"Your leaders
responded to the initiative of Sheik Osama, may God protect him, by saying they
don't negotiate with terrorists and that they are winning the war on terror. I
tell them: You liars, greedy war mongers, who is pulling out from Iraq and
Afghanistan? Us or you? Whose soldiers are committing suicide because of
despair? Us or you?"
This is a reference
to U.S. Vice President Dick Cheney's Jan. 19 response to the truce offer al
Qaeda chief Osama bin Laden made in his Jan. 19 audiotape release. This means
the al-Zawahiri tape was made within the last 10 days.
He also said,
"Bush, do you know where I am? I am amidst the Muslim masses, what God
blessed me with: their support, their care, their generosity, their
protection." This no doubt will be followed by some heated discussions
between Islamabad and Washington, since the Pakistani government doesn’t want
to allow U.S. operations on its territory anymore.
As for my mentioning
Iraq today, if you consider the following graph one cann
in fact see that since late 2005, there has been a growing trend of Iraqi
Sunnis (Saddam's Baatists) turning against their
jihadist allies.
Thus, it may be
increasingly difficult for al Qaeda to import bombers into the country,
reverting this flow back to Afghanistan.
As for Palestine and
al-Qeada I mentioned last month of a rise of Islamism
Hamas in Judea, Samaria, and Gaza, the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Shiites in Lebanon, and the Sunnis in Syria. And
that by end 2006, Judea and Samaria and Gaza most likely, will be split into
separate geographic divisions. Islamic Preparations for an Iraq
Nr.2 (if you discount the
current trend in Afghanistan).
P.S.: Just after I
completed the above, CNN started to
air its own translation.
Watching this, it once more became clear to me that although the al-Qaeda
leaders are in hiding, they are clearly still able to continue waging an
ideological battle with the West.
The fairy tale that poverty
produces terrorists doesn’t deserve any further comment (instead poverty is
known to produce resignation). Yet one still finds the poverty/terrorist even
in otherwise intelligent Newspapers like this one today: http://news.independent.co.uk/world/politics/article335859.ece
But if political inclusion
produce ideological moderation has been doubted in the past, today, moderate
Muslim groups are justifying their new pluralist practices on Islamic terms.
We also have the
politically-correct mendacity, which even British Prime Minister Tony Blair
recently repeated: that Islam has been “hijacked” by terrorists. In this view
Bin Ladin, the ayatollahs in Iran, the former Taliban rulers of Afghanistan,
the Saudis with their Wahhabism (a particularly puritanical brand of Sunni
Islam), all are twisting a “moderate” religion to suit their purpose. The
“Islam = peace” brigade essentializes Islam as peaceful. UBL essentializes it
as jihad. In fact Ibn Taymiyah, 700 years before
George Bush said “you’re either for us or against us,” and like other scholars
that time, divided the world into the domain of Islam and that of war. The only
good ruler is a Muslim ruler, asserted Ibn Taymiyah.
And by that he meant one that enforces shari`ah, or
Islamic law. It is no use pretending that the UBLs of the world have falsely
“hijacked” Islam. Indeed, their view of the faith, however intolerant and
violent it may seem, has a basis in the Quran.
We refuse to get
involved in the discussion of some modern Western and even some Muslim-born
scholars who diagnose the process of Quranic revelation to Mohammed as a case
of paranoid delusion. However, many commentators claim that Islam is where
Christianity was before the Thirty Years War (1618-1648) and then the
Enlightenment led the West to divorce religion and state, thereby removing
(mostly) the threat of religious-based warfare. And true or not, we do need to
open our eyes to the reality of the harsher aspects of Islam and Islamic
history. Anything else is simple—and dangerous—self-deception.
An earlier
controversy has been the "Orientalism and Occidentalism” myth.
Although it is silly to devide the world in an East
and West for there is no such thing, Edward Said mentioned in Future World
Jihad, was the man who touched off this contemporary controversy.
Said was raised
mostly in Cairo, educated at Princeton and Harvard, and taught English and
comparative literature at Columbia University in New York. A radical activist
in the cause of an independent Palestine, he served as an overseas member of
the Palestinian National Council, an arm of the PLO, until breaking with Yasir
Arafat over the Oslo accords (he thought Arafat had sold out).
