Covering all issues
involved with the break-up of Yugoslavia is not an easy task as it has to take
in account the differing sides and ethnic communities of six republics involved
in Yugoslavia. It furthermore should clarify previously neglected details like
for example why among others, the World War II concentration camp Jasenovac in the Independent State of Croatia (NDM, became
a contested site for competing memories between Serbs and Croats in Yugoslavia.
At Jasenovac, the most infamous camp in the NDH,
Croatian Ustaga killed thousands of Serbs. After the
war the new communist leader, Josip Broz Tito, decided to mask the ethnic
dimensions of this tragedy. In the official narrative of Jasenovac
there was no mention of the targeted victims (Serbs, Jews, and Gypsies). While
the way to achieve justice and heal the wounds of those injured would have been
to memorialize the atrocities truthfully, Tito's official narrative of World
War II impeded reconciliation and healing. Tito's decision to cover up WWII
ethnic conflict had several consequences. Without justice there is no healing
and without healing it is more likely the violence would eventually re-erupt,
in a cycle of revenge. And while the underlying economic and political
conflicts that precipitated the violence remained unresolved; with no
commitment to discovering the truth about Jasenovac
and other mass atrocities during WWII, later national narratives appeared
without constraint, which only further inflamed the hatred between in this
particular example, the Serbs and Croats (Croatia started EU membership talks
along with Turkey in 2005 and may join the EU by the end of the
decade). We will in fact cover Jasenovac
related issues in Belgium to Kosovo P.4. But the importance of studying the phenomenon of
nationalism furthermore is to understand its challenge to international peace,
stability, and relations in the growing number of violent conflicts described
and justified in terms of ethnicity, culture and religion. As the experience
with Yugoslavia‘s six republics, and the Balkans as a whole once more
illustrates, nationalism can be a potent divider of ethnic groups and a
dangerous, even deadly tool driving people into a civil war. Hence, it should
not surprise that Nationalism is often used as a scapegoat and a mask for real
intentions or reasons behind a conflict. It is oftentimes a tool for reaching
political aims. This was for example evident in Bosnia and Herzegovina in which
after recognition Bosnian Serbs pledged their allegiance to Republika
Srpska and Belgrade while Bosnian Croats did the same to Herzeg-Bosna and to
Zagreb. What we thus set out to examine with „From Belgium to Kosovo” is
also, the extent to which historical claims to statehood and/or memories of
statehood play a role in decision-making regarding whether an entity becomes a
state and whether it is recognized as such by the international community.
Whether historical memories and statehood have an impact on entities' drives
and desires to achieve statehood; whether historical memories or drive towards
independence play a role in the decision to grant recognition to an aspiring
entity; the role of nationalism and the extent to which it can be on the one
hand a potent force that unites ethnic groups and on the other a deadly,
destructive mechanism that can be manipulated to accentuate differences,
promote hatred and deepen a divide between ethnic groups. The working
definition of a state for the purposes of analyzing the upcoming three cases of
Slovenia, Croatia and Bosnia; is that it is the authoritative and legitimate
political institution that is sovereign over a recognized territory.1
Additional criteria that will be considered are the general criteria outlined
in the Montevideo Convention requiring each state to have a permanent population,
defined territory, government and ability of that government to enter into
relations with other states.
Slovenia
The Slovenes were
converted to Catholicism in the 10th century and fell under the dominion of the
Habsburg Empire in the 13th century. They remained a part of that empire until
the 20th century and as such their primary "other" for much of their
history was the Catholic Austrian and Hungarian Empires. As such, there was a
time wherein the Slovenes were somewhat separated from their heritage - as in
the Czech case. The reformation had some impact in Slovenia, but was quickly
quelled by the counterreformation. In addition, during the 19th century, as
Slovene identity began to strengthened, it did so in response to Hungarian and
Austrian identity. The presence of the Ottoman Turks was, however, always
apparent, and often disrupted Slovenian life. As a result, the religious
dimension never fully subsided. Once Slovenia was integrated into the Yugoslav
state, the Serbian efforts at dominance created tension within the Slovenian
community as it did in the Croat community. Ultimately this tension proved less
severe than the Serb-Croat tension. As a result, although there is no current
religious frontier for Slovenia, the frontier created by a Serb-dominated
Yugoslavia in the latter part of the 20th century did lead to Catholic ties to
Slovenian Nationalism. The main threat to Slovenian identity over the years has
come from Austrian and Hungarian dominance. This fact changed, however, in the
20th century with the creation of Yugoslavia. As a result of the multiple
religions within the Yugoslav state, a new emphasis was placed on Catholicism
in Slovenia. When Yugoslavia crumbled in the 1990s, Slovenia was the first to
move for independence - an act that led to a brief war between Slovenia and
Yugoslavia. The Slovenian victory allowed for a swifter transfer to
independence than was possible in Croatia or Bosnia. As a result, there was a
clear threat involved (a 10 day war was fought); however, the threat was less
than in other former Yugoslav states. The impact is clear. One could argue that
the public presence of the Catholic Church in Bosnia and Croatia, manifested in
