By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers

Osama bin Laden and suicide bombers

In our Global Jihad study besides and in-depth historical overview, we also presented sufficient evidence to conclude that Al Qaeda and its guiding ideology where the primary drivers of the globalization of Suicide Jihadism. In addition we also inferred four issues concerning Suicide Jihadism:

- No Mental Illness. Suicide bombers are not mentally ill.

- No general profile of suicide attackers could be established. Suicide attackers have been male and female, younger and older, richer and poorer, single and married (some with children), as well as employed and unemployed. Some suicide attackers have engaged in petty crime, while others have not.Some appear to have had a difficult childhood, while others have grown up under seemingly solid circumstances.

-Suicide attackers are not necessarily religious. While it is true that most suicide attackers, kill and die in the name of Islam, many suicide bombers do not seem to have a religious background per se. Though some have grown up in a religious environment, most appear not to have led a pious lifestyle. Although their transformation is akin to a conversion to a born-again-Muslim, complete with profound changes in behavior and lifestyle.

-We have shown that social bonds, including friendship and kinship ties, appear as one of the dominant factors in the radicalization of suicide bombers, including the decision of an individual to become a suicide bomber, and that social kinship ties, are an important part of the process.

It remained unclear, however, exactly how that crisis of identity translates into the desire to become a suicide bomber, and we will shed light on this question.

We also, have argued that individuals and groups - the two units without which a suicide attack would not take place - are influenced by their external environment. An analysis of the external environment is by definition complex, as the external environment includes a wide range of possible factors that may affect the preferences and choices of individuals and groups, including the economic, political, social, cultural, historical, and/or religious context.  In our previous overview of Jihadism we also focused on the level of the individual, the group, and the larger environment, yet in our next concluding overview will particularly focus on the fourth and most important aspect--the ideology. To be more precise, as we will see ideology helps the suicide bomber articulate (a)the justification for his act; and (b) it helps shape the mental framework of the attacker; and (c) it helps the suicide attacker to morally disengage from his act and from the victim.

a. Justifying the act: Ideology helps the suicide attacker justify the act by articulating why this act is called for, and why every ‘true’ Muslim must participate in it. The ideology describes - and statements by suicide bombers reflect - the need to defend Islam from attack as an individual duty for each and every Muslim; the participation in jihad as the ultimate proof of one’s worthiness as a Muslim; and the failure to participate in jihad as an act of heresy.

b. Shaping the mental framework of the attacker: Ideology shapes the mental framework of the suicide attacker by constantly repeating the West’s real or perceived infractions against Islam. This tend to employ conspiracy theories to further incite fear and hatred of the West. These conspiracy theories may involve a gross exaggeration of real infractions (f.ex. accusing the United States of killing many more civilians in a military operation than have actually been killed), or a fabrication of lies (f.ex., accusing the White House or Mossad of being behind 9/11). These conspiracy theories are often designed to deflect blame from Muslims (f.ex. blaming the West, as opposed to Osama bin Laden, for 9/11), thus portraying Muslims as victims. This ongoing victimization of Muslims - has created a siege mentality among some Muslims, who have accepted the notion that they are under consistent attack and humiliation.

See Case Study P.1:

c. Moral disengagement. Ideology is a key tool used to morally disengage suicide attackers from their deeds, as well as from their victims. Processes of moral disengagement, for instance, often involve the creation of in-groups and out-groups.

Salafi-Jihadist ideology helps creating this dichotomy of good-vs-evil by dividing the world into ‘true’ Muslims on one hand, and kuffar on the other. Dehumanization of the enemy is another mechanism of moral disengagement. As we will demonstrate Suicide-Jihadism often dehumanizes the enemy—whether it is the West, Christians, Jews, or the Shia, the enemy is regarded as defiled, degenerate, bereft of any sense of decency, unjust, and cruel.

Further we will also show, that different suicide bombers are likely to be influenced by a combination of motivations to conduct a suicide attack. Motivations are distinct from ideology. An ideology is better understood as a tool that provides mental preparation, support, and justification for suicide attackers to perpetrate an attack. Ideology helps explain ‘how’ suicide bombers are able to perpetrate attacks. Motivations, on the other hand, are those factors that lead the attacker to kill and die. They are the reasons ‘why’ suicide bombers kill and die. The cases studied here suggest that the following motivations are particularly salient among globalized suicide attackers:

a. Revenge. Statements and wills of the bombers examined here reflect an intense desire to exact revenge upon the enemy by inflicting upon him the same pain that he has allegedly inflicted on the bomber’s brethren. Revenge is perhaps the single most important motive for a person to become a suicide bomber.

b. Restoring honor and manhood. As statements across the board suggest, suicide bombers appear to sense that they need to perpetrate a suicide attack in order to restore their honor and, by extension, the honor of an Islam that has been subjected to repeated humiliation by the West over centuries and up to the present time. Related to this, many bombers seem to believe that perpetrating a suicide bombing is a manly deed - a belief that is exploited by the leadership of the various groups, which often appeal to Muslims to be “real men” and defend the honor of Islam.

c. Commitment: A strong commitment to the cell or larger group appears as a frequent motive for suicide attackers. Commitment to one’s kin, a small social group, or larger community - which in some cases may be explained by primordial bonds - is intensified, in the case of globalized suicide attacks, by a shared sense of victimization. The Internet plays a crucial role in providing a sense of brotherhood, a sense of solidarity, belonging, pride, and empowerment to suicide bombers. It is partly as a result of the Internet that the new pattern of globalized suicide attacks exhibits a large number of cases where grievances are visceral, rather than personally experienced. Occupation, therefore, must not have been personally experienced by a suicide bomber in order for him or her to feel humiliated enough to seek a drastic action.

d. Martyr’s benefits. Statements and wills we have examined strongly suggest that suicide bombers believe that by becoming a martyr, they will reap a number of benefits. They firmly believe that the act of martyrdom is a service to God, and pleasing to Him. Because of their willingness to sacrifice their lives in the service of God, they believe that God rewards the martyr by washing away all of the martyr’s sins. Furthermore, the martyr enjoys the benefits of paradise, a reservation for scores of his or her family members in heaven, and a wedding to the huris (black-eyed virgins) of paradise. Although the possibility of sexual motivations driving male suicide attackers is sometimes dismissed by researchers, statements made by the bombers, as evidenced here, are replete with references to the women of paradise.
While this fact, in itself, does not prove that suicide bombers die and kill for sexual pleasure, it is nevertheless clear that sponsoring groups continuously promise these rewards to would-be-bombers. And yet, it is fair to assume that these groups would not consistently preach the rewards of paradise if they would not believe that these promises would not resonate at some level with would-be-bombers. That said, there is no evidence suggesting that the benefits of sexual pleasures are either a necessary or a sufficient factor for a person to become a suicide bomber.

Also, on hand of the evidence examined, we will be able to proof following six:

1) Varying Degrees of Ties to Al Qaeda. The extent of the various groups’ ties to the Al Qaeda core leadership varies from case to case. That said, however, all groups examined here appear to be influenced by the strategic message relayed by Al Qaeda’s core leadership (especially Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri). This is in contrast to groups such as the LTTE, PKK, Hizballah, and the various Palestinian organizations - groups that have been categorized as traditional groups - who do not seem to be directly influenced or inspired by Al Qaeda’s strategic message.

2) Fluid organizational attachments. Increasingly, it appears that the attachment of suicide bombers to their organizations is fluid, when compared to the 1990s. Increasingly, suicide bombers are not recruited by an organization, but often reach the decision to become human bombs themselves, and then seek out a link to a sponsor who can enable them to do this. The identity of the group may be less important for some volunteers than the group’s ability to help the volunteer realize his dream of being a suicide bomber. Increasingly, however, these groups are Salafi-Jihadist in nature.

3) Bottom-up and Virtual Recruitment. Related to the above point, the case studies examined confirm that recruitment occurs increasingly from the bottom up, rather than from the top down. Several individuals have attempted to, and some have succeeded in, joining jihad elsewhere, before ending up as a suicide bomber in Iraq. This strongly suggests that these individuals regard jihad as an initiative that transcends national borders, but also that these individuals are willing, and in many cases eager, to die. Kinship and friendship ties, as has been seen, also plays a role in the recruitment and radicalization of suicide bombers. The predominant bottom-up nature of today’s recruitment for globalized suicide attacks, however, does not suggest that the group (as opposed to the individual) is irrelevant in the mobilization towards suicide attacks. On the contrary, most videotapes examined here serve as recruitment tools by portraying suicide bombers as heroes and the sponsoring group as fearless and powerful, and hence as an entity to be respected, emulated, and supported. The Internet has helped spread such recruitment videos instantly to individuals all over the world.

