal Serbian acquiescence to its demands could stop the crisis from
escalating. However, what was unknown to international opinion at the time, except to very small decision-making circles in
Austria-Hungary and Germany, was that the ultimatum which Giesl was to deliver in Belgrade on 23 July was always
intended to be a complete farce. Prince Friedrich Stolberg, the Councillor at the German Embassy in Vienna, had in mid-July
asked Berchtold what would happen if Serbia accepted
all the demands. "With a smile ... the count had said he felt it most
unlikely that even such a government as the Serbian would swallow the ultimatum
whole. If, however, they did make up their mind to do it, the only other
course, after all its exactions had been fulfilled, would be so to harry and
injure Serbia that, in the end, she gave Austria pretext for invading
her."6 Despite such evidence, some historians, from Albertini to the
present day, have pursued what to them is not an academic question of why
Serbia had not accepted all the demands in full. And while the ultimatum itself
has certainly not been the subject of heated historiographical disputes, views
on the evolution of the Serbian response present, if not a controversy as such,
then at least very strange dichotomies among historians. Given a century-long
academic debate on the origins of the war of 1914, fixated on the question of
"war-guilt", it is useful that some background be given here on how
contemporaries and historians have treated the matter.
The Serbian Government, whatever its views on the possible European
repercussions of the local Balkan ruckus , was at least supremely aware that
Serbia could find itself suddenly standing first in the line of fire if it
returned to Vienna anything other than a wholly satisfactory reply Indeed, one
account from 1928 by a contemporary on the spot in Belgrade in 1914 (the
journalist Dusan Loncarevic)
suggested that the Serbs had been heading for complete capitulation, when a
"sensational turnabout" occurred in the afternoon hours of 25 July as
a result of two telegrams that had arrived from St Petersburg.7 In 1927 Giesl wrote in his memoirs that until midday on that 25
July it had looked as if the Serbs would give in; in the early afternoon hours,
however, he had learnt of a long telegram which had just arrived from the Tsar
for King Petar: "Russia's entire might" had
apparently been pledged to Serbia that she might resist the ultimatum; and
Crown Prince Alexander, according to Giesl, brought the
telegram to the officers' club where it was read to the assembled amid
"stormy demonstrations in favour of the
war".8 In 1931 Alfred von Wegerer, the editor of
Berliner Monatshefte and a key academic apologist for
the Central Powers, wrote a whole book on the subject: in it, he argued that
two telegrams from Russia - one from the Serbian Minister Spalajkovic,
and one from the Tsar - had on 25 July decisively changed the outlook of the
Serbian Government which had been about to surrender to the Austro-Hungarian
ultimatum.9 However, Wegerer supplied neither. In
1933 the French historian Jules Isaac assumed that the information arriving
from St Petersburg had produced a new attitude in Belgrade - but he was careful
not to claim any certainty on the matter.10 The celebrated authority Luigi
Albertini later elaborated on these contentions, arguing that, but for the
"assurances of full support" from St Petersburg, the Serbian reply
would have contained "full formal acceptance of the ultimatum", with
a reservation on one point only (point 6) - but a reservation "so skilfully worded' that it would have made it 'very
difficult for Austria to construe it into a rejection".11
"Full support" from St Petersburg? Did Russia, then, start
World War One? And did Serbia, by embracing that alleged Russian support on 25
July and by not accepting at least one of the demands in the ultimatum (point
6, referring to the participation of Austro-Hungarian officials in a judicial
enquiry on Serbian soil) play a full ancillary role in bringing about the war?
These questions go right to the heart of the war guilt issue which has
characterized so much of the historiographical discussion on the origins of the
First World War. For if Russia had indeed advised the Serbian Government to resist
the ultimatum, it must have willed the war.
Of course, the converse also applies. But the question of exactly what
information the Serbian Government received from St Petersburg after the
delivery of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum at 6 p.m. on Thursday; 23 July- and
before the expiry of the time limit for Serbia to reply by 6 p.m. on Saturday;
25 July - has not been settled even after a hundred years. In his renowned 1983
study of Russia and the origins of the First World War, Dominic Lieven briefly
tackled the subject and mentioned "Russia's support" (communicated,
according to Lieven, on 24 July by Foreign Minister Sazonov
to Miroslav Spalajkovic, the Serbian Minister at St
Petersburg) which, Lieven writes, "came as music to the ears of Pasic and
Prince-Regent Alexander". Lieven even deferentially refers to Albertini's
conclusion that Russian promises of support had resulted in the Serbian
rejection of Point 6 of the ultimatum."12 However, following the
publication in 1980 of the relevant Serbian documents, the American historian
Samuel R. Williamson rejected, in an essay from 1988, the earlier explanations
that "the Russians had acted to stiffen the Serbian will to resist",
emphasizing that a "hardline position in Belgrade" had predated the
ultimatum.13 In 1995 the British historian Mark Cornwall, utilizing the same
Serbian documents and a wealth of additional material, produced by far the most
thorough account of Serbia's action and responses during the July Crisis. He
addressed the subject of the St Petersburg telegrams head on, concluding that
during those crucial forty-eight hours Serbia had "remained almost
isolated" and 'lacked sufficient backing even from the Russians".14
And yet, already in 1996, in his influential book on the July Crisis, the American
historian William Jannen had gone back to the assumptions entertained by
Albertini. Jannen submitted that in the afternoon hours of 25 July a telegram
from Spalajkovic, caused the Serbian Government not
to agree to all ten demands in the ultimatum ("with minor
reservations") and "risk a firmer reply" instead.15
The bewildering discrepancies between various accounts of the Serbian
reply to the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum have continued to this day. The
Albertini school is certainly still very strong. In 2012 Christopher Clark
essentially dismissed Mark Cornwall's research and relied on Albertini instead.
"It was probably the news from Russia", Clark writes, "that
dispelled the mood of fatalism in Belgrade and dissuaded the ministers from attempting
to avoid war by acquiescing in the demands of the ultimarum."16 And in
2013, Margaret MacMillan wrote that a report had reached Belgrade on 25 July
that Russia's key ministers and the Tsar had decided 'to go to the limit in
defense of Serbia', and that this 'may well have encouraged' the Serbian
Government as it formulated its final reply to the ultimatum."17 In his
book on the July Crisis, likewise from 2013, Sean McMeekin similarly writes
that sometime in the afternoon of 25 July a new attitude had been formed in
Belgrade - following the arrival of a telegram from Spalajkovic
in which Sazonov had advised Pasic not to accept
points 5 and 6 and that 'Serbia may count on Russian aid".18 In her 2014
study of the July Crisis, Annika Mombauer drew
attention to Sazonov's view; expressed to Spalajkovic on 24 July, that no state could accept the
points in the ultimatum "without committing suicide". While careful
to emphasize that no blank cheque had been given by Russia to Serbia, Mombauer nevertheless writes: "This counsel was fatal,
for it implied an encouragement of Serbia not to accept all the Austrian terms,
and to risk a war."19 In his updated, massive work on Austria-Hungary in
World War One, Austria's leading authority Manfried Rauchensteiner repeated in 2013 the point he had already
made in 1993: that the Serbian Government, in rejecting point 6 of the
ultimatum, was "confident of Russia's support".20
On the other hand, three other experts who in 2014 published detailed
books on the July Crisis have remained sceptical
about such claims. Gerd Krumeich has explicitly
rejected Clark's arguments, declaring himself a follower of Mark Cornwall's
"impressively clear analysis".21 TG. Otte
has remarked that Sazonov's advice to the Serbs
"appeared anything but hardline", and that he did not wish Serbia
"to complicate matters by taking a provocative stance".22 Finally,
Gordon Martel has argued that Russia, France and Britain had all urged the
Serbs to go for maximum accommodation: "No one promised military assistance."
Martel also pointed out that the British and French representatives in Belgrade
both thought that 'Russia had been instrumental in convincing the Serbs to
reply in such a conciliatory manner".23
Clearly, then, a massive divergence of opinion still exists about what
is arguably the most important single episode in the whole of the July Crisis.
How so? Are the Serbian (and Russian) sources really so ambiguous as to allow
of diametrically opposed interpretations? As will be shown below; the available
evidence actually makes it abundantly clear that, far from encouraging the
Serbian Government to defy any points in the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum, the
information from St Petersburg which reached Belgrade on 25 July, before the
expiry of the ultimatum, actually had the opposite effect, demonstrating to the
Serbs that concrete Russian support for them was conspicuous only by its
absence. The recently published memoirs of Vasily Strandtmann, the Russian Charge d'Affaires
in Belgrade, confirm that Russia had in fact engaged in a moderating effort.
And although there is no final clarity as to the arrival time of one particular
telegram from Spalajkovic, it will be seen from
long-neglected Serbian evidence that the drafting of Serbia's reply to the
ultimatum was in any case completed at around 11 a.m. on Saturday, 25 July.
That is to say, contrary to the suggestions of numerous historians, there were,
in reality, no further interventions that afternoon, i.e., before the expiry of
the deadline at 6 p.m.