the affirmation of the collective-national as a dominant social value, and the
failure of the Slovenian Catholic Church to have the same role and influence,
was shaped by the conditions of the wars in Bosnia and Croatia and the mainly
peaceful transition from communism to democracy in Slovenia. Therefore, the
religious frontier in Slovenia was less significant than in many of its
neighbor states, and when it was significant, the threat was relatively
minimal. Nationalism in Slovenia is, as a result of the mixed circumstances
listed above, partially linked to religion and partially secularized. In terms
of demographics, the Slovenian people are largely Catholic - over 71 % in the
1990 census. Interestingly enough, in the ten years to follow, the rate of self identification dropped rather drastically to slightly
over 57%. It is no coincidence that the significantly higher figure occurred
during a time of national struggle for independence from a religiously
differentiated group - the Orthodox Serbs. This shift to secularism has
continued, but it has been accompanied by a continued emphasis on religious
identity in society. For instance, "In the period from September 2001 to
February 2002, mass media have participated in the perpetuation of the dominant
perception of the Muslim community and Islam as inherently alien to Slovenia. In
addition, there is a formal separation of religion and state, and this is
reflected in policies such as abortion (Slovenia allows abortion in most
cases). Religion played an important part in Slovenian nationalism for a
relatively brief period of time.
The modem concepts of
nationalism did not develop among Slovenes until the eighteenth century largely
due to the fact that for many centuries they lived as part of a medieval
Europe. This is mainly because the Slovenes enjoyed the same rights as other ethnic
groups and felt no need to express their 'separateness'. In the thirteenth and
fourteenth centuries most Slovene lands became a part of the Habsburg feudal
domain. Until 1918, the majority of Slovenes lived in the Austrian half of
Austria-Hungary.2This fact is essential in understanding many differences
between the Slovenes and the Serbs.3 The very first Slovene national program
was formulated in 1848 with a goal of unifying their administratively split
ethnic territory into one. Since the Slovenes did not have a medieval tradition
of statehood, their demands were based on the principle of natural law.4
Until the fall ofthe Dual monarchy, the demand for a unified Slovenia
remained the main goal of the Slovene national movement, which took on a mass
character in the second half of the nineteenth century.5 The period ftom the French Revolution to the Congress of Vienna, 1789
to 1815, drastically changed the lives of all Europeans, including the
Slovenes. For the intellectuals, French political thought combined concepts of
nationhood and homeland that will become a political entity at some point in
the future.5 Slovenes were significantly affected by two decades of war and
between 1809 and 1813 found themselves under French Imperial rule. During the
four-year lifespan of France's Illyrian provinces, its population was exposed
to an enlightened French administration. The French encouraged the use of the
local language, which they preferred to the use of German, the language of the
defeated Austria. Slovenes used the vernacular in schools, courts, newspapers
and text books. Some Slovenes even enjoyed the privilege of being part of the
French administration, which had its seat in its current capital, Ljubljana.
The liberties Slovenes enjoyed during this period in time had a significant
role in the development of a sense of unity and nationhood.
It thus was after
1815 the Slovenes embarked on the nationalistic road, passing the point of no
return.6 Slovenian nationalism did not have a proper opportunity to flourish
until the Habsburg rule which was validated by the Treaty of Vienna in 1815. As
in most historic cases of nationalism, it was the intellectuals and clergy that
shaped Slovene identity. The first political agenda for "United
Slovenia" was formulated in 1848 by a group of intellectuals who promoted
the joining of all Slovene inhabited lands within the Habsburg Empire and the
right of public use of Slovenian language in schools and administration.7 The
Slovenes who were for the most part satisfied with their rights and freedoms
within Austria, were not separatists, and practiced non-secessionist
"quiet nationalism.“8 This urge for the unification can only be
interpreted as a desire to preserve and further develop their culture and
preserve Slovene tradition. Slovene aspirations for statehood became pronounced
in the final stages of the Habsburg Empire in the 19th century as the Slovenes
for the first time began to think of themselves as being a nation. This drive
developed simultaneously with Slovenes becoming more aware of their uniqueness
and separateness from other peoples in Europe. This delay in expressing a
desire for a separate state was largely due to realpolitik thinking of the
pre-1914 era that favored the powerful nations like France and Germany, that
possessed large militaries and sound economies. The thinking of the time made
it clear that the small nations of central Europe were better served operating
under the umbrella of the Habsburg Empire. Its proclaimed raison d'etat was protecting small national communities such as
that of Slovenia of only one million.9
It was evident that
the political climate at the time did not favor formation of small states which
likely played a role in the lack of aspirations for independence of small
entities. Hence, even if there was a secret desire among the Slovenes to form
their own entity, the idea would not have been supported by powerful Empires
and states which controlled the international arena. In their eyes, smaller
states were unable to defend themselves and would have only weakened the
stability in Europe. The first time Slovene socialists' made a
contribution to the idea of Yugoslav ism, was in the Tivoli Resolution of 1909.
