By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers

Al-Jazeera

Transnational TV, has impacted upon the Arab world, creating new visions of Islam, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict and Israel's positioning in the Arab world. The rise of transnational Arab satellite broadcasting fostering ‘pan-Arabism’ in fact is also becoming a media challenge in contemporary history to state regime dominance. Not surprising conspiracy theories abound about al-Jazeera, some of them taken quite seriously by al-Jazeera staff members and much of its highly educated public. And certainly reflects a complexity, means that the novelty of serious news-based channels in the Arab world is still apparent.

Particularly as we shall see in P.2, implications can  be seen, through the amount of people participating in protests for Palestine through repeated assaults upon the West Bank and now Palestine; through the increasing legitimacy given to news broadcasts on transnational stations, through the increasing hostility (occasionally expressed through preventing transmission and removing press cards from journalists) via governments and their institutions towards transnational TV and finally, through the increasing desire for satellite dish ownership.

This rise of regional information entities has reinvigorated a sense of common destiny among many in the Arab world. Put another way, it has fostered a re-imagination of Arab and Islamic communities, perhaps best symbolized by the shared concern satellite channels have fostered both about Palestine (Arab) and Afghanistan (Islam). This common destiny is created on the regional pan-Arab scale that is common to all Arabs regardless of their location or place of residence. Although none of this obviates their loyalties and identifications with their respective states, the increasing interaction Arabs have with non-Arab cultures and the manner in which they are treated by those cultures which see them as Arabs rather than as holders of specific nationalities, prompts Syrians, Moroccans, Iraqis, Saudis and other Arabs to embrace a heightened Arab identity vis a vis the outside  world.

Previously the broadcasting media was a powerful tool in the hands of Arab regimes and ruling elites to exert influence and control over citizens.1 Except in Lebanon, all terrestrial television stations in the Arab world belong to the Ministry of Information.2 Prior to satellite television, free information flows, especially in the political sphere, were almost nonexistent. Arab State regime media control over information has consistently meant providing audiences with an "official" version of the news.3 Alternative information flows from beyond the State were extremely limited often to only to radio, such as Radio Monte Carlo and BBC Arabic.

Yet the phenomenon media content exchange inside the Arab world is not new. From the 70's and 80's, Egyptian movies and Lebanese-Syrian plays, telenovelas and soap operas have been shown on almost every Arab television. While most terrestrial television stations are extensions of state information ministries, news has also been exchanged between them, although generally on the margins of the receiving station's newscasts. Yet due to the high degree of state considerations governing national television stations, even program/news item exchanges have been limited, as political alliances and sensitivities shift. Moreover, local news-the main item exchanged between state owned terrestrial television stations-has had little intrinsic journalistic interest, often being local news items.

With the onset of regional Arab satellite television, the trend to exchange content has increased. By 1975, Mowlana observed "multinational corporation has become one of the chief organizers and manufacturers of the international flow of communication." The entrance of transnational media to the Arab world has quantitatively and qualitatively increased this trend.4 More importantly, it has lead to new kinds of media content, not exchanged previously, such as news and documentary programs. Thus while the amount of information received has increased, largely due to a "diversity of outlets," 5, Government control is becoming more informal and indirect.

While diversity has been an offshoot of Arab satellite television, the most important point is the release of information from government's control. Qatar was the first Arab state to cancel the control of the Ministry of Information on the media. In 1994--95, this leads to the establishment of the al-Jazeera channel. In the other states like Jordan, Kuwait and Morocco the Ministry of Information has began to be less evident. Information is now managed according to different interests: business-playing itself out in advertising and market power-ratings. For state owned satellite television, political interests, or a desire for regional importance, are also important. Thus both al-Jazeera and Abu Dhabi TV command high ratings and are supported by their respective governments, seeking a place on the Arab political map.

With the erosion of state borders to stop the flow of information, Arab satellite television, with its regional audiences, has previously relied heavily on basing its operations offshore. Production location is secondary to product content. Talented editors, writers, announcers and programmers are sourced from virtually anywhere. The popular entertainment programs for Ramadan produced mainly in Egypt, Syria, Jordan and Dubai and sold to almost all Arab television stations (local or regional) is typical. Prior to the entrance of Arab transnational television, each Arab state was fitted to its own borders, mainly due to technological restrictions of the terrestrial broadcasting and geopolitically, the lack of interest and relevance of local Arab state programming agendas to other states. In the era of transnational broadcasting, new media technologies have overcome this problem. Arab regional broadcasters are organized and oriented for regional audiences and structure their programming accordingly.

In government broadcasting, competition from global television networks such as CNN seems to have brought further pressures on government television organizations to modify their news programming contents and techniques.6 Wide population exposure in the Arab world to transnational channels urges producers in each Arab state to take into considerations other (Arab) audiences from all over the region. As commercial interests and political interests-as some Arab states attempt to influence other Arab audiences, take priority over nation state building, successful programming emerges from experimentation and audience engagement. Thus we see changes in popular broadcasting styles with the introduction of satellite television.

In the pre-satellite Arab world, television producers planned locally, replicating local programming used on other Arab terrestrial television stations. Meanwhile, most television programs were produced locally for local/state (regime) needs, except for Egyptian movies, Syrio-Lebanese soap operas and plays and Arab-Islamic dramas delivered to other Arab states. Satellite channels have eliminated this process to a large extent, uniting many Arab television markets in their pan-Arab coverage.

This has impacted on several levels. Modem Standard Arabic rather than local dialects is used so that pan-Arab audiences can understand what is being said. News and current affairs programs are completely different: conventional camera-on or voiceover news-cast formats has proven a failure compared to the sleek, visually attractive news programs like CNN, whose news layout has had a notable impact on Arab news programs. MBC and al-Jazeera are exemplary, with live broadcasting from different regions, comprehensive, fairly unrestricted, news coverage-that local television in each region often cannot, or does not, report and attractive newscasters. Major satellite channels have also swayed audiences into their fold by giving television entertainment a new meaning.

With this change, many local television channels have found themselves redundant (although not closed down, as a section of the Ministry of Information), while a few others have rejuvenated and repositioned themselves as competitors to the more prominent satellite channels. The Syrian local channel is a good example for this, changing its program agenda in 1997 to more attractive programs of music and light talk shows. A local Egyptian channel has also renovated its programs, bringing attractive programs, focusing on social talk shows and hosting popular Arab stars in order to compete with Orbit and ART in 1996.