The Crisis of 23-25 July
What information, then, about the likely conduct of Russia did Belgrade
receive during the pivotal forty-eight hours, 23-25 July 1914? A central figure
in the historiography of these famous days in the July Crisis, perhaps
undeservedly, became Miroslav Spalajkovic, the
Serbian Minister in St Petersburg. There are several reasons for Spalajkovic's fame or, rather, his infamy. In the first
place, his unquestionably combative nature was always going to ruffle feathers
and attract comment. In July 1914 even Sazonov
reportedly thought of Spalajkovic as
"unbalanced".24 A few years later, with Spalajkovic
still serving as the Serbian Minister in Russia, Lenin was to remark on his
"brutality of expression". For in January 1918, at a meeting with
Lenin and his associates, Spalajkovic produced a
"veritable tirade of accusation", calling them "bandits"
and announcing that "he was spitting in their faces".25
Secondly, Spalajkovic's notoriety was further
guaranteed when Albertini reinforced the mystery (created initially in Germany
by the aforementioned Wegerer) of a "missing
telegram" from him, which supposedly arrived in Belgrade in the afternoon
of 25 July, and which allegedly contained Russia's recommendation to Serbia to
reject points 5 and 6 of the ultimatum, coupled with the promise that Russia
would vigorously support and defend Serbia.26 As will be seen below; this
reconstruction of events finds adherents even today. And, thirdly, Spalajkovic has been seen as an ardent, at times reckless,
Serbian ultra-nationalist - mostly by post-war Austrian and German academics
making the case for the Central Powers, and subsequently by the like-minded
Anglo-Saxon 'new revisionists' of today. They were never able to forgive him,
inter alia, for the highly effective role he had played during the Friedjung process in exposing the Austro- Hungarian
forgeries. The fact that Spalajkovic was the
son-in-law of Gligorije Jeftanovic,
the Bosnian Serb grandee from Sarajevo, is also taken as proof of his
ultra-nationalism - notwithstanding the fact, that Jeftanovic
and his political circle were quite happy to cooperate with the imperial
Austro-Hungarian authorities in Bosnia-Herzegovina. In 1935 Alfred Rappaport
von Arbengau wrote a long, malicious article for
Berliner Monatshefte, devoted entirely to
Spalajkovic.27 Christopher Clarke has recently described Spalajkovic
as the "excitable Austrophobe".28
It seems, however, that such adverse assessments of Spalajkovic
have been exaggerated. Robert Seton-Watson wrote admiringly about him in 1911, commenting,
in particular, on his self-restraint at the Friedjung
trial."29 Anatole Nekludov, Spalajkovic's
Russian colleague when they were serving in Sofia, thought that his Serbian
nationalism was tempered by sensitivity to wider Slavic solidarity.30 And as
for his bellicosity, even Count Friedrich Szapary;
the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador to St Petersburg, remarked that Spalajkovic appeared 'crestfallen' when Austria-Hungary
declared war on Serbia.31
Be that as it may, Spalajkovic's role in the
July Crisis has unfortunately been over-coloured by
frequent references to his vibrant persona. Historically far more relevant,
however, are the telegrams which he sent in the critical forty-eight hours
following the ultimatum. It will be contended here that they have been invested
with an importance out of all proportion to any impact they may have had. It
will be further contended that they are in a sense more significant for what
they omitted to say than for what they actually passed on.
What, then, had Spalajkovic been reporting
from St Petersburg? There was an air of routine business about the dispatches
he had sent to Belgrade just before the storm unleashed by the delivery of the
Austro- Hungarian ultimatum in the early evening of 23 July. He had briefly
notified Belgrade on 22 July that, since Sazonov was
busy with the French President's visit, the contents of Pasic's circular
telegram of 18 July had been sent to him in a letter.32 The next telegram, sent
on 23 July was similarly terse. It stated that the Russian Foreign Ministry had
had no news from either Vienna or Belgrade, and that there had been no talk of
an ultimatum. In the concluding sentence, Spalajkovic
informed that Szapary who had recently returned from
Vienna, had personally told him that there, in the Austrian capital, the
relations with Serbia were being viewed "with calm".33
Of course, by the time this telegram had reached Belgrade, at 12:40 p.m.
on 24 July; following the presentation of the ultimatum the day before, the
Serbian Government had taken precisely the opposite view of the state of its
relations with Austria-Hungary. Nevertheless, amid the turmoil in Belgrade,
Pasic, the hardened political veteran, kept his nerve. He also kept his
determination not to compromise Serbia's independence. It was seen in the
preceding chapter that he had returned to Belgrade that morning and had been to
see Strandtmann, whom he had told in no uncertain
terms that, if necessary; Serbia would fight - whatever the Tsar might say. On
the same day; Pasic asked Crackanthorpe to convey to
London his hope that the British Government would work to moderate the Austrian
demands, whilst adding that some of them were 'quite unacceptable' He then let
the Serbian Legation in London know that he had spoken to the English Charge d'Affaires, and concluded: "I did not hide my concern
about the events that might unfold."35
Meanwhile, in St Petersburg, Spalajkovic had
towards noon on the 24th received from the Foreign Ministry in Belgrade the
full text (in French) of the Austro- Hungarian ultimatum. In 1934 he was to
write a memoir of that day for a lecture delivered at the Societe
d'Histoire Generale et d'Histoire Diplomatique in Paris, subsequently published in
Revue d'Histoire Diplomatique. In it, Spalajkovic writes that after "the first moments of
consternation" had passed, he telephoned the Russian Foreign Ministry;
asking for an urgent meeting with Foreign Minister Sazonov.
The meeting, according to Spalajkovic, was agreed for
4 p.m. at the Ministry; and he recalls arriving there shortly before the
appointed hour.36 However, it is most unlikely that he was able to see the
Russian Foreign Minister at around that time: Sazonov
had in the morning already talked to Szapary who had
shown him the note his country had presented to Serbia; he had then had
luncheon at the French Embassy with the French and British Ambassadors to
discuss the crisis; and afterwards attended the Russian Ministerial Council,
which had been hastily convened for the same reason, starting at 3 p.m. Count Friedrich
Pourtales, the German Ambassador to St Petersburg,
informed Berlin that the Ministerial Council session was still in progress at 5
p.m.37 According to the official diary of the Russian Foreign Ministry for 24
July; Spalajkovic had an interview with Sazonov after the Ministerial Council had ended but before
the arrival of Pour tales, who was received around 7 p.m.38
The meeting of the Russian Ministerial Council on 24 July 1914, in
response to the Austro-Serbian tension, is a famous benchmark in the history of
the July Crisis, for it decided in principle (pending the Tsar's approval) to
mobilize four Russian military districts as well as the Baltic and Black Sea
fleets. As regards Serbia, the Council approved two proposals by Sazonov: "(I) In conjunction with the other Powers to
request Austria to prolong the period which she had fixed for the receipt of a
reply from Serbia in order to afford the Powers time in which to acquaint
themselves, in accordance with the proposal of Austria herself, with the results
of the judicial enquiry into the Serajevo
assassination; and (2) to advise Serbia not to enter into hostilities with
Austro-Hungarian troops, but, withdrawing her own forces, to request the Powers
to compose the quarrel that had arisen." The diary of the Russian Foreign
Ministry notes briefly that Sazonov, in his ensuing
interview with Spalajkovic, had "advised extreme
moderation in respect of the Serbian reply to the Austrian note".39
Sazonov's memoirs also make only brief
mention of his talk with Spalajkovic, The latter was
told that his Government "should accept the Austrian demands, save those
concerning the sovereign rights of Serbia". Sazonov
wrote that he had offered this advice "from a practical point of
view".40 He was clearly alluding to the idea that Serbia, and the Great
Powers, might be able to gain time were there to be a conciliatory Serbian
reply. As has been seen, Pasic had already received much the same advice from
the Quay d'Orsay, and Grey had communicated to Crackanthorpe
in Belgrade a similar suggestion that Serbia's only chance of averting Austrian
military action was to accept as many demands as possible. In other words, all
three Entente Powers viewed the question in essentially identical manner: that
Serbia should comply to the last possible limit of concession. Their
recommended tactical scenario - offering maximum concession in order to buy
time - did not differ from the one envisaged by Pasic.
But the Sazonov-Spalajkovic meeting had lasted
for about one hour.41 What else had been said? Had Sazonov,
contrary to his own and the official Russian Foreign Ministry's record, perhaps
whispered words of encouragement to Spalajkovic,
promising mother Russia's military support to little Slavic Serbia - as writers
from Wegerer and Albertini to, more recently, Clark
and McMeekin, have been more or less suggesting? Not according to Spalajkovic's recollections from 1934. After he and Sazonov had considered the various points raised in the
Austro- Hungarian ultimatum, the Russian Foreign Minister said that it
contained some clauses which a sovereign state could hardly accept
"without risking suicide". But he then proposed that they should
treat the matter as "wise and practical people", following this up by
asking: "What should be our objective?" To which he himself answered:
"Avoiding the worst, which is war. Therefore one ought to accept as much
as possible of what Austria demands." Sazonov
then went on to praise Pasic's wisdom, saying how certain he was that Pasic
would be able to do the "impossible", that he would "even find
the means not to refuse anything". Pasic alone, Sazonov
said, "could make sacrifices which, probably, no one else would dare
contemplate".42
Sazonov, in other words, was more
than hinting at the desirability of Serbia considering complete capitulation in
its reply to the ultimatum. When Spalajkovic put it
to him that "the key to the solution" did not lie "there"
(i.e., in how Pasic would handle the matter), Sazonov
agreed that whatever the Serbian response to the ultimatum, it would not be of
"capital importance" in the whole affair. This sounds strange in the
light of the emphasis by Sazonov on the need for
Serbia to make sacrifices in its response to the ultimatum. It will be
explained below; however, that the Russian Foreign Minister was urging Serbia
to adopt a submissive attitude only as the initial gambit in a desperately
tight framework when time was of the essence.
Not everything is clear in Spalajkovic's
account from 1934. Sazonov added, according to Spalajkovic, that he would immediately ask Nikolai Shebeko, Russia's Ambassador to Vienna, to demand a
prolongation of the forty-eight hour limit for the Serbian reply.43 But Shebeko was at that time on his way to St Petersburg and Sazonov must have known that - the Russian Embassy in
Vienna was in Shebeko's absence being run by Prince
Nikolai Kudashev, the Charge d'Affaires.44 Moreover,
as has been seen, the Russian Ministerial Council had just taken the decision
to seek a prolongation of the time-limit for the Serbian response - Sazonov, presumably, would have informed Spalajkovic of this development. There is a further oddity
in Spalajkovic's 1934 memoir. He writes about how he
had suggested to Sazonov that, for there to exist the
slightest hope of averting war, Germany had to understand that the conflict
could not be localised to Austria-Hungary and Serbia.