Along with political demands, the Tivoli document contained a comprehensive cultural
program, advocating cultural amalgamation. It called for the national
unification of all Southern Slavs, irrespective of name, religion, alphabet and
dialect or language.In the years before the First
World War, all three Slovene parties, the Catholic, Liberal, and Social
Democrat party together and introduced the Yugoslav idea. The dissolution of
Austria-Hungary which came with the end of the First World War in 19 presented
an opportune moment for the realization of unification goal which was achieved
on December 1, 1918 between the State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs (SCS)10 and
the Kingdom of Serbia.11
The period between
the unification and the adoption of the constitution on June 1921 represented a
period during which provisional authorities were to accomplish the transitional
tasks of getting the state's boundaries recognized and signing the peace
treaty.12 The borders of the Kingdom were established at the Versailles Peace
Conference which commenced on January 18, 1919.13 In order to ensure its political
status, peace, stability and borders SCS signed several international
agreements.14 The creation of SCS did not mean however that the South Slavs
would befree of foreign intrigues and hostilities. The defeated powers in World
War I, as well as Italy, made no secret of their hostility towards the new
state, a hatred that was to continue for the two decades of the First
Yugoslavia's existence. Italy, which was present at Versailles, strongly
resisted the creation of SCS. This was largely due to its interest in acquiring
some of the SCS territories. On September 12, 1919 Italy occupied the city of
Rijeka. Pressured by the Entente powers to sign the peace agreement with SCS,
Italy returned Rijeka in exchange for islands of Cres, Losinj,
Lastovo and Paiagruza.15 The first Great Power to
recognize the new state was the United States in February 1919.16
The history of the
first Yugoslavia ended in collapse as Germany and Italy invaded a weak and
divided country on 6 April 1941. The Nazis were able to break the country up,
making Serbia a German Protectorate, annexing parts of Slovenia and Istria to
Italy, and creating a so-called Independent State of Croatia on the territory
of Croatia and Bosnia. After the Second World War on November 22, 1945,
Yugoslavia was united as a Socialist Federal Republic (SFRJ) by the Partisans
and it consisted of six republics and two autonomous provinces. The old
Yugoslavia was recreated as a federation in which each of the South Slav
peoples would have a framework for self-determination and a stake in the new
state. Slovenia was one of the six republics which in the SFRJ enjoyed great
economic prosperity and was allowed to develop politically while having equal
rights as the other republics. The root of Slovene nationalism was based on the
belief in the linguistic and cultural distinctness of the Slovene people. Since
the 19th century, Slovene intellectuals had standardized the language and used
it to create sophisticated literary writings. Intellectuals promoted belief
that the federal republic of Slovenia and its legislative and political
authority was the chief political instrument in the task of guarding its
cultural distinctness.17 This belief will remain a central argument for
Slovenian nationalism and quest for independence. Today's Slovene intellectuals
often consider themselves as successors to the creators of Slovene nationhood,
with a task of guarding its cultural and linguistic distinctness. From their
point of view the federal republic of Slovenia, and its legislative, economic
18 and political autonomy was the chief political instrument in this task.