Rejuvenation has proven difficult however. Cosmetic make overs are given to news programs, although content is fairly unchanged.7 More entertainment programs may be pumped into broadcasting agendas and less politically dogmatic programs may be aired, such as Parliament al-Shabab (Youth Parliament), whereby students ask (trusted) representatives of the Jordanian government questions, live and face to face.

Yet state owned channels simply do not have pan-Arab appeal. It may prove to be more difficult to renovate a brand image of a channel than to revitalize its program mix. Fixing a program mix may simply require that more money be pumped in. Face-lifting a brand image requires that all the marketing mix elements, such as promotional advertising, program content, upgrading, new talent, be activated. Thus we see that satellite television stations run by Arab regimes are often comparably similar to their territorial versions. The most prominent example in this sense is the Syrian satellite channel, which is principally similar to the Syrian terrestrial television station in terms of concept and programming. Even broadcasting hours are similar, running the same programs simultaneously. This is also the case of the Saudi satellite television stations, Egypt, Morocco and the U.A.E.

In the Arab world, the traditional role of television as a mouthpiece of ruling political and economic elite groups came under pressures as new groups began to stake their claims in this important medium of mass communication. Research in the 1970s and early 1980s showed news on Arab television as highly dominated by government sources and activities to the exclusion of other groups.8 The dominant paradigm of news as a government information outlet dictated the inclusion of protocol news, personality hype and politically maximizing information in news programs. In technical terms, news formats were characterized by serious and formal delivery methods, usually colored by asymmetrical orientations.

Furthermore, newscasters were appearing most often on camera, reminding viewers of radio newscast they had listened to hours earlier. The visual potential of television news was barely evident and so was the handling of domestic is sues falling outside government agenda. In its basic configuration, a newscast was a lineup of either very long items dealing with leadership news or very short items dealing with regional and international developments. Television reports were hardly used as the newscast drew on studio delivery.9 The launch of commercial television in the Arab world has not only widened viewers' programming choices, but it has also given them access to new formats and styles rarely used in government-monopolized television. Professional rather than political considerations seem to be the driving force behind news work at private stations keen on establishing a foothold in a highly competitive media market. For them, what makes news is a host of values that relate to the event or issue and its significance for the audience.

When academics study CNN they are often attracted by what has come to be known as the "CNN effect.” This is not to say they necessarily endorse any hyperbole about it.10

Philip Taylor, for example, remarks that, by "providing a public forum to the traditionally secretive world of diplomacy," C1\TN appeared during the 1991 Gulf War to be "quite simply changing the rules of international politics.” 11

In comparison with this assertion, CNN's effect on Arab media was just a sideshow. But it was an important sideshow nonetheless. For example, CNN's live international broadcasts from Baghdad during the 1990-91 Gulf crisis marked a turning point not only in establishing the game of 24-hour satellite television news but in bringing Arab viewers' dissatisfaction with terrestrial television news coverage to a head. In the absence of CNN in Arabic, Arab broadcasters felt compelled to produce a replica. MBC in particular was explicit about wanting an Arabic version of CNN. Sakr (2001), quotes Sami Raffoul, general manager of the Pan-Arab Research Center in Dubai, explaining why stations serving the Arab world would want to follow the CNN formula:

CNN came on the scene presenting 'pure, untainted, spontaneous' news, with a disclaimer clearly attached to pictures saying they were unedited. They were telling people to see and make their own judgment. The public found this unusual. It was unprecedented for them to be asked to use their own powers of interpretation. It was a turning point.12

In the Arab world, CNN found an intense hunger for reliable, up-to-date regional news. This appetite had been growing for at least two generations through a combination of regional crises related to the Arab-Israeli conflict and superpower involvement and a lack of uncensored information generated locally.

In the decade and a half following the October War of 1973, the practice of sampling a range of foreign radio stations and other different news sources in order to piece together an understanding of current events may have subsided somewhat. During the Gulf War of 1991 it resumed with a vengeance. With the discovery that, through CNN, viewers could see breaking news stories covered on screen, the context for all Arab print and broadcast media changed. Having sampled this impression of spontaneity and immediacy in political and economic news broadcasts, it seems Gulf viewers wanted it in lifestyle programming too. From the beginning, the MBC schedule was publicized as containing not just news, religious programming and television drama but coverage of "fashion, money, sport, health and tourism.” 13

Just as the proliferation of Arab satellite channels was driven by the copycat syndrome, whereby governments felt compelled to respond to the use of the new medium by outsiders and then by each other, the same happened with the model of the 24-hour news channel. Ted Turner, the American who launched CNN in the U. S. in 1980 on the back of Turner Advertising, said that the idea of a 24hour global news network was "uncharted waters." However, he told an interviewer in 1999, ‘when I saw we were going to make it, we started spreading all over the world, like a virus.' 14

Similarity between the names of Arab News Network (ANN) and CNN is no coincidence. Qatar's al-Jazeera was set up to specialize in news and current affairs, while Egypt created Nile News as one of the Nile Thematic Channels. In reaching agreement with the BBC for an Arabic news service, it is believed that Orbit originally intended the service to develop into a 24-hour operation.15

But while models are one thing, actual content is another. The BBC Arabic service was kept to only eight hours per day and was then axed because of disagreements over news stories about Saudi Arabia. Despite this, Orbit's management acknowledged that the rationale for running an Arabic-language all-news channel had not gone away.16

Most news staff has been either trained in Europe or North America or has worked for media organizations from these two regions. Their sense of news work draws on it as a highly selective process. To this end, private broadcasters have invested heavily in news development by introducing state-of-the-art technologies and establishing far-flung networks of reporters and correspondents who often do their dispatches on live bases. The visual capabilities of television are highly utilized with rich graphics and video materials as well as sleek delivery formats. A newscast is made up of a series of news intros for reports and news items. Rarely does a news item appear without an accompanying footage. Conversational and friendly news delivery methods are adopted. The head of alJazeera notes.17

It is also a question of the content of the news. You often get here someone reading an item about leaders arriving in the country, sitting together-it's not news, they only do it to give them TV time. The view is of leaders sitting together, talking together, and everything is fine, there's no news. But behind the scenes, everything is not fine. They never put that on the screen. People saw something dramatically different in CNN's coverage of the Gulf War. At that time everyone was watching CNN; no one was watching any entertainment then, just the news. There were so many stories in the war; human interest and war stories even took the place of entertainment.

A new generation of television executives and practitioners with solid professional training in North American, British and European media settings has pushed for the opening up of traditionally closed media systems, including news formats and delivery modes, The introduction of these technical features has been viewed as an integral component of a professional broadcast outlook. The use of digital and computer-based technologies in television news production is thus taken as a craft governed by professional standards that bear heavily on both message format and content.