And so he recommended that Russia should mobilize in those districts adjoining
the border with Austria-Hungary. Sazonov, according
to Spalajkovic, replied that he would talk to the
Tsar.45 Again, the Russian Ministerial Council had only a little while earlier
decided in principle on such a mobilization. It is not inconceivable, on the
other hand, that Sazonov deliberately withheld this
information so as not to unduly encourage Spalajkovic
who, as he knew; was about to report to Pasic.
It is of course also possible that Spalajkovic's
memory, twenty years after the event, had left something to be desired. Be that
as it may, the next section in his 1934 memoir contains undoubtedly authentic
utterances from Sazonov because, as will be seen, the
Serbian Minister would later that night pass on to Belgrade substantially the
same information. Sazonov, aware that Spalajkovic's report from St Petersburg had to reach Pasic
at the latest by midday the next day, 25 July, "envisaged the eventuality
of an Austro-Hungarian declaration of war on Serbia". In such a case, he
advised "abstaining completely from any defence,
any fight, any resistance." He asked: "What is the point?" Serbia,
he thought, had been exhausted by the two Balkan Wars and could not defend
itself without arms, ammunition and equipment. So, his advice was that Serbia,
instead of resisting, make an appeal to all the nations, "even
Japan", that a small country numbering four million, attacked by a Great
Power of over fifty million, desists to defend itself in such an unequal
battle, and takes humanity as the witness of its martyrdom. "And the
world", Sazonov added, "will soon revolt
against the infamy of Austria-Hungary." He then explained the practical
aspect of his advice: "Whilst, if no blood is being spilled, if Serbia
does not resist, one gains time, one continues to negotiate, and finally, we'll
see."
Clearly, then, Sazonov had for his guidance to
the Serbs conceived of two scenarios, both of which were all about gaining
time. The first was to urge that Pasic should make sacrifices when responding
to the ultimatum: that he do the "impossible' and even find ways 'not to
refuse anything". Thus, unlike France and Britain, Russia was actually
recommending complete surrender. Sazonov, however,
had anticipated that not even such an abject submission would necessarily deter
Vienna from launching war. His remark to Spalajkovic
that the Serbian response would not be of "capital importance"
reflects his own scepticism on the matter, that is,
his conviction that Austria-Hungary was determined on war. He had therefore
thought a step further, prognosticating a second scenario (in effect a
continuation of the first) whereby Austria-Hungary indeed declared war, in
which event he begged Serbia not to resist but appeal to the Powers instead. Spalajkovic's comment is perhaps worth noting:
"Paradoxical as his thoughts may seem to us today, Sazonovwas
no less confident in July 1914 that, to get the most, Serbia had to momentarily
renounce everything, and that through its imminent declaration of war,
Austria-Hungary would offer Serbia a way to recover from this paradox."46
Spalajkovic, however, was less than
impressed by Sazonov's advice to Serbia not to oppose
an attack. "Mr Pasic", he told Sazonov, "can do everything, even the impossible,
except one thing ... I know him as well as I know myself and we both know our
people. All defeatism is repugnant to the Serbian soul. How can you advise the
most heroic among peoples a non-resistance which will be seen everywhere as an
abdication of its honour, its independence, its
glory? Anything, anything, even death, but not that! A people which does not
defend itself hardly deserves that other peoples come
to its aid." Before he left Sazonov, Spalajkovic also reproached him by reminding him about the
promise that had been made to Pasic to deliver much-needed Russian rifles to
the Serbian Army. "I did not wish to do it up to now", Sazonov replied revealingly, 'so that Russia could not be
accused of arming Serbia against Austria."46
Spalajkovic sent Pasic his report about
the meeting with Sazonov in a telegram at midnight,
24/25 July. But this was only the first part of the telegram, the second part
being sent at 1 a.m. on 25 July. The first part arrived in Belgrade at 4:17 in
the morning of 25 July, and the second later that morning at 10. Thus both
parts could be considered by the Serbian Government before the expiry of
Vienna's deadline at 6 p.m.48 The first part of Spalajkovic's
telegram reads as follows:
The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs condemns, with loathing, the
Austro-Hungarian ultimatum. He tells me: there are demands within it which no
state can accept without committing suicide. Report: we can undoubtedly count
on Russia's support, but as yet he did not make himself clear in what shape
that support will manifest itself, since the Tsar will have to decide on that
and France will have to be asked; he has taken energetic steps in Vienna and
Berlin. He has received a telegram from the Charge d'Affaires
in Belgrade that chaos has taken over there and that Serbia, for lack of
weapons and ammunition, was not in a position to defend itself. If that is so,
the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs is giving this advice: to announce,
immediately, to all the states that Serbia had condemned, with loathing, the
crime in Sarajevo and it had been prepared to deliver to the Court any of its
subjects about whom it had been proved that he had been a participant; the
Serbian Government categorically rejects all the charges which stipulate that
Serbia is responsible for that crime; towards Austria-Hungary, Serbia had
loyally carried out all its obligations; and, generally, through its loyal
conduct Serbia had in the last years won general recognition on all questions.
The second part of the telegram continued thus:
Hence Serbia is directing an appeal at the feeling of justice and humanity,
declaring that it will not, and cannot, defend itself by arms against a Great
Power like Austria-Hungary, which is eleven times the size of small Serbia.
Accordingly, the Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs is advising us
provisionally: if you cannot defend yourselves, then act like the Bulgarians
did last year. That would cause the indignation of all the peoples against
A.-Hungary. He has, to that effect, telegraphed the Charge d'Affaires
in Belgrade. I told him that his advice would be practical if we had the
assurance that Austria-Hungary would invade only the border areas, but we
cannot allow Austria-Hungary to devastate the whole of our country, and we
would have to organize the defence somewhere in the
interior and accept the fight. The Minister for Foreign Affairs replied to me
that our decision has to depend on our defence
capability, and we could transport the money and the rest to Greece, and
retreat with the Army towards Greece. He has also telegraphed to Bucharest, for
Romania's role will be of great significance. I said to the Minister: the only
method of preventing war is for Russia to declare to Austria-Hungary and
Germany that it will be forced to declare general mobilization should the
Serbo-Austrian conflict not be submitted, as in 1909, for the deliberation of
the Great Powers, as the declaration of the Serbian Government at the time was
the work of the Great Powers which retain the exclusive right to assess whether
or not Serbia had fulfilled its obligations from that declaration. This matter
will be solved in the evening, and a communique will be issued. Spalajkovic.49
The telegram makes no mention of the 24 July meeting and decisions of
the Russian Ministerial Council, but it is an open question here as to how
much, if anything at all, Sazonov had told Spalajkovic about the meeting from which he had just
emerged. More strangely, perhaps, not a word was written here about Sazonov's urgings that Pasic do the "impossible"
and accommodate the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum - something which Spalajkovic himself admitted in his 1934 memoir that Sazonov had implored. Yet it would be difficult to argue
that Spalajkovic was deliberately hiding anything
from Pasic, or that he had contrived to present a picture rosier than the
reality For the telegram to Belgrade contained not a single greatly encouraging
piece of news from St Petersburg. Spalajkovic did
inform that Serbia could "undoubtedly" count on Russian support, but
he added that Sazonov had been unable to specify the
nature of that support. And this, in conjunction with the mention of Sazonov's talk about taking "energetic steps" in
Vienna and Berlin, was just about the only moderately buoyant piece of news
that Pasic could glean from Spalajkovic's telegram -
not an altogether reassuring message.
Moreover, Sazonov's suggestion that Serbia's
treasure should be sent to Greece, and that the Serbian Army should also be
withdrawing towards Greece, could only be interpreted as a sure indication that
Russia was not about to spring to Serbia's military defence.
Sazonov's words, as reported by Spalajkovic,
that Serbia should consider whether to fight in the light of its "defence capability" carried the meaning that Serbia
should not include Russia in any such calculation. As Mark Cornwall has argued,
"the implication was that, although Russia was working on Serbia's behalf,
for the present the latter would be alone in its conflict with the
Austrians".50
Pasic wrote a short minute at the bottom of this telegram: "Have
taken note with gratitude." But his gratitude could only have related to
reading that Sazonov had assessed the ultimatum as
containing demands which no state could accept without committing suicide. The
Serbian Prime Minister could thus feel justified and confirmed in the course he
had taken from the start: there would be no complete surrender to the
ultimatum. Little did he know; owing to Spalajkovic's
impressionistic telegram, that Sazonov had in fact
recommended precisely such a suicide, i.e., that Pasic should fashion a way
"not to refuse anything".
There followed a further, much shorter telegram from Spalajkovic,
sent at 1.40 a.m. on 25 July, which mayor may not
have arrived in the course of the morning. Vladimir Dedijer
and Zivota Anic, the
editors of the relevant tome of Serbian documents, pointed out that the
two-part telegram from St Petersburg was the only one to have arrived in
Belgrade on 25 July before the expiry of the Austro-Hungarian deadline.51 Mark
Cornwall disagrees according to him, the next telegram arrived at 11:30 a.m. on
25 July.52 Be that as it may, this telegram should also be cited in full:
The Russian Minister for Foreign Affairs told the Austro-Hungarian
Ambassador that all of this represents a threat in the highest degree. The
general opinion is that Serbia cannot accept the demands of Austria-Hungary.