The most real and
tangible threat to Slovenenian uniqueness and
distinctness, as well as autonomy, was expressed in a Memorandum 19 of the
Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences in 1986. This document, though never
officially published, was widely circulated. What caused the uproar was the
rather strong tone of certain chapters, which proclaimed that the entire
Serbian race was threatened by an anti-Serb conspiracy. It stated: "The
physical, political, legal and cultural genocide of the Serbian population in
Kosovo and Metohija is the worst defeat in its battle for liberation that the
Serbs have waged from 1804 until the revolution in 1941.“20 The Memorandum
further faulted Slovenia and Croatia for their economic development which far
exceeded that of Serbia and poorer republics mainly Kosovo and Metohija. It
cites that this economic superiority was achieved through political influence
and manipulation.21 The document also points out that the integrity of the
republic had been destroyed and that the "Serbian people cannot peacefully
wait in such a situation“22. This sentence left the Slovenes wondering as to
what action the Serbs might take to remedy it. Without a doubt the Memorandum
was written as a reaction to the realization on the part of Serbian elite that
their political and economic development was lagging behind that of Slovenia
and Croatia. Often unfounded accusations directed towards Slovenia were made
out of fear that Slovenia has reached the highest level of independence and
development and that it would soon result in their request for independence
from Yugoslavia. Slovenia defended the Albanians in Kosovo in part as it felt
threatened.23 However, it soon realized that their focus should be on guarding
their own sovereignty, which resulted in their abandonment of Kosovo. The
Memorandum was the key political tool which Slobodan Milosevic abused in order
to portray Serbs as victims and climb to power in 1987. He promised to make
Serbia 'whole' again by repairing the damage done by the 1974 Constitution and
ending autonomy for the provinces. Milosevic's campaign against the Albanians
in Kosovo and for the restoration of the province to the republic, using
'street democracy', frightened other Yugoslavs.
Partially in response
to the draft, in 1987 the editors of the Ljubljana based journal Nova Revija requested from a diverse group of Slovene
intellectuals their views on the Slovene national programme.
Several authors pointed to the absence of Slovenian armed forces and argued for
the need to assert Slovenia's sovereignty and the formation of its own military
force.24 The main concern for all the authors was finding the right road for
Slovenian independence in the future. In the early 1980s the first political
dissident groups emerged in Slovenia. Two prominent examples included the
Alternative movement comprised of Slovene youth (Mladina).25
Their true ambition was disassociation from the Balkan Southerners, mainly
Serbs, who according to this group lacked European culture.26 Milan Kucan, who became a prominent politician and president of
Slovenia, voiced his opposition by saying: "Slovenes cannot regard as
their own any state that does not secure the use of their mother tongue and its
equality and in which the freedom, sovereignty and equality of the Slovene
people is not guaranteed.“27 The first alternative political party, the Slovene
Democratic Alliance was formed and Nova Revija,
became its platform for the free expression of nationalistic sentiment. Founder
of the new party, Dimitrij Rupel was one of the
contributors to the 1987 Nova Revija issue arguing
for Slovenia's political as well as cultural independence. Joze
Pucnik, who was also a contributor for Nova Revija, formed the Slovene Democratic Alliance, committed
to the drafting of a new Slovenian constitution and institutionalizing the
republic's sovereignty.28
This encouraged the
establishment of more parties such as the Slovene Christian Democratic Party,
the Green Alliance and the Slovene Craftsmen's party, the Slovene Farmers'
Alliance, all of which having already worked together in the Committee for the
Defense of Human Rights, formed the opposition coalition bloc in January 1990
famously known by its Slovene acronym DEMOS. In September 1989, Milan Kucan asserted Slovenia's right to secede from the Yugoslav
federation.29 A series of constitutional amendments was passed by the Assembly
of the Republic of Slovenia enabling the republic's organs to proclaim a state
of emergency in the republic and codifying the Slovenian state organs' duty to
defend and protect the republic against any federal organs.30 This represented
the first in the series of legislative moves asserting full Slovenian
sovereignty over its affairs. Another important development was the
transformation of the Communist party of Slovenia into a Slovene National
Party. A member of the Committee memorably claimed that in the process the
Communist party 'highjacked' the national cause from the Committee for the
Defense of Human Rights for its own purposes. 31 The Slovene Communist Party
delegation walked out of the Fourteenth Extraordinary Congress of the Communist
party of Yugoslavia in January 1990, refusing to be outvoted on its proposal to
confederalize the Yugoslav Communist party. It soon
took drastic measures by abandoning Marxism, changing its name, programme, flag and image and adopting a new slogan 'Europe
now', while presenting itself as a national party of the Slovenes fighting for
a sovereign state within a new confederal Yugoslavia.32 While the opposition
DEMOS parties differed greatly among themselves in their ideological programmes, they were united in their rejection of
Yugoslavia as an 'exhausted concept'. In the elections for the lower chamber of
the Slovenian assembly in April 1990 the communist Party of Democratic Renewal
got 55 per cent of the vote; the coalition formed the first post
communist government in Yugoslavia with the prime minister Lojze Peterle. In the second
round of voting, Milan Kucan won the presidential
election. Even though they held different political views, former dissidents
were in the Government, united by a common goal of Slovenia's independence and
secession from Yugoslavia. The new Slovene government accelerated preparations