For young viewers in tune with computer-based interactive technologies, the sleek newscast formats seem to be the most appealing. Young viewers seem to be attracted mostly to the conversational nature of news delivery, the use of digital technologies and virtual designs and the timely reporting of events from around the world. In the cases of Abu Dhabi, al-Jazeera, ANN and MBC (before al-Arabiya's establishment), a good number of interviews were conducted live with personalities in the West Bank and some Arab capitals. AI-Jazeera went one step further by showing live footage of clashes in Jerusalem between Palestinian stone throwers and heavily armed Israeli soldiers.18

As we pointed out above, media institutions in the Arab world were established with an orientation toward local needs, consumption and nation building, where the state regime apparatus manipulates the media on all levels, in order to ensure state (regime) survival.19 Thus, since the creation of new Arab states and until the appearance of Arab transnational media in the 1990s, localism or statism became both the orientation of the media and a social reality.

In other words, the process of the establishment of the nation state and the subsequent need to ensure its survival and strengthen it, characterized the developmental media model created according to the spirit of the Barber's (1992) term "Jihad," denoting a form of "tribal media." This was reflected by the television programs, notably news and documentary shows which place or identify the regime as the homeland (the new Arab state); feeding the audience nation building improvements done by the regime, whilst also encouraging citizens to be more loyal to the current ruling elite and manipulating religion to strengthen the position and the legitimacy of that elite.

For instance, local Jordanian television has produced a documentary called al-Qimmam al- 'Arabiyyah (The Arab Summits), which forces the viewer to see the summit through King Hussein's eyes. Almost all of the terrestrial state owned televisions in the Arab world present development programs, such as Jordan's al-Ard al-Tayyibah (The Fertile Earth) and other 'learn about your homeland' programs alongside religious shows and local documentaries and social dramas.

The creation in the 1960s and 1970s of national media structures in Arab countries worked in part to create a heightened sense of nationhood using the framework of the nation state in the shadow of pan-Arabism. Repressive measures such as censorship were used in combination with state sponsored media as a means to prevent the infiltration of media effects from beyond the state's borders and to create a closed ethno-national media environment. Hence, one of the primary goals of creating a tribal media was to shape a narrow national identity to be oriented towards and controlled by the respective political regimes.

In the Arab world, de-monopolization since the beginning of the 1990's, has been reflected in the expansion of commercial broadcasting satellite channels, from one - MBC (Middle East Broadcasting Company) - in 1991 to more than 50 in 2002. However, commercialization-a process whereby media becomes dependant on market responses for revenue-has mainly been realized through the transformation of the media's financial structure, not through the transformation of the media's ownership.20

Commercialization of the Arab satellite broadcast media is characterized by a swift growth in advertising. In fact, commercial pan-Arab television proved its worth to advertisers, by 2000 mushrooming into a half-billion-dollar industry (at rate card value). It has also been accompanied by a rapid increase in foreign programs such as Mexican soap operas and American movies and an expansion of channels and broadcasting hours with little alternation to programming content or diversity, with most satellite channels imitating the other.

While most pioneering initiatives (in terms of content) have been from private satellite channels, the overwhelming majority of satellite media is state owned, thus although the commercialization of satellite media is still in its infancy, it remains the most popular and powerful television viewing in the region.21

The commercial nature of the Arab transnational televisions is reflected in programming policy that aims to attract increasing audience numbers, such as creating Arabic versions of famous television game shows, such as Mun Sayarbah al-Malyun? (Who Wants to be a Millionaire?) Greed on LBCI other musical shows and light entertainment programs like Super Star and socio-cultural talk shows live with audience participation, as broadcast from ART (Arab Radio and TV Company) and Orbit TV. Meanwhile, semi-commercial programs and channels have used intensive political and documentary programs and talk shows as their main focus, such as al-Jazeera, al-Arabiya, Abu-Dhabi TV and ANN.

Fee-far-service stations like ART and Orbit have been successful in this regard. Driven by high per-user fees and a superior ability to monitor the viewing habits of their wealthy customers, they have identified a way to remain afloat without subsidies from outside parties. These stations seem destined to have their sights fixed mostly on the Saudi market, where incomes are highest (and individuals are most able to pay the requisite fees) and entertainment alternatives the lowest.

As Arab transnational television becomes more market-oriented, they will engage progressively more with audience choices. If the Turkish experience, from state owned to privately run media s any guide, this Arab medium will find pushing boundaries often proves more successful than keeping within them. On the other hand, as audience choices are balanced with profit targets, which are paramount to the success of commercial satellite channels, the quality of programming and its content shall suffer. This may prove worse than Arab-state regime control of visual media. While the growth of the media market will force outlets to continue to experiment with content to draw more viewers, this may be at the expense of quality.

Dajani, for example, notes the main problem facing satellite broadcasting in Lebanon today (specifically regarding LBCI) is not government interference but giving predominate attention to commercialism at the expense of professionalism ... rather than public issues, and television is a melange of various inconsistent programs, policies and structures, predominantly foreign in orientation and barely relevant to the needs Lebanese society or the Arab world.22

Ajami's description of al-Jazeera is telling:

The show of al-Jazeera paused for a commercial break. One ad offered a striking counterpoint to the furious anti-Westernism of the call-in program. It was for Hugo Boss "Deep Red" perfume. A willowy Western woman in leather pants strode toward a half-naked young man sprawled on a bed. "Your fragrance, your rules, Hugo Deep Red," the Arabic voiceover intoned. I imagined the young men in Arab-Muslim cities watching this. In the culture where the commercial was made, it was nothing unusual. But on those other shores, this ad threw into the air insinuations about the liberties of the West-the kind of liberties that can never be had by the thwarted youths of the Islamic world.

The history of television in the Arab world reveals a complex relationship to multiple issues of sensitivity to tradition and religion, preserving existing state regimes and nation state building needs, which have spawned firm regulations, restrictions and censorship.23 Nudity, sex, positive portrayals of homosexuals, positive spins on violence and drugs have all been taboo. Nevertheless, the grip of traditional-religious ideologies over television has varied over the Arab world. It has tended to be strongest in Saudi Arabia and weakest in Lebanon.

Satellite television has worked to introduce previously taboo social and political issues. In terms of social issues, satellite television has both introduced socially permissive programs and academic programs deconstructing social behavior. For instance, Haysa, a Lebanese MTV program, virtually enacts an 'Oriental strip tease,' whereby women dance, in suggestive clothing or semi-nude to songs during a competition contest. The widespread popularity of this show is indicated by the diverse advertisements throughout the show - from Coca Cola to local banks.

Satellite television has also worked to introduce programs which analyze controversial social issues within the Arab world, such as discussions on prostitution, polygamy, women's freedoms on an al-Jazeera women's show, Lil Nisa 'i Faqat (For Women Only) and through religious programs, or as guests on other talk shows or discussions.

Although satellite television has introduced previously taboo social issues, it is worth noting that it still does not certain red lines. For instance, the terrestrial LBC station broadcasts extremely provocative films and advertisements, occasionally featuring almost nude women or sexual scenes. Meanwhile, LBCI-the transnational channel, will not go so far. Indeed, often the same advertisement on LBC is repeated on LBCI, but with less provocative or suggestive speaks and more fully covered women.

MBC, LBCI, MTV, al-Manar, al-Jazeera, al-Arabiya, Abu Dhabi and ANN have regularly broken political taboos through their broadcasting. As recalled previously, these satellite channels are either privately owned, or belong to marginalized Arab states. AI-Manar hosts Beit al- 'Anqabout (The Spiders Web), MTV Jadal (Debate), al-Jazeera host al-Ittijah al-Mu 'akas (The Opposite Direction), LBCI Kalam al-Nas (People's Talk), and ANN Parliament, each offering a diet of critical political analysis. However these programs may be considered relatively free or critical. Since the beginning of the latest Intifada in September 2000 and the accompanying increase in poverty, dispossession, destruction and civilian deaths, critiques of the Palestinian leadership was virtually taboo.

Interactive television broadcasting has allowed live audience participation and similarly, audience shaping of broadcasting content. Interactive television broadcasting covers live guests, shows which cover voting, live phone calls, game shows, talk shows and other similar programs. These programs may be political or socio-cultural in nature.

It appears that interactive television of all kinds has increased in terms of broadcasting hours in the Arab world. It seems that the popularity of interactive television is in part caused by its novelty status. Interactive television is genuinely a new form of broadcasting in the Arab world. It cannot be overstated that these programs engage the audience, sidelines Arab state regime power and empowers the audience by providing both a voice for them publicly and by airing views-politically or socially. We may speak of interactive television as a form of ventilation of social and political pressure pervasive in the Arab world: the former through strict cultural mores regarding relationships, combined with poor economic aspiration; and the latter due to the pervasive presence of individual Arab state regimes in the lives of citizens.24

Nevertheless, while audience participation has shaped and influenced broadcasting content, the participating audience is extremely small: limited to those Arabs who can afford to make international calls (where the show asks the viewer to call), limited to those Arabs who have access to the internet (where the show asks for an internet vote), limited to those Arabs who have geographic access to be present in a live audience. African-Arab states are also extremely hidden from audience participation. Moreover, each of these factors systematically works against women, rural populations and youth.

Arabs in diaspora are over represented in interactive programs, as are social and political elites. This is not to say that women, rural populations, youth or people from African-Arab states do not have access to these programs, rather they are immensely under-represented in the calling population.

This however, does not imply their estrangement from interactive programs. Rather, the popularity and number of similar programs indicate that callers are either speaking somehow on behalf of estranged groups, or are providing ideas that have response among viewing populations. Additionally, it may be noted that Arabs in diaspora and citizens of relatively free Arab state regimes, are more openly critical of internal Arab issues, both social and political.

Perhaps as a reflection of the way transnational television has leaded to greater democratization are the new opportunities given to marginalized/opposition groups. Different political groups, parties, movements or individuals who find themselves in the opposition to Arab state regimes are invariably denied access to domestic media are dependent on transnational media both to convey their message nationally and internationally and to monitor developments elsewhere within their own country.25

Historically, terrestrial Arab television has functioned principally within the Ministry of Information, denying access to all alternative forms of socio-political reality, including political or social opposition groups and even civil society.

With the outset of critical satellite television, such as al-Jazeera, al-Arabiya, ANN, Abu Dhabi TV and the like, political opposition leaders and dissenting intellectuals have been encouraged to access programs and their audiences. This mayor may not be emerging from a real commitment to journalistic values, as the fourth estate, However it is clear that such programming, as a clear break from monotonous Arab state regime only views, attracts viewer interest and thus ratings.

There appears to be a clear dynamic between opposition groups, leaders and prominent oppositionist individuals in the Arab world and critical satellite television. Zednik (2002) notes in his article, "Inside al-Jazeera" one method in which Arab state regime failings are highlighted on transnational media: whereby an opposition figure speaks to the satellite channel directly, indicating a problematic issue not dealt with by a particular government. The satellite channel opens an avenue to discuss this problem in a talk show and then invites the relevant government minister and (normally) the oppositionist figure for debate.

So for instance, Al-Ghanouji from Tunis, Laith Shbeilat and Toujan alFaysal from Jordan, Hassan Tourabi and Sadiq al-Mahdi from Sudan are given access to political and social programs to air their critiques and views of their particular governments and socio-cultural structures. Indeed, al-Faysal was jailed after her comments on al-Jazeera indicating that ministers in the Jordanian government had benefited from the new insurance laws.

While political opposition leaders and individuals have been provided relatively open access to such programs, social commentators are not given similar access. It is not clear whether this is due to a lack of audience interest, professional disinterest, static programming policy, or a fear of crossing social red lines in the Arab world.

Firm regulations, restrictions and censorship have been a cornerstone of television policy in the Arab world, sensitive to the conservative-religious character of Arab societies in general.26 Most Arab State regimes emphasize Islamic values as the basis of society and the basic values of the State. Almost without exception, most Arab countries, chiefly in the Gulf, place a special emphasis on the role of media in manifesting Islamic values and beliefs.27

The exception to this quite possibly is Lebanon, despite it having quite strong guidelines forewarning the broadcasting, publishing or producing of any materials which may be offensive to any sectarian group 28, this is generally interpreted as avoiding targeted slurs towards sectarian groups, rather than activities which may cause offense to any religious sect in general, such as semi-nude women or mixed dancing.

The role of the media in promoting or conserving Arab-Islamic values is consistently maintained when planning for programs in terms of both content and schedule. In terms of content, there are very strict redlines which media content must take into consideration-not causing offence to Arab-Islamic collective Arab moral values, mainly regarding female behavior and sexual relations. Meanwhile, in terms of scheduling, regardless of programming, playing the call to prayer and pausing five times a day, every day, for up to ten minutes characterizes television as broadcast in most of the Arab world.

The role of media in these societies is assumed to reflect peoples' interest in Islam and their needs for such programming. Meanwhile, it seems to attempt to divert people from the non-Arab external satellite channels, which are perceived to feed very different ideas into the minds of the television audiences in this part of the world. Indeed, even programs imported from abroad (whether Mexican soaps, American/Western dramas, films, movies etc) are also altered (and often edited) to fit this system of ethics.

Traditional/religious ideology prevailing in most Arab societies like the Gulf societies consists of traditional and religious elements that are past oriented. In the case of these societies, past orientedness is combined with sacredness. Consequently, adhering to many traditional patterns of thinking and behaving, merely because these patterns came from the past, permeates many aspects of Arab societies.

However, the strength of traditional/religious ideology upon the social structure varies from one Arab society to another. It tends to be strongest in Saudi Arabia and weakest in Lebanon. The latter is characterized by far weaker degrees of traditional/religious ideological influence. In Lebanese-owned or run television stations sensational news items are accompanied by heavy entertainment programming in which central cultural and religious values are ignored.
Nonetheless, all political authorities in the Arab countries invoke the traditional/religious ideology in their pronouncements and they have all succeeded in making the prevailing religious ideology subservient to their power.29

However, transnational satellite television by definition need not respect the individual red lines of each Arab state regime. Often based beyond state borders, transnational satellite television focuses on its main goals: advertisers and ratings.In this light, the new sensational styles used heavily by the new transnational media contradict socio-cultural and religious values of Arab society in general 30, such as semi-nude women on LBCI and the production and transmission of liberal musical programs and game shows on many Arab satellite channels, such as Sahra (Soiree) on MBC and Jar al- 'A mar (Neighbor of the Moon) on Orbit. This sensational entertainment content is most clearly displayed on Lebanese terrestrial and transnational channels as well as on ART and Orbit. An indication of these shows' popularity is the amount of callers and audiences participating in these programs, the discussions and debates they create in public spaces and the nature of the advertisements aired during these programs, such as Saudi Arabian products during the most controversial show, fa Lei! Ya 'Ein on LBCI.

Consequently, the most important impact of both foreign and regional media on the Arab societies is the degree of exposure it provides to secular, principally European and North American, values, lifestyles and more importantly, patterns of thought. Although there has been few 'open' or public reactions against this new kind of programming (most notably the 2004 protests in Bahrain to prevent MBC's Big Brother to filmed in the country, even after altering the household to fit to some-not all-Arab and Islamic mores), it has created widespread public debate among secular and Islamic elites. Even women's magazines and local newspapers, traditional troughs for the gossip stars from such shows enjoy feeding from enjoy criticizing these shows for precisely the values they broadcast. Arab satellite television has taken advantage of the controversy caused by new sensational programming by allowing more space to Islamists and secular elites to debate and discuss these issues through their programming. This includes alManar, the Hizbollah station, which regularly airs these issues live, with viewers calling in on al-Deen wal Dunya (Religion and Life).

Thus, sensational programming has also given secular groups more opportunity to discuss previously taboo issues, mainly in the pre-September 11 context of the rising power of Islamists, such as the case of Hamid Nasr Abu Zayd. Abu Zayd, an Egyptian scholar was forced to divorce his wife in Egypt under the pressure of Islamists, who accused him of kufr-renouncing his religion, punishable by death under Islamic law. Abu Zayd subsequently enjoyed a long interview on al-Jazeera about this issue.Meanwhile, alongside the increasing number of Arab satellite channels appearing, Islamic stations have also appeared, appealing to traditional and neoconservative Muslims, such as Monajah (Prayer), broadcast from Saudi Arabia and Iqra' (Read), a part of the ART group. These satellite channels offers religiously based programming, encouraging Arab-Muslims to stay within Islamic boundaries and to educate audiences on this basis.

Interestingly, Islam has also emerged in some elements of the media as a unifying force for the region, reflected in news, documentaries, on historical programs on Arabs, such as the series on Salah ai-Din al-Ayoubi (Saladin) and other historical series. This is reflected in the popular al-Jazeera program, alShari 'a wal Hayat (Islamic Law and Life), whereby Sheikh Yusufal-Qaradawi, a prominent Mufti (Islamic jurisprudential legislator) answers callers' questions live about Islam and daily life. I shall discuss Islam as a unifying element in more detail through the section on the Arab-Israeli conflict and transnational television.

It is impossible to say whether the emphasis on Islam is driven primarily by the fact that the overwhelming majority of Arabs (in the Arab world) are Muslims, or by the dominance of Saudi financing in the transnational Arab media or by a new impetus or cognition of Islam, as reflected by McArabism. Nevertheless, it is important to note that whereas states and elites led the charge for panArabism in the 1950s and 1960s, transnational Islamic movements and their mass followings are much more important actors today and their efforts are being significantly abetted by the new media.

This has been reflected in the changing attitude towards the PalestinianIsraeli conflict, particularly since the beginning of the latest Palestinian Intifada in September 2000, especially demonstrated in the identifying title given to this Intifada-Intifadat al-Aqsa (the Intifada of the al-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem the third holiest site in Islam). The idea of preserving an Arab Jerusalem is anxiously conveyed, while Arab television stations have telethons to raise money for Palestine, using a new emotional rhetoric of an Arab Muslim-Christian Jeru salem. Indeed, Palestine's Islamic context, encouraged by Palestinian Authority leadership, Hamas and even traditionally secular groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PLFP) have encouraged this new focus, at the expense of the human rights context of the Palestinian issue (the right of return, self-determination, etc).

This emotional rhetoric is also conveyed through the regular broadcasting of emotional, alternately sad and angry, musical montages showing footage from the 1987 Intifada, the war in South Lebanon and the latest Intifada. The broadcasting of these montages increase whenever emotional tragedies strike in Palestine (such as the death of Mohammad al-Durra in 2000), Importantly, only alManar, the Shiite Lebanese television station regularly runs any sort of montage whereby Palestinians possess real agency, such as playing militant music or broadcasting scenes of Palestinian women/children/fighters actually fighting back. Regardless of the montage, most Arab satellite television stations will also include some kind of prayer for the liberation of Jerusalem.

It remains whether to be seen if there will be any movement to boycott satellite television channels that regularly cross Arab-Islamic cultural red lines. This is unlikely, considering the diversity or specialization of Arab satellite television, which accommodates Arabs of secular, traditional and/or neoconservative persuasion.