The Ministerial Council has resolved to take energetic measures, even a
mobilization. The Tsar's sanction is expected. An official communique will now
be published, by which Russia is taking Serbia under protection. Spalajkovic53
As is well known, during the morning of 25 July there indeed took place
another session of the Russian Ministerial Council, at Tsarskoe
Selo, presided over by the Tsar. This meeting
"approved and further developed" the decisions of the Ministerial
Council from the previous evening.54 At long last, Spalajkovic
had passed on to Belgrade that something was moving, or was about to move, at
the highest levels in St Petersburg. But did this telegram, assuming that it
had indeed reached Belgrade at 11:30 a.m. on 25 July, along with the two-part
telegram which had indisputably arrived in the morning of 25 July, actually
make any difference to Pasic and his colleagues as they were polishing off the
Serbian reply to the ultimatum?
In the first place, it will be shown below that the drafting of the
Serbian reply had in all probability already been completed around 11 a.m. -
and undergone no subsequent addition or alteration. And secondly, the evidence
from contemporaries, such as it is, also suggests that Belgrade had acted
independently. Already in 1925 Robert Seton-Watson had "learnt on
first-hand authority at Belgrade" that the Serbian answer to the
Austro-Hungarian ultimatum was 'the unaided work of the Belgrade
Government".55 Also in 1925, Ljuba jovanovic told Hamilton Fish Armstrong of Foreign Affairs
that it had been "prepared entirely without communication with the
Powers".56 The academic opinion, as has been seen, is mixed, but Mark
Cornwall, the leading authority on the subject, is also on the whole convinced
that the Serbian Government had behaved autonomously on that fateful 25 July.
He considers that the 'messages from St Petersburg by midday on 25 July were
still imprecise". Sazonov's language, he writes,
was "too vague". He maintains that, even taking into account the
telegram hinting at Russian mobilization, "it seems highly unlikely that
... Pasic was suddenly moved to stiffen the terms of the Serbian reply". Cornwall concludes that it is "quite
probable ... that Russian advice had little effect on the framing of Serbia's
note".57
The "Missing
Telegram" from St Petersburg
Where, then, is Spalajkovic's
"suppressed" telegram from St Petersburg, speculated about and made
famous by Luigi Albertini?58 Where is the evidence on which Christopher Clark
bases his musings that "the steady crescendo of indications in Spalajkovic's cables must have sufficed to reassure the
Serbian leadership that the Russians were on the track to intervene"?59
And just where does Sean McMeekin find support for what he calls "Sazonov's pledge" and "Russian backing" -
referring to an alleged report from Spalajkovic in
which Sazonov had advised Pasic "not to accept
points 5 and 6"?60 All these are major, indeed massive claims, for they
depict the Serbian reply to the ultimatum as a last-minute modification of what
is alleged to have previously been a draft note offering complete capitulation.
The drift of their logic points to the conclusion that war broke out in 1914
because Russia had decisively encouraged Serbia not to accept the ultimatum in
toto. Such contentions, therefore, require to be addressed and examined,
especially because, as will be shown, they stem from a fantastic concoction.
And whereas Clark and McMeekin have only recently appeared with their
contributions to the subject, Albertini has over many decades barely been
challenged.
Perhaps the most problematic of all is his analysis of what took place
in Belgrade on 23-25 July 1914. Here, Albertini relied heavily on what his
friend and fellow Italian journalist Luciano Magrini
had written after the war. In the autumn of 1915 Magrini
was in Serbia as a journalist, joining the Serbian Army on its retreat south in
October. His 1929 book on the origins of the war, II drama di Seraievo, is especially interesting because it describes
the events in Belgrade following the reception of the Austro Hungarian
ultimatum on 23 July. Magrini writes that in 1915 he
obtained details about that period from Colonel Zivko
Pavlovic, whose function in the Serbian Army in July 1914 he gives as
"Chief of Staff". His account, certainly, makes for some arresting
reading.
According to Magrini, the Serbian Government
held a meeting on the evening of 23 July, presided over by Regent Alexander,
and "in the presence of Colonel Pavlovic" as Chief of Staff Everybody
realized that "if the Austrian note were not accepted in full, war would
follow". Pavlovic too, along with the Ministers, was in favour of full acceptance of the ultimatum "to avoid
the worst" - so claims Magrini. But no decision
was taken, not only because Pasic was absent, but also because the governments
in London, Paris and St Petersburg would have to be consulted -
"especially the latter". When Pasic returned the following day; a new
cabinet meeting was held. "The opinions were not different", Magrini writes, "from those of the previous evening.
The Chief of Staff categorically repeated that Serbia was not able to sustain
an Austrian offensive."61
There now follows the crucial part of Magrini's
story: "But in the afternoon [of 24 July] came a telegram from Spalajkovic, stating that Sazonov
had told him that he considered the Austrian ultimatum unacceptable in its
totality, and that Serbia, to demonstrate goodwill, should accept those parts
which it considered compatible with its independence, but that if she wished to
preserve its honour, she had to reject those
impositions such as clauses 5 and 6, damaging the sovereign rights of Serbia.
Russia could not remain indifferent to an Austrian attack against Slav
interests and, taking up the Serb cause, would vigorously support and defend
legitimate Serb interests."62
What appears to be an excited Luigi Albertini makes a great deal in his
book out of Magrini's startling revelations, citing
large chunks of what his friend had written on this subject. "The
existence of this telegram from Spalaikovic",
Albertini opines, "vouched for by Colonel Pavlovic, is not proved by the
Serbian documents which have been made public, but that does not mean anything
because the Serbian diplomatic documents of the period have never been
published in full. This may well be due to the unwillingness of the Serbian
Government to confess that Serbia would have accepted the ultimatum
unconditionally if Russia had not advised her otherwise." And more: "This
telegram proves that the Serbian Government had suppressed certain
communications from its St Petersburg representative."63
Not many people read Magrini these days, but
Albertini's work on the origins of the war of 1914 is still seen as one of the
most authoritative studies. Indeed, Christopher Clark's bestseller The
Sleepwalkers, directs its readers to Albertini's account of the impact of the
telegrams from Russia, but it also - "specifically on Sazonov's
rejection of points 5 and 6 of the ultimatum" cites page 206 of Magrini's work - the page which contains the story about
the arrival of Spalajkovic's dramatic telegram in the
afternoon of 24 July. 64 In his book on the July Crisis, Sean McMeekin wonders
about the reasons why "Serbia's prime minister decided not to comply with
the Austrian ultimatum" and suggests an explanation whereby 'Pasic
resolved to take a firmer line after reading Spalaikovic's
report from Petersburg, in which Sazonov had advised
him not to accept points 5 and 6".65
Elsewhere in his book McMeekin insists on this explanation. "Sazonov's advice was firm", he writes, Serbia must not
'accept articles 5 and 6'. Sazonov, according to
McMeekin, sent a 'clear' message to Belgrade: "Serbia should make a show
of moderation but not yield. If it came to war, Russia would fight on her behalf."The authority cited by McMeekin for these
rather brave assertions is Albertini. 66
It appears that Albertini had constructed his own relevant passages on
the basis of what his friend Magrini had written. Yet
despite a fanfare lasting many decades, the famous St Petersburg telegram of 24
July has stubbornly refused to surface - for in reality it never existed.
Whereas Albertini could, at the time of writing his work, legitimately complain
about the non-publication of relevant Serbian documents, later generations of
historians have had every opportunity to look at them, as they were published
in 1980. However, instead of then questioning the Magrini-Albertini
thesis, as those documents seem to demand, these historians have actually lent
it further support. Yet it can now be demonstrated in any case that the entire
basis upon which Magrini, then Albertini, and now
their modern followers, pronounced judgment on Serbia's reply to the ultimatum
is a spurious one: a pure concoction. The latter concerns the whereabouts at
key times of Colonel Zivko Pavlovic - the
indispensable figure in Magrini's narrative.
Colonel Pavlovic was not, as Magrini stated,
the Serbian "Chief of Staff". He was the head of the operations
section of the Serbian General Staff As such, he was the first assistant to Vojvoda (Field Marshal) Radomir Putnik, who was the Chief of the General Staff But that is
not the problem - the problem is that Pavlovic was not even in Belgrade at the
time when Magrini makes him not just a witness, but
also a player with a role in the deliberations of the Serbian Government which
were held in Belgrade on 23-24 July. Yet Pavlovic had been staying in Bad
Reichenhall, Bavaria. Just like his boss Putnik, who
had since late June been in Bad Gleichenberg, Styria,
Pavlovic was taking a cure at a time when July's major European events were
taking place. A three-page letter by Pavlovic, deposited in the archive of the
Serbian Academy in Belgrade, reveals his exact movements. He wrote it in July
1931 to his friend Dusan Stefanovic who had been the
War Minister in 1914. Pavlovic had already left Belgrade for Bad Reichenhall
with his wife and son at the end of May. After the assassination in Sarajevo,
feeling "very uncomfortable" in the German environment and sensing
that serious events were about to take place, he decided to cut short his stay
and set off for Belgrade, which he reached via Salzburg and Zagreb towards
midnight on 24 July (he writes: "around 23:30").