His famous 1978 book,
Orientalism, assumed, with the French structuralists of the 1960's, that every
civilization defines itself by its "Other." Assuming with Michel
Foucault that knowledge always generates power, he proceeded to maintain that
Orientalism-and the same is with the reverse ‘Occidentalism’ far from being the
objective, from the very beginnings served political ends.
While Said's idea
came under a certain amount of return fire from within the bastions of the
traditional academy, it was gleefully welcomed by a new generation of scholars,
eager to be free of the shackles of the old disciplines, especially the
linguistic ones.
In the decades since
1978, innumerable papers have been written, with extensions to Said's
celebrated "insight." This was also the case with Ian Buruma and Avishai Margalit, who
co-authored an article in the New York Review, of Books in 2001 shortly
after the 9/11 debacle. It represented the ‘Said’ topic to a wider public
once more when the article was re-published in the form of a booklet titled"Occidentalism" (2003) is a handy term with
which to conflate now those in the East who hold a malignly simplistic view of
the West.
As Buruma and Margalit suggest, much of what is anti-Western
in the East today was in former generations a critique of modernity from within
the West. They mention the pan-German stirrings of the 18th century, which
contrasted the pastoral and spiritual qualities of pre-industrial Germany with
the alien and soulless metropolitan culture of postindustrial London and Paris;
or, later, the pan-Slavic stirrings in Russia against an alien 'West that now
incorporated Germany. Even as Berlin and then Moscow tried desperately to catch
up with the industrial age, an important constituency resented the impact of
modern goods, manners, and ideas, finding literary _expression in writers as
sophisticated as Herder and Dostoevsky. And very Western forms of idealism and
romanticism went underground to resurface as racial theories.
From the West the
wave continued to the East. By the 20th century, write Buruma
and Margalit, it was the turn of many Japanese to lament the
"contamination" of Tokyo and Osaka by the movies, cafes, dance halls,
radios, newspapers, short skirts, and cars that bad become symbols of Western
cultural hegemony. Although large cities in themselves were not a novelty in
the East-Baghdad, Peking, and Edo were vast metropolitan centers long before
London--the supposed atomization of the city by the importation of Western
commodities and attitudes kindled a reactionary fire. Paradoxically, Buruma and Margalit point out, there was here the shadow of
still another Western idea of ancient provenance: the big city as Babylon. And
with it came a further paradox: the importation of such originally Western
bogeymen as Jews and Freemasons, taken to be the devilish,
"cosmopolitan" managers and conspirators advancing the Occidental
conquest.
Capitalism, too,
became a target of Eastern animosity, especially in the form of the bourgeois
satisfaction with money and the comfort it can buy. To this were opposed the
heroic virtues, the ideals of self-sacrifice, and the religious and
aristocratic visions of grandeur that each afflicted society associated with
its own past. Liberalism and democracy were no less frequently rejected as
symptoms of the same disease, along with artistic freedom and sexual license.
Hence, in much of the Third World, the appeal of socialism with its promise of
a purely "scientific" way to obtain the advantages of modernity
without the cultural and religious ramifications. But then, with the failure of
socialism to deliver the goods, resentment was added to an already combustible
inferiority complex to fuel still further animosity to the West.
Mao drove the urban
proletariat out to work in rural communes, and the Khmer Rouge emptied Phnom
Penh; both were inspired by approximately the same set of objections that
provoked the Taliban to strafe Kabul.
What the Occidentalists in each place and time have shared,
according to Buruma and Margalit, is a failure to
grasp the indivisibility of human advancement. "You cannot import what is
merely utilitarian while keeping out the potentially subversive ideas that go
with it." (Alas, what you can do is try.) But this is not to say that the
authors absolve the Wrest of blame. To the contrary,
they are eager to concede that people who attribute all their problems to (for
example) American foreign policy have some valid points. Nor are they against
anti-Westernism per se; they are just against taking it to the point where it
thoroughly dehumanizes the Other. Criticism of "globalization" is one
thing, but by the time a whole Western society has been reduced to "a mass
of soulless, decadent, money-grubbing, rootless, faithless, unfeeling
parasites," things have gone too far.