One of the most important effects of transnational satellite television is that its new style and content allows the audience to make comparisons between what they see on the screen and what they have in almost all levels of life, particularly socially, politically and materially. For instance, through documentaries, live-reporting from the field, how a demonstration in one locality may change government decisions, changes in government (through election) - even through al-Jazeera reporting on a particular bill in a particular country where ministers debate, make and break coalitions, audiences are exposed to utterly different realities from their own, where the absolute majority of Arabs live under non-democracies: whether monarchies, autocracies, dictatorships or quasi/de facto dictatorships, or are stateless or live as an unrecognized indigenous minority with minimal rights.

The automatic comparison between the broadcasted and reality forces many to rethink the very basic issues of their lives.31 This is also produces itself in the social level when exposed to Anglo-European/secular ways of life through different non-Arab programs and movies (although edited for Arab-Islamic audiences). This process urges them to begin thinking of changing their political and social reality. Although there are no specific indicators which show a direct relation between satellite television and political or social change in particular, this seems to intergrate itself with the larger cultural shift taking place in the Arab world today, towards nuclear families, women working outside the home and inter generational relationships.

Anglo-European styles of broadcasting that have characterized Arab transnational television so far, has had a great effect on Arab viewers in the direction of adopting different styles of political thought and social behavior. This is due to the fact that the discussions and ideas which the viewers receive from television is transformed to daily life meetings discussions in private meetings in cafes, clubs and other social spaces, mostly meeting places for (male) Arabs of all walks of life. The impact of satellite television upon women, although felt, is even more difficult to quantify, as Arab women traditionally do not access spaces such as cafes or clubs. Nevertheless, their access to satellite television is in many ways greater to men, through their traditional roles within the household.

Civil society in the Arab world is also given an opportunity of primary importance to develop. That is, new media technologies have provided individuals and marginal groups large podiums allowing them to reach wider audiences and segments of Arab society, such Syrian, Kuwaiti, Iraqi, Saudi opposition groups and ethnic minorities, such as the Amazigh and Iraqi and Syrian-based Kurds. This has lead to a degree of opportunity for political liberalism and civil society to flourish through awareness raising and public debate.

However, opportunities for change are limited. The development of civil society clearly, has and will always be limited by political regime-structures that do not allow for real democratic change or civil society development beyond their reach or control. Meanwhile, this may be limited to tiny segments of Arab society. Some researchers argue that the opportunities for democratization emerging from the new media technologies can be utilized by the intellectual elite of Arab society and certainly not the marginalized or poor.32

Nevertheless this argument overlooks how satellite television affects all walks of live and how it affects the individual citizen in his or her various roles. With satellite broadcasting there is an element of "social engineering," 33 which includes its role as a forum for the exchange of thoughts and ideas between citizens or the different social groups of communities; its function as an integrating influence upon children and young people and its importance as a platform and agent for all kinds of cultural forms and expressions; and its function to advance communities, speed progress and enhance development. This does lead to the enhancement of basic structures developing civil society and builds on the interactive role of different institutions of society.

Indicative of this, the policies of most traditional terrestrial Arab state owned media are based on short-term goals, where messages concentrate on current affairs. Arab audiences watching these stations are more engaged with daily issues and less with tomorrow or the construction of a pan-Arab collective character and culture.34 Transnational media, despite its principle interest being profit, functions also an educational agent through the different kinds of programs broadcasted, chiefly its pan-Arab contents, such as pan-Arab news, documentaries, entertainment programs which appeal to pan-Arab audiences, which in time shape a sense of collective identity. I elaborate on this through my discussion on transnational television and a new regional Arab identity.

Arab transnational television we thus can say as conclusion of this p.1 of this investigation, has contributed to a new regional Arab identity and that some of these new social and political ideas transmitted become a part of thought structures, a value and a binary comparison or otherwise engaged with individuals in the Arab world 35, apathy may the other result. The abundance of TV channels, its variety, availability and continuous broadcasting hours--especially of political news, may similarly lead to apathy, desensitization or a fixation with escapist programs, given the prominence of entertainment shows and music video clips in transnational broadcasting.

The importance of media to civil society as discussed by Habermas finds its articulation in Arab transnational TV, chiefly critical news stations. While access to this space, or to critique or debate social or political issues is fairly restricted to political and social elites. Although apathy may reign and even while there are no direct indicators for the impact of Arab transnational TV upon social or political change, its contribution to civil society development is vital. Arab transnational TV has functioned to raise awareness about issues previously taboo or unknown to many Arabs beyond specific locations. It has functioned to (re)create or strengthen a pan-Arab identity, which may transform into pan-Arab aspiration (beyond the Palestinian issue). It may well have more important functions in the future. Indeed, before satellite TV, media coverage of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict was simply limited to the policy and personal interests of each leader and regime, where the main focus of the coverage was the 'virtual role' of the regime and the state leader on behalf of the Palestinians, in order to strengthen the leader/regimes popularity as a patriot for the Palestinians and the Arab issues.

The performance of the Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak on al-Jazeera before the last Israeli election in January 2001 was a historic act in the Arab media tradition, not only because of uniqueness of the appearance of an Israeli official on an Arab TV screen, but also to the meaning and the timing of this appearance in the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict; the attitude of the Arab media and public to Israelis and finally to the use of the Arab media by Israeli politicians for lobbying for their interests.

Following Barak's appearance on al-Jazeera, a growing number of historical documentaries appeared on Arab television, including interviews with important Israeli figures, made the appearance of Israelis on Arab screens a normal phenomenon. Arab transnational TV has impacted directly and indirectly on the Israeli-Arab conflict.

Israeli officials and politicians can now access Arab homes directly without any mediation, contributing indirectly to lobbying for Arab public opinion. In one sense, this has lead to 'virtual normalization' between Israel and Arab state regimes on symbolic and conceptual levels. In other words, that Israeli leaders have become a part of the Arab media and using this framework to engage in discourse with the Arab media has had its own unique effect.

