So why is Turkey so quiet in spite of Gul's ascent?

On August 24, 2007, Newservices announced that; The Turkish military will safeguard a secular and democratic Turkey against the "evil" Islamic forces in the upcoming presidential election, military chief Gen. Yasar Buyukanit said on the military's Web site Aug. 27. The military has seized power from civilian governments three times in the past and has threatened to do so again if presidential candidate Foreign Minister Abdullah Gul wins the election.

Throughout this five part article/study we tried to understand the reasons that made political Islam in Turkey such a formidable force against the established order. This rise of political Islam was inexorably connected to the great transformations that occurred in the nature of global social relations of production. The agents of this new hegemonic drive of global capitalism and its ideology of transnational liberalism, the multinational corporations, Western financial circles, members of the World Economic Forum, etc, had established politically and economically convenient alliances with the Islamist movement whenever they saw fit. But the real unification of these sides happened after the profitability crises struck international capitalism and the Fordist style of accumulation just after 1973.

Historically, the significance of my explanation is, due to the fact that at around the same time frame, Turkish capitalism entered its own crisis of accumulation largely stemming from the foreign currency shortage that was created by the Turkish import substitution policies. With the coincidence of geopolitical and economic interests of both the USA as the superpower of capitalism, and the Saudi family in their aspiration for hegemony in the Arab world, against the Iranian revolution and the Soviet threat, the late 1970s and 1980s witnessed a surge in Islamic financial markets in the international arena whose resources were mainly diverted to supply the rebels of Afghanistan or the madrasas (religious schools) of Middle eastern countries, including Turkey.

Within that context, the Turkish business who wanted to transform the import substitution model into an export-oriented model launched its structural adjustment project at the beginning of 1980, which was not implemented due to growing militancy of the working class. But the Turkish army for the third time in the last three decades, intervened to stop so-called anarchy and terror in the country in September 1980.

However, the army’s political repression, new labor, education, privatization, and liberalization reforms precisely served the interests of the big busines, and its 1980 structural adjustment program. With the new ideological consensus around neo-liberalism in economics and the Turkish-Islam synthesis in politics, and the heavy political repression against the left, coupled with one of the most restrictive labor and union laws, Turkish governments actively promoted the Islamic movement.

Islamists not only used this new ideological means of a Turkish-Islam synthesis but they also organized around trade unions where the left was crippled, opened new educational facilities, especially more Imam Hatip High schools and religious courses, established Islamic financial houses and replaced the state in providing basic welfare services, penetrating almost every walk of Turkish social life in an unprecedented way.

The strange intertwining of the interest of neoliberals and Islamists in Turkey after 1980 can best be explained by the political and sociological effects that globalization of capitalism has had over the societies. On the economic front the IMF’s structural adjustment policies which require financial liberalization, transparency in balance sheets and trade, less government bureaucracy in transactions, all perfectly fit into the Islamic economics’ agenda. The main Islamic finance agencies saw that nonconventional interest free banking and trading necessitated costlier supervision and closer cooperation for the lenders and borrowers in Islamic trade. The transparency demand of international institutions was a godsend for them in that context.

Secondly, the deregulatory environment that forced nation states to lessen their financial controls, as a result of widespread currency markets’ surpassing of time/space conceptions of nationalism, provided opportunities to Islamic movements to shift their resources conveniently without strict scrutiny. Thirdly, on the political and ideological front the fixity of Fordism’s and import substitution’s modern day production and social relations that promote nuclear family, mass consumption, mass unionization and partial participation of the popular classes into the governance structures of national economies, suffered massive setbacks with the neoliberal political and economic assault. That assault which crippled unions, and previous gains of working classes brought forth pre-industrial production relationships, mainly patriarchal and kinship based ones. These relations were the by products of new globalized production lines that returned to piece by piece wages, small businesses, nonunionized independent and skilled workforces. The hierarchies of those new relationships deepened the ideological vacuum of the post-fordist era, as the abstract individualism of free markets left people completely helpless in the face of relentless changes within time/space conceptualizations of nation states and previous industrial era. The kinship, ethnicity, religious and tribal affiliations gradually resonated more in the “commonsense” of people as the transnational bourgeoisies effort to create a world in its own image shook all solid understandings and ossified relationships. That resurgence of pre-industrial era allegiances was complemented by the ideologically pragmatic but reactionary alliances of neoliberals with religious fanatics in the Middle East, and ethnic nationalist in Eastern Europe. Turkey was even influenced by the culturally sustained assault of postmodernism on enlightenment ideals which strengthened the doubts of Turks regarding whether or not there was a secular sustainable human alternative to all that was happening.