4) Small-group characteristics. In addition to the larger, sponsoring group or organization, the dynamics within the small group or cell are of key importance. Individuals in cells undergo a process of intensive radicalization that, as is most clearly evident in the case of the London bombers, provides emotional benefits to its members, including a sense of belonging, purpose, and shared destiny. Preparation in cells - especially when consisting of friends - appears to strengthen the resolve to carry out suicide attacks. Suicide bombers are rarely alone in their last moments, but surrounded by friends, who provide psychological support until shortly before the attack.

5) Growing Role of the Internet. The role of the Internet as a tool for the organization in casing, information-gathering and sharing, planning, recruiting, indoctrinating, training, and fundraising terrorist operations has become critical, and is likely to continue to grow in importance.

6) Tactical and Strategic Aspects of Suicide Attacks. Information examined suggests that the reasons why groups employ suicide attacks can be usefully divided into tactical and strategic aspects.

a. Tactical Advantages. The tactical advantages of suicide attacks is one of the most striking continuities in the employment of suicide attacks since 1981. Suicide operations are cost-effective, highly lethal, and the most accurate weapons available.

Their use requires little planning, yet suicide attacks are among the most shocking and awe-inspiring tactics possible. Hence, the ratio between benefits and costs of suicide attacks is enormous. In addition, suicide attacks help present the group as fearless and determined. They draw attention to the group’s cause because this modus operandi compounds the media effect. In sum, these straightforward tactical benefits of suicide attacks are one of the main reasons why groups employ SAs.

b. Strategic Reasons. Suicide attacks, like other tactics, are employed for various strategic reasons. In the cases under examination here, these reasons included punishment and intimidation of a country for certain policies; isolation of an enemy; attempts to drive a wedge between a regime and its population; creating economic harm to a country; delegitimizing a new political order; but also an ideological belief in the necessity to wage war against a demonized enemy. Suicide attacks are particularly useful as a weapon intended to send strategic signals to a number of audiences because of the devastation it wreaks, and because its targets often appear helpless in their attempts to defend against this weapon.

7) Indoctrination and Incitement. Ideology again, enables individuals to perpetratethe act of killing and dying by helping to articulate the justification for the act; by shaping the mental framework of the attacker; and by helping the suicide attacker to morally disengage from his act and from the victim. In supplying this ideology and otherwise strengthening the resolve of the suicide attacker - i.e., through indoctrination and incitement - the group plays a crucial part in the process of readying the individual for the attack.

Finally then, we also will discuss implications and policy recommendations.

For those who have read our overview presented in World Jihad, it comes as no surprise that the global rise of suicide attacks has been on a steady rise. Based on a dataset compiled by the National Security Studies Center (NSSC) of the University of Haifa, Arie Perliger and Ami Pedahzur concluded that a total of 986 SAs have been perpetrated between 1981 and 2005. In the first decade after the first SA against the Iraqi embassy in Beirut in December 1981, 51 suicide attacks were conducted - the majority in Lebanon and Sri Lanka. Over the next five years, the average yearly number of SAs doubled, with nearly the same number of attacks (53) perpetrated in only half the number of years, from 1991 to 1995.Beginning in 2001 and until 2005, the number of SAs per year increased consistently. 65 attacks were carried out in 2001 and 71 in 2002. Beginning in 2003, SAs in Iraq would substantially increase the number of these attacks per year. 89 attacks were carried out in 2003 and 166 in 2004. The number more than doubled in 2005, with at least 375 suicide attacks, the vast majority of which were carried out in Iraq. As a result of the rising number of attacks, the number of people killed by SAs has risen sharply between 1981 and 2005. Significantly, every year since 2002, the fatalities have risen by a larger percentage - by 71% between 2002 and 2003, 84% between 2003 and 2004, and by 89% between 2004 and 2005. Of the 986 suicide attacks between 1981 and 2005, nearly half were carried out in Iraq. Where Israel is the second most frequently targeted country, with 178 attacks since1981.47 attacks were carried out in Lebanon, mostly against Israeli targets, and 37 attacks took place in Russia. (Source: Suicide Terrorism Database, NSSC, Haifa University)