In other words, Magrini's chief source Colonel
Pavlovic was actually traveling on a series of trains through Austria-Hungary
at the time of his supposed personal involvement in the Belgrade conferences of
the Serbian Government on 23 and 24 July. Concerning the ultimatum, Pavlovic
wrote that he had not had "the foggiest idea" about it, and had
learned of it only after his return to Belgrade late on 24 July. On the next
day, 25 July, he reported to Colonel Dusan Pesic at the General Staff where he found "a terrible
hubbub" as the General Staff were moving to Kragujevac. Nowhere in his
letter does Pavlovic hint that he may have been, even on 25 July, in any way
consulted by the Serbian Government.67 This is important to emphasize, because
Albertini, in an obsessive attempt to prove the existence of a game-changing
telegram from St Petersburg was forced to change the arrival day of this
supposed telegram - from 24 July as cited by Magrini,
to the following day, 25 July. Hence he wrote: "Pavlovic's statement that
the telegram which changed the whole situation arrived on the afternoon of the
24th is evidently due to a slip of memory which has led him to confuse the 24th
with the 25th."68 Of course, Albertini had to say this. Unlike Magrini, he knew his history and realized that Belgrade could
not possibly have received such a telegram on the afternoon of 24 July since
that day the Russian Ministerial Council had been in session until the evening.
Even so, Albertini's retrospective change of date would still presuppose
Pavlovic's presence in the Foreign Ministry on 25 July - something which, if
true, Pavlovic would surely have mentioned in his detailed letter. Whereas
Pavlovic merely stated in that letter that on 25 July he had been called to the
War Ministry by Minister Stefanovic and confirmed in his position as head of
the operations section.69 Stefanovic's own account makes it clear that this
meeting took place as late as 9p.m.70 And given that Magrini
has Pavlovic allegedly participating in the earlier ministerial deliberations
of 23 July - a claim Albertini does not question - the whole story, even when
modified by the later change of date, is simply unsustainable because its chief
protagonist Pavlovic, despite being cited as the source, had clearly had
nothing to do with it.
The accounts by Albertini and Magrini are thus
baseless and fallacious. The more recent ones (Clark, McMeekin), relying on
those two Italians, should now also be dismissed in the light of the available
evidence. There is a telling little intervention by Albertini who demotes
Pavlovic to "acting" Chief of Staff, whereas Magrini
had promoted him to "Chief of Staff".71 Even this correction by
Albertini, incidentally, is false: in the absence of Vojvodina Putnik, his deputy, i.e., the acting Chief of Staff, was
actually Colonel Dusan Pesic.72 But Albertini, who
had otherwise interviewed a great many participants of the events leading up to
the outbreak of the war, had never interviewed Pavlovic who was still alive in
1938.73 Magrini mayor may
not have talked to Pavlovic in 1915, but he certainly could not have heard from
the latter's lips the sort of information which he subsequently put in his
book.74 It would be fruitless to wonder why he wrote his tale. Perhaps a more
appropriate question to ask might be why some historians today still refer to a
telegram which has never been seen and, in the light of published materials, is
highly unlikely ever to have been sent.
25 July 1914: Morning or
Afternoon?
Important circumstantial evidence - hitherto neglected - actually exists
about the impact of at least some of the information from Spalajkovic
in St Petersburg reaching Belgrade on the morning of 25 July It is contained in
the brief 1926 memoir of Jovan Nestorovic, the editor
of Samouprava. As this paper was the mouthpiece of
Pasic's Radical Party, Nestorovic was in daily touch
with its leaders. He saw Pasic on the evening of Friday, 24 July, when the
latter asked him to write an article for Samouprava
in which the main message should be that "Serbia will meet all the justified
demands of its northern neighbour, but that there
also exist in the submitted note such demands which infringe sovereign Serbia
as an independent state". Nestorovic dutifully
carried out this 'order', as he called it, and submitted the article to Pasic sometime
that night. The piece was meant to appear the following day, Saturday, 25 July.
Pasic read it and, though satisfied, asked Nestorovic
to bring him the article again in the morning - newspapers in Belgrade, it
should be noted, appeared in the afternoon hours, so that Pasic would still
have the time on the morning of 25 July to ask for revisions. Indeed, Nestorovic thought to himself: "He still hasn't made
up his mind!"
At "around" 10 a.m. on Saturday, 25 July, Nestorovic
arrived at the Foreign Ministry with the article, now already typeset. But
Pasic was in a ministerial session, so Nestorovic
sent him the article via an employee at the Ministry. After "several
minutes" he was summoned inside and Pasic told him: "Run just this
first part, and cut the rest." The first part, as Nestorovic
recalled, was only about a third of the original article and referred to
Serbia's readiness to meet all the justified demands of Austria-Hungary. The
rest, about Serbia's reservations with regard to the demands infringing its
sovereignty, had been censored by Pasic. Nestorovic
unfortunately does not specify those reservations, but judging by his reaction
to the fact that they had now been struck from his article one can safely
assume that they were numerous. "We have had it", he thought to
himself, his knees trembling. "With desperation in my heart", he
recalled, "I carried out the order"
He need not have worried, however, that Pasic was about to capitulate.
Nevertheless, later in the day the Samouprava
carried the truncated article on its front page under the title "Serious
Moments". After introductory remarks about the delivery of the ultimatum,
it stated:
Serbia's Minister for Foreign Affairs has on several occasions already
expressed his and his government colleagues' view that Serbia, in the name of
its great and important interests, desires sincere and correct neighbourly relations with the Austro- Hungarian Monarchy.
Permeated sincerely by this desire and the conviction about the necessity of
such relations, the Government of the Kingdom of Serbia will compliantly meet
all those demands of the Austro- Hungarian Government which aim at the
elimination of criminal and disorderly acts in the neighbouring
countries, because it sees this as the obligatory fulfilment of duty for any
civilized state. Today, the Government of the Kingdom of Serbia continues,
after the submission of the note, to adhere to that standpoint and will, in
pursuit of that aim, do everything in its power to demonstrate the full
sincerity of its aspiration to carry out, vis-ii-vis Austria-Hungary, all the
obligations of a good neighbour.76
The proposed acceptance here of "all those demands" which
aimed at "the elimination of criminal and disorderly acts" had still
left Pasic with plenty of space to reject any demand compromising Serbia's
sovereignty. Now, by the time Pasic had bowdlerized most of the original
article at some point after 10 a.m. on Saturday, 25 July, he mayor may not have read the second part of Spalajkovic's telegram - which had arrived at 10 a.m., but
may not have been deciphered in time for him to consider. That second part, it
will be remembered, had passed on Sazonov's suggestion
that, in the event of an Austro-Hungarian attack, Serbia's response should
depend on its defence capability - about which the
Russian Foreign Minister had obviously taken a dim view since he had also
suggested that the Serbian Army should in such a situation retreat towards
Greece. But Pasic would undoubtedly have read the first part of the telegram,
which had arrived at 4.17 a.m. In that first part, it will also be remembered, Spalajkovic had related Sazonov's
horror at the ultimatum ("there are demands within it which no state can
accept without committing suicide"), and his assurance of Russian support
for Serbia. But Spalajkovic had also commented on the
basic ambiguity of that assurance, since Sazonov
"did not make himself clear in what shape that support will manifest
itself".
This piece of information alone would have been enough for Pasic to wish
to moderate the public pronouncement of his position, about to be published in
the Samouprava. In other words, his action in
stopping Nestorovic from printing what were no doubt
hawkish parts of the original article had been influenced by information about
Russian ambivalence. If Pasic had by this time also seen the second part of the
telegram, his further conclusion could only have been that Sazonov's
language betrayed meekness as well as ambivalence. Nestorovic's
evidence convincingly demonstrates that, contrary to Albertini's view about 25
July 1914, Pasic had, far from moving towards complete capitulation on 24 July
and the morning of 25 July, in fact contemplated a tougher response than the
one which his Government eventually submitted. It was Russian restraint, not
Russian encouragement, that had begun to influence Pasic. At the same time
there was never any doubt that, in the reply to the ultimatum, the Serbian
Prime Minister would include objections or reservations regarding anything
perceived as encroaching on Serbia's sovereignty. All his pronouncements and
telegrams since his return to Belgrade early on 24 July had contained at least
a shade of defiance.
Unfortunately, in his treatment of the events of 25 July in Belgrade,
Luigi Albertini was not content to rely solely on Colonel Pavlovic's supposed
testimony. He also believed he had identified a document to which, to his
surprise, "so few historians have paid attention". This is Pasic's
circular telegram to Serbian legations of 25 July, which does not carry the
time of dispatch, but whose context makes clear that it had been sent before
the handing in of the Serbian reply to the ultimatum:
A brief summary of the reply of the Royal Government was communicated to
the representatives of the allied Governments at the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs to-day. They were informed that the reply would be quite conciliatory
on all points and that the Serbian Government would accept second part of Spalajkovic's telegram - which had arrived at 10 a.m., but
may not have been deciphered in time for him to consider. That second part, it
will be remembered, had passed on Sazonov's
suggestion that, in the event of an Austro- Hungarian attack, Serbia's response
should depend on its defence capability - about which
the Russian Foreign Minister had obviously taken a dim view since he had also
suggested that the Serbian Army should in such a situation retreat towards Greece.
But Pasic would undoubtedly have read the first part of the telegram, which had
arrived at 4.17 a.m. In that first part, it will also be remembered, Spalajkovic had related Sazonov's
horror at the ultimatum ("there are demands within it which no state can
accept without committing suicide"), and his assurance of Russian support
for Serbia. But Spalajkovic had also commented on the
basic ambiguity of that assurance, since Sazonov
"did not make himself clear in what shape that support will manifest itself".
This piece of information alone would have been enough for Pasic to wish
to moderate the public pronouncement of his position, about to be published in
the Samouprava. In other words, his action in
stopping Nestorovic from printing what were no doubt
hawkish parts of the original article had been influenced by information about
Russian ambivalence. If Pasic had by this time also seen the second part of the
telegram, his further conclusion could only have been that Sazonov's
language betrayed meekness as well as ambivalence. Nestorovic's
evidence convincingly demonstrates that, contrary to Albertini's view about 25
July 1914, Pasic had, far from moving towards complete capitulation on 24 July
and the morning of 25 July, in fact contemplated a tougher response than the
one which his Government eventually submitted. It was Russian restraint, not
Russian encouragement, that had begun to influence Pasic. At the same time
there was never any doubt that, in the reply to the ultimatum, the Serbian
Prime Minister would include objections or reservations regarding anything
perceived as encroaching on Serbia's sovereignty All his pronouncements and
telegrams since his return to Belgrade early on 24 July had contained at least
a shade of defiance.