What can one say
about these various exercises in cross-cultural analysis? In fact, both Said on
the one hand and Buruma and Margalit on the other are
deeply unsatisfactory. By restricting his field to a small sampling of
Anglo-Saxons and Frenchmen (plus some gratuitously introduced Israelis), Said
managed to exclude the German contribution that dominated Western Orientalism
through both of the centuries he surveyed, and without which the scholarly
tradition as a whole is incomprehensible. Likewise he ignored significant
Dutch, Italian, Austrian, Hungarian, and other scholars-for the obvious reason
that their countries had no horses in the race to occupy the collapsing Ottoman
Empire. Seeking no enemies on the Left, he also sedulously bypassed the Soviet
Russian Oriental School-which would have supplied a true rogues' gallery for
comparison with the Europeans. For, in the service of Marxist ideology, the
Russians peppered their studies with extremely insulting and dismissive remarks
about Islamic religion and "feudal" Arab society.
Said in fact borrowed
from the French scholar Raymond Schwab, that corresponded to Anglo-French
adventures in India but predated the Anglo-French forays into the old Ottoman
dominions of the Near East by more than a century. Indeed, his book amounted to
a Procrustean transplantation of Schwab's work on sub-continental India to
another region entirely.
Buruma
and Margalit's Occidentalism next offered us a long catalogue of now-defunct
enemies of Western civilization- all who tend to characterize us in much the
same wax. We-the Westerners, Europeans/ Americans, the cosmopolitans,-are
whores; our civilization is Babylon. Unfortunately, what Buruma
and Margalit like Said presented is a collection less of ideas than of
caricatures, and what unites them is only that they are caricatures of the same
thing, really.
The final
prescription by Buruma and Margalit as presented in
the book version of their article however gives the game away, when they write:
The story we have mentioned in this book is a tale of cross-contamination, the
spread of bad ideas. This could happen to us now, if we fall for the temptation
to fight fire with fire, Islamism with our own forms of intolerance. Religious
authority, especially in the United States, is already having a dangerous
influence on political governance. We cannot afford to close our societies as a
defense against those who have closed theirs. For then we would all become Occidentalists, and there would be nothing left to defend.
In other words: where
Said intend to address his, public, Buruma and
Margalit are addressing a purely Western audience accustomed to the same parlor
game that Edward Said was playing.
The claims of French
structuralists notwithstanding, each civilization created itself, not by an
"othering" process but by building upon its own traditions, its own legacy
of faith. At one point, when the Christians discovered themselves to be
completely surrounded by Muslims, the Christians became self
consciously aware of Islamic civilization. At a later point-the colonial
situation--the Muslims discovered themselves to be surrounded by Christians.
The rivalry between this West and that East-between the West and Islam-is
different in kind from the rivalries between either.
Beneath both accounts
of "othering" lies the naive assumption that the West can be
identified with modernity and even more specifically with the
Enlightenment--prior to which, we might suppose, it was just a backward,
third-world sort of culture like every other. But the West precedes the
Enlightenment, and the ideals of the Enlightenment could only grow out of a
much longer history.
It is also an error
to conceive of the Enlightenment and all that followed it as a breach with
Christian history as is detailed on this website. By the same token, however,
the phrase "Islamic humanism," though a conjunction devoutly to be
wished, is in fact a contradiction in terms; as a goal, it has repeatedly
eluded those down through the ages.
Though the medieval
Arabs took over various Greek traditions in science and philosophy they
absolutely rejected Greek art and literature, with their representations of the
divine-in-man. Islam could not have a reformation or an enlightenment or a
genuine humanism because such things were not only missing from Islam but
explicitly repudiated by it.
In the later 19th
century, there were many Islamic liberals at work, merrily importing all sorts
of "discoveries" from the West. What happened to them? They died
right out. We may applaud those who today are trying against all odds to
resurrect that noble project. But we should also acknowledge how great, if not
insurmountable, the odds really are.
The 14th-century
Muslim historian ibn Khaldun Ibn Khaldun considered the primary cause of
civilizational decline to be forgetfulness, a collective amnesia, of how we
came to be, and therefore of what we must do to continue being.
But although it is in
the nature of civilizations to ‘civilize’, it is also in their nature to learn,
as the Romans learned from the Greeks, the Christians from the Romans, Greeks,
and Jews, the Muslims from the Christians, Jews, and Greeks. And it is in the
nature of successful civilizations, to transcend their teachers, and in turn to
become teachers themselves, raising up from barbarism the untutored world
around them-or else falling back into barbarism.
