On the morning of July 7, 2005, four explosions rocked London’s transportation system. At around 8.50 am, three nearly simultaneous explosions hit the London Underground system in a Circle Line tunnel between Liverpool Street and Aldgate stations; in the Circle Line just outside Edgware Road; and in a Piccadilly Line tunnel, between King’s Cross and Russell Square. Less than an hour later, at 9.47am, a bomb carried in a backpack exploded on the upper deck of a no. 30 bus in Tavistock Square. The bombs, which vaporized the four suicide attackers, killed an additional 52 people and injured some 700 more.1 The four bombers were identified as Shehzad Tanweer, Mohammed Siddique Khan, Jermaine Lindsay, and Hasib Mir Hussein.In the months leading up to the attacks, Khan and Tanweer, the apparent ringleader and right-hand man, respectively, of the London bombings, are believed to have devoted themselves more or less full-time to the planning of the operation. In May 2005, the group rented 18 Alexandra Grove, a modern ground floor apartment in a two-storey block adjacent to the Leeds Grand Mosque, where Khan, Tanweer, and Hussain prepared the explosives.2 The bombs were homemade, peroxide-based devices, which were commercially available and relatively cheap.3The bombers did not require great experience to assemble the device, and may have gained the know-how to produce the bombs from open sources, including possibly from the Internet.

The Official Account of the attacks ordered by the House of Commons estimates that the overall cost of the operation was less than 8,000. It believes that Khan has likely provided most of the funding due to his “reasonable credit rating” and multiple bank accounts, credit cards, and a 10,000 Pound personal loan.4 Nine days prior to the bombings, the group made a reconnaissance visit to London, where they were picked up on CCTV.5 This trial run suggested both a strong discipline of the group and a strong awareness to its security, an awareness that was perhaps fed by Khan’s apparent knowledge that he was under surveillance during that time.6

See our initial Dec. 2005 Case Study:

To many Britons, the most surprising fact about the four suicide bombers was that they,the four suicide bombers were all British citizens, and the Official Account of the bombings described the personal backgrounds of the bombers as “largely unexceptional.”7

Tanweer, Khan, and Hussein were all second-generation British citizens whose parents were of Pakistani origin, whereas Lindsay was of Jamaican descent. Shehzad Tanweer, the 22 year-old bomber responsible for the blast between Liverpool Street and Aldgate Station, was from Leeds. His father Mumtaz, who is considered a pillar of the Pakistani community in Beeston, the working class suburb of Leeds where Shehzad grew up, immigrated to Britain in 1961 from the eastern Pakistani city of Faisalabad. In the quarter century in which he lived in the UK, he had slowly built a business for himself that eventually included a slaughterhouse and a fish-and-chips shop.8 Mumtaz and his family, including Shehzad, lived in a large house, and Shehzad led a seemingly ordinary live. He wore brand-name clothes, worked out at a gym, took classes in martial arts, and played for a local cricket team, where he excelled. He studied sports science at Leeds Metropolitan University and occasionally helped out at his father’s shop.9 Shehzad, grew up in a religious, although not radically religious environment, praying five times a day and attending mosques regularly.10 Although Shehzad’s dream had been to become a professional cricketer, at around age 18 he apparently underwent a political and religious transformation in the course of which he began to feel distant from all things British.

Around the time of the 9/11 attacks, he became more religious and began socializing with people who were convinced that Islam was besieged.11 According to one friend, “Shehzad definitely opened his eyes because of September 11. That’s when many young people got back into Islam around here.”12 Beginning in around mid-2002, religion became a major focus of his life, and he increasingly lost interest in his studies. Nevertheless, nobody seemed to have observed that he became more and more extreme.13 Together with Khan and Hussein, he began frequenting a local Islamic bookstore, the Iqra Islamic Learning Center. In December 2004, he went to Lahore, accompanied by Khan, where they stayed for two months and may have received terrorist training at a madrassa run by Lashkar-e-Taibeh, according to Pakistani intelligence officers.14 He did not have paid employment at that point and was financially supported by his father, who wanted him to work in his business.15

