On Sunday, Putin flew to Saudi Arabia -- becoming the first-ever Russian head of state to visit
the kingdom -- and was received at the Riyadh airport by King Abdullah. During
the visit, Putin -- who brought dozens of Russian businessmen along on the trip
-- will discuss increased political and economic cooperation as well as
military assistance to the Saudis. The issues of Iraq, Iran's nuclear program,
the Lebanese political crisis and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict were also
high on the agenda.
Other stops on the
regional tour will include visits with Jordanian King Abdullah II and Palestinian
National Authority President Mahmoud Abbas in Amman, as well as a trip to
Qatar. Though Russia long has had strong ties to Middle Eastern states like
Syria, Iraq and Yemen, Putin's current tour is notable in that he will be
visiting countries that historically have been well within Washington's sphere
of influence -- rather than Moscow's. Such a move, particularly following the
remarks in Europe, can be viewed as a direct Russian challenge to the United
States in yet another region that Washington considers vital.
In his speech at the
Munich conference, Putin said the United States is responsible for growing
instability and insecurity in the international system. By lashing out at the
United States, Russia hoped to appeal to a latent perception among U.S. Arab
allies that Washington is playing with fire in their region.
Moscow hopes to
exploit these concerns to make infiltrate the region, which has been firmly in
the U.S. sphere of influence. The Russians hope to counter U.S. moves in its
own neighborhood and contain U.S. power overall; the Kremlin has already
started this process with Iran. But the Kremlin knows it must position itself
among the Arabs to really use the Middle East as a lever in its struggle with
the United States. This explains Putin's planned visits to Saudi Arabia, Qatar
and Jordan, all major U.S. allies.
Russia has correctly
realized the potential for an opening in the Middle East. The Russians know
that the Arabs, despite their continued close relations with Washington, are
unhappy with U.S. policies in the region and are looking for leverage in
dealing with the United States.
Jordan, since it
relies financially on Washington, might not be willing to warm up to Russia.
That said, Putin's trip to Amman includes a meeting with PNA President Mahmoud
Abbas. Russia wants to use its membership in the Middle East Quartet to create
problems for the U.S. calculus on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict; Putin's
meeting with Abbas could therefore prove instrumental. As for Qatar, good
relations with Russia are in keeping with its goal to enhance its role as a
regional player. This is something Moscow hopes to capitalize on in order to
get close to Doha, where U.S. Central Command is headquartered.
But the most
significant relationship that the Russians are looking to develop in the Middle
East is that with the Saudis, especially given Riyadh 's close relations with
the United States. The Russians are aware the Saudis think the U.S. position in
the region is weakening, and that Riyadh has grown wary of U.S. policies in the
region, which have empowered rival Iran. In fact, Putin's visit to Saudi Arabia
is in part the result of Riyadh's assistance to Moscow to help quell the
jihadist insurgency in the Caucasus.
Under King Abdullah,
the Saudis are trying to diversify their foreign policy options. They see the
decline of the U.S. position in the region and want to have other choices for
security. Moreover, Riyadh is concerned about U.S.-Israeli ties upsetting its
calculus regarding the Palestinian situation, especially since the Saudis have
assumed a more direct role in mediating the conflict. The Saudis also want to
counter Iran and Syria, which they hope will be possible by engaging the
Russians, who have backed both Tehran and Damascus.
Though the Russians
and Saudis hope to benefit from their relationship, energy and the sale of
military hardware limit the extent to which they can cooperate. Russia and
Saudi Arabia do not see eye to eye on oil production -- Saudi moves to increase
production lead to a drop in oil prices, financially hurting Russia. And though
Moscow wants to sell Riyadh military hardware, it is unlikely since Riyadh can
purchase superior U.S. wepons.
Despite Moscow 's
ambitions in Saudi Arabia, Putin's arrival there has not gone quite as well as
it might seem. Mintimer Shaimiev,
president of the constituent republic of Tatarstan, is a member of Putin's
delegation. Shaimiev is the leader of the only
republic in which Putin has not been able to install his choice of governor; Shaimiev's influence does not end in Tatarstan -- he is the
most influential of Russia's 30 million Muslims. And the Saudis are rewarding Shaimiev with cash for his service to Islam.
Furthermore, ethnic Tatars and Russia's other Muslim minorities have among the
world's highest birth rate, and Russians among the lowest, making Putin's visit
in Riyadh today, perhaps not as pleasant as the media suggests.
