By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers

As we have been able to see, the advent of Salafi-Jihadism has altered the nature and employment of some SAs in five key areas in a way that allows a distinction between the existence of two ideal-type patterns of SAs, a traditional pattern of localized SAs, and the predominant, contemporary pattern of globalized SAs. The five areas of divergence are the types of conflicts in which SAs are used; the types of groups employing SAs; the geographic scope of these actors; their target definition; and the types of goals that actors pursue. The onset of SAs tied to Salafi-Jihadism has altered the nature and employment of SAs in fundamental ways. The implication of these changes is that we may now distinguish between two general patterns of SAs, localized and globalized attacks. The overwhelming majority of Sas since 1981 have occurred in relatively localized settings. Localized suicide attacks tend to have several characteristics:

a) Conflict type: SAs have traditionally occurred in the context of a relatively localized conflict that is identified as such by two belligerent parties. Examples of these conflicts are those between Israel and Hizballah, Israelis and the Palestinians, Tamils and Sinhalese, and Turks and Kurds. These conflicts have generally raged for many years, and often decades, and are oftentimes long-standing conflicts between groups of a different ethnic background and/or religion.

b) Ideology: SAs that abide by the traditional pattern have been planned and executed by groups that have been both religious in character, but also by groups who are primarily driven by secular, Marxist, ethno-nationalist, or nationalist motives. Religion alone is therefore unable to account for the genesis of the traditional pattern of SAs. Examples of religious groups that have employed localized pattern SAs include Hamas, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and Hizballah.Examples of groups that are secular or nationalist in character include the LTTE, the PFLP,Fatah-Al Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, the PKK, and the Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP).

c) Geographic scope of actors: Traditionally, most SAs have been planned and executed by subnational terrorist or insurgent actors such as Hizballah, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), Hamas, PIJ, or the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK). Palestinian organizations employing SAs, for example, have largely conducted the operational planning of suicide missions locally, although they may have been receptive to the strategic message and direction of an exile leadership. The subnational nature of these groups that execute this pattern of SAs implies that these organizations have recruited and trained suicide bombers mostly in or near the conflict area proper, and rarely abroad. Unlike modern suicide bombers, who oftentimes migrate to blow themselves up in a foreign country, ‘traditional’ suicide bombers appear to be largely residents of the area of conflict. Most recruits of the PKK, for example, stem from large, poor families residing in Turkey. In the case of attacks by Palestinian organizations, over 99% of the bombers between 1993 and 2005 have been residents of the area of conflict, the West Bank, Gaza, and Israel proper. As far as the LTTE is concerned, LTTE experts believe that it is unlikely that the group has drawn Black Tiger recruits from outside Sri Lanka since they are chosen from within the existing ranks of the regular LTTE army, where motivation to serve is high. According to Stephen Hopgood, for example, “the emphasis on commitment to the cause both for regular cadres and Black Tigers makes non-Sri Lankan or Indian Tamil recruits highly unlikely. The LTTE seems to have no recruitment problems for Black Tigers, so looking outside would only be necessary if some ethnic or linguistic feature of the operative's identity was necessary to accomplish the mission.

 d) Targets: Hamas, LTTE, PKK, and Hizballah, groups that have conducted localized SAs, have mostly targeted people and assets of the enemy state in the conflict area proper, or in close proximity thereof, while by and large refraining from targeting assets of their foes in other locations. The PKK, for instance, has conducted all of its SAs in Turkey. Hamas and other Palestinian organizations have never executed a SA against Israeli or Jewish targets outside of Israel, the West Bank, and Gaza. Hizballah’s SAs against Israel were staged mostly against Israel Defense Forces troops inside Lebanon, with the exception of two suicide attacks on Israeli and Jewish targets in Argentina for which the group has declined to take official responsibility.The LTTE has staged the vast majority of its estimated 200 attacks in Sri Lanka proper, a notable exception being the killing of Indian prime minister Rajiv Ghandi in the Indian city of Madras in May 1991. We are unaware of additional SAs carried out by the LTTE outside of Sri Lanka. In fact the LTTE is very careful to make it clear its target is the Sri Lankan state, and its collaborators, rather than all Sri Lankans. It is conscious of its public image and escalating to attack on foreign soil would be counterproductive both to legitimacy and diaspora fundraising.