Unfortunately, in his treatment of the events of 25 July in Belgrade,
Luigi Albertini was not content to rely solely on Colonel Pavlovic's supposed
testimony. He also believed he had identified a document to which, to his
surprise, "so few historians have paid attention". This is Pasic's
circular telegram to Serbian legations of 25 July, which does not carry the
time of dispatch, but whose context makes clear that it had been sent before
the handing in of the Serbian reply to the ultimatum:
A brief summary of the reply of the Royal Government was communicated to
the representatives of the allied Governments at the Ministry for Foreign
Affairs to-day. They were informed that the reply would be quite conciliatory
on all points and that the Serbian Government would accept the Austro-
Hungarian demands as far as possible. The Serbian Government trust that the
Austro-Hungarian Government, unless they are determined to make war at all
costs, will see their way to accept the full satisfaction offered in the
Serbian reply.
According to Albertini, in this telegram "Pasic announces the
acceptance in principle of all the Austrian demands". And he berates other
historians because they had failed to ask themselves how it came about that
Pasic "later in the final reply made reservations on many points and
rejected one outright".77Albertini uses here the English translation of
the telegram which is included in the Serbian Blue Book and which forms part of
the Collected Diplomatic Documents, published in London and New York in 1915. In
the original Serbian publication from 1914, however, "quite conciliatory
on all points" is in fact "quite conciliatory overall". But this
is a minor point - what is worrisome is Albertini's disregard of the ensuing
caveat by Pasic that the Austro- Hungarian demands would be accepted "as
far as possible". 78 In other words, the telegram which is claimed by
Albertini as corroborating his thesis about an imminent capitulation, contains
the opposite message.
In the course of 25 July it was entirely clear to at least two diplomats
in Belgrade that the reply of the Serbian Government was not going to embody a
full acceptance of the demands. Crackanthorpe, having
received from Grujic at the Foreign Ministry a brief
summary of the reply, dispatched a telegram to London at 12.30 p.m. informing
that the demands would be met "in as large measure as possible", and
that the ten points "are accepted with reserves",79 As Mark Cornwall
has noted, the words "in as large measure as possible" were really a
euphemism for the rejection of those points violating Serbia's sovereignty.80
The other diplomat on that day was Auguste Boppe, who
had arrived in Belgrade only that morning to replace the increasingly demented Descos as the French Minister. Boppe
had always dreamt of becoming the Minister in Belgrade - he had learnt Serbian
as a student and had already served at the French Legation in Belgrade in a
junior capacity.81 But his old acquaintance Strandtmann,
who had run into him at the railway station whilst putting his family on what
turned out to be the last Orient Express train to Constantinople before war
broke out, told him that the Government and the diplomatic corps would be
leaving the city that very evening.82 By 3 p.m. Boppe
had found out enough about the situation to be able to send his first telegram
to Paris. Having seen Pasic, he wrote to the Quai d'Orsay about the
wide-ranging acceptance by the Serbian Government of the demands in the
ultimatum - exceping one point: namely, regarding the
participation of Austrian functionaries in the enquete
on Serbian soil, the Government would ask for an explanation, and it would
"only take into consideration that which corresponds to international law
or good neighbourly relations". The fact that Boppe further reported Pasic's readiness - in the event of
Austrian dissatisfaction with the Serbian government response - to hand the
matter over to the Hague Tribunal or to the Great Powers, also heralded a less
than absolutely conciliatory Serbian reply.83
Strandtmann, for his part, was convinced
that the Serbs would fight. So much so that he chose not to convey to Pasic the
contents of an urgent telegram he had received on the morning of 25 July from Sazonov in which the latter now repeated the advice he had
already given to Spalajkovic: if Serbia's position
was hopeless, it would perhaps be better for the Serbs to allow the country to
be occupied without a fight and then make a solemn appeal to the Great
Powers.84 Even though, as has been seen, Strandtmann
had otherwise been a veritable dove of peace in the advice he had been giving
the Serbs ever since the arrival of the ultimatum, his encounters with Pasic
and Regent Alexander had left him in "no doubt about their determination
to defend the fatherland'. So he ignored the telegram because he considered it
impossible to give advice which, while it would not be taken, could be
interpreted as 'a shameful incitement to lay down the weapons". 85
It is important, however, to point out another telegram from St
Petersburg which Strandtmann did show to Pasic in the
course of 25 July. This was Sazonov's circular of 24
July to the Russian embassies in Vienna, Berlin, Paris, London and Rome, and to
the legations in Bucharest and Belgrade. Sazonov
insisted that, since Austria-Hungary had only consulted the Powers twelve hours
after the delivery of the ultimatum, the remaining short period did not suffice
for them to undertake anything useful towards the settlement of the
complications which had thereby arisen. It was thus necessary that
Austria-Hungary should, "above all", prolong the time-limit for the
reply, and a failure to so would be contrary to "international
ethics". 86 Again, what Pasic had learnt from this about Russian reaction
to the ultimatum was that it seemed merely to consist of some diplomatic
resistance to what Austria.Hungary was doing - not of
any proposed Russian military steps. In his memoirs Strandtmann
wrote that he had shown this telegram to Pasid before
the completion of the Serbian reply.87 Essentially, both telegrams seen by
Pasic had it in common that neither was offering him concrete Russian support
nor any encouragement for a hardline Serbian response.
But when exactly on 25 July had the Serbian reply to the ultimatum been
completed? This is not some pointless academic question. For those historians
painting a picture whereby "Russian support stiffened Serbia's
spine",88 it is rather important to maintain that the reply had only been
completed in the late afternoon hours - as more work had been required
following the alleged receipt of information during the day about, so it is
claimed, Russian encouragement. "During the afternoon of Saturday 25
July", Christopher Clark writes, "there were numerous drafts as the
ministers took turns in adding and scratching out various passages."89
Recently, Clark has by no means been alone in suggesting that frenetic activity
had been taking place in the Serbian Foreign Ministry in the few hours left
before the expiry of the deadline. "All Saturday afternoon", Sean
McMeekin insists, "Pasic and his advisers badgered poor Gruic with suggested changes", and the Serbian Prime
Minister "clearly sweated over his draft until the last minute. In fact,
no drama of this kind had transpired.
The source used by Clark and McMeekin - and many others before them - to
back up such vivid descriptions is once more that towering authority, Luigi
Albertini. The latter, it has to be said, was a rather imaginative
scenographer. In addition to hastening Colonel Pavlovic's return from Bavaria
and placing him in the very interesting role of a crown witness to the events
in Belgrade from 23 to 25 July, he also succeeded in creating historiographically lasting images of a supposedly very
hectic afternoon of 25 July in the Serbian Foreign Ministry. So what did
Albertini do here? He claimed to have talked to Slavko Grujic,
in 1914 the Secretary-General at the Serbian Foreign Ministry, who had
"narrated" to him (Albertini does not say when or where) that at II
a.m. he had received "the first text" of the Serbian reply for translation
(into French). Without directly quoting Grujic,
Albertini merely tells the following story:
At many points the text was almost illegible, there were many sentences
crossed out and many added. While the work of translation was proceeding,
between noon and 5 p.m., the text was several times taken away and the
Ministers, in continuous session in an adjoining large room, made many changes,
additions, and completions. At last, after 4 p.m. the text seemed finally
settled and an attempt was made to type it out. But the typist was
inexperienced and very nervous and after a few lines the typewriter refused to
work, with the result that the reply had to be written out by hand in hectographic ink, copies being jellied off Towards 5 p.m.
when the copying out of the translation was not yet quite finished, Gruic was summoned into the Cabinet room and asked for the
first part of the Serbian text for the introduction of one more change. Gruic declared that it was not possible to make any fresh
corrections or the text would never be ready in time. The last half-hour was
one of feverish work. The reply was corrected by pen here and there. One whole
phrase placed in parenthesis was crossed out in ink and made illegible. At 5.45
p.m. Gruic handed the text to Pasic in an envelope.91
It is truly surprising that the above account, used and relied on by so
many historians, has never been challenged. For it becomes clear, on closer
inspection, that Albertini had probably never talked to Grujic
- but merely read him. After all in 1934 Grujic's
1934 memoir which had been published in four instalments by the Belgrade daily Politika. Albertini
literally reproduced large chunks of the relevant part of Grujic's
memoir while claiming that the material had been "narrated" to him by
Grujic. In 1935 the Berliner Monatshefte
published the memoir in German - which is what Albertini must have read.
Everything in Albertini's narration, from the contents of the sentences to the
sequences in which they appear, and even the mispelling
of Grujic's name, indicates not a conversation with Grujic, but rather a reading of his published memoir.92 In
this exercise, however, there was also a necessary modicum of adding - in order
for an authentic testimony to be twisted to conform to Albertini's view of 25
July in Belgrade.
The key change which Albertini made to Grujic's
published account relates to the time when the Serbian reply (in Serbian) had
finally been completed. Grujic states very clearly
that he received the text "at around II a.m." - he did not write that
this was "the first text" as Albertini would have it. He then began
working on its translation into the French. While complaining about the
difficulty of reading the original Serbian text, in which many parts were
rubbed out and new sentences inserted, at no point does he say - as Albertini
makes him say in the imagined rendition - that "the text was several times
taken away" so that the Ministers could make "many changes, additions
and completions". There is nothing about that in Grujic's
memoir. True, he writes (and Albertini repeats this) that around 5 p.m. he had
been called into the Cabinet room and asked to bring back the first part of the
Serbian text because a change needed to be made. Grujic
had refused to go along with this because time had been pressing, but Albertini
describes the episode not as a request for a change, but as a request for
"one more change". Again, this is absent from Grujic's
memoir, in which the firm impression is given that this had been the only
attempt at changing anything in the six hours since 11 a.m.93
The fact that Grujic had been asked to bring
back the first part of the Serbian reply is in itself quite revealing. For the
first part of the Serbian reply to the ultimatum did not deal with any of the
ten points raised in the ultimatum - those were dealt with in the second part.