30 year-old Mohammed Siddique Khan, who detonated his explosive device in the Circle Line outside Edgware Road, was the oldest member of the London suicide cell. He was from the Leeds area, married with a pregnant wife, and the father of an 18-month old daughter. Investigators of the London attacks regard him as the senior and dominant figure, and the overall ringleader of the cell who was responsible for identifying, cultivating, and supporting the other members. Khan is also the person likely to have liaised with contacts outside Britain, including in Pakistan. He was employed as a “learning mentor” at a local primary school until December 2004, where many of his students perceived him as a “father figure.”16 Friends remembered him as quiet and studious, and while some have suggested that he consumed some alcohol and drugs in the 1990s, he mostly stayed out of trouble. Khan studied at Leeds Metropolitan University, where he met his wife. According to the House of Commons report, he “developed a vocation for helping disadvantaged young people,” and he worked part time in youth and community counseling while completing his degree.17 It is unclear precisely when Khan developed more extreme views, but by 2001, Khan was clearly very serious about Islam. He prayed regularly at work, attended mosque on Fridays, but was not remembered being aggressive when he spoke to colleagues about religion. He had spoken out against the 9/11 attacks in school. Some of his friends, however, remembered that there had been “a subtle change in his character” about a year after he begun studying, when he became less talkative, more introverted, and slightly more intolerant about dissenting views. Still, teachers and parents held him in high regard since he had “a real empathy with difficult children,” helped calm down a number of distressed children, and even managed to bring a few excluded students back into school.18

Hasib Mir Hussein, 18, of Leeds, who bombed the no. 30 bus in Tavistock Square, was a tall and shy youth described by his classmates as “docile, until provoked,” at which point he had a tendency to become violent. 19 Hussein attended college, where he studied for an Advanced Business Program, but his academic achievements were poor, as was his attendance record.20 He is also said to have smoked marijuana with friends.21 He turned very religious around 2003, and his extremism intensified when he returned from a visit with his parents to Saudi Arabia, where he went on the hajj. He became more openly supportive of Al Qaeda after the hajj, and was open about his belief that the 9/11 bombers were martyrs.22 Around 2004, Hussein began to wear Western clothes again, and shortly before the attack he shaved off his beard, possibly to attract less attention to himself.23

Germaine Lindsay, 19, who detonated himself in the Piccadilly Line tunnel between King’s Cross and Russell Squre, was the only one of the four bombers who had no Pakistani origins. Born in Jamaica, Lindsay came to the UK as a 5-month old baby, together with his mother. He did not have an easy childhood. His natural father had remained in Jamaica, and his stepfather reportedly had treated him harshly. His relationship with his second stepfather was better, but he left the family in 2000. Lindsay was described as a bright child, and he did well both in school and in sports, and showed some artistic and musical talent. 24 He spent his childhood in the outskirts of Leeds, and adopted Islam “zealously” about four years before the London bombings.25 After his conversion, he began referring to himself as Jamal. According to friends, he underwent a personal transformation after adopting Islam. He turned away from some of his old friends, quit smoking, and stopped listening to music and playing soccer, while attempting to convert some of his friends to Islam. He began wearing the traditional white thobe, learned Arabic quickly, and attended mosque frequently, first the Omar Mosque, followed by the Leeds Grand Mosque, where worshipers said “he was an enthusiast of Arabic recitation of the Koran and prayed loudly and fervently.”26 Lindsay socialized with known troublemakers, and after his conversion he was disciplined for distributing leaflets in support of Al Qaeda. He apparently suffered a crisis when in 2002, his mother left for the United States, leaving Lindsay alone in his family home after that. He performed occasional odd jobs since his mother’s departure. In October 2002, he married Samantha Lewthwaite, another Muslim convert, and in April 2004, their child was born. Lindsay worked as a carpet fitter at that point, although at the time of the London bombings he was unemployed.

Although he had previously avoided contact with other women, he began flirting with women openly and soon had a girlfriend. He shaved his beard, began wearing western clothes, and associated with petty criminals. After his wife realized that he had cheated on her, Lindsay left the house. The social life of the four bombers was rather similar. It revolved around mosques, youth clubs, gyms, and an Islamic bookshop in Beeston. 28 Tanweer and Khan seemed to have reconnected at the gym, after they had known each other as children. When they became reacquainted, they grew increasingly close to each other. Hussein joined Tanweer and Khan, and the three formed a clique that spent much time in a local youth club, the bookshop. In the second half of 2004, Khan and Lindsay became close associates of one another. The four bombers had not been identified in advance as potential terrorist threats, however, according to the report by the UK’s Intelligence and Security Committee, Khan and Tanweer, appeared on the peripheries of other investigations as they had been “among a group of men who had held meetings with others under Security Service investigation in 2004.29

 

Motifs and Justifications.

The bombers were from Beeston and the neