By Eric Vandenbroeck
As we have seen the Bosnian Crisis of 1908-09 and the Balkan War, are
often seen as a precursor to what spilled over into the
assassination of Franz Ferdinand at Sarajevo in June 1914. But that it was the Habsburgs' expansion to the south-east what
made their concern about the ambitions of the small Slavonic neighbors a
self-inflicted strategic predicament.
But Serbian thinking in 1912 about ditching Russia and the Triple
Entente has hardly figured in the voluminous literature on the Balkan Wars. But
then, the prevalent assumption among historians continues to be that Serbia was
a Russian client state.192 This assumption flies in the face of the fact that
ill-disposed Russian diplomacy made such a Serbian alignment with Russia and
the Triple Entente impossible. For little had changed since 1908-1909. At the
end of September 1912, Sazonov flew into a hysterical
rage at a meeting in London with Grujic, the Serbian
Minister. The Russian Minister repeatedly described as 'mindless' the
intentions of Serbia and Bulgaria to attack Turkey; warning that Austria would
'immediately' attack Serbia. He added for good measure that Serbia and Bulgaria
wanted to 'hoodwink' Russia with their Alliance, insisting that Russia needed
'at least ten years' to complete its economic, financial and military
renaissance.193 His unambiguous message was that the South Slavs had no basis
on which to ask for help from St Petersburg - nor any basis on which to expect
it. In the British Foreign Office, the view was expressed that the Russians
'have got themselves into an equivocal position in the Balkans, for, having
made the marriage, they are compelled to urge divorce for fear of its first
fruits'.194
In Sofia, the Serbian Minister Spalajkovic,
appalled by Russia's pressure to prevent the outbreak of war against Turkey;
told his British colleague that the Serbs and Bulgarians were thoroughly
'embittered' by Russia and the Triple Alliance. 195 In St Petersburg, Popovic
concluded: 'It seems to me that current Russian diplomacy; out of weakness and
fear of war, takes greater care about the interests of other states than about
its own and that of Slavonic states.'196 In Paris, Russia's great friend and
ally the French Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Raymond Poincare tried to
intimidate the Serbian Minister of Justice Milenko Vesnić
by pointing out the danger from Austria. The Serbian Minister calmly suggested
that, since Europe was so convinced of Austria-Hungary's omnipotence, it should
not be surprised if Serbia were someday to seek an arrangement with Vienna.Vesnić added, for good measure, that the Triple
Entente would never achieve anything if it worked only to avoid war.197
In fact, there was initially no danger whatsoever that Austria-Hungary
would attack because it was anticipating that Turkey would easily defeat
Serbia. Austria-Hungary, according to the Vienna correspondent of The Times,
'welcomed the prospect of a Balkan war in which the Turks were expected to
smash Greece and, particularly, Serbia, however successful the Bulgarians might
be'.198 But it is also true that the Austrians had been caught napping: their
Military Attaches in Belgrade and Constantinople were on holiday as the war
approached.199 And so was Stephan von Ugron, the
Austro-Hungarian Minister in Belgrade. A messenger reached him in Hungary where
he was shooting and gave him the news: 'There is a mobilization in Serbia.
Belgrade is full of soldiers.' Whereupon Ugron
protested: 'That is not possible. For I would have known something about
it.'200
He was soon to know much more. Keen to be the first in the field, tiny
Montenegro declared war on Turkey on 8 October 1912 - King Nicholas had
apparently sensed that he could make money by 'bearing' the Viennese and other
stock markets.201 Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece declared war on 17 October. Most
observers had expected the German-organized Turkish Army to defeat the forces
of the Balkan states. But the latter recorded one stunning victory after
another over the Turkish adversary. 'To no class', Winston Churchill wrote,
'had the crushing Turkish defeats come with more surprise than to the military
experts. The Bulgarian Army, having smashed the Turks in Thrace, soon stood at
the gates of Constantinople. Meanwhile, the Serbian Army, having brushed aside
the Turks in Macedonia, stood on the shores of the Adriatic Sea. The Russians
were appalled at the prospect of the Bulgarians taking Constantinople. Sazonov had previously asserted that Russia's only interest
in the Balkans was to ensure that the Straits remained in the Turkish hands.203
But in Vienna, they were equally horrified at the sight of the Serbian Army in
the port of Durazzo. Supported by Italy, Austria-Hungary led a sustained drive
to force Serbia away from the Albanian coast. The London Conference of the
Ambassadors was set up, the main aim of which was to bring into existence an
independent state of Albania, which duly took place at the end of July 1913.
The First Balkan War had experienced a temporary standstill from 3
December 1912, the date an armistice was declared on all the fronts, with the
Turks still holding Edirne, besieged by the Bulgarians, Yanina,
besieged by the Greeks, and Scutari, besieged by the Montenegrins. Hostilities
resumed following the Young Turk coup in January 1913. Yanina
and Edirne surrendered in March, but Scutari held on. The Montenegrins finally
took the town late in April, but an Austrian-led international action coerced
them to withdraw early in May. Earlier, in January 1913, Austria-Hungary had
undertaken a series of mobilization measures designed to put pressure on the
Serbs to withdraw from Northern Albania. The First Balkan War was finally ended
by the so-called London Settlement on 30 May 1913. But the Second Balkan War
quickly followed only a month later. Forced away from the Adriatic by
Austria-Hungary, the Serbs decided they should keep most of their gains in
Macedonia instead, proposing to the Bulgarians a revision of their treaty
concerning the division of this land. While it is true that the Serbian Army
had helped the Bulgarians to take the city of Edirne, that the Bulgarians had
made massive gains in the east, and that they had done nothing to help the
Serbs in Macedonia, the Serbian position constituted a clear-cut breach of the
Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of 1912. Without waiting for any arbitration by the
Russian Tsar, at the end of June 1913, the Bulgarians attacked the Serbs as
well as the Greeks who, for their part, had in the previous campaign taken the
contested port of Salonika. The attack was repelled, however, and now both
Romania and Turkey joined this war against Bulgaria, ensuring its complete
defeat. The Treaty of Bucharest (August 1913), while excluding Turkey as a
participant, was an all-Balkan affair which formalized the new order on the
peninsula without the patronage of the Great Powers. Serbia emerged from these
conflicts with its territory almost doubled. At the same time, it was bitterly
antagonized by the Austro-Hungarian action which had denied it its principal
war aim of a port on the Adriatic.
This was indeed Austria's objective. Once it was understood in Vienna
that Serbia would emerge victorious from the Balkan conflict, the chief concern
was to keep it away from the Adriatic Sea. The official reason that
Austro-Hungarian diplomacy put forward for objecting to the Serbian presence in
northern Albania was that it was inhabited by Albanians. Borrowing the slogan
that had been current in the Balkans for several decades, Vienna argued for
'The Balkans to the Balkan peoples!' This was of course somewhat cynical coming
from a Power that had, back in 1878, conquered Bosnia-Herzegovina with blood
and iron and which, thirty years later, annexed the provinces against the
wishes of four-fifths of the local population. Besides, the nationality
principle was not exactly a holy precept in the Habsburg Monarchy. To the
official argument was added a kind of semi-official one opposing a Serbian port
on the Adriatic. Such a port, it was suggested, could be turned into a
stronghold of the Russian Navy. This, however, was a fanciful fable dreamt up
at the Ballhausplatz. Russia's naval construction programme was proceeding very slowly before 1914. In the
Baltic Sea, the Russians faced the vastly superior German Navy; while any
meaningful operations from the Black Sea required the physical possession of at
least one side of the Straits. Any kind of Russian naval threat in the
Mediterranean was years away.204
The real reasons for wishing to throw the Serbs out of the Adriatic area
in Albania were the old ones, those formulated by Goluchowski:
building a Vienna-controlled Albanian entity as a non-Slav barrier to Serbia's
expansion; preventing Serbia from securing its commercial independence by
denying it an Adriatic port; and generally keeping Serbia as small and as weak
as possible so that it would lack any power of attraction for the South Slavs
of the Monarchy. Admittedly; there were those in the Habsburg elite who took a
somewhat different view: Thus General Moritz von Auffenberg,
who was until December 1912 the Joint War Minister, believed that it would have
been better to leave the Serbs with the Albanians, for 'the Albanian morsel'
was quite tough and it might take Serbia ten to twenty years to digest it.205
Interestingly; Aehrenthal's successor Count Berchtold did initially want to talk to the Serbs. Early in
November 1912, he sent Professor Josef Redlich to Belgrade to explore the
possibility of an Austro-Serbian customs union - which would, of course,
coupled perhaps with a military convention, have been the easiest way to
control Serbia. General Oskar Potiorek, who in 1911
became the Landeschefin Bosnia-Herzegovina, was to
advocate similar ideas. But Berchtold made clear in
advance to Redlich that the Albanian region had to be preserved and that the
Serbs would not receive a port, that is to say; would be getting nothing from Berchtold. Redlich was thus predictably unsuccessful in
Belgrade. Pasic thought a customs union achievable at some point in future, but
he insisted on the Adriatic port. Significantly; however, he offered to Redlich
that Serbia would not trespass the Bosnian line. Conditions, he said, could be
different in a hundred years' time when perhaps the whole of Europe would
constitute a 'single realm'.206 This was not the first time that Pasic had
promised the Austrians Serbia's passivity towards Bosnia, and it would not be
the last time, either. But no one was impressed in Vienna.
In Budapest, on the other hand, they did not even want to hear about a
customs union with Serbia. As he stopped in the Hungarian capital on his way
back from Belgrade, Redlich found that no less a person than Tisza was against
it.207 This Austro- Hungarian comedy about an accommodation with Serbia then
quickly gave way to war planning against Serbia. For quite apart from the
Serbian Army's march towards the Adriatic, the impermissible joining of the
Serbian and Montenegrin forces in the Sanjak had already taken place. Decades
of Austro-Hungarian policy towards Serbia had been shattered in just a few
weeks. To the Austro- Hungarian military; according to Germany's Military Attache in Vienna, it was now a question of maintaining
one's prestige as a Great Power. 'We are ashamed', is what the officers were
saying at the General Staff Headquarters. 'We have begun to feel ashamed of
ourselves', was how the mandarins felt at the Ballhausplatz.208
Inevitably; however, there existed a degree of concern in Vienna about a
possible Russian intervention in the event of a war against an otherwise
completely unprotected Serbia.209 Such fears were unfounded. Although a vocal
military party existed at St Petersburg, Russia was in fact not ready or willing
to fight. On 8 November Sazonov informed Popovic that
Russia and France would not go to war over Serbia's port on the Adriatic. And
he was furious when he heard that Milos Bogicevic,
the Serbian Charge d'Affaires in Berlin, had talked
to diplomats there about the certainty of
Russian military support for Serbia.110 On 23 November, when the Tsar
wanted the precautionary measures of reinforcing Russia's frontier against
Austria-Hungary to be considered, the Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Kokovtsov famously disagreed even with this, for
'mobilization remained a mobilization, to be countered by our adversaries with
actual war'. Sazonov, also present at this meeting,
fully backed Kokovtsov.211 Christopher Clark's assertion that in the winter
crisis of 19I2-1913 'Sazonov supported a policy of
confrontation with Austria' is a most puzzling endeavor to ignore evidence to
the contrary.212 At the height of the Albanian crisis in December 1912 Sazonov told Popovic that, if it were up to him, he would
give Serbia the whole of Albania, but that if Serbia wanted to go to war with
Austria-Hungary on the matter, it alone would have to bear the consequences as
Russia would not help it.213 Early in January 1913, the Russian Foreign
Minister declared point blank to an amazed Popovic that 'Russia has no
interests in the Balkans'.214
On the other hand, the Austro-Hungarian Chief of General Staff Feldmarschalleutnant Blasius Schemua
(in fact Blaz Zemva, a
Slovene name) was demanding war against Serbia and assessing, on 9 November,
that the chances of success were not unfavorable even if the Monarchy had to go
to war alone.t" But as his incognito visit to Berlin on 22 November
testifies, it was still important to him to know what the German ally would do.
And although both the Kaiser and the Chief of the General Staff Helmuth von
Moltke promised him Germany's support 'under any circumstances', this pledge
proved to be quite misleading. As in 1909, Kiderlen- Wiichter , who had in the meantime become Foreign
Secretary; once again acted decisively in the European arena. Upset at this
time that the Ballhausplatz had been giving him
almost no information about its intentions, and keen also to maintain good
relations with Britain, he arranged for the publication in a semi-official
German newspaper of an article whose main message was that the Serbian-Albanian
question would be tackled jointly by the Great Powers. In Vienna, this had the
effect of a 'cold shower'.216
Very soon, however, Serbia definitively reconsidered its own position on
Albania. On 1 December 1912 Pasic called a meeting of leaders of all political
parties to tell them that, in the light of advice from St Petersburg, Serbia
could no longer insist on a direct outlet to the Adriatic. 217 The absence of
Russian support had indeed led to this climb-down. Meeting with Foreign
Secretary Grey, the French Ambassador Paul Cambon commented that this was good
news, showing that 'Russia had been acting energetically'.218 The Serbian
Government's decision, however, was not made public in order to avoid a
humiliating capitulation. The crisis thus continued, but Pasic had found an
exit strategy in accepting the mediation of the Great Powers.219 On 20 December
the Serbian Charge d'Affaires handed to Grey an
aide-memoire in which the Serbian Government formally consented to the question
of its access to the sea being decided by the Ambassadors' Conference convening
in London.220 The focus of the wrangle between Austria-Hungary and Serbia now
shifted to the question of Albania's northern frontiers. In particular, the
Serbs were keen to retain the town of Dakovica in
Kosovo which Vienna wanted to allocate to the future autonomous Albania. Once
again, Belgrade found little support in St Petersburg. 'We are not', Sazonov told Popovic, 'going to war over Dakovica'. Pasic was appalled, and minuted:
'We now realize, with horror, that Russia cannot defend us.'221
Franz Ferdinand in the
Fighting Camp
Meanwhile, in Austria-Hungary during this period, one of the chief advocates of the war option was Franz
Ferdinand. On 18 November 1912, he instructed Colonel Bardolff,
the head of his military chancellery, to hand the Chief of Staff Schemua a most warlike memorandum calling for an immediate
reinforcement of the Galician front against Russia and the sending of a 'sharp
protest note' to Serbia and Montenegro, demanding, inter alia, that their
troops clear out of the Albanian region. Should the protest note be ignored
after forty-eight hours, the memorandum demanded an 'ultimatum' and
'mobilization'222 Franz Ferdinand, too, was in Germany around the time of Schemua's visit (on 22 and 23 November) and spoke to
Wilhelm II who assured him that, 'if the prestige of Austria-Hungary was at
stake', he would 'not be afraid of a world war' and was ready to enter into a
conflict with the Triple Entente. For his part the Archduke insisted that
Austria-Hungary would 'under no circumstances' allow Serbia an Adriatic port.
After the meeting, a rather delighted Archduke sent a telegram back to Vienna
about the 'splendid' meeting he had had with the Kaiser.223
Soon thereafter, on 24 November, the Archduke received some counsel that
must have dampened his enthusiasm for war somewhat. His trusted adviser
Heinrich Lammasch had submitted to him a memorandum
on Balkan affairs which, as Lammasch himself knew,
'did not at that time correspond to the disposition of the Heir to the Throne'.
The memorandum argued that a fully independent Albania was not in Austria-
Hungary's interest as it would actually gravitate to Italy; that a Serbian port
at Durazzo presented 'no particular danger'; that a war against Serbia would
turn the South Slav population against the Monarchy; and that an annexation of
Serbia would simply add a further two million hostile South Slavs to those
already in the Monarchy, creating thereby 'a new Lombardy'.224
It would appear that Lammasch was successful
at least in slowly persuading Franz Ferdinand that annexing Serbia would
probably be a blunder. For by February 1913 the Archduke was declaring that he
did not wish to take 'a single plum tree' from Serbia.225 This statement has
been endlessly paraded by those historians wishing to present the Archduke as a
man of peace. The problem with their presentations is that the context is
always lacking. When Russia did not look particularly threatening, he would
invariably leave open the possibility of military action against Serbia in
order, as he put it to Conrad towards the end of that same month of February
1913, 'to chastise it'.226 And in November-December 1912, despite Lammasch's memorandum, he was certainly still hoping for a
military solution to the crisis. For this reason, he was at that point intent
on bringing back Conrad to replace Schemua as Chief
of General Staff Conrad had previously fallen out with Aehrenthal
for advocating a preventive war against Italy. This got him the sack early in
December 1911.227 In addition, his affair with Gina von Reininghaus,
a married woman, and mother of six, did not exactly endear him to the Kaiser.
But in the crisis atmosphere prevailing in Austria-Hungary towards the end of
1912, Franz Ferdinand managed to restore him to his old post on 12 December: if
there were to be a war effort, it had better be led by the man who had talked
so much about it.
A day before, in the Belvedere Palace, Berchtold
had an audience with the Archduke who told him that things did 'not look good
in the Balkans' and that timely military preparations with regard to Serbia and
Montenegro had to be made instead of waiting until it was 'too late'. There was
a danger, he continued, not only of losing influence in Albania but also of
losing 'our South Slav lands'. As things stood, Austria-Hungary could count on
Germany, and Russia would not move in any case because it was 'not fully prepared'.
In vain did Berchtold point out that the German
Government did not share Kaiser Wilhelm's fighting elan and, moreover, that it
had stated pretty clearly it would not participate in an aggressive policy. The
two men were then chauffeured off to a crisis meeting called by Franz Joseph at
Sch6nbrunn Palace. Among others, the Joint Finance Minister Bilinski
and the Austrian Prime Minister Count Karl Sti.irgkh
were also there. The Emperor spoke in favor of keeping the peace, the Archduke
in favor of making military preparations, and Berchtold
to express his misgivings about adopting a combative policy at a time when the
London Ambassadors' Conference was about to start its work. The other ministers
supported Berchtold. Franz Ferdinand was 'obviously
not a little taken aback' at being overruled.228
The Archduke again showed his bellicose inclination a few months later,
at the height of the Scutari crisis in April 1913. The Montenegrins had shown
gross inefficiency in their previous attempts to take the town. The Serbian
Army was now helping them - with artillery, troops and even aircraft.229 To
Austria-Hungary, Scutari was hugely important not only as a vital part of a
future Albania but also as its main Catholic stronghold. In March the Russians
agreed that the city should go to Albania. The forces of Montenegro and Serbia
nevertheless kept up the siege. Early in April, a naval demonstration arranged
by the Great Powers took place off the coast of Montenegro: three
Austro-Hungarian warships, two Italian, and one each from France, Britain, and
Germany. Sazonov could not quite bring himself to
send a Russian warship. At this time, a demonstration in St Petersburg,
numbering some 50,000, demanded: 'Scutari to Montenegro, the Holy Cross on St
Sophia'.230 On 10 April Pasic decided, 'with wrath and pain in the soul', to
withdraw the Serbian forces.231 The Montenegrins, however, continued the fight
defiantly. By this time starvation and disease had considerably weakened the
defenders inside the city. It finally surrendered on 24 April after King
Nicholas and Essad Pasha, the Albanian commander of
the Turkish forces, had made an inglorious arrangement involving money.
A Serbian intelligence report from Vienna passed on an assessment from
circles hostile to Franz Ferdinand that the fall of Scutari was primarily his defeat.v" Certainly, as General von Auffenberg recalled, the Archduke had been a leading force
behind the Albanian project.233 On 26 April, immediately after the Montenegrins
had entered Scutari, he went to see Franz Joseph to
argue in favor of 'the great action' because what was at stake now was
'the prestige of the Throne'. Significantly, the Russians had in March agreed
with the Austrians that Scutari should not go to Montenegro. Against the
background of this Great Power consensus, Franz Ferdinand felt quite free to
advocate war. In those days after the fall of the city, he was 'constantly
conferring' with Conrad and War Minister Krobatin.r"
Berchtold, too, was in a warlike mood.
At a Joint Ministerial Council meeting on 2 May he told those present that
Montenegro would probably be giving Serbia the nearby port of San Giovanni di Medua, and then went so far as to state that Scutari was
the 'key to our Balkan programme' - there could be no
viable Albania without it.236 Given that the fall of Scutari was being taken so
tragically at the highest levels of Habsburg hierarchy, there was now no doubt
that Austria-Hungary would intervene militarily. The only dilemma faced by
Vienna's decision-makers was whether such an oper¬ation
would be restricted to ejecting the Montenegrins from Scutari, or whether it
should be a much wider one, aimed at both Montenegro and Serbia. The latter
course was unsurprisingly favored by Conrad.237 It seems, however, that this
view was widely shared at the time. According to Bilinski,
there had existed in Vienna, in April and May 1913, a firm resolve to make the
proposed campaign against Montenegro the starting point for a final reckoning
with Serbia.238 The only reason that nothing came of these Austro-Hungarian war
plans was that the Montenegrins, under tremendous pressure, announced their
withdrawal on 5 May.
The Scutari commotion demonstrated once again Franz Ferdinand's
readiness to back military action. Significantly for July 1914, this was also
true of Berchtold. For all his caution and hesitancy,
the Foreign Minister was in the last analysis a closet advocate of violent
solutions. His many conversations with Conrad, recorded in the latter's
extensive memoirs, reveal a frustrated figure who, for example, complained in
March 1913 that he had support only in military circles.239 Nor had Berchtold's diplomacy sought to exploit opportunities to
improve relations with Serbia. When, for example, the Czech politician Tomas
Masaryk, a member of the Austrian Parliament, visited Belgrade and talked to
Pasic on 10 December about Austro-Serbian relations, Pasic begged him to convey
to Berchtold that, while Serbia wished to retain
economic and political independence, it also wished 'most friendly' relations
with Austria; that Serbia would accept an autonomous Albania, but wished a harbour and a connecting strip of territory to it, even the
narrowest one; that the harbour would never be
fortified and 'all possible guarantees' could be given, including the Serbian
Government's commitment not to place the harbour at
the disposal of any other Power; and that, finally, Serbia was ready to extend
to Austria-Hungary first consideration in all economic matters, including
railway materials and all the necessary loans to be obtained exclusively from
Austria-Hungary. To indicate his seriousness, Pasic offered to come to Vienna
and discuss these questions with Berchtold.240 The young Czech deputy Tomáš Masaryk duly informed Berchtold,
but the latter 'would not hear of a reconciliation'. The Czech statesman later
recalled: 'More than ever did I become convinced of the superficiality and
worthlessness of the Viennese Balkan policy.'241
Important figures in Vienna, such as Joseph Baernreither
and Ottokar Czernin, were
highly disappointed by Berchtold's refusal to talk to
Pasic, and they told him so. 242 Joint Finance Minister Bilinski,
responsible for Bosnia-Herzegovina, soon adopted a similar view and took up the
matter with the Foreign Minister. To his astonishment, the latter told him that
Masaryk's motive in mediating had been to 'earn a provision'.243 Berchtold's biographer Hugo Hantsch
has defended the Count's decision to ignore the
overture by Pasic on the grounds that Serbia was offering 'no concrete
concessions' and that Pasic was hardly a reliable partner.244But Pasic's
suggestions could hardly have been more conciliatory and indeed concrete given
that Austria-Hungary had since 1906 been doing its best to strangulate Serbia
economically. Also, if Pasic was such an unreliable partner, why had Berchtold only recently sent Professor Redlich to Belgrade
to offer a far-reaching customs union which would tie Serbia economically to
the Monarchy? This proposal had not been accepted by Pasic, The truth was, as Berchtold himself told the German Ambassador on 6 December,
Serbia was not willingly going to make itself economically dependent on
Austria.245 In that sense, there was indeed nothing that Berchtold
could discuss with Pasic.
The Strange Case of the
Disappearing Consul
Equally foreboding was the behavior of the Ballhausplatz
in the so-called 'Prochaska Affair' of November-December 1912. This, in fact,
is perhaps the most famous episode in Austro-Serbian relations during the
Balkan Wars, a protracted incident that contributed enormously to the war
psychosis in Vienna. Oskar Prochaska was a Czech and a Habsburg loyalist in the
Austro-Hungarian Consular service. At the outbreak of the First Balkan War, he
was serving in Turkey as Consul in the town of Prizren,
Kosovo. Late October saw the town captured by the Serbian 3rd Army. On 6
November Crown Prince Alexander, who was commanding the first Army, sent a
telegram to Pasic, informing him that the Austro-Hungarian Consul in Prizren had been inciting the Turks and Albanians against
the Serbian troops, encouraging them not to surrender. The Crown Prince
requested that the Consul should leave Prizren,
otherwise he might find himself in difficulties. Pasic then contacted Minister Simic in Vienna, to suggest that the Ballhausplatz
recall its Consul so as to avoid 'unpleasant incidents'.246 On 8 November Simic duly acted at the Ballhausplatz
on the basis of this instruction.247
Prochaska, for sure, was no Serbophile. In one
of his reports, which the Serbian Army seized at a local post office, he wrote
of the Serbs as 'savages'. His job, according to the Belgrade correspondent of
the Viennese Telegrapben-Korrespondenz Burau, was to
organize and set the Muslim and Catholic Albanians against the Serbian
population.248 It also happened that he was on very bad terms with the Russian
Consul in Prizren, Nicholas Emilianov.