It must be assumed that not all suicide attacks that occur in Iraq are reported in the press, which tends to report mostly on attacks occurring in the larger cities. Furthermore, between 1981 and 1994, there were usually between one or two countries attacked in any given year, but never more than four. In 1995, there was a spike to 7 countries attacked by suicide attacks. Between 1996 and 1999, relatively few countries - between three and six - suffered from SAs. Beginning in 2000, the number of countries in which SAs occurred has risen sharply to at least 9 countries (in 2000 and 2002) attacked per year to 15 countries attacked in 2004 and 2005.Attacks in a given country, however, are not necessarily directed against targets of that country. As of 2005, SAs have been carried out in 39 countries on five continents. This modus operandi literally spans nearly the entire globe. The global spread of SAs lies in two related and mutually reinforcing phenomena, namely the rise of Al Qaeda and the rise of its guiding ideology - Salafi-Jihadism.

As we have seen, Al Qaeda’s establishment is connected to the nine-year long Afghan war against the Soviet Union. The idea of Al Qaeda was conceived around 1988, partly due to the desire to organize the records of foreign Muslim, mostly Arab, fighters who joined the Afghan mujahideen’s battle against the Red Army. These foreign fighters would be known as ‘Afghan Arabs.’ The idea to turn Al Qaeda into a base for future jihad was raised after the Soviet withdrawal in 1988, with the publication of The Solid Base, an article by Abdullah Azzam, the co-founder of Al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden’s mentor. In that article, Azzam laid out his vision to establish Al Qaeda as a vanguard for the new Islamic society he envisioned. (“The Solid Base,” as quoted in Reuven Paz, "The Brotherhood of Global Jihad," Project for the Research of Islamist Movement, PRISM, October 2001). See also:

Salafism in turn, or salafiyya, is an Islamic trend that developed in the late 19th century as a movement that strove to reform Islam and help it meet the challenge of Western colonization. Early Salafis were not opposed to modernity, and instead attempted to reconcile what modernity had to offer with the traditions of Islam. Following World War II, and under the influence of Saudi Wahhabism and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the reformist outlook that had shaped early Salafism was increasingly sidelined by a Salafism more concerned with the struggle against colonialism.

See Case Study P.2:

At present, a variety of Salafi groups exist, each claiming to be the only true heirs of Allah’s program, as conveyed by his messenger, Muhammad, and as practiced by him and his messengers - known as the ‘ancient ones,’ or salaf. Salafis adopt a strict implementation of Islamic religious law, and their doctrine centers around a far more literal understanding of the concept of tawhid (the unity of God) than does that of ordinary Muslims. For Salafis, the unity of God - a concept which all Muslims believe in - extends to the belief that all man-made laws must be rejected as an interference with the word and will of God. Salafis therefore reject the division of religion and state, which would suggest that man-made laws are supreme to those of Islam. In order to abide by and protect tawhid, Salafis believe that Muslims must strictly follow the Quran and emulate the model of the prophet Muhammad, who, as the Muslim exemplar, embodied the perfection of tawhid. Salafis believe that only the salaf - the Prophet himself and his ancient companions - led a lifestyle that was in accordance with God’s will and hence pleasing to him. Only by emulating that lifestyle can Muslims reverse the decline of Islam. While ordinary Salafis believe that God’s word should be spread by da’wa alone - the non-violent call to Islam by proselytizing - Salafi-Jihadists, a sub-category of Salafis - advocate waging violent jihad. There are four main points of contention between Salafis and Salafi-jihadists.