But to argue that
other cultures cannot change because their members are incapable of embodying
the values we hold dear is what formerly was called racism and reemerged as ‘culturallism’.
See Also
Case Study P.1: Certainly the
fundamentalists invoke a militant understanding of jihad, justifying a violence
that the modernists rejected. But the key difference, I think, hence the sine
qua non of fundamentalism, goes beyond this specific doctrine. What makes
militant Islam militant is not merely the doctrine of jihad, nor heightened
intolerance, nor violence, nor traditionalism, nor fear of modernity, nor an
angry response to imperialism. Its novelty is more profound
than that.
Every person of
Muslim background is supposed to share a common Muslim culture, whatever his or
her real culture of origin (Turk, Bosnian, Pakistani or Arab), which means that
religion is seen as the main component of these cultures, a component that can
be isolated and erected as a culture in itself? 2. This culture is attributed
to everybody with a Muslim origin, whatever his or her religious practice or
level of faith (that is, without any link to religiosity). In this sense, one
could speak of'non-believing Muslims'? 3. This
culture differentiates a `Muslim' from an`other',
who, in the West, is defined as a member never of a religious community, but of
a pseudo-ethnic group. Enter P.2:
Yet if tolerance, is
part of the Western heritage also this cannot be an end in itself, if we are to
survive.
But as mentioned in
the above case study, it is important to understand that "Islamist" -
not "Islamic" - is the accurate term to refer to the ideology, which
seeks the establishment of a government that implements Islamic law. Further
complications for one, that Muslim militants such as the Palestinian
nationalist groups al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine, Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and Iraqi Sunni nationalist
insurgents such as the Baathists - are ideologically more like ‘secular’
groups.
Plus, among the
moderate mainstream of Islamism are two types - radical and militant. Hizb al-Tahrir, the transnational group calling for the
re-establishment of the supranational caliphate, is one such example. The
latter group, comprising the militants, does espouse violence - which is why it
is important to use the term "militant Islamist" when defining such
groups.
However – where it
gets most confusing - some, such as Hamas and Hezbollah, are ideologically
Islamist (meaning they seek the establishment of a government that implements
Islamic law) have in addition nationalistic goals. This type of groups maintain
armed wings to fight what they perceive as foreign occupation, but when it
comes to achieving their goals of establishing an Islamic polity, they also
engage in mainstream electoral politics. There are those who operate within a
given state, such as the Taliban, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat in
Algeria, and Jamaat al Mujahideen in Bangladesh. Plus groups with a regional
agenda - including Jemaah Islamiyah in Southeast Asia and the Chechen group led
by Shamil Basayev - that want one Islamic state to
encompass a region. Thus, although the Arab footprint is quite obvious in
almost all Islamist militant groups, ethnicity is also, a determining factor.
The, EU Counterterrorism Coordinator Gijs de Vries acknowledged on Sept. 12
,2005 (speaking at the Institute for Counterterrorism's annual conference in
Herzliya), that Europe has become an active front in the global jihadist war -
a change from its earlier status as a planning base for attacks elsewhere.
According to de Vries, Europeans at home and abroad likely will be targeted by
terrorist groups for years to come.
A look at the numbers
shows that per end 2005, there have been double as many deaths attributed to al
Qaeda since Sept. 11 (more than 800) than in the 52 months prior to it (less
than 400). We should note that these statistics do not include the deaths in
Iraq, Afghanistan or the former Soviet Union where active insurgencies are
under way.
In his soon to be
released book, Dying to Win: Why Suicide Terrorists Do It, Robert A. Pape
quotes Pierre Rehov, a French documentary filmmaker who went underground to do
research in Palestine ,and explains how he is horrified by the real side
of Islam, which fosters a culture of hatred by brainwashing, to such an extent
that the only solution to the members’ life problems is to kill themselves and
others in the name of their religion. See also: http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=20505 .
And we can say in
conclusion here, that Islam was born as an aggressive movement, that used
violence and terror to expand. Judaism, Christianity, Shintoism, Buddhism,
Hinduism and other world religions espouse their teachings but none of their
doctrines propose that non-devotees be slain. Islam decrees that as a top
priority if one is going to be a practicing Muslim, loyal to the faith.