for Slovenia's independence, by now supported by an overwhelming majority of
Slovenes. At a referendum held in December 1990,88.2 per cent voted for
independence.33
The Struggle
Serbia and its
satellites within the Collective Presidency of the SFRY decided to block the
automatic rotation to the office of President of the Presidency that is,
nominal head of the SFRY, to the Croatian representative, Stipe Mesic. The
Serbian bloc did so to create conditions for a 'state of emergency' in which
the army would declare martial law. Although Serbian representative to the
Collective Presidency Borisav Jovic
had discussed this possibility with army chief General Veljko Kadijevic, it did not emerge as Kadijevic
opted to act cautiously and, in his own terms-constitutionally. 34 From this
point the SFRY, already crippled by the inter-republican quarrels, ceased de
facto to function. Mesic argued that the purpose of this was to end
Yugoslavia.35 The leaders of the national parties anticipating that the
Jugoslav National Army (JNA) would provide resistance to their quest for
independence started forming their own armed forces. While Slovenes were
opening champagne bottles and celebrating on the streets of Ljubljana, the new
government was preparing for a military confrontation.26 Slovenia utilized its
intelligence network in the Yugoslav army's headquarters, and discovered the
army's plans to counter the Slovenian take-over of Yugoslav federal
institutions in Slovenia.27
The Yugoslav army
high command viewed Slovenia's planned secession as part of a foreign,
primarily German, plot to partition federal Yugoslavia and thus to weaken its
armed forces. The JNA saw it as their constitutional duty to preserve and
protect the territorial integrity of the country and prevent any partition. By
seeking to instigate military confrontation, the Slovene government hoped to
achieve not only unity in Slovenia but European intervention and an
international recognition of its independence. The major obstacle to their
independence was the refusal of the US and the EC to recognize any unilateral
secession of Yugoslav republics.28 However, Slovenia made one of its wisest
diplomatic decisions by establishing contacts in Austria, Germany and other
European countries and making the argument for European security. The Slovenes
claimed that the conflict would not only be a threat to Slovenian security but
also a threat to Europe as a whole. Placed in the context of European security,
the conflict in Yugoslavia attained a new dimension.29
One of the main
tactics of the Slovene defense ministry was its clandestinely imported weaponry
to be used for a show of force that hardly anyone in Belgrade anticipated. On
25 June 1991, the day of the proclamation of independence, the initial Slovene
operations moved forward by taking over the international border crossings in
Slovenia and erecting a border crossing with the federal republic of Croatia.
By using the intelligence from the Yugoslav federal army's headquarters, the
Slovenian forces were initially able to stop almost all of the Yugoslav army's
armed units as they moved out of their barracks in Slovenia to regain control
over borders crossings.30 The Slovenian resistance took many by surprise. Many
believed that the JNA miscalculated in Slovenia. On 27 June 1991 the JNA
assumed that the Slovenia's Territorial Defense Force (TO Slovenska
Teritorialna Obramba) would
give up its efforts based on a mere show of force by the JNA. The JNA also
presumed that its efforts would be supported by the international community,
which at this point stood on the sidelines watching the events unfold.31 The
short 'Ten Day War' ended rather swiftly with Slovenian victory. The main
purpose of the war was to demonstrate to the Slovene population the alleged
hostility of the Yugoslav federal government and remove any remaining
allegiance to the Yugoslav state.32 The process was portrayed as national
liberation, which in many ways strengthened Slovenian patriotic feelings and
reinforced citizens' allegiance to Slovenia. Additional reason for its
perception as a success was a minimal number of casualties. Only 8 Slovene and
39 JNA soldiers died and 111 Slovene and 163 JNA troops were wounded, while
more than 2,500 JNA conscripts were taken prisoner.33
The Slovenian
government, immediately upon the outbreak of the conflict, asked the EC and the
Council for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) to intervene.34 In May
1991 the EC troika35 consisting of the foreign affairs ministers of the
Netherlands, Luxembourg and Italy, diplomatically intervened into the Slovenian
war, while contributing to war's end.36 Both organizations promptly obliged
within two days of the outbreak of the conflict. The EC sent its troika to
negotiate in Belgrade and the CSCE entrusted the EC with its peacekeeping
mission in Slovenia. The first cease-fire negotiation by the troika broke down
almost immediately and the troika returned to the island of Brioni
on July 8, 1991 to negotiate a peace agreement, which defacto
recognized Slovenia's independence. The Brioni
Declaration endorsed by all six republics and the federal presidency required
the Yugoslav army and federal government to hand over the international border
crossings. The Slovenian government was to lift the blockade of the army's
units, deactivate its defense forces and, together with the Croatian
government, proclaim a three-month moratorium on its declaration of
independence. The EC, acting on behalf of the CSCE, also sent an observer
mission of unarmed officials, which was to monitor the cease-fire and the
compliance with the military aspects of the agreement. 37
Many Slovenes were
dissatisfied with this outcome. For them the moratorium and the renewed
negotiations among the six republics meant that Slovenia was being forced, by
the EC, to remain within Yugoslavia against its will. While refraining from
granting Slovenia independence, in agreeing to the Brioni
Declaration, the Yugoslav federal government in effect gave up its jurisdiction
in the republic.38 This decision was followed by the action of the Yugoslav
state presidency, under the chairmanship of the Croat representative, which
decided on 18 July, to withdraw unilaterally all army units from the republic.