Meanwhile, the regionalization (or pan-Arab access) of news has had an especially important influence on Arab public opinion towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. Arab television has blasted away the isolation experienced by Israeli politicians and policymakers. No longer content to provide a one-sided perspective on either history or the recent past, Arab producers are finding that including Israeli views increases a show's credibility and viewer interest. Israel is no longer ignored or denied in the Arab media, but increasingly is presented as an important regional actor.36

Arab satellite television also provides Arab homes with another picture on Israel-the internal picture: domestic issues, politics, social-cultural events and way of life. This has been entirely unprecedented in the Arab media. Thus, Arab transnational TV's not only closely monitor the statements of the Israeli government, but also evince a rather sophisticated understanding of Israeli internal politics and Israeli governmental policy.37

Arab satellite TV moreover, covers events of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict more effectively than their terrestrial or Israeli counterparts. While due to politicalor public opinion sensitivities, Israeli TV stations will not report accurately on suicide bombings for instance, or show graphic images of such events, al Jazeera, al-Arabiya, al-Manar and Abu Dhabi TV in particular, have no such hesitations. In fact, they often provide more accurate reports of casualties and deaths. In this regard, the high prominence (ironically) once given to Israeli TV as more accurate and factual than its Arab counterparts has fallen by the wayside.

This has not come without cost however. While the Gulf War was the first televised war, bought to audiences by CNN, this stage of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict is the first televised war whereby Arab transnational TV sets the agenda for the Arab audiences-the first comprehensive indigenous coverage of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.

Alongside including Israeli voices and perspectives, Arab satellite television has covered the Israeli-Palestinian conflict more intensively and without censorship, especially in times of crises with Israel, such as the latest Intifada. Arab satellite television has clearly portrayed Israel's activities against the Palestinians and their suffering in an intensive way, unlike state TV. Using a network of television reporters in broadcasts, reports on Israeli settlement construction, home demolitions and open conflict with Palestinians, Arab viewers are receiving a largely negative picture of Israel. Therefore, despite the fact that Arabs can meet Israeli personalities directly and unmediated through the screen, Arab satellite TV has served to strengthen negative impressions about Israel and its supporters, mainly the U.S.

Thus the findings of Muhammed I. Ayish are no surprise. Ayish's research on the five Arab transnational TVs show that anti-Israel items were reported by all five services with the highest number of negative items reported by SSC (Syrian Satellite Channel), Abu Dhabi (Abu Dhabi Satellite Channel) and alJazeera. The United States received mostly negative treatment in news items carried by the five broadcasters. This is clearly due to U.S. support for Israel's position during the al-Aqsa uprising. This supportive attitude towards Palestinian resistance against Israeli occupation reflects the commitment of transnational Arab TV to furthering the Palestinian cause.

Transnational Arab TV has also had a crucial role in freeing coverage of the Palestinian-Israeli conflict from Arab government censorship.38 In the past (and continuing today on terrestrial television), the Israeli-Arab conflict was brought to Arab audiences and homes by the Arab state controlled media, which occasionally (or often) exaggerated events (Syria and Iraq usually), or melded and softened these events due to state interests - or as a result of American pressure to these regimes to "soften" reporting.

A positive result of Arab satellite TV coverage of the Palestine-Israel conflict has been the exposure of Arab state regimes-in the vast gap between terrestrial reporting and transnational coverage. Arab leaders have been held up as powerless and silent towards the Occupation-literally viewed live by Arab viewers. Consequently, the conflict's escalation in the last two years and the intensive coverage the conflict has created, based on a relatively free flow of information has strengthened internal pressure on Arab state regimes. This has lead to (perhaps cosmetic) changes in terrestrial coverage of the conflict, so it may at least cover some of the clear gaps between it and transnational coverage, certainly perceived as more credible.

Another change, which I have alluded to previously, is the transformation of the Intifada to the al-Aqsa Intifada through transnational Arab TV, finding its center of concern in preserving an Arab Jerusalem. Arab transnational television stations invest time and concern to this issue, both politically and religiously important. I have previously spoken about the way the regional nature of transnational TV has created pan-Arab audiences and later, I shall discuss this in the context of a new Arab regional identity. However what is important to note here, is why al-Aqsa has been focused on and marketed by Arab transnational TV.

The latest Intifada began in the al-Aqsa compound, thus ecouraging panArab identification with the struggle. Meanwhile, Palestinian spokespeople, whether secular or Islamist, have highlighted this issue as a public relations boon, highlighting the Arab nature of this struggle through Jerusalem and thus sociliting concern and strengthening the symbolic position of al-Aqsa to Arab audiences, on a religious and political pan-Arab level. Ayish notes:

The supportive role of satellite television broadcasters for the Palestinian uprising has been viewed by observers as an important factor accounting for sustaining acts of rcsistance in the Palestinian territories despite the heavy losses incurred. It has been noted that the 2000 uprising differs from the 1988 uprising in some important features, the most outstanding of which has been the satellite television reporting of the events. In 1988, the Middle East had no satellite television as all world and regional events were reported by govemmentcontrolled services on a limited basis. Television broadcasters in 2000 seem to be convinced that in order to attract their viewers' loyalty, they have to be in line with their political expectations about national and regional issues like that of Palestine. When some TV channels were hosting Israeli personalities during the uprising, they came under fire for acting irresponsibly regarding the Arabs' central issue: Palestine.

Ultimately, the impact of transnational Arab TV upon the Arab-Israeli conflict has been both important and in some ways, permanent. Arab regimes will never be able to rely on terrestrial channels to convey their version of the struggle within their own borders. Israeli figures will not disappear from Arab screens and the level of intensive coverage is most likely to continue unabated, despite Israeli soldiers confiscating journalists ID cards, killing or expelling individual journalists, as in the case of closing the Abu Dhabi TV office in Jerusalem.

Unlike most observations arguing that the new transnational media is positive for the Israeli Arab conflict and shall improve the negative image of Israel among Arab audiences, I suggest that this medium strengthens the negative image of Israel and makes the conflict more salient and live through the sensationalism effect in the short term. However, in the long term, a process of normalization has already begun, which once the conflict abates, will continue to work to create a spirit of openness about Israel-both negative and positive, but nevertheless, placing Israel firmly on the Arab political map and consciousness.

The slow and skewed socio-economic liberalization of Arab societies, coupled with accelerating advancements in information and communication technologies, seem to have created a new environment conducive to the utilization of television as a powerful force of public opinion formation.

The rise of commercial satellite television alongside government-controlled broadcasting has brought about a new public sphere marked by varied news agendas. More than ever before, previously suppressed political perspectives and orientation have become more visible on Arab world television. Regional broadcasting has created regional news organizations-both in terms of news coverage and delivery-that far surpassed what had previously existed, partly based upon a new generation of television executives and practitioners, with professional training in the United States and Western Europe. They seem to believe in the potential role of Arab world television in the age of globalization and media competition. New television journalism practices drawing on news work as a professional rather than a political domain, have also become more common with the rising popularity of live talk shows, panel discussions and interviews.39

Perhaps as the Arab world has been experiencing dramatic political developments in the past 50 years, this seems to have created a deep consciousness amongst people in the region of the centrality of politics in shaping their lives.40 As television has evolved within government institutions in the Arab world, political news always tops news agendas. Political news has also been the most sensitive point of state run TV.