Russia for some time
has been in confrontation with the United States over U.S. actions in the
former Soviet Union (FSU). What the Russians perceive as an American attempt to
create a pro-U.S. regime in Ukraine triggered the confrontation. But now, the
issue goes beyond U.S. actions in the FSU. The Russians are arguing that the
unipolar world -- meaning that the United States is the only global power and
is surrounded by lesser, regional powers -- is itself unacceptable. In other
words, the United States sees itself as the solution when it is, actually, the
problem.
In his speech, Putin
reached out to European states -- particularly Germany, pointing out that it
has close, but blunt, relations with Russia. The Central Europeans showed
themselves to be extremely wary about Putin's speech, recognizing it for what
it was -- a new level of assertiveness from an historical enemy. Some German
leaders appeared more understanding, however: Foreign Minister Frank-Walter
Steinmeier made no mention of Putin's speech in his own presentation to the
conference, while Ruprecht Polenz, chairman of the
Bundestag Foreign Affairs Committee, praised Putin's stance on Iran. He also
noted that the U.S. plans to deploy an anti-missile shield in Poland and the
Czech Republic was cause for concern -- and not only to Russia.
Putin now clearly
wants to escalate the confrontations with the United States and likely wants to
build a coalition to limit American power. The gross imbalance of global power
in the current system makes such coalition-building inevitable -- and it makes
sense that the Russians should be taking the lead. The Europeans are risk-averse,
and the Chinese do not have much at risk in their dealings with the United
States at the moment. The Russians, however, have everything at risk. The
United States is intruding in the FSU, and an ideological success for the
Americans in Ukraine would leave the Russians permanently on the defensive.
The Russians need
allies but are not likely to find them among other great-power states.
Fortunately for Moscow, the U.S. obsession with Iraq creates alternative
opportunities. First, the focus on Iraq prevents the Americans from countering
Russia elsewhere. Second, it gives the Russians serious leverage against the
United States -- for example, by shipping weapons to key players in the region.
Finally, there are Middle Eastern states that seek great-power patronage. It is
therefore no accident that Putin's next stop, following the Munich conference,
was in Saudi Arabia. Having stabilized the situation in the former Soviet
region, the Russians now are constructing their follow-on strategy, and that
concerns the Middle East.
The Middle East is
the pressure point to which the United States is most sensitive. Its military
commitment in Iraq, the confrontation with Iran, the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict and oil in the Arabian Peninsula create a situation such that pain in
the region affects the United States intensely. Therefore, it makes sense for
the Russians to use all available means of pressure in the Middle East in
efforts to control U.S. behavior elsewhere, particularly in the former Soviet
Union.
Like the Americans,
the Russians also have direct interests in the Middle East. Energy is a primary
one: Russia is not only a major exporter of energy supplies, it is currently
the world's top oil producer. The Russians have a need to maintain robust
energy prices, and working with the Iranians and Saudis in some way to achieve
this is directly in line with Moscow's interest. To be more specific, the
Russians do not want the Saudis increasing oil production.
There are strategic
interests in the Middle East as well. For example, the Russians are still
bogged down in Chechnya. It is Moscow's belief that if Chechnya were to secede
from the Russian Federation, a precedent would be set that could lead to the
dissolution of the Federation. Moscow will not allow this. The Russians
consistently have claimed that the Chechen rebellion has been funded by
"Wahhabis," by which they mean Saudis. Reaching an accommodation with
the Saudis, therefore, would have not only economic, but also strategic,
implications for the Russians.
On a broader level,
the Russians retain important interests in the Caucasus and in Central Asia. In
both cases, their needs intersect with forces originating in the Muslim world
and trace, to some extent, back to the Middle East. If the Russian strategy is
to reassert a sphere of influence in the former Soviet region, it follows that
these regions must be secured. That, in turn, inevitably involves the Russians
in the Middle East.
Therefore, even if
Russia is not in a position to pursue some of the strategic goals that date
back to the Soviet era and before -- such as control of the Bosporus and
projection of naval power into the Mediterranean -- it nevertheless has a
basic, ongoing interest in the region. Russia has a need both to limit American
power and to achieve direct goals of its own. So it makes perfect sense for
Putin to leave Munich and embark on a tour of Saudi Arabia and other Persian
Gulf countries.
But the Russians also
have a problem. The strategic interests of Middle Eastern states diverge, to
say the least. The two main Islamic powers between the Levant and the Hindu
Kush are Saudi Arabia and Iran. The Russians have things they want from each,
but the Saudis and Iranians have dramatically different interests. Saudi Arabia
-- an Arab and primarily Sunni kingdom -- is rich but militarily weak. The
government's reliance on outside help for national defense generates intense
opposition within the kingdom. Desert Storm, which established a basing
arrangement for Western troops within Saudi Arabia, was one of the driving
forces behind the creation of al Qaeda. Iran -- a predominantly Persian and
Shiite power -- is not nearly as rich as Saudi Arabia but militarily much more
powerful. Iran seeks to become the dominant power in the Persian Gulf -- out of
both its need to defend itself against aggression, and for controlling and
exploiting the oil wealth of the region.