Serbia accepted the Brioni Declaration because
Slovenia's secession was unavoidable. The idea of federal Yugoslavia was
already been dead. This reality left very little leverage to Milosevic and his
government in Belgrade. In the following five months Slovenia prepared for
independence, it solidified its own government in Ljubljana which by now
operated independently trom Belgrade. Slovenia
officially requested recognition from the European Community on December 19,
1991.
Thus this case study
so far has slown, that Slovenia does not have a clear
historic record of independent statehood. In the period prior to World War I,
Slovenia was part of the, Habsburg Empire under which it enjoyed certain
privileges and had the opportunity to develop its own culture and identity.
Under Yugoslavia, Slovenia continued to develop its own language, culture and
distinct mentality different from that of other Yugoslav republics. It
developed solid political and economic ties with its Western neighbors such as
Germany, Austria and Italy. Even though there is no record of a strategy on the
part of Slovenes to secede from Yugoslavia, the steps that were taken prior to
1989 made the process of independence much easier to obtain. The Slovenian
republic was to a large extent mono-ethnic, it had a potential to become
economically independent; it had its own culture and identity, its own
education system and a language distinct from that of other republics.
Economically Slovenes were much more developed than the rest of Yugoslavia.
This fact was always a source of grievance for the Slovenes. This
"separateness" evident in their language and economy helped mobilize
Slovenes in their quest for independence.
The Slovenian case
indicates that the prior existence or a historical record of statehood is not a
requirement in order for an entity to develop an aspiration towards statehood
or to be recognized by the international community. Slovenia used a clever
strategy and developed strong ties to Austria, Germany and Switzerland and
lobbied for their support in recognizing its independence. The deciding factors
had to do with the circumstances, its geographic location, and its distinctness
as well as willingness of the government in Belgrade to allow Slovenia to leave
the Federation. In the long run Slovenian secession and early promises of
recognition had a domino effect. It started an irreversible spiral. At the
time, Croatian President Franjo Tudjman stated that
if Slovenia declared independence, Croatia will immediately follow with the
same course of action. Slobodan Milosevic decided to "let Slovenia
go" because there were hardly any Serbs living on its territory which
meant Serbia couldn't make any claims for its territory. But his focus was on
Croatia and Bosnia, Macedonia and creating greater Serbia. The fact that
Slovenia gained independence did not disrupt his plans.
Slovenia satisfied
the general criteria for statehood. It had a defined territory as it had clear
and undisputed borders; it had a permanent population consisting mostly of
Slovenes; it had a government in Ljubljana which had full capacity to conduct international
relations and had already developed sound relations with other countries
especially Austria, Germany and Italy. In addition to the basic, general
criteria, Slovenia had legitimate government that exercised full control over
its population, it had enacted laws and its constitution which guaranteed
protection of minorities, it developed its own army and by the time of
independence, Slovenia was by far the most advanced economically of all the
other republics. The case of Croatia however was a lot more complicated as its
independence and recognition involved many unresolved and disputed issues.
1 Adeed
Dawisha and I. William Zartman,
Beyond Coercion, pp. 6-7.
2 The census of 1910 indicated
that the 1,253,148 Slovenes represented 4.48 per cent of the citizens of this
western half of the monarchy. See Fran Zwitter, Nacionalni Problemi v Habsburski Monarhiji, p. 224 392
Due to their close relationship with Austria, the Slovenes over the years
always claimed that they were part of the West and tried to disassociate
themselves from the 'Balkans' and the Serbs. In addition, their relationship
with the West also explains the difference in mentalities as well as a deep gap
in economic conditions and development.
3 The term natural
law refers to a type of moral theory, as well as to a type of legal theory,
despite the fact that the core claims of the two kinds of theory are logically
independent. According to natural law in ethical theory, the moral standards
that govern human behavior are objective, derived from the nature of human
beings. According to natural law in legal theory, the authority of at least
some legal standards necessarily derives from considerations having to do with
the moral merit of those standards. There are a number of different kinds of
natural law theories of law, differing from each other with respect to the role
that morality plays in determining the authority of legal norms.