America's counterterrorism strategy appears predominantly weighted toward a
"kill or capture" approach targeting individuals. Accordingly, the
attention of the U.S. military and intelligence community is directed almost
uniformly toward hunting down militant leaders or protecting U.S. forces, not
toward understanding the real enemy they face. This is a monumental failing
because al Qaeda's ability to continue this struggle is predicated on its
capacity to attract new recruits and replenish its resources.
A look at the numbers
shows that per end 2005, there have been double as many deaths attributed to al
Qaeda since Sept. 11 (more than 800) than in the 52 months prior to it (less
than 400). We should note that these statistics do not include the deaths in
Iraq, Afghanistan or the former Soviet Union where active insurgencies are
under way.
In his soon to be
released book, Dying to Win: Why Suicide Terrorists Do It, Robert A. Pape
quotes Pierre Rehov, a French documentary filmmaker who went underground to do
research in Palestine, and explains how he is horrified by the real side of
Islam, which fosters a culture of hatred by brainwashing, to such an extent
that the only solution to the members’ life problems is to kill themselves and
others in the name of their religion. See also: http://www.frontpagemag.com/Articles/ReadArticle.asp?ID=20505 .
Islam was born as an
aggressive movement, that used violence and terror to expand.
Judaism, Christianity, Shintoism, Buddhism, Hinduism and other world religions
espouse their teachings but none of their doctrines propose that non-devotees
be slain. Islam decrees that as a top priority if one is going to be a
practicing Muslim, loyal to the faith. Yet, except for the document mentioned
in p.2 of my world Jihad series, even Washington still has no proper program
yet. Hence America's counterterrorism strategy appears predominantly weighted
toward a "kill or capture" approach targeting individuals.
Accordingly, the attention of the U.S. military and intelligence community is
directed almost uniformly toward hunting down militant leaders or protecting
U.S. forces, not toward understanding the real enemy they face. This is a
monumental failing because al Qaeda's ability to continue this struggle is
predicated on its capacity to attract new recruits and replenish its resources.
Also more and more
books start to appear written by those sympathetic towards jihadists like for
example Fawaz A. Gerges' "The Far Enemy" with misleading information.
He claims that the jihadist movement inclined more toward isolation and
introspection about internal Muslim affairs than to supposed external threats
to Islam, although history ever since the Crusades and the Mongol invasion has
shown differently. Gerges thus writes apologetically that Abdullah Azzam, the
Palestinian radical who together with bin Laden founded al Qaeda in the late
1980s, was an exponent of "resistance, not expansion or aggression."
Gerges notes that Azzam "also eschewed terrorism, targeting civilians, and
taking jihad global, where in fact it already was. In "The Great
Theft" Abou El Fadl, an Islamic jurist promotes
the myth that as I mentioned above, Islam, would have been hijacked. Similar to
the propaganda by Fawaz A. Gerges' history has proven otherwise as I will
be able to proof as soon my next study about Islamic imperialism has been
edited and next checked by our toe specialist peer reviewers. Although Abou El Fadl so far only echo’s the opinion of other Muslim’s, he
then expresses his personal opinion with a call for a "counter-jihad"
to reaffirm what he terms “Islam's moral message." I did however learn
much from reading "The Great Theft" and incorporated some of its
information in my own “World Jihad” series for it provides a good guide to
Muslim intellectual discourse. Sun Tzu already wrote long ago, only when
we know whom (what) we are up against, can we prevail. Since the above essay in
letter format, is more of a personal nature than my ‘articles’ on this website,
I should add here that although in the above I made for example mention
of “Judaism, Christianity, Shintoism, Buddhism, Hinduism and other world
religions” I am an agnostic, never belonged to any political party or group,
thus also never voted in my life. Rather I approach related issues from a
history of ideas point of view, plus weight the evidence based on forensic
research, as thought at the best universities today.
Important is also
that we should not expect that most, who are born as Muslims will follow the
faith. In fact we have to be careful about what I termed 'culturalism'. Hence I
initially started of this study four years ago not only with an overview of
leading ideologists of the Muslim Brotherhood (the most successful Islamic
political party in the world today), but also as to how to avoid culturalist
ideas as a whole.
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