First, unlike Salafis, Salafi-Jihadists give priority to jihad, elevating it to the same level as the five pillars of Islam. Second, Salafi-Jihadists engage in takfir, the process of labelling fellow Muslims infidels (kufr), thus justifying violence against them. Third, Salafi-Jihadists justify the targeting of civilians, and fourth, they justify the use of suicide operations. Even though theological justifications for SAs are largely absent from the Salafi-Jihadist discourse, Salafi-Jihadists nevertheless believe that suicide operations against infidels and apostates - shorthand for non-Muslim infidels and nominally Muslim traitors—are the ultimate form of devotion to God and the best way to wage jihad. They present jihad and self-sacrifice as the antithesis to everything that the West stands for, and hence repeat the mantra that “the West loves life, while true Muslims love death.” In the words of Abu Ayman al-Hilali, a key interpreter of bin Laden’s ideas on Salafi-Jihadist web sites: “First we have to acknowledge a basic fact, proved by experience and reality, already acknowledged by the enemy, which is that the vital contradiction to the Zionist and American enemy is the doctrine of Jihad and Martyrdom (Istishhad).”As will be seen, Salafi-Jihadist preachers such as Abu Hamza al-Mazri or Omar Bakri Muhammad help inspire thousands of Muslim youth to develop a cult-like relationship to martyrdom in mosques. Other preachers are active on the Internet, such as Yussuf al-Ayeri, a key strategist of the mujahideen in Iraq, who died in a shootout in Saudi Arabia in 2003. References to the benefits presumably awaiting the martyr in paradise are cited systematically. Since Islam forbids the taking of one’s own life, Salafi-Jihadists draw a conceptual distinction between suicide and ‘martyrdom,’ arguing that ordinary suicides kill themselves for personal reasons, such as distress or depression, while true martyrs die for the sake of God and the Muslim community.

Thus, Salafi-Jihadism is not a religion per se, but rather an ideology. It is composed of an internally coherent system of beliefs, prescribes strict codes of behavior, presents a clear diagnosis of the causes responsible for the predicaments of its adherents, identifies its enemies, and prescribes clear steps to be taken to remedy the problem. Like other ideologies, it is an outgrowth of modernity - a negative effect of the industrialization that has swept through Europe beginning in the 19th century. It is intimately linked to the dislocating and turbulent effects of globalization, as rapid changes in the social, political, and economic realms of life are turning established and rooted notions of identity provided by traditional social structures upside down. Like other ideologies such as fascism or communism, Salafi-Jihadism gives individuals a new sense of identity by offering individuals a membership to a supranational entity. A new sense of belonging to a new community is provided to individuals who are confused by modernization. That community is the umma, the Muslim community of believers, which embodies and provides a sense of comfort, dignity, security, and identity to the downtrodden Muslim.

See Case Study P.3:

As Jason Burke has noted, the real power of bin Laden’s discourse is that, like Marxism, it explains a personal experience by reference to a convincing general theory and then provides a comprehensible programme of action.” ( Burke, Al-Qaeda: The True Story of Radical Islam , 286.) Many Muslim youth protest the Islam of their parents, and adopt a more radical Islamic lifestyle as a form of protest. Meanwhile, Salafi-Jihadist preachers exploit the dislocating effects of the youth’s breach with the parents andtraditional religion. Immigration of many Muslims to Europe - and the failure to integrate them properly -  has created ghettoes on the margins of Western societies populated in large part by unemployed youth. These neighborhoods allow youth to rationalize a sense of marginalization and loss of identity. Islam offers an alternative identity to them as well as a chance to earn respect among their peers. Muslims from various walks of life find a new comfort, community, and discipline in the Salafi movement.

Converts feel alone, writes French sociologist Farhad Khosrokhavar, but by converting to Islam, they join a new humanity that provides them with obligations and rights. Converts can now feel actively committed to an extended community of over a billion Muslim men and women. (Khosrokhavar, Suicide Bombers, 208.) Converts to Islam are particularly prone to adopt violence because of an inverse racism, Khosrokhavar adds. Not fully accepted among Muslims, they are overzealous, attempting to prove to themselves and others that they truly belong to the Muslim ummah. “Showing your willingness to die for Islam is a good way to prove that.” (Ibid., 211.)
   

Global Jihad P.2

Global Jihad P.3.

Global Jihad P.4.

Global Jihad P.5.

Global Jihad P.6.

Global Jihad P.7.

Bibliography



For updates click homepage here

 

 

 

 

shopify analytics