e) Goals: The subnational terrorist or insurgent movements that characterize localized patterns of SAs generally aim to advance limited and well-defined political goals for the community it purports to represent. Such political goals may include an end to foreign occupation or military presence, increased regional autonomy, and self-determination. The struggle for an independent homeland, whether it is Tamil Eelam, Kurdistan, or Palestine, lies at the center of the conflicts in the course of which SAs have traditionally been adopted.The localized pattern of suicide missions described above contrasts sharply with a different general pattern of globalized SAs epitomized by Al Qaeda and its affiliates. The globalized pattern of SAs bears a number of distinct characteristics:

a) Conflict type: The new pattern of globalized SAs may occur in the context of clearly identifiable conflicts such as Iraq, but those conflicts may not necessarily be historical and/or long-standing. SAs in Iraq, for example, occurred less than a week following the beginning of the U.S. led invasion of Iraq in March 2003, hardly long enough to produce the types of deepseated grievances that have presumably affected Palestinian, Tamil, or Kurdish suicide bombers in localized contexts. Neither are the targets of many of today’s globalized SAs always aware that they are involved in a conflict with a bitter enemy who seeks their death along with its own. Unlike traditional SAs, globalized SAs frequently occur in areas that, by any objective standards, are not identified by all parties as zones of conflict. The 9/11 attacks, for instance, did not take place in a region where a large ethnic group is vying for an independent state while battling an occupation army. The same is true for the SAs at Khobar Towers in June 1996; the
U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998; the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000; as well as other examples of globalized SAs in Djerba (April 2002), Bali (October 2002 and October 2005), Mombasa (November 2002), Saudi Arabia (May 2003), Casablanca (May 2003), Istanbul (November 2003), London (July 2005), and Amman (November 2005), to cite a few examples.

b) Ideology: Whereas traditionally, SAs have been perpetrated by both religious and secular groups, the new globalized SAs are overwhelmingly planned and executed by Salafi-Jihadist groups, as has been demonstrated earlier.

c) Geographic scope of actors: Unlike localized SAs, which are executed mainly by subnational actors, many of today’s globalized SAs are planned and executed by cells and groups that are connected to a transnational terrorist or insurgent network or movement. The transnational nature of the groups that execute this pattern of SAs implies that the planning of the SA and its execution may occur in entirely separate places. Whereas localized SAs are generally planned in or near the area of conflict, where these attacks are also executed, globalized attacks may be planned in one country, and executed in another. This is true, for example, for the 9/11 attacks, which were not planned in Washington and New York; the April 2002 attack on a synagogue in Djerba, which was planned in Pakistan; or the November 2005 attacks on three hotels in Amman, Jordan, which were planned by a cell affiliated with Abu Musab al-Zarqawi in Iraq.Additionally, unlike in the localized pattern, organizations conducting globalized SAs no longer tend to recruit and train the suicide bombers in the region or country where the attack will eventually be executed. Instead, the suicide attackers are increasingly implanted from other countries. This is true, again, in the case of the 9/11 attacks, and especially apparent in the high proportion of foreign jihadists, including suicide bombers, in Iraq. According to a Department of Defense News Briefing with Col. Sean MacFarland, Commander of the 1st Brigade Combat Team, 1st Armored Division stationed in Ramadi, Iraq, “[foreign fighters] are very few in number, although as far as we can tell, they constitute about 100 percent of the suicide bombers.” ("Iraq Index: Tracking Variables of Reconstruction and Security in Post-Saddam Iraq," ed. Michael O'Hanlon and Nina Kamp, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2006, 13 November 2006, 18.; see also comments by Maj. Gen. Rick Lynch, who stated on December 1, 2005, that “at least 96% of suicide bombers [in Iraq] are not Iraqis.” Chris Tomlinson, "Us General: Suicide and Car Bomb Attacks Down in Iraq," Associated Press, 1 December 2005.)
The November 2005 bombings in Amman, for example, were executed by three Iraqis, while many suicide bombers in Afghanistan appear to be non-Afghanis.

d) Targets: Organizations and cells staging globalized SAs no longer limit their attacks to an identifiable zone of conflict, as has been the case in traditional, localized SAs. In fact, due in large part to the nature of Salafi-Jihadism, which speaks on behalf of a worldwide community of Muslim believers, many of today’s suicide attackers regard much of the world as a legitimate target.Hence, even though Al Qaeda has declared the United States as its main enemy, it does not limit its SAs to the U.S. homeland. Instead, it will strike U.S. interests wherever an opportunity may arise. In addition, it may also strike targets of real or perceived allies of the United States.

e) Goals: The goals of the organizations that are responsible for the traditional pattern of SAs are often extreme, Hamas, for instance, calls for the destruction of Israel, but they nevertheless tend to be clearly pronounced, relatively well defined, and geographically narrow in scope. The globalization of SAs, on the other hand, is characterized by organizations whose goals are more elusive. It is not entirely clear, for instance, whether the SAs in Amman in November 2005 were intended to punish the Hashemite monarchy for its pro-Western stance, including its relations with Israel; to target foreign diplomats; to hurt Israeli and Jewish interests in the kingdom; to create instability in the kingdom and spark an anti-Hashemite backlash; or to extend the jihad in Iraq to the broader Middle East. Similarly, Western analysts are often at odds over what exactly Al Qaeda’s goals and motivations are, although there is an overall consensus that Al Qaeda’s demands are maximalist.

