Following the failed
Feb. 24 suicide attack on the big Abuqayq oil
processing center in the east Saudi oil region of Dammam, al Qaeda operatives
were handed fresh guidelines for a total offensive on Saudi and Gulf emirates
oil installations. In contrast to the cursory, cut-and-dried style of a Western
military directive, counter-terror sources describe the document as running to
140 pages (transmitted via the internet).
Al Qaeda directives
are typically voluminous because each operation calls for more than field
deployment, logistical support and tactics. As a jihadist operation, specific
doctrinal injunctions and prohibitions must be folded into the military
guidelines.
This one, entitled
Canon for Striking Saudi Oil Installations, reads as much like a religious
manifesto as a military plan of campaign.
In the new document,
economic warfare is charted as the short cut to a jihad victory. It entails
striking at the American Crusader’s economic interests. Currently oil is
targeted, not just as an Arab resource but as a font of Muslim wealth. This
wealth causes the West to place its foot on Arab necks, making it a liability
rather than an asset for the Arabs. Therefore, notwithstanding the colossal
revenues generated from the production and export of oil, there is no option
but to disrupt the industry, because it has degenerated into a Western lever of
domination activated from within the Muslim world. The dos and don’ts of the jihad
against oil resources are carefully defined:
1. Targeting oil is
now the highest priority of the economic Jihad.
2. Muslim tenets
assign the ownership of oil fields to the masters of the land from which it is
drawn. Like I pointed out some time ago al Qaeda does not view the Saudi crown
as the proper masters of the land; therefore they are not the rightful
beneficiaries of its oil riches but thieves and robbers who are fair game for
terrorist targeting.
3. This point
reinforces Point 2 by affirming that non-believers warrant no title to any
resource they may confiscate on Muslim soil.
4. Damaging the
properties of non-believers in time of war is a virtuous deed. Since oil ranks
as such property, it is incumbent on holy warriors to attack it.
5. It is permissible
and obligatory to target Muslim properties which benefit non-believers,
especially those which are predetermined for repossession by Muslims.
Our experts note that this point refers to the future as envisioned by al
Qaeda.
It is a way of urging the attacks on Saudi oil installations to persist as the
means of assuring al Qaeda's recovery of the black gold for the true Muslims
after it takes over the rule of Saudi Arabia.
6. Saudi oil targets
are divided into four categories by the doctrinal rationale running through the
document:
A. The actual oil
wells must remain inviolate as long as the sacred cause is served by disrupting
other parts of the oil industry. If not, they may be struck - provided a
special dispensation is granted by Qaeda’s Supreme Shura Council. Our Islamic
experts translate this as meaning that the oil wells are just about
untouchable.
B. Preferred targets
are oil and gas pipelines because they are easiest to hit for the greatest
disruptive damage to exports.
C. Also terminals,
pumping stations, processing plants and oil tankers.
But there are important exceptions.
Al Qaeda exempts from attack installations and maritime and overland fuel
transport companies owned by private Muslim owners, including Saudi tycoons and
wealthy sheiks. No such immunity is enjoyed by enterprises owned by members of
the Saudi royal family or American proprietors. They are legitimate targets.
D. The same
distinction applies to oil production and marketing enterprises. They are fair
targets as the holdings of non-believers, crusaders or members of the Saudi
royal family, but exempted when owned by the faithful (Muslims).
The final chapter of the document deals with offshore wells and terminals.
The same rules apply to oil drawn from the seabed as oil produced on land.
Barring a special dispensation, offshore wells must be kept safe from attack,
so too oil ports which benefit the community as a whole – especially if
privately owned by Muslims.
But all other oil
ports, terminals, refineries and pipelines are legitimate targets.
Anxious to set the
record straight, Qaeda in Saudi Arabia issued a special statement on Feb. 26,
accusing the Saudi media of falsely depicting the network’s first strike
against a Saudi oil installation as a failure. The statement claimed that,
ahead of the two suicide car bombers, a “cell of mujahedeen” first entered the
refinery compound, killing and injuring guards and opening the entry gate for
the bombers to enter “after the guards fled.”
This communiqué
reiterates the Saudi al Qaeda’s determination to “stop the exploitation of the
Muslims’ resources” and continue the raids until “the polytheists” leave Muslim
lands.
Fact is that the
energy industry is extremely easy to hit, particularly in the Middle East.
There are pipelines and wells and tankers and berths and refineries everywhere.
But it is extremely difficult to strike the industry in a way that actually
impedes supply on the international level. Blowing up a tanker just does not do
it -- and blowing up a tanker is a lot harder than it sounds. Further, while
there are critical nodes, routes and facilities, many have redundancies built
into the system.