The latter may have painted a very negative picture of the Austro-Hungarian
Consul to General Bozidar Jankovic, the Commander of
the third Army. Jankovic, in turn, was quite upset at the fact that Prochaska
was ignoring his presence in town and being 'openly hostile'.249 The General
posted sentries at the Austro-Hungarian Consulate - which really irritated
Prochaska, though it should be mentioned that the Consul's freedom of movement
was in no way restricted by this, and nor had people been prevented from
entering and leaving the Consulate. Finally, on 17 November Prochaska actually
visited the General to announce that he wanted to leave for Skopje because, he
alleged, restrictions had been placed on him. His wish was granted. On 24
November, the Consul, his mistress, and the personnel of the Consulate left the
town.v" As his carriage drove out, flanked by a
military escort, some children ran behind him, he later reported, throwing '
tin pots, copper kettles, sticks,
stones, cabbages and similar'r'" It would appear
that the son of the Russian Consul was the ringleader.252
However, apart from ' dieser Skandal', as Prochaska wrote, he had not been subjected to
any mishandling or physical abuse. Yet in the meantime, he had been pronounced
probably dead by the Austrian and Hungarian press. How had this come about?
Being in the middle of the war zone, the town of Prizren
found its communications with the rest of the world cut off during those days
in November, so Prochaska was unable to report to Vienna. Following Simic's demand for the Consul's recall, the Ballhausplatz wanted to send its own man to investigate the
matter. A consular official, Theodor Edl, was picked
and permission requested from the Serbian Government for his journey to Prizren. Belgrade agreed straight away, but because the
matter also involved the military authorities, it took five days before the
formalities were cleared.v' It was during this
period, when all contact with Prochaska had been broken, that the press in
Austria-Hungary engaged in an orgy of anti-Serb hysteria. Depending on which
newspaper one read, Prochaska had been abducted, castrated or even killed by
the Serbs. The Reichspost, which often reflected the
views of Franz Ferdinand's circle, claimed on 19 November that Prochaska, while
not dead, had suffered 'bayonet stabs'. In its leading article (entitled 'How
much longer...') the paper commented: 'If the Monarchy now allows its patience
to be perceived as weakness, then soon every goat herder in the whole of the
Balkans will have the audacity to preach war against Austria-Hungary.'254
Prochaska reached Skopje on 25 November - the Ballhausplatz
was immediately informed by its Consul in the city.255 In his brilliant short
study of the Prochaska affair, Robert Kann draws
attention to 26 November as a rather important date in the whole story - for
that was the day when, at the very latest, the Ballhausplatz
found out that Prochaska was alive and well. And yet, it was not until 17
December that the Foreign Ministry's Press Bureau finally issued a communique
declaring the whole matter to be closed as all the rumors about Prochaska's
fate were 'completely unfounded'. The statement even praised the Serbian
Government for having been 'perfectly accommodating' towards the emissary
Theodor Edp56 General astonishment greeted this announcement. For three weeks the
Ballhausplatz had kept the great Austro- Hungarian
public - and the world at large - in complete ignorance of the true facts in
the affair of the Consul Prochaska. Admittedly, on 6 December Berchtold did 'confidentially' inform the German Ambassador
that there was 'nothing very incriminating' for Serbia in the Prochaska case.
But the same German Ambassador found it necessary to complain to Berchtold a full week later about the continued
warmongering in the Austrian and Hungarian press. Germany, of course, had a
vital interest in being fully acquainted with the Balkan aims of its
Austro-Hungarian ally. Yet shortly before his death at the end of December
1912, Kiderlen-Wachter protested that Vienna had kept
Berlin in the dark about what exactly it knew and intended to do in the
Prochaska affair.257
There can be no doubt that a kind of war fever was being encouraged and
promoted by Habsburg official circles. Robert Kann
points to Kalman von Kanya, the head of the Press Bureau at the Ballhausplatz, as the direct instigator of the
Prochaska-related press campaign.258 When the Austro-Hungarian diplomat Baron
Julius Szilassy expressed his misgivings to von Kanya
about the effective concealment of the facts of the Prochaska affair, he was
told that 'the whole country wants war'.259 It is almost certain, however, that
Conrad too, as well as the circle around Franz Ferdinand, had also made
patriotic contributions to this exercise.260 Berchtold's
role remains unclear. His biographer Hugo Hantsch
absolutely glosses over the whole episode. The Foreign Minister made no reply
when he was asked, later, whether the Prochaska affair had been manipulated so
as to serve eventually 'as the excuse for a conflict with Serbia'. And he tried
to justify not clearing things up on the implausible grounds that 'the matter
had been overlooked, in the pressure of other business'.261
Christopher Clark describes the Prochaska affair as 'a modest but inept
exercise in media manipulation'.263 In fact, it was neither modest nor inept:
for weeks it kept the whole of Europe on edge. It was a highly successful ploy
to precipitate war, which only turned into a farce in December 1912 when,
lacking German support, Vienna finally decided against the military solution.
Clark also writes that Prochaska had been 'illegally detained' by the Serbs.
Yet the Consul had not been detained at any point. Had he been, he would most
certainly have mentioned it in his exhaustive report to Vienna of 26
November.264Such details, surely, are easier to check today than they were in
1912. In the immediate aftermath of the admission by the Ballhausplatz
on 17 December that no harm had come to Prochaska, the witty, sarcastic
Viennese provided their own assessment of the whole affair. Because so much had
in the previous weeks been made of the Consul's testicles, they would now go to
restaurants and enthusiastically order 'omelette ala
Prochaska'.265
The myth of the Serbian secret plan:
Another pertinent myth long in circulation concerns the Serbian origins
of the First World War. Serbia has been seen as Austria-Hungary's docile
satellite until the 1903 murder of King Alexander Obrenovic.