Localized vs. Globalized Patterns of Suicide Attacks

As stated previously, the two patterns described here, summarized in the Table above, are ideal type descriptions. Most SAs will bear characteristics of both patterns, and thus fall somewhere in between localized and globalized attacks.

In the final chart on the right, the dark column represents globalized suicide attacks, and is seen to be steadily increasing over the last five years. Only attacks by ‘Unknown’ groups outnumber globalized suicide attacks in 2003, 2004, and 2005, but it is again important to remember that 91% of the unknown attacks occurred in Iraq and, due to their overwhelmingly Salafi-Jihadist nature, contain strong characteristics of globalized SAs. Thus again, since 2003, globalized SAs have become the dominant pattern of SAs. As argued before, the high lethality and global spread of Salafi-Jihadism render this significant change in pattern of SAs particularly important. And what can be established is that although globalized SAs are rising compared to localized attacks, localized and globalized SAs continue to coexist. Indeed, there is little reason to believe that all localized groups will assume globalized characteristics. Adopting a globalized stance may be harmful to a localized organization, particularly if it decides to target third countries. Drawing the ire of third countries (such as the United States) could be perceived as a potential existential threat to the localized organization.

While some localized groups can therefore be expected to remain localized, many other previously localized groups have gone global, for example, by officially affiliating themselves with Al Qaeda. The Algerian Salafist Group for the Call and Combat, better known by its French acronym, GSPC, is a case in point. Around 2001, the group began operating outside of Algeria by establishing a number of cells in various European countries, after having been previously focused solely on Algeria. On the second anniversary of 9/11 in September 2003, however, the group made it clear that it now included the United States among its enemies. And in 2006,Ayman al-Zawahiri announced the official merger of the GSPC with Al Qaeda. (Kathryn Haahr, "Gspc Joins Al-Qaeda and France Becomes Top Enemy," Terrorism Focus 3, no. 37, 26 September 2006).

Examples of such previously localized groups who have, over time, become globalized, also include the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (now known as the Islamic Movement of Turkestan). Once focused mainly on Central Asia, the IMU now champions Al Qaeda’s internationalist goals, including the establishment of an Islamic caliphate. (Rabasa et al., Beyond Al-Qaeda, Part I , xii, 22.)

The same trajectory from the local to the global applies to the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG). Formerly focused on Libya, the LIFG has substantial ties to Al Qaeda. LIFG member Abu Anas al-Libi, for example, was a key planner of the U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya. According to the State Department, non-Libyan members of LIFG are also suspected of involvement in the planning and facilitation of the May 2003 SAs in Casablanca. (Gary Gambill, "The Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (Lifg)," Terrorism Monitor 3, no. 6, 24 March 2005).  Similarly, the Moroccan Islamic Fighting Group (GICM), once dedicated merely to the creation of an Islamist state in Morocco, now actively supports the objectives of Al Qaeda against Western countries. Lashkar-e-Taybeh, a group once solely dedicated to the ouster of Indian forces from Kashmir, recently shifted its focus to Iraq. In one of the group’s publications, it calls on jihadists to go to Iraq and take revenge for the torture at Abu Ghraib prison and the alleged mistreatment of Iraqi Muslim women. “The Americans are dishonoring our mothers and sisters … Therefore, jihad against America has now become mandatory” read a notice on the LeT’s website. (Daniel Benjamin and Gabriel Weimann, "What the Terrorists Have in Mind," New York Times, 27 October 2004, 21.) Sipah-e-Sahaba and its more militant offshoot, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi, two radically anti-Shia Salafi-Jihadist terrorist outfits previously focused on Kashmir as well, have increasingly adopted the goals of global jihad. Perhaps the most well-known of groups to have turned from a local to a global outfit is Jemaah Islamiyya (JI), an Indonesia-based group that is bent on establishing an Islamic caliphate throughout all of South East Asia. JI grew increasingly close to Al Qaeda after 9/11, when Al Qaeda began to exploit local causes of groups like JI while imposing its globalized, Salafi-Jihadist ideology on them.

 

Global Jihad P.1.

Global Jihad P.2

Global Jihad P.3.

Global Jihad P.5.

Global Jihad P.6.

Global Jihad P.7.

Bibliography

For updates click homepage here