4 Jill Benderly and Even Kraft, Independent Slovenia p. 27
5 Fran Zwitter, "Narodnost in Politika pri Siovencih
(Nationality and Politics Among the Slovenes) Zgodoviski
Casopis I, in Jill Benderaly
and Evan Kraft, Independent Slovenia; Origins. Movements, Prospects 1944 pp.
6-7.
6 Carole Roogel, The Slovenes and Yugoslavism,
/890-/9/4 New York: East European Monographs in Jill Benderly
and Evan Kraft Independent Slovenia Origins. Movements Prospects pp. 7-8.
7 Dejan
Djokic, Yugoslavism:
Histories of a Failed Idea 1918-1992, p. 84
8 Jill Benderly, Evan Kraft. Independent Slovenia: Origins,
Movements, Prospects 1994 p.13
9 Carole Rogel, In the Beginning the Slovenes trom
the Seventh Century to 1945, in Jill Benderly and
Evan Kraft, Independent Slovenia: Origins, Movements, Prospects p. 3
10 The Kingdom of
Serbs, Croats and Slovenes was renamed Yugoslavia in 1929 after a troubled
first decade.
11 For the record of
official documentation regarding the formation of SCS see Dr. Orner Ibrahimagic, Politicki Sistem Bosne i Herzegovine.
pp. 157-192.
12 In most parts of
the new kingdom, the cabinet faced near chaotic conditions
-legal-administrative, economic, social and psychological. Prior to unification
there had been six legal units, and despite the early creation ofa special ministry for the purpose of bringing about
equalization of the law and a modicum of legal uniformity, progress was rather
slow. In Alex N. Dragnich, The First Yugoslavia:
Search for a Viable Political System, p. 14.
13 Dr. Mustafa Imamovic, Historija Drzave I Provo Bosne I Herzegovine. p. 296.
14 First peace
agreement was with Austria on September 10, 1919; second was the peace
agreement with Bulgaria on November 27,1919 which enlarged Serbia by two
provinces - Dimitrovgradski and Bosiljgradski;
third peace agreement was with Hungary on June 4, 1920; fourth peace agreement
was signed with Turkey on August 10, 1920. in Dr. Mustafa lmamovic,
Historija Drzave I Prava,
p. 297.
15 Ibid.
16 Alex N. Dragnich, The First Yugoslavia: Search for a Viable
Political System, p.ll.
17 Alexandar Pavkovic, p.92
18 In the late 1980s,
Slovenia, with 8 per cent of the whole population, produced 22 per cent of
Yugoslavia's public revenues, 30 per cent of Yugoslavia's export in general.
See Viktor Meier, Zakaj je Razpadla
Jugoslavija, Ljubljana, 1996 p. 171.
19 The Memorandum of
the Serbian Academy of Arts and Sciences (SANU), released in 1986, is a well organized list of complaints and criticisms against
the Yugoslav system as it existed at the time. The main theme of the argument
in the Memorandum is that Serbia was wrongfully taken advantage of and weakened
under 1974 constitution of Yugoslavia, and that as a result, Serbians are the
victims of genocide (in Kosovo) among other things. The Memorandum is written
in such a way that it acts as a call to arms for the Serbian people, and
justifies any actions taken that will insure the security of threatened Serbia.
20 "The Memorandum", cited in B. Covic,
ed., Roots of Serbian Aggression, Zagreb, 1993 p. 324.
21 "The
Memorandum" cited in H. Sarkinovic, Bosnjaci od Nacertanija do Memoranduma, Muslimansko Nacionalno Vijece Sandzaka, Podgorica, 1997, Podgorica, 1997, pp. 287-406
22 Nase Teme, Vol. 33
Nos 1-2, Zagreb, 1989 p. 162.
23 This statement was
part of a speech in defense of the Albanian position on Kosovo by Slovenian
President Milan Kucan which was used by Dusan Mitevic, Milosevic's man at
Radio Television Serbia, to stir Serbian opinion against the Slovenian
leadership. For a detailed account see Death of Yugoslavia.
24 See, I. Urgancic, 'Jugoslavenska "Nacionalisticka Kriza" in Slovenei v Perspektivi Konea Naeija'. p. 56 and F. Bucar, 'Pravni ueditev polozaja Slovence kot naroda'.
p. 159 in Nova Revija (1987); Alexandar
Pakovic, p. 109.
25 A. Bibic, 'The Emergence of Pluralism in Slovenia,' Communist
and Post-Communist Studies, vol. 26, no. 4 (1993) 370-1. In Alexander Pavkovic, The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism and
wars in the Balkans. p. 109
26 This was the time
when both dissident groups took on a more active role in voicing their agendas.