In the Turkish case the reactionary Turkish-Islamic synthesis was accommodated to big bourgeoisies’ ideological framework in the aftermath of 1980 coup that shifted country’s direction from import substitution to the export oriented model. The process not only created a neoliberal Islamist nuevo rich elite that can get along well with capitalism, but also that pragmatic alliance, in the absence of sound wide based support to the neoliberal project, engendered new dangerous cracks within Turkish political scene.

After the 1991 Gulf War and the collapse of the Soviet Union, through their experiences of the last decade in education, public administration and export oriented industries, the Islamic bourgeoisie increasingly contested the dominance of the metropolitan based big businesses. Meanwhile lower class people flocked to Islam to oppose strict secularism and the unjust system. In Islam’s oppositional rhetoric, Kemalist’s top-down style imposition of secularism on population, which equated western style dressing and behaviors with upwards mobility and respect, were perceived by Welfare Party activists and supporters as the real basis of class divisions in Turkish society. One other factor enmeshed Islam into the political culture that broadly is the Turkish nationalism. Since the foundation of the republic, the government promoted Muslim identity as a cement that unify Kurds and Turks against Armenians, Greeks and other minorities. That kind of manipulation of religion by the state inevitably reawakened old ties to Islamic identity when the conditions were ripe for the resonation of residual ideologies. The 1980s and 1990s were those years. Just as the Ottoman elite emphasized the rule of the just sultan and Islamic just order, a weak bourgeoisies’ failure to create a completely secular civicnationalist identity for the population facilitated the Welfare Party’s propaganda efforts when it referred to Islam as a supra-political feature of Turkish social formation.

But the generals and their bourgeois supporters in the 12 September coup as well as in their attempt to transform society along neoliberal lines through a conservative hegemony were short sighted. They tried to produce a conservative hegemony by promoting emergence of Islam. Their neoliberal conservative project did not have any encompassing solution to the problems of broad layers of the population, who in the absence of the left alternative channeled their support to Islamists. The last decade’s disputes between the Welfare Party and its successors and the civilian military bureaucracy of the state, from the tensions in the defense budget to the 28 February 1997s “post-modern” coup, lucidly taught us that in the near future those cracks in the neoliberal project would continue as the latest successor of Welfare Party, the AKP, has constantly confronted the military and nationalist elite on the subject of Turkey’s accession to EU and how to negotiate Copenhagen criteria.

In order to understand the rise of Islamists clearly one should also look at the historical mutation of the nature of the Turkish state. First, in Ottoman times, the concept of a just ruler in people’s commonsense in an Islamic framework crafted a space for Islamic politics. And during the republican times the initial decision of the Kemalist elite to use Muslim brotherhood as a concept that unites Kurds and Turks which at the same time excludes non-Muslim minorities, inevitably created a dual role for religion both as a spiritual guidance and the symbol of Turkish identity. Then references to Turkish people’s religious identities resonated more widely than the intended purposes when the politicians began to use it as a political tool to enlarge the legitimacy of their dominant projects.

However, Turkey’s Islamic movement, which grew as a subordinate to the neoliberal project of the Turkish dominant classes, gained its political independence after the collapse of the Soviet Union and the erosion of the ideological influence of socialdemocracy among masses. In the mid-90s ideological attraction of Islam took a role of class critique when it organized around shantytowns of urban areas by promising a just order against inequalities and corruption, which they predominantly associated with Western-style capitalism. At the same time Islam provided a useful network to the emerging exporters of the conservative Anatolian bourgeoisie in their quest to enlarge their share from the economic pie vis-à-vis the big bourgeoisie. Those opportunity structures made the Islamic Welfare Party of Necmettin Erbakan a leading faction in the parliament in the 1995 elections.

The Welfare Party’s official performance in government and its non-reconciled critique of Western cultural influences and the immorality of seculars in Turkey, and its redistributive policies, which largely diverted resources to the emerging small and middle-size businessmen in Anatolia within the general framework of neo-liberalism created tension with the civil and military bureaucracy and Istanbul-based big capital.