The first part was restricted to general remarks. In other words, whatever
change the Serbian Ministers had wished to make towards 5 p.m., it could not
have been related to a last-minute attempt to alter the substance of the draft
reply as a result of any allegedly encouraging news coming from Spalajkovic in St Petersburg.
Attempting to maintain the credibility of his story that Colonel
Pavlovic had testified to the arrival of a supportive telegram from Russia in
the afternoon of 25 July, Albertini thus had to do two things: firstly, to
depict the drafting of the Serbian reply as running well into the afternoon
and, secondly, in order to make this believable, he had to invent a first class
witness. Given the structural likeness of his account to Grujic's
published memoir, it seems clear that Albertini simply added to the latter a
few crucial details - those concerning the allegedly incessant reworking of the
reply late into the afternoon - and pretended that Grujic
himself was the author of this revised narrative. Why, Grujic
himself had told him so (Grujic had died in London in
1937 and was thus not able to comment). All the other details, for example the
typewriter breaking down, were genuine and had been wisely retained by
Albertini. But what the Italian journalist had in effect managed to achieve, in
order to validate his own story, was to report Grujic
as the source - in blatant contradiction, at least in crucial details, to the
latter's own 1934 account. There is little point in dwelling on why Albertini
crafted his falsification - except to say, perhaps, that people can get
perversely obsessed with the question of how to persuade others to accept a
scenario in which they themselves genuinely believe. Inventing small, key
details when depicting events may seem to them a small price to pay. However,
this crossing of the boundary between history and undeclared fiction is of
course a step too far.
The fact that the Serbian reply had been completed well before 5 p.m. on
25 July is confirmed by Strandtmann in his memoirs. Strandtmann, otherwise quite taken up on that day with
packing the archive of his Legation, nevertheless managed to see Pasic who told
him that the text of the reply had been formulated and was being translated,
and that he should 'come back after 5 o'clock in the afternoon' when he, Pasic,
would be able to show him the reply in its final, translated form. Strandtmann does not state the time of this meeting with
Pasic, but the context points towards late rnorning.94 In any event, Pasic's
words hardly suggest a continuous, feverish activity on re-wording the text of
the reply until the last moment. Alexander Savinsky,
who knew Strandtmann, and who in 1914 served as the
Russian Minister in Sofia, later wrote that the text of the Serbian reply to
the Austrian ultimatum had been established "much earlier than the
appointed hour" - one assumes that he had received this information from
his Russian colleague in Belgrade.95 According to the diary entry for 25 July
of the Serbian politician Jovan Zujovic, it had been
known in Belgrade "around midday" that Austria would not be satisfied
with the reply to the ultimatum - this, again, suggests that the original
Serbian version had been completed sometime late in the morning 96
Grujic wrote that the final French
translation was handed to Pasic at 5.45 pm.97 The reason why it had taken so
long to complete the work is fully explained in his article in Politika. He had initially been allocated another Ministry
official, fluent in French, to carry out the work of translation. But soon
Pasic had given this man some other task, so that Grujic
had had to do it all alone. His writing was fairly illegible, necessitating
that the whole text had to be written down again, with Grujic
dictating his own translation. On top of that the work was constantly being
interrupted by officials bringing in deciphered telegrams, as well as by
foreign diplomats, hungry for news, crowding the ante chamber of the Ministry and
"physically detaining" Grujic as he crossed
it to enter the Cabinet room. Because the Ministry was being evacuated, Grujic, as its Secretary-General, had to deal at the same
time with his officials seeking instructions.98 It is remarkable that, in this
chaotic environment, he had been able to complete his onerous task on time.
He may even have done it a little earlier than he himself suggested,
i.e., before 5.45 p.m. For another contemporary source maintains that Pasic had
emerged from the Foreign Ministry "at exactly 5.40 p.m." to take the
reply to the Austro-Hungarian Legation.99 Be that as it may, it should perhaps
be noted here that the Prime Minister was not carrying some horribly messy
collage of a document which, under Albertini's influence, many historians still
believe was the case. The nine-page hand-written reply (plus Pasic's covering
note) is available for inspection in Vienna's Haus-, Hof- und Staatsarchiv. It is very legible and contains only a few
minor corrections - with one exception on page 6 where a whole sentence is
blotted out.100 This, indeed, is the page which the editors of the Osterreich-Ungarns Aussepolitik
chose to attach as a facsimile to their official collection of documents. 101
As Pasic, sporting a black redingote and with a long white envelope
under arm, stepped on to a carriage, he looked "dignified" and wore
on his face "that eternal, light smile". A crowd had already gathered
at the Foreign Ministry. When they heard Pasic order the coachman to take him
to the Austro- Hungarian Legation, many people ran to Krunska
Street in order to await his departure from the Legation and attempt to judge
the outcome by his demeanour and facial
expression.102 For his part, Baron Giesl knew in
advance that the Serbian reply would not concede all the points because shortly
before Pasic's arrival he had seen the Economy Minister Velizar
Jankovic who had told him that the 'humiliating' demands had not been accepted.
Giesl had in any case anticipated as much, having
during the day packed everything in the Legation and got his personnel ready to
catch the 6.30 train to Zemun, just across the river
in Hungary. He must also have felt justified in his choice of attire for the
day, which Jankovic described as "a travelling suit" with "short
trousers". Although Giesl subsequently denied it
in his memoirs, other witnesses, not least Pasic, also reported him as wearing
an informal outfit, which was most probably a suit with knee-length
breeches.103
The meeting between Baron Giesl and Nikola
Pasic at the Austro-Hungarian Legation was brief and devoid of any drama. Pasic
arrived, according to Giesl, at 5.55 p.m.,
"evidently aware of the importance of the moment". His
"exceptionally clever" eyes betrayed a "solemn gravity" of
expression. When Giesl enquired about the contents of
the reply, he said: "We have accepted one part of your demands ... as for
the rest, we place our hopes on the loyalty and chivalry of an Austrian
General. We have always been content with you." Pasic must have been gently
poking fun with his flattering remarks addressed to Giesl,
though the latter had apparently taken him seriously because in his 1927 memoir
he wrote that Pasic could "naturally not have known" that the
decision had not depended on him, i.e., on Giesl. He
promised Pasic an early response - he first had to compare the terms of the
Serbian reply with his instructions. The two men then shook hands and the Prime
Minister left the Legation.104
1 Richard C. Hall, "Serbia" in Richard F. Hamilton and Holger
H. Herwig, The Origins of World War I, Cambridge, 2003, p.110.
2 Robert Gilbert Vansittart Vansittart, The
mist procession: the autobiography of Lord Vansittart, 1958, p.123.
3 Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis 1911-1914, London, 1923, p.193.
4 Antonio Salandra, Italy and the Great War:
From Neutrality to Intervention, London, 1932, pp.49-50.
5 Theodor Wolff, Tagebucher 1914-1919,1984,
vol. 1, entry for 31 January 1916, p.342.
6 Bernhard Bülow, Memoirs of Prince Von Bülow, 1909-1919, 1972, p.205.
7 Dusan A. Loncarevic,Jugoslaviens Enstehung,
1929, p.608.
8 Giesl,
Zwei Jahrzente, 1927, pp.267-268. Giesl
repeated these points in Konnte die Annahme der serbische Antwortnote den
Ausbruch des Weltkrieges verhindern? Berliner Monatshefte, May 1933, p.465.
9 Alfred von Wegerer, Der entscheidende Schritt in den Weltkrieg,
Berlin, 1931. See, in particular, pp.44-B.
10 Jules Isaac, Un debat
historique. Le probleme des Origins de la Guerre, Paris, 1933, pp.122-124.
11 Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, vol.2, pp.36o-361. In 1933
an interview with Berchtold was published, in which
he claimed that the Serbs were on the morning of 25 July intent on accepting
the ultimatum, but Russia had then "belstered
them up." See Hans Roger Madol, Gespräche mit
Verantwortlichen,1933, Berlin, p.4.
12 Lieven, Russia and the Origins of the First World War, p.144.
13 Samuel R. Williamson, Jr., The Origins of World War 1, The Journal of
Inter disciplinary History, vol.18, no.4, Spring 1988, p.811.
14 Cornwall, "Serbia", p.84.
15 William Jannen Jr., The Lions of July: Prelude to war, 1914, Novato,
1996, p.100.
16 Clark, The Sleepwalkers, p.463 and n.35, p.649.
17 MacMillan, The war That Ended Peace, 2014, p.537.
18 Sean McMeekin, July 1914, 2014
pp.198-199.
19 Annika Mombauer, Die
Julikrise. Europas Weg in den Ersten Weltkrieg, Munchen,
2014, p.65.
20 Rauchensteiner, Der
Erste Weltkrieg,2014 p.118; Manfried Rauchensteiner,
Der Tod des Doppeladlers. Osterreich-Ungarn und der Erste Weltkrieg, Graz-Wien-Koln, 1997, p.85.
21 Gerd Krumeich,Juli 1914. Eine Bilanz, Paderborn-Munchen-Wien-Zurich, 2014, p.128.
22 Otte, T. G. July Crisis: The World's
Descent into War, Summer 1914, 2014, pp..238-239.
23 Martel, The Month That Changed the World, 2014, pp.204-205.
24 Österreich-Ungarns Aussenpolitik von der Bosnischen Krise 1908 bis zum
Kriegsausbruch 1914 (ÖUA), ed. L. Bittner, A. F. Pribram, H. Srbik and H. Uebersberger (9 vols., Vienna and Leipzig, 1930), vol.8,
no.10461, telegram Szapary, 21 july
1914.
25 George F. Kennan, Russia Leaves the war, Princeton, 1956, p-336.
26 Albertini, The Origins of the war of 1914, vol.2, pp.352-353.
27 Alfred Rappaport von Argenbau, Staatsmanner und
Diplomaten der Vorkriegszeit. Spalajkovic', Berliner Monatshefte,July 1935, pp.555-576.
28 Clark, The Sleepwalkers, p.359.
29 Seton-Watson, The Southern Slav Question, pp.263-271.
30 Nekludoff, Diplomatic Reminiscences, p.53.
31 ÖUA, vol.8, no.10999, telegram Szapary; 29
July 1914.
32 Vladimir Dedijer et al.(eds.), vol.7/2,
no.477 telegram Spalajkovic, 22 July 1914- In fact,
it was in the form of an aide-memoire that Spalajkovic
notified Sazonov, on 22 July, about Pasic's circular
of 18 July. See Internationale Beziehungen im Zeitalter
des Imperialismus, 1st ser., 1911–14, ed. O. Hoetzsch (5 vols.,
Berlin, 1931–6) IBZI, vol.1/4, no.319.
33 Vladimir Dedijer et al.(eds.), vol.7/2,
no.496, telegram Spalajkovic, 23 July 1914-
34 British Documents, vol.11, nos. 92 and 94, Crackanthorpe
to Grey, 24 July 1914.
35 Vladimir Dedijer et al.(eds.), vol.7/2,
no.502, telegram Pasic, 24 July 1914.
36 M. Spalaikovitch, Une
journee du Ministre de Serbie a Petrograd, Le 24 juillet 1914', Revue
d'histoire diplomatique, Paris, April-June 1934, p.138.
37 Deutsche Dokumente, vol. I, no.148,
telegram Pourtales, 24 July 1914- The conversations
at the French Embassy had begun "at noon", according to Sir George
Buchanan, the British Ambassador. See George Buchanan, My Mision
to Russia and Other Diplomatic Memories, London, 1923, vol.I,
p.192. Paleologue, the French Ambassador, writes that
Sazonov had left at "three o'clock" to go
to Ielaguin Island, where the Ministerial Council
meeting was going to be held. See Paleologue, An
Ambassador's Memoirs, vol.1, p.32.
38 IBZI, vol.1/5, no.25. Albertini asserts that on 24July Spalajkovic saw Sazonov or his
representative twice before the Cabinet meeting, i.e., before he saw him for
the third time in the evening. Based on Sazonov's
timetable for 24 July, it is impossible to see just when, before the evening,
he could have received Spalajkovic. The latter may
well have seen a representative of Sazonov in the
afternoon hours as he waited for the Cabinet meeting to come to an end. But it
seems most unlikely that Spalajkovic was sending any
telegrams to Belgrade that afternoon - another claim made by Albertini. Indeed,
the Serbian documents do not contain any telegrams from him sent before
midnight on 24/25 July. See Albertini, The Origins of the war of 1914, vol.2,
p.354.
39 The citations are from the English translation of the relevant
passages in the diary of the Russian Foreign Ministry. See How the war Began in
1914, London, 1925, pp.30-31.
40 Serge Sazonov, Fateful Years 1909-1916,
London, 1928, p.177.
41 Cornwall, "Serbia",
p.79.
42 M. Spalaikovitch, Une
journee du ministre de Serbie ä Petrograd. Le 24 juillet 1914, Rev.Hist. Dipl
48.1934, p.139.
43 Ibid., pp.139-140.
44 N. Schebeko,
Souvenirs. Essai historique sur les origines de la guerre de 1914, Paris, 1936,
p.218.
45 Spalaikovitch, Une journee,
p.40-46.
46 Ibid., pp.140-141.
47 Ibid., pp.142-143.
48 See the note by the editors of the relevant volume of Serbian
documents, Dedijer et al.(eds.), vol.7/2, no.527,
n.1, p.649.
49 Dedijer et al., vol.7/2, no.527, telegram Spalajkovic, The dispatch date and time of this telegram
are given as 24 July 1914 at 12 a.m.-"24. VII 1914. u 12 sati - min. prepodne". This is clearly a mistake as Spalajkovic was reporting on his 24 July talk with Sazonov - the correct date is 25 July, that is, around
midnight on 24/25 July.
50 Cornwall, Serbia, p.80.
51 See the note by the editors, Dedijer et
al., vol 7/2, no.527, n.I, p.649.
52 Cornwall, Serbia, p.80 and p.94, n.149.
53 Dedijer et al., vol.7/2, no.503, telegram Spalajkovic, 25 July 1914. Mark Cornwall points out that
this telegram is incorrectly dated as 24 July, Cornwall, Serbia, p.94, n.152.
Since it was sent at 1:40 a.m. (received at n:30), and since it clearly refers
to the events of 24 July, its date of dispatch can indeed only be 25 July.
54 IBZI., vol/5, no.51.
55 Seton-Watson, Sarajevo, p.257 and n.4 on the same page.
56 Armstrong, Peace and Counterpeace, p.363
57 Cornwall, Serbia, pp.80-81.
58 Albertini, The Origins of the war of 1914, vol.2, p.353.
59 Clark, The Sleepwalkers, p.649, n.35.
60 McMeekin, July 1914, pp.199-200.
61 Luciano Magrini, II
drama di Seraievo. Origini e responsabilita della guerra europea, Milano, 1929
pp.203-205.
62 Ibid., p.206.
63 Albertini, The Origins of the war of 1914, vol.2, p.353.
64 Clark, The Sleepwalkers, p.649, n.35.
65 McMeekin, July 1914, p.199.
66 Ibid., pp.185-186 and p.414, n.12 to "Notes to Chapter 14".
67 Letter Pavlovic to Dusan Stefanovic, 16
July 1931.
68 Albertini, The Origins of the war of 1914, vol.2, p.356.
69 Letter Pavlovic to Dusan Stefanovic, 16
July 1931.
70 Dušan P. Stefanović, "Pred buru", 1931, p.7.
71 Ibid., p.352.
72 Rudolf Kibling, Die serbische Mobilmachung im Juli 1914, Berliner
Monatshefte, July 1932, p.678.
73 Mile S. Bjelajac, Generali i admirali Kraljevine Jugoslavije 1918-1941, Beograd, 2004, p.239.
74 Pavlovic was an altogether serious officer and also, after the war, a
noted military historian, publishing a study of the battles between Serbia and
Austria-Hungary during August 1914. See Zivko G.
Pavlovic, Bitka na Jadru avgusta 1914 god., Beograd,
1924.
75 Jovan V Nestorovic, "Prisebnost" in Spomenica
Nikole P. Pajita 1845-1925, Beograd, 1926, p.123.
76 "Ozbiljni trenutci",
Samouprava, Beograd, 12 (25) July 1914, p.1.
77 Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, vol.2, pp.358-359.
78 Dedijer et al., vol.7/2, no.537 Telegram
Pasic, 12 (25) July 1914.
79 British Documents, vol.II, no.114, telegram
Crackanthorpe to Grey.
80 Cornwall, Serbia, p.81.
81 Dedijer et al., vol.7/2, no.495, report Vesnic, 23 July 1914.
82 Strandman, Balkanske
uspomene, p.306.
83 Documents diplomatiques francais, Paris,
1936, 3rd series, vol.II no.63, telegram Boppe to Bienvenu-Martin, 25 July 1914. Hereafter cited as
DDF.
84 IBZI, vol.1/5, no.22, telegram Sazonov to Strandtmann, 24 July 1914.
85 Strandman, Balkamke
uspomene, pp.309-310.
86 IBZI., vol.1/5, no.23, Sazonov circular, 24
July 1914.
87 Strandman, Balkamke
uspomene, p.309.
88 Paul Ham, 1914: The Year the World Ended, London, 2013, p.306.
89 Clark, The Sleepwalkers, p.463.
90 McMeekin, July 1914, p.200.
91 Albertini, The Origins of the War of 1914, vol.2, pp.36 n.64.
92 Slavko Gruic, Personliche Erinnerungen
aus der Julikrisis 1914, Berliner Monatshefte, July
1935 pp.576-597. Grujic's surname is spelled in the
Berliner Monatshefte without the letter 'j', which is
how Albertini also spells it. Had he really talked to Grujic,
he would have received from him a carte de visite
with the correct spelling. Interestingly, Albertini does not include this
article in his bibliography.
93 Grujic, Od austro-ugarskog
ultimatuma do objave rata Srbiji, Politika, Beograd, 24July
1934, p.1-2.
94 Strandman, Balkanske
uspomene, p.308.
95 Savinsky, Recollections, p.238.
96 Zujovic, Dnevnik,
vol.2, p.58.
97 Grujic, 'Od austro-ugarskog
ultimatuma do objave rata Srbiji', Politika, Beograd, 24
July 1934, p.2.
98 Ibid., p.1.
99 Pavlovic, 1914: Ljudi i
dogatfaji, p.64.
100 Haus-, Hof- und
Staatsarchiv, Vienna, P.A. I/8-11.
101 ÖUA, vol.8, attachment to no.10648.
102 Aleksandar Pavlović, 1914: Ljudi i dogadjaji, p.64.
103 Giesl,
Zwei Jahrzente, p.268-269.
104 Giesl,
Zwei Jahrzente, pp.268-269.
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