In early 1988, Mladina boldly 'attacked' the Yugoslav
federation army by exposing its arms sales to impoverished Third World
countries and revealing its corruption activities. That same year, as the paper
was preparing to publish transcripts of military meetings discussing the arrest
of Slovene dissidents, the Yugoslav federal army made an arrest of three of Mladina 's joumaJists and a
Slovene sergeant -major who provided the documents for them. As one of the
arrested individuals was Janez Jansa,
prominent activist of the Alternative movement's peace branch, the movement
responded by founding the Committee for the Defense of Human Rights consisting
of dissidents ftom the Mladina
and ftom the Slovenian Society of Writers. Supported
by the Slovene Communist Party, the media and the Roman Catholic church, the
committee organized a widespread campaign of protests against the arrest of the
so-called 'Ljubljana four'. The decision to conduct the proceedings in
Serbo-Croatian, which the constitutional court ruled to be constitutional,
marked the high point in the Slovene dissatisfaction. The trial and sentencing
prison terms escalated what was already considered a volatile situation in
Slovenia. People were mobilized by their grievances and started protesting
paving a way to a clear road to independence.
M. Bakic-Hayden and R. M. Hayden. 'Orientalist
Variations on the Theme "Balkans": Symbolic Geography in Recent
Yugoslav Cultural Politics', Slavic Review, vol. 51 no 1 (1992) pp. 1-16.
27 S.P. Ramet, Nationalism
and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1992) p.211.
28 Alexander Pavkovic, The Fragmentation of Yugoslavia: Nationalism and
wars in the Balkans.p.110
29 S.P. Ramet, Nationalism
and Federalism in Yugoslavia, 1962-1991, 2nd ed. (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 1992) p.211.
20 These amendments
as well as constitutional changes by Serbia and other republics were
subsequently declared unconstitutional by the Yugoslav Constitutional Court. R.
M. Hayden, The Beginning of the End of Federal Yugoslavia: The Slovenian
Amendment Crisis of 1989 (Pittsburgh: The Center for Russian and East European
Studies, The Carl Back papers, 1992) pp. 11-20.
21 T. Mastnak, p.312
22 Aleandar Pavkovic, The
Fragmentation of Yugoslavia, p.lll
23 The turnout at the
elections was 93.2 per cent. Dejan Djokic (ed.) Yugoslavism: Historie~; of a Failed Idea 1918 -1992. p. 97.
24 See The Death of
Yugoslavia, Programme 2 for Jovic's
account and military intelligence film of the crucial meeting.
25 Susan Woodward,
June 27, 2005.
26 J.Jansha, The Making of the Slovenian State 1988-1992 (Ljubljana:Mladinska Knjiga 1994)
pp. 101-113 4
27 Alexandar Pavkovic, The
Fragmentation of Yugoslavia, pp. 135-135
28 See B. Bucar 'The International Recognition of Slovenia' in D.
Fink Hafuer and J. R. Robbins (eds) Making New
Nation: The Formation of Slovenia, (Adershot: Darmouth, 1997)
29 For Slovenian
planning and requests for mediation see D. Rupel 'Slovenia's Shift from the
Balkans to Central Europe' in J. Benderly and E.
Kraft (eds.) Independent Slovenia: Origins. Movements. Prospects (London:
Macmillan, 1994) pp. 190-191.
30 Alexandar Pavkovic, The
Fragmentation of Yugoslavia, p 137
31 James Gow and Cathi Carmichael, Slovenia and the Slovenes: A
Small State and the New Europe, p. 177.
32 J. Robbins,
'Epilogue the Attainment of Viability' in Making a New Nation the Formation of
Slovenia, E.287.
33 Christopher
Bennett, Yugoslavia's Bloody Collapse: Causes. Course and Consequences, p. 159.
34 Ruper, op. Cit. 191.
35 The Troika
comprised the past, present and coming foreign ministers of the Presidency of
the European Council of Ministers. In June they were Gianni de Michelis (Italy), Jacques Poos (Luxebourg)
and Hans van den Broek (the Netherlands).
36 Some authors
claimed that the direct European intervention in the conflict began in May 1991
with the clandestine delivery of several thousand infantry weapons as well as
communications equipment to the Slovenian defense forces trom
an unnamed European country. See J. Jansa, The Making
of the Slovenian State 1988-1992 pp. 101-113.
37 Susan Woodward in
Balkan Tragedy argues that the fate of Slovenia and Croatia were already
resolved at Brioni. She pointed out that the meeting
which took place paved the way to eventual recognition of both countries. James
Gow in The Triumph of the Lack of Will points out
that at Brioni the troika managed to establish peace
in Sloveni and create conditions for peaceful
negotiations. p. 52.
38 This included its
control over the international borders and the collection of customs duties.
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