Thereafter, according to conventional interpretations, a sharp change, of
course, took place with the arrival of a supposedly Russophile Karadordevic dynasty, bringing an increasingly assertive
Serbia into collision with the Dual Monarchy Stereo typically pejorative
depictions of Serbia have gone hand in hand with these accounts. Recently,
Serbia has been described as 'a turbulent and intermittently violent state' -
as if other states did not experience political turbulence and occasionally
resort to the use of force. 4 Another recent description of Serbia, typically
jaundiced while analytically unhelpful, is that it was the Habsburg Empire's 'troublesome
neighbor'. The assassination of Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo is normally
portrayed in non-Serbian literature as the culmination of Serbia's relentless -
indeed programmed - anti-Habsburg orientation.
Little if anything in this picture corresponds to the historical truth.
The basis of Serbia's presumed programme of
expansion, the Nacertanije of 1844, was a document
inspired, and largely written, by a Paris-based Polish emigre organization
scheming plots and building allies against Russia and Austria. Few in Serbia
had read it, let alone followed it. It goes without saying that Belgrade wished
to incorporate the Serbian-inhabited territories outside Serbia, but this was
neither a systematically conducted enterprise, nor, with regard to
Austria-Hungary; viewed as a very realistic aim or pursued at all. As for the
1903 regicide, its import has been vastly exaggerated. Almost all relevant
historiography treats the subsequent clashes ' between Belgrade and Vienna as
flowing from it, in effect endowing this event with a world-historical
significance. But those clashes were also happening before the regicide, and
therefore did not derive from it. Austro-Serbian relations had during the reign
of Alexander Obrenovic left much to be desired, as
evidenced by a series of 'pig wars' launched by Vienna in order to keep Serbia
economically weak. Serbia's 1881 secret convention with Austria-Hungary; which
had placed the country in such a subservient position vis-ii-vis its large
neighbor, expired at the end of 1895 and would not be renewed. The 1903
conspiracy against King Alexander and Queen Draga was
itself entirely divorced from any foreign policy agenda, although it so
happened that its civilian organizers were Austrophiles
who made sure of obtaining Vienna's backing before proceeding with the putsch.
Charges of subversive Serb activities before the annexation of
Bosnia-Herzegovina actually emerged not in Bosnia
but rather in Croatia. There, the new Ban (Viceroy) since the beginning of
1908 was Baron Rauch, a determined opponent of the Serbs. When the Croat
politician Iso Krsnjavi put it to him that the Serbs
of Croatia should be made politically harmless, he agreed. 'Yes', he said, 'we
cannot exterminate 700,000 Serbs'. Rauch's main task in Croatia, as we have
seen, was to destroy the Croato-Serb Coalition. The latter had in the February
elections gained a majority in the Sabor, whereas the
Rauch (i.e., government) party failed to win a single seat. The aims of
Budapest and Vienna happened to coincide for once: the Hungarians were worried
about the Croato-Serb Coalition as a force driving towards Trialism, with the
Serb Independent Party being the main prop of the Coalition. Meanwhile, Aehrenthal, by now already pursuing a forward policy in the
Balkans, was keen to promote the image of subversive Serb activities within the
Empire.
And so, in July 1908, the Austro-Hungarian agent Borde
Nastić, of the above Montenegrin 'Bombs Affair' fame,
suddenly re-emerged in Budapest where he published a pamphlet entitled Finale.
Here, Nastić named prominent Serbs of Croatia,
connecting them to Slovenski jug (The Slav South), an
allegedly Pan Serbian organization in Belgrade, suggesting they were planning
terrorist activities on Austro- Hungarian territory. The whole pamphlet is
riddled with contradictions and unlikely constructions. Slovenski
jug, which also published a journal under the same name, had indeed existed and
Nastić had known the people around it from his agent
provocateur days in Serbia. But judging by the articles in its journal, Slovenski jug was a platform for the idealist,
Yugoslav-oriented young intellectuals advocating 'a union of Serbia, Bulgaria,
and Montenegro' which would then be joined by 'all South Slavs'. This was no
Pan Serbian agency. Interestingly, the journal was frequently attacked by Samouprava, the mouthpiece of Pasic's Radical Party, and
even had to close down on one occasion.The whole
outfit existed on a town council subsidy. At any rate, soon after the
publication of Nastic's Finale, many leading Croatian
Serbs from the Croato-Serb Coalition were locked up and held for months before
being tried for high treason in 1909. At the court in Zagreb (Agram) the pamphlet was used as cardinal evidence against
fifty-three accused Serbs, thirty-one of whom received sentences. Political
bias on the part of the court at the expense of the accused was clearly
visible. Europe was scandalized, and eventually, the Emperor was to pardon all
those who had been imprisoned. But the Ballhausplatz
likewise used Nastić 's material: only days before
the annexation, the prestigious Oesterreichische Rundschau published an article about 'King Peter and the
Great Serbian Movement', basing itself on Nastic. In the absence of better
material, Nastić 's pamphlet would have to do.
Thus the subject of Serbia's pre-1914 plans to expand its borders has
generated perhaps the most enduring furor in the historiography of
south-eastern Europe. Moreover, it seems that no discussion of this theme is
possible without going back in time to an alleged Serbian secret plan from
1844, the Nacertanije ('outline' or 'draft'), which
supposedly contained a blueprint for sweeping expansion, and which is normally
attributed to Ilija Garasanin, at the time the
country's Interior Minister. The controversy regarding Nacertanije
began seventy years later, in the aftermath of the Great War when Serbia's role
in the events leading up to the war was placed under scrutiny. Similarly, at
the time of Yugoslavia's wars in the 1990s, which were themselves to attract
considerable attention around the world and produce an army of instant experts
on the country, a trend emerged seeking to explain Serbia's foreign policy in
terms of a grand design. Today, a broad academic and journalistic consensus
exists outside Serbia that Belgrade had ever since Nacertanije
pursued aggressive policies against neighboring states, and against non-Serbs,
designed to bring about a 'Great Serbia'. The historic significance of Nacertanije is thus rarely questioned. On the contrary: 'It
would be difficult to overstate', Christopher Clark writes, 'the influence of
this document on generations of Serb politicians and patriots; in time it
became the Magna Carta of Serb nationalism'35 266
In fact, the importance of Naiertani]« has not
only been grossly overstated, but its content has been and is routinely
misrepresented. Firstly, one should note that this document originally lacked
any Serbian input. Nacertanije was actually a diluted
version of a Balkan political project initially dreamt up by a Paris-based
Polish exile, Prince Adam Czartoryski. The latter,
working for the restoration of Poland, had created in his headquarters at the
Hotel Lambert a kind of foreign office in exile. Backed by France and Britain,
his organization was not without importance. An indefatigable opponent of
Russia, he had played quite a role in Serbian politics: in 1843 his agents had
persuaded the Serbs to elect as their Prince the pro-Western, that is, the
pro-French and pro-British, Alexander Karadordevic.