There are really only
seven targets of international significance that, if seriously damaged, could
substantially affect international energy flows: the Rotterdam oil port, the
collective might of Texas' Galveston Bay oil facilities, the Houston ship
channel, Russia's Samara pipeline nexus, Saudi Arabia's Ras Tanura oil port,
Saudi Arabia's Yanbu oil port and Saudi Arabia's Abqaiq facility.
Although damage to
these facilities would be quite harmful to the global economy, hurting these
facilities in any really significant way would be extremely difficult. The
Abqaiq facility, for example, has by far the smallest footprint of the seven,
and even it covers a square mile of territory. That is not something that a
suicide bomber -- even in a van -- can substantially affect.
Partial damage can be
inflicted on a facility, slowing down operations, requiring repairs and higher
security, and sending psychological shockwaves through the international
system. But as militants from Pakistan to Nigeria have shown, attacks on the
energy infrastructure can have a local effect without necessarily striking at
the most critical of international nodes.
Regionally, there are
several second-tier facilities that, if attacked -- though the effects on the
overall international energy picture might not be significant -- could cause
serious problems at the national level. But many of these second-tier targets
are insulated due to either size or backup infrastructure.
Saudi Arabia's Petroline shuttles up to 5 million barrels per day (bpd)
back and forth across the peninsula to keep the country's various oil ports
supplied. But striking the world's largest pipeline raises two problems. First,
oil pipelines are easily repaired; and second, the line is in reality one
massive work-around. Saudi Arabia has excess oil port facilities; the Ras al-Juaymah oil port, for example, is the smallest of the
country's big three but can still handle 3 million bpd in case something goes
offline. The Petroline exists in order to keep the
country's options option.
Similarly, the
primary Kuwaiti terminal at Mina al-Ahmadi is a potential target. But Kuwait
also maintains capacity at Mina Abdullah, Shuaiba and Mina Saud, with yet
another facility under construction on Bubiyan
Island. No matter what is hit, exports would likely continue flowing.
In reality, there are
only three locations on the west shore of the Persian Gulf where a single
attack could cause catastrophic damage.
The first is in
Iraq's sector of the Persian Gulf, where its Basra oil terminal handles 90
percent of the country's oil exports. There are no backups. In fact, Iraq's
only oil export option -- a pipeline north to Turkey -- is so often attacked by
guerillas that it is largely inoperable.
The second is Qatar's
liquefied natural gas (LNG) facility at Ras Laffan. While there are actually
two separate facilities there -- three, if one considers the two phases of the Rasgas project to be separate -- neither has the capacity
to cover for the other.
The third is Oman's
LNG facility at Minal al Fahal,
which has no backup whatsoever. Also, Oman's oil network is unique in the
region, in that it has no realistic workarounds; it consists of a line of
pipelines and oil fields stretching from the south of the country all the way
up to the only oil port, also at Minal al Fahal.
When the three
variables are assessed together, it becomes clear that al Qaeda has altered its
target selection to include at least certain types of oil and gas
infrastructure, but desire alone does not make for a successful attack. The
group's regional infrastructure has been constrained, and the attack on Abqaiq
showed signs of only minimal initial surveillance -- hence the failure to
inflict significant damage even with the use of high-profile group members.
Regionally, the desires
and the targets may match, but the reach and capabilities seem more limited.
Though Riyadh was troubled by attacks against Western contractors a few years
ago, it has even less tolerance for attacks on the energy infrastructure. Saudi
security forces have thus far demonstrated both a defensive capability and an
offensive one, going after al Qaeda militants and supplies throughout the
kingdom.
Elsewhere in the
region, al Qaeda has a more limited reach. Though the group has jumped borders
in the past, the surveillance and preparation necessary for a significant
operation is more difficult outside of the traditional operating ground.
That said, there are
two areas that appear most vulnerable in the near term: Iraq and Saudi Arabia.
In Iraq there remains a wider operating range, and while al Qaeda has had
difficulty operating in the mostly Shiite areas around the export facilities,
there is a potential opening in the area as tensions grow between local and
Iranian-inspired forces and the foreign troops in the area. Al Qaeda might not
be able to sustain long-term operations in that part of Iraq, but the
instability could open a window for a strategic strike.
Despite the relative
effectiveness of the Saudi security forces, Saudi Arabia remains the central
focus of al Qaeda. Al Qaeda will continue to push resources, funding and
training to its Saudi operations, even if these prove difficult. The Abqaiq
attack was a failure, but offered the jihadists hope and operational
intelligence for planning future attacks.
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