Putting the split
between Sunni and Shiite aside for the moment, there is tremendous geopolitical
asymmetry between Saudi Arabia and Iran. Saudi Arabia wants to limit Iranian
power, while keeping its own dependence on foreign powers at a minimum. That
means that, though keeping energy prices high might make financial sense for
the kingdom, the fact that high energy prices also strengthen the Iranians
actually can be a more important consideration, depending on circumstances.
There is some evidence that recent declines in oil prices are linked to
decisions in Riyadh that are aimed at increasing production, reducing prices
and hurting the Iranians.
This creates a
problem for Russia. While Moscow has substantial room for maneuver, the fact is
that lowered oil prices impact energy prices overall, and therefore hurt the
Russians. The Saudis, moreover, need the Iranians blocked -- but without going
so far as to permit foreign troops to be based in Saudi Arabia itself. In other
words, they want to see the United States remain in Iraq, since the Americans
serve as the perfect shield against the Iranians so long as they remain there.
Putin's criticisms of the United States, as delivered in Munich, would have
been applauded by Saudi Arabia prior to the 2003 invasion of Iraq. But in 2007,
the results of that invasion are exactly what the Saudis feared -- a collapsed
Iraq and a relatively powerful Iran. The Saudis now need the Americans to stay
put in the region.
The interests of
Russia and Iran align more closely, but there are points of divergence there as
well. Both benefit from having the United States tied up, militarily and
politically, in wars, but Tehran would be delighted to see a U.S. withdrawal
from Iraq that leaves a power vacuum for Iran to fill. The Russians would
rather not see this outcome. First, they are quite happy to have the United
States bogged down in Iraq and would prefer that to having the U.S. military
freed for operations elsewhere. Second, they are interested in a relationship
with Iran but are not eager to drive the United States and Saudi Arabia into
closer relations. Third, the Russians do not want to see Iran become the
dominant power in the region. They want to use Iran, but within certain
manageable limits.
Russia has been
supplying Iran with weapons. Of particular significance is the supply of
surface-to-air missiles that would raise the cost of U.S. air operations against
Iran. It is not clear whether the advanced S300PMU surface-to-air missile has
yet been delivered, although there has been some discussion of this lately. If
it were delivered, this would present significant challenges for U.S. air
operation over Iran. The Russians would find this particularly advantageous, as
the Iranians would absorb U.S. attentions and, as in Vietnam, the Russians
would benefit from extended, fruitless commitments of U.S. military forces in
regions not vital to Russia.
Meanwhile, there are
energy matters: The Russians, as we have said, are interested in working with
Iran to manage world oil prices. But at the same time, they would not be averse
to a U.S. attack that takes Iran's oil off the market, spikes prices and
enriches Russia.
Finally, it must be
remembered that behind this complex relationship with Iran, there historically
has been animosity and rivalry between the two countries. The Caucasus has been
their battleground. For the moment, with the collapse of the Soviet Union,
there is a buffer there, but it is a buffer in which Russians and Iranians are
already dueling. So long as both states are relatively weak, the buffer will
maintain itself. But as they get stronger, the Caucasus will become a
battleground again. When Russian and Iranian territories border each other, the
two powers are rarely at peace. Indeed, Iran frequently needs outside help to
contain the Russians.
In sum, the Russian
position in the Middle East is at least as complex as the American one. Or
perhaps even more so, since the Americans can leave and the Russians always
will live on the doorstep of the Middle East. Historically, once the Russians
start fishing in Middle Eastern waters, they find themselves in a greater trap
than the Americans. The opening moves are easy. The duel between Saudi Arabia
and Iran seems manageable. But as time goes on, Putin's Soviet predecessors
learned, the Middle East is a graveyard of ambitions -- and not just American
ambitions.
Russia wants to contain
U.S. power, and manipulating the situation in the Middle East certainly will
cause the Americans substantial pain. But whatever short-term advantages the
Russians may be able to find and exploit in the region, there is an order of
complexity in Russia's opening gambit in order to gain back it's "great
power" status.
More recently Gulf
intelligence sources report that the agreement reached between Putin and King
Abdullah is that Moscow will assist in Saudi development of a civilian nuclear
program and build six research satellites for the oil kingdom. And that this in
turn got Israel worried because it will enable Riyadh to pick up highly
sensitive intelligence on its military movements and relay it to Egypt and the
Palestinians. We cannot proof or disprove such 'intelligence' info, but it is
plausible.
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