In 1844, Tsar Nicholas I complained that all the difficulties he had in Serbia
were due to Czartoryski.267 The British diplomat David Urquhart, a most
illustrious figure and a friend of Karl Marx, had apparently stimulated Czartoryski's interest in the affairs of Serbia which
Urquhart had visited several times in the 1830s. Prince Milos Obrenovic, the country's ruler at the time, had told him
about his wish to get rid of Russian influence. Urquhart shared with Czartoryski a general obsession with Russia.268 Serbia's
attraction for Czartoryski was as the nucleus of a
future big Balkan state that would be pro-Western and anti-Russian - as well as
anti-Austrian. In January 1843 he wrote and sent to the Serbian leaders his ' Conseifs sur fa conduite a suivre par la Serbie' in which he
advocated Serbia's territorial expansion and urged that it should take a lively
interest in its fellow Slavs in the Turkish and Austrian Empires. He was as
hostile to Austria as he was to Russia, warning the Serbs that Austria intended
to swallow up their country He even recommended to them that they try to get on
with the Hungarians in order to weaken Austria.269
'Where a Serb dwells, that is
Serbia'
In 1844 Czartoryski's agent in Belgrade
Frantisek Zach, a Czech, decided to use this memorandum to make
Serbian-language proposals of his own. The 'Zach Plan', as it became known',
could actually in many ways be seen as a blueprint for a Great Serbia. It opens
with the idea that the medieval Serbian Empire of Tsar Dusan
which had been destroyed by the Turks could see a 'renaissance', now that the
power of Turkey was on the wane, something that 'the other South Slavs' would
welcome 'with joy', for nowhere else in Europe was remembrance of glorious past
so strong as with the Slavs of Turkey Zach then specifically mentions a 'new
South Slav, Serbian state [nova juinoslavenska, srbska driava]' and
repeatedly points to the old Serbian Empire as the foundation on which to build
it. In the section on Serbia's relations with Croatia, he considered Serbs and
Croats 'one and the same people, speaking the same language', with the Croat
literary language 'becoming increasingly Serbian'. He even suggests that the
'Illyrian' movement in Croatia was given its name because, under Austrian rule,
the Croats would not have been allowed 'to raise the flag of the Serbian name
and Empire'. So while Zach may have been imagining a state of the South Slavs,
it would clearly have been one in which the Serbs and their history towered
above the rest. A key concept contained in his Plan is that of historic right.
'You Serbs', Zach wrote, 'will appear before the world as the rightful
inheritors of a glorious past, as the sons of great fathers, who are merely
reclaiming ancestral lands ... and so Serbdom, its nation and the affairs of
its state stand under the protection of holy historic right'. It is simply not
the case, as Christopher Clark maintains, that Zach had in his plan 'envisaged
a federal organization of the South Slav peoples'. On the contrary, in his
discussion of Bosnia, Zach recommends that awareness be spread among the people
of Bosnia of 'all the fundamental laws, the constitution and all the main
regulations of the Principality of Serbia's'.270 But then, Clark does seem
anxious to fashion out of nothing 'Zach's cosmopolitan vision' - as he
describes it - in order to contrast it with 'a more narrowly focused Serbian
nationalist manifesto'.271
Such a manifesto is supposed to have been penned in 1844 by Ilija Garasanin, the Serbian statesman with whom Zach maintained
contact in Belgrade. But interestingly, Garasanin,
who is often accused of having transformed the Zach Plan into a master plan for
a 'Great Serbia' (Nacertanije), did precisely the
opposite: the change he made was to replace the megalomaniac ideas of Czartoryski and Zach with something more realistic. In this
vein, Garasanin cut out in its entirety Zach's
section on relations with the Croats, for he was interested in the Turkish, not
the Habsburg Empire. Where Zach had written 'new South Slav, Serbian state', Garasanin replaced this with 'new Serbian state in the
South' [nova srbska država na jugu]'.272 The
territories to which he paid attention in the Nacertanije,
apart from Montenegro, were Bosnia, Herzegovina and 'Northern Albania', i.e.,
Kosovo and Metohija or 'Old Serbia'. At this time, of course, these were all
part of the Ottoman Empire and Serbia itself was still its vassal state. It
must have been clear to Garasanin that what in Zach's
plan amounted to a Great Serbia, envisaged to incorporate Habsburg as well as
Ottoman territories, was an objective hopelessly beyond the means of the tiny
Serbian Principality. Garasanin's vision was that of
a future Serbian state made up basically of the Serbs of Turkey. His programme was 'Serbian, not Great Serbian'.273 He
nevertheless retained Zach's suggestions about Serbia's possible South Slav
cooperation with the Serbs and Croats in the Habsburg Empire, and the
Bulgarians outside it. Clearly, though, this was to him of secondary importance,
a project perhaps for some distant future.
A hypothetical court case on authorial rights between Garasanin the politician and Zach, Czartoryski's
agent, would have no difficulty in deciding that descriptions of Garasanin as the author of Nacertanije
are entirely exaggerated: most of the time, he copied Zach's Plan word by word,
sentence by sentence, passage by passage. All the key inputs by Zach, and
especially the references to the medieval Empire of Tsar Dusan
and the Serbs' historic rights arising from it, were left untouched by Garasanin. The often cited message of Nacertanije
that Austria must be seen as a 'permanent enemy' is also Zach's. Garasanin's few original additions were insubstantial. It
would be much more accurate to describe him as Nacertanije's
editor. His cuts and modifications, however, were significant in that they
reduced the Zach Plan to a more realistic scope. Charles and Barbara Jelavich, the noted authorities on Balkan history,
described Garasanin's programme
as laying emphasis 'on the acquisition of lands that were Serbian and Orthodox
in population'.274
But Garasanin did not write, and nor did Zach,
that 'Where a Serb dwells, that is Serbia'. Those words are simply not there.