In contrast to Arab state regime media, Arab transnational TV has generally adopted the American journalism model, whereby news is defined in terms of what is fit to print. According to this definition, politics may not by itself be newsworthy unless it deals with issues that are important, relevant, and timely and with significant consequences for the audience.41 These changes will be discussed and illustrated in the final chapter of this book.

The rise of Arab transnational TV-here in particular critical transnational TV-has had several important political implications to audiences and regimes alike, As previously sensitive or taboo information becomes freely broadcast, there has been a rise in political cynicism, a greater awareness of political issues, and a transformation from political news broadcasts to fit political reality towards audience acceptance of ideas. This rather democratic move is mirrored in the rise of an indigenous critical media, which can no longer be dismissed by Arab state regimes,

An important effect of the Arab transnational TV is the rise of political cynicism within society.42 State owned TV aims through its media agenda to sustain the political order and to legitimate its existence, trying to build a 'virtual' reality through its political and news programs, enforcing 'virtual' legitimacy, through neglecting sensitive issues and focusing on the general, defused ane uncontroversial issues which do not raise instability or suspicion.

Meanwhile, the transnational TV channels work in the opposite direction, creating deeper gaps of trust between the two essential classes in the Arab world: the ruling and the ruled 43, as it attempts to trace and address sensitive political issues.44

Consequently, the audience's degree of uncertainty regarding the national, regional and world environments is heightened in this situation, adding to a structure of dis-trust already present, whereby audiences watch state run TV to check for 'local versions' and critical transnational TV to check the event. Thus at the death of Hafiz ai-Assad in 2000, many Lebanese watched Syrian and Lebanese TV to check the official version of events, but transnational TV to see what happened.

Previously, Arab audiences in times of uncertainty, used to resort to foreign media to find out about the true version of events within their countries or region. This was the case during the attack of the Muslim fundamentalists on Mecca in 1979, in the aftermath of Sadat's assassination in 1981 and during the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1990-1991.45 With the emergence of Arab transnational TV Arab audiences have turned to an indigenous critical source of news to check real (or relatively truer) versions of events.

Rising indigenous critical press has enjoyed a positive effect, whereby previously Arab state regimes, above all those deriving legitimacy from their own versions of pan-Arabism, cannot successfully de legitimize critical indigenous transnational media as plots or conspiracies of Western imperialism.

The rapid expansion of information available to Arabs transmitted by transnational media, besides their function as an alternative source of information, has put an increased premium on their ability to sort through that information and separate the important and meaningful from the scurrilous or irrelevant. The likely effect on politics is unclear. Besides the rapid growth in the amount of information that reaches them, Arab audiences are exposed to new topics, issues and discourse in the political arena previously marginalized in the best case - if not deleted or ignored and not included in the media agenda, considered sensitive issues. Arab audiences will have to evaluate political data and reports with a more critical eye than they have done to date and governments will have to put forward information in a competitive marketplace of ideas in which those ideas will increasingly stand or fall based on their acceptability to the public rather than on governments' ability to compel their acceptance.46

The pioneering steps of transnational Arab TV have impacted strongly on state regimes, eroding their soverigenty, forcing their positioning within a regional information market place, where most have floundered, despite cosmetic makeovers and entertainment program stacking. If not yet qualitatively visible, transnational TV has impacted upon the Arab world, creating new visions of Islam; the Palestinian-Israeli conflict; Israel's positioning in the Arab world. It has created new dialogues about women in the Arab world; critiques on various levels of political relationships and is fostering, slowly, moves towards strengthening civil society. Transnational TV, through its role as appealing to a mass market place, with competition firmly in place, is adopting the Turkish model of pushing social boundaries, broadcasting alternative realities of social relations, while also appealing to Muslims concerned with Islam through Islamic programs and specialized channels.

The relationship of transnational TV to Arab audiences is principally of engagement, whereby new technologies, combined with individual policies specifically conveying a sense of Arabism of several (critical) transnational channels, such as al-Arabiya, ANN, Abu Dhabi, al-Jazeera and an already existing background of Arab identity, have coalasced on varying levels towards a new regional identity.

1. Karam 1999, Boyd 1993.

2. ibid.

3. al-Hitti 2000.

4. TBS 2000.

5. Alterman 1999, Karam 2000.

6. Ayish 1995.

7. Karam 1999.

8. Ayish, 1989.

9. Sakr, 2000.

10. e.g. Piers Robinson, 'World politics and media power; problems of research design', Media, Culture & Society 22 (2000), P 228; Dwayne Win seck, 'Gulf war in the global village: CNN, democracy and the information age', in J. Wasko and V. Mosco (eds.), Democratic Communications in the Information Age (Toronto, 1992), pp 60-74).

11. Taylor, War and the Media: Propaganda and Persuasion in the Gulf War, Manchester, 1992, p 7.

12. Hussein Amin and Douglas Boyd, 'The development of direct broadcast television to and within the Middle East', Journal of South Asian and Middle East Studies XVIII/2, Winter 1994.

13. Advertisement in al-Sharq al-Awsat. 18 September 1991, quoted in EI Emary: 'L'industrie du feuilleton', p 257.

14. Curtis: 'The mouth of the south'.

15. Al-Quds ai-Arabi, quoted in Mideast Mirror, 8 January 1996, p.15.

16. Gulf Marketing Review, July 1998, p 35.

17. Schleifer 2000.

18 Ayish 2001.

19. Karam 1999.

20. Chan 1994.

21. Ajami 2001.

22. Zureikat 1999, Ajami 2001.

23. Karam 2000; al-Hitti 2000.

24. al-Hitti 2000.

25. Thomas 1999.

26. Karam 2000, al-Hitti 2000.

27. TBS 1999.

28. Dajani 1999.

29. Kazan 1993.

30. Ayish 2001.

31. al-Hitti 2000.

32. Ghareeb and Mansour 2000.

33. TBS 1999.

34. al-Hitti 2000.

35. al-Hitti 2000.

36. Alterman 1999.

37. Alterman 1999.

38. Rinnawi 2003.

39. Ayish 2001.

40. a1-Ritti 2000.

41. Ayish 2001.

42. al-Ritti 2000.

43. al-Hitti 2000.

44. Ghareeb and Mansour 2000.

45. Kazan 1993.

46. Alterman 1999.

 

 

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