Even the largely symbolic gestures of Erbakan to its conservative base became a sensational media story that depicted those as potential threats to the secular republic. However, under all these political tensions lay the class interests of the big bourgeoisie and military, which in crisis times undertook the role of the unified party of the bourgeoisie to smash the opposition.

As a result of civilian and uniformed reactions against the Welfare Party government, Erbakan resigned in June 1997 after the military forced him to strictly implement its largely anti-Islamist 28 February ultimatum. That secular offensive both broadened the base of the official Kemalist ideology among the public and eroded the financial and economic power of the Islamist businesses. As the Constitutional Court prosecuted the Welfare Party and its successor Virtue Party on the grounds that they had become the focal points of anti-secular activities, the young generation of reformists in the Islamic movement, led by Abdullah Gul and Tayyip Erdogan, planned a break with the old guard of the Islamist movement. The new AKP (Justice and Development Party) not only pragmatically refuse to be categorized as a religious party but it also dropped the decades-long Islamist references to social equality, anti-Westernism and slogans like just order.

When AKP won the 2002 (and now again in 2007) elections with 34 percent of the vote they resembled a conservative democratic party whose primary emphasis was human rights, democracy, rule of law and Turkey’s quick integration with the Western capitalism under IMF supervision. This new face of Turkey’s Islamist movement can be interpreted as a pragmatic reconciliation with the old establishment in order to create a breathing space for the weakened Islamic political and economic forces. As their new pro-establishment line contradicted their previous references to social equality, their class-based supporters in the shantytowns became disillusioned with AKP’s economic performance. The question remained: was their new rhetoric of democracy and decreasing the role of the military within politics, this time with the backing of TUSIAD (big business), sincere?

From past experiences and how the Islamists interpreted democracy and the anti establishment struggles of the left and the Kurds, we have great doubts that we can rely on AKP to further the democratization of Turkey. Their perennial emphasis on a morally higher way of life, an Islamic society, greatly falls short of the demands of freedom of humanity from exploitation by its own kind. A movement that sanctifies the basic tenets of capitalism today, getting support from the emerging exporter businessmen of Anatolia, would hardly be a panacea to the mountainous social and economic inequalities that the Turkish people have to struggle with everyday.

The reelection of Erdogan in July 2007, however will also mean that a new offensive might be launched to invade N.Iraq or so called Kurdistan.

The reelection of Erdogan in July 2007, however will also mean that a new offensive might be launched to invade N.Iraq or so called Kurdistan. Introduction:
Will Iran and Turkey soon invade N.Iraq? The initial reason for such planning is because as we pointed out before 'Kurdistan' lowered the Iraqi flag on Sept. 2, 2006. However what may hasten up this development is an occurrence on Sept. 28, 2006. Thus where in the previous link we presented an in depth report about the situation in Iraq as a whole, we now proceede with a background-report about on ‘the other side’ of the border:

Kurds repeatedly staged uprisings in Iraq and in adjacent regions of Iran. Typically they launched rebellions when central government authorities appeared weak. Thus there is a long history of Kurdish uprising during or immediately after wars. The early uprisings were regional and tribal, but Kurdish revolutionary movements became increasingly nationalist during the twentieth century. Mullah Mustafa Barzani of the Barzani tribe of northeastern Iraq was the most famous of all Kurdish revolutionaries. With his elder brother Sheikh Ahmad, he fought the government of Iraq in an uprising in 1931 and 1932 that was suppressed with the help of the Royal Air Force. In 1945 Barzani declared revolution but retreated under Iraqi pressure to the town of Mahabad in northern Iran. Mahabad flourished as a center of Kurdish nationalism during World War II after the Soviet Union took control of northern Iran in 1941. The Republic of Mahabad declared its independence in January 1946 but soon fell to Iranian forces, and in 1947 Barzani retreated to the USSR. He returned to Iraq from exile in 1958 after a revolution that briefly led to improved relations between the central government and Iraq's Kurds, but renewed fighting broke out in 1961. (Jonathan C. Randal. After Such Knowledge, What Forgiveness? My Encounters with Kurdistan (Boulder, Colo., 1999), pp. 112-131.)

Kurdish nationalism developed a new intensity after the Baath party took control of Iraq in 1968. At first the new regime in Baghdad, uncertain of its power, offered Kurds in the north elements of self-rule, but the status of the city of Kirkuk and its oil fields proved a major problem. Saddam Hussein's regime and Kurdish leaders disputed whether Kirkuk would lie within the borders of a Kurdish region. In 1974 Baghdad unilaterally announced an autonomy measure that maintained central control over Kirkuk. Barzani refused to accept these terms and launched his last uprising. He depended on Iran for support, but Iraq concluded an agreement with Iran in 1975 and defeated Barzani. (Human Rights Watch, Iraq's Crime of Genocide: The Anfal Campaign Against the Kurds, 1995, pp. 4,19-20).

This was Mullah Mustafa Barzani's final defeat-he died in 1979 in the United States. But in 1980 Iraq's invasion of Iran weakened the Iraqi military presence in Kurdish areas and sparked renewed Kurdish revolution by two competing Kurdish parties, the Kurdistan Democratic party (KDP) led by Mullah Mustafa's son Massoud Barzani, and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan party (PUK) led by Jalal Talabani.

The governments of Iraq and Iran both employed selected deportations as a tool to suppress Kurdish uprisings, but in Iraq deportation gradually developed into ethnic cleansing. After suppressing Mullah Mustafa Barzani's final uprising, Iraq embarked on a campaign to remake the population of parts of northern Iraq. The government destroyed numerous Kurdish villages and provided incentives to Arabs to replace Kurds. Sunni Arabs from the desert south of Mosul, for example, moved north into Kurdish lands. As one Arab explained of his move into a Kurdish village in 1975, "We were very happy to go to the north because we had no irrigated lands in the south." Meanwhile tens of thousands of Kurds were deported south. In 1978 and 1979 Iraq cleared a zone of close to twenty miles along areas of its northern border, and destroyed hundreds more Kurdish villages. All told, Iraq pushed about a quarter of a million nonArabs, including Kurds, out of their lands. (Human Rights Watch, Claims in Conflict: Reversing Ethnic Cleansing in Northern Iraq, August 2004, vol. 16, no. 4 E, pp. 2, 8, 10; and Samantha Power, "A Problem from Hell": America and the Age of Genocide, 2002, p. 175.)

Between 1987 and 1989 Iraq carried out an even more violent campaign against the country's Kurds. In 1987 Saddam placed his cousin Ali Hassan al-Majid in charge of retaking control over Iraq's north, and in April Iraqi forces first used the weapon that would give al-Majid the name that made him internationally notorious:

"Chemical Ali." Iraqi forces released chemical weapons over Kurdish villages in the valley of Balisan. They also destroyed hundreds of villages. Peter Galbraith, a staff member for the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, saw some of the destruction in September 1987. The Iraqi ambassador to the United States offered to let Galbraith visit, and Iraqi forces surprisingly allowed Galbraith and an American diplomat to continue on their way into the Kurdish region where they found that most of the Kurdish towns and villages along the road had been destroyed. (Human Rights Watch, Iraq's Crime of Genocide, pp. 40-47, 49-51; Power, "A Problem from Hell," p. 183.)

The war against Iraq's Kurds culminated in 1989 with the Anfal Operation in which Iraqi forces burned villages, launched chemical attacks, and relocated Kurds. This was an ambitious program of ethnic cleansing. AI-Majid described his goals in a tape of an April 1988 meeting. "By next summer," he said, "there will be no more villages remaining that are spread out here and there throughout the region, but only camps." He spoke of prohibiting settlements in large areas ana of mass evacuations: "No human beings except on the main roads." The most infamous Iraqi gas attack of the Anfal Operation took place on March 16 at the town of Halabja; many other towns and villages suffered a similar fate. On the afternoon of May 3, 1988, Kurds at the village of Goktapa, for example, heard the sound of Iraqi jets. Goktapa had been bombed many times before, but this time was different. As one witness recounted, "When the bombing started, the sound was different from previous times. I saw smoke rising, first white, then turning to gray. The smoke smelled like a matchstick when you burn it. I passed out.” (Quoted in Human Rights Watch, Iraq's Crime of Genocide, pp. 255, 118; Power, "A Problem from Hell," pp. 188-189).

In all, Iraqi forces killed about 100,000 Kurds during the Anfal Operation and forced hundreds of thousands out of their homes. The final Iraqi campaign to remake the ethnic map of the country's north followed immediately after the Gulf War of 1991. With the Allied victory, Kurds staged a nationalist revolution and took over virtually all of the Kurdish areas of northern Iraq. After reaching a cease-fire, Saddam Hussein struck back against the Kurds. The fall of Kirkuk in late March to Iraqi forces unleashed a wave of flight. More than a million Kurds fled north. They crossed by the thousands over mountains to the border of Turkey. The Turkish government did not welcome the refugees, though local Kurds did what they could to provide food. One Kurdish baker in southeastern Turkey increased his bread production more than threefold. "I don't know if it's enough," he told a reporter. "But everyone from this area is helping." (New York Times, April 7, 1991.)

This crisis so soon after the Allied victory in the Gulf War gained international attention. Acting on humanitarian grounds, the United States, Britain, and France created a "safe haven" close to Iraq's northern border with Turkey and established a "no-fly zone" for the Iraqi air force north of the thirty-sixth parallel. By October 1991 Iraqi forces and authorities withdrew from most Kurdish regions of Iraq's north with the exception of Kirkuk. The effective division of northern Iraq into Kurdish and Iraqi zones simultaneously advanced Kurdish interests and the Iraqi regime's campaign to Arabize the north. Kurds gained autonomy, but the Iraqi government accelerated its campaign to remake Kirkuk into an Arab city and region. Iraqi authorities deported 100,000 people from Kirkuk and other communities and encouraged Arabs to move north to replace them.

Since then, the Kurds, have been playing their cards carefully to ensure the advances they have made since the 1991 Persian Gulf War were not lost in the web of negotiations with the Shia and Sunnis after the overthrow of Saddam Hussein. The Kurds opted for a more gradual approach in securing their autonomy in northern Iraq, realizing that an aggressive push for independence in the post-Saddam Hussein era would only have invited a messy reprisal from Turkey.

Thus, even though it was a priority for the Kurdish delegation to keep Kirkuk under the control of the Kurdish regional government, the Kurds were willing to offer the concession of allowing current oil revenues to filter through the central government in Baghdad. Displaced Kurds who were driven out of Kirkuk by Hussein's forces in his bid to "Arabize" the city are now returning; the Kurdish leadership hopes they will constitute a majority in the December 2007 census, so that a proposed referendum in the city will allow them to keep Kirkuk part of the Kurdistan Autonomous Region legitimately. And Kurdish leaders do not plan on disbanding the peshmerga, but will gradually integrate its guerrilla forces into the state security apparatus.

Washington likely will not endorse the Kurdish strategy fully. Kurdistan faces the dilemma of having its territory spread across four countries -- Iran, Iraq, Syria and Turkey -- each of which has a core interest in repressing its Kurdish minority to dampen any separatist tendencies. For its part, the United States has complex relations with each of these countries, and so cannot afford to promote the existence of an independent Kurdistan in the region.

Washington's main goal in the negotiations for the formation of Iraq's full-term government was to bring the Sunnis into the political fold. This is aimed at quelling the Sunni nationalist insurgency and bringing pressure to bear on the Sunni jihadists.

For the Kurds, this means a considerable number of obstacles lie in their path to regional autonomy. Earlier, Abdel Aziz al-Hakim -- who leads the main Iraqi Shiite political party, the United Iraqi Alliance, as well as the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) -- loosely supported the Kurds in the idea of regional federalism during the referendum negotiations. At that time, the prospect of securing a Shiite enclave in the south looked promising.

While SCIRI, an Iranian creation formed in Tehran in 1982, saw federalism as being in its interest, Jaafari's Hizb al-Dawah and the movements of al-Sadr and Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani are much more centered on a strong central government. Thanks to the Shiite failure to achieve a consensus on the notion of federalism, the Sunnis won a chunk of the government in the December 2005 elections. When Sunni participation in the election decreased their influence, Shiite leaders joined al-Sadr's call for a strong central government. They also openly opposed the Kurdish preference for a regional federal structure, which essentially provides for an autonomous Kurdish region in the north that would include all the provinces with sizable Kurdish populations.

Given the complexity of the negotiations, the most the Kurds can hope for at this juncture is a political framework containing as many loopholes as possible to allow for their continued evolution into a sovereign entity. Moreover, for Kurdish aspirations to be met, the United States must maintain its military presence in Iraq to keep regional forces in check. What is becoming increasingly clear, however, is that Washington's interests in Iraq do not clearly align with Kurdish interests.  
 

Evolving Turkey P.1

Evolving Turkey P.2

Evolving Turkey P.3

Evolving Turkey P.4

Evolving Turkey P.5

 

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