Such non-existent content, bewilderingly supplied in this case complete with
quotation marks (but without a reference) by Christopher Clark, might leave an
erroneous impression in the minds of non-specialist readers who are hardly
likely to have the text of Nacertanije lying
around.275 Persistent attempts to present it as a toxic instrumentality at the
heart of Serbia's foreign policy have necessitated here a closer scrutiny of
this otherwise inconsequential mid-nineteenth century piece of work. For Nacertanije is neither a bona fide Serbian document nor has
anyone been able to demonstrate its impact on Serbian policy after 1844- It is,
in fact, a classic example of a historiographical straw man argument. Ivo
Pilar, the Bosnian Croat nationalist who under the pseudonym von Sudland published in 1918 Die sudslavische Frage, one of the most sustained attacks ever on what he
saw as plans for a 'Great Serbia', says nothing about it and does not even
mention Ilija Garasanin, The Serbian historian
Andrija Radenic has drawn attention to the fact that
the importance of Nacertanije has - retrospectively -
been vastly exaggerated. According to Radenic, no one
among the rulers and leading personalities in Serbia had used it for guidance;
it had got no mention in the programmes of political
parties; not a single word had been uttered about it in the sessions of the
National Assembly or at the meetings of other state and social institutions;
only historians and later, publicists, took a great interest in it.276 To this
may be added that Nacer: tanije , first
published in Belgrade in 1906, had not been particularly 'secret', either: in
1893, in his famous study of Serbia's Balkan policies, Vladislav Karic paid it a warm tribute. But contrary to the mythology
about Nacer: tanije supposedly illuminating Serbia's path, Karic complained bitterly that Serbian statesmen had
actually been ignoring it.277 Načertanije
Just what exactly Serbia's foreign policy amounted to was at times not
clear even to those in charge of it. Two years after the 1903 coup, the lack of
direction was so conspicuous that the acting Foreign Minister Jovan Zujovic felt the need for a brainstorming event. In August
1905 he staged a conference of Serbia's diplomatic representatives abroad,
attended also by several political figures, to discuss the priorities of the
country's foreign policy. In the first session of the three-day conference the
complaint was heard that 'our foreign policy has no clearly formulated
direction.' Another view expressed was that, since the Congress of Berlin, 'we
have been drifting, trying to find a path'. No one brought up Načertanije. Czartoryski, Zach
and Garasanin must have been turning in their graves.
What is quite striking - in the light of so much cock-sure modern
historiography about Serbia's purported expansionist drive after 1903 - is that
the conference very nearly failed to discuss Bosnia-Herzegovina at all. The
matter was only addressed belatedly when General Sava Grujic
noted that a record about the work of the conference would survive in the
Foreign Ministry, and that 'it would not look good' if Bosnia-Herzegovina were
not to have been mentioned. So the participants then addressed this question,
but merely agreed that Serbia's work should steer the various religious groups
in Bosnia-Herzegovina towards getting ready to put forward a demand for
autonomy 'at an opportune moment'.278
It is therefore odd that things are now presented as having been exactly
the opposite. 'After the regicide of 1903,' writes Christopher Clark, 'Belgrade
stepped up the pace of irredentist activity within the empire, focusing in
particular on Bosnia-Herzegovina'.279 Just what this 'irredentist activity'
consisted of Clark does not clarify. In reality, in December 1906 Burian stated in the Austrian Delegation as the minister
responsible for Bosnia-Herzegovina that he was not aware of any centrifugal
tendencies among the Serbs (or the Muslims) of Bosnia.280 As late as December
1907 he was explaining to his fellow ministers in the Joint Ministerial Council
that the Serbian autonomist endeavours in Bosnia-Herzegovina
were occurring 'only in the framework of the Occupation concept' (i.e., within
Habsburg rule), that a tendency towards outside (i.e., towards Serbia) did not
exist, and that the danger of a revolutionary movement among Serbs or any other
population group in Bosnia-Herzegovina was likewise non -existent.281
After 1903 Serbia did stage significant, albeit sporadic, cross-border
activities, but they related to Macedonia, not Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Serbian
Army, certainly, did not think that the country was implementing some lofty
national project. In his confidential report of November 1906, criticising the weakness of the Serbian Army, Colonel Masin wrote: 'In the last decades we have lived, and still
live today, without a national programme. We have
talked a great deal and felt the need for a grand national policy, for the
unification of dispersed Serbs, for the creation of Great Serbia. Such a policy
can only be realized by relying on an Army as ready and as large as possible,
but we have not achieved that.'282
Conclusion
Aehrenthal's move to establish Habsburg
sovereignty over Bosnia- Herzegovina may have related to plans for internally
consolidating the Empire and even restructuring it, but he was at the same time
signaling that Austria-Hungary was not especially interested in supporting the
Balkan status quo. In any case, strange as it may sound, the storm caused by
his act of annexation really concerned a peripheral issue in relations between
Vienna and Belgrade. In steering Bosnia-Herzegovina towards the calm waters of
Habsburg-controlled quasi-constitutionalism, Burian
had managed to obtain the political cooperation of all the national groups.
There had been no Great Serbianu-Hungarian 'Drang nach Saloniki'.
The primary aim of the Serbian Government before the annexation was to counter Aehrenthal's Sanjak railway with its own Danube-Adriatic
project. After the annexation, Austro-Serbian wrangles again had nothing to do
with Bosnia-Herzegovina: the issue of the Serbian Army's presence on the coast
of Albania in winter 1912-1913; Scutari in spring of 1913; and Albania again in
October 1913. At no point was Serbia threatening, or in a position to threaten,
the integrity of the Habsburg Empire. Vienna's Balkan imperialism, by contrast,
was relentlessly stifling Serbia's at every turn. At times, both Milovanovic
and Pasic, unable to whip up external support, toyed with the idea that Serbia
should give up altogether as an independent state and submit to the Monarchy.
Footnotes upon
request.
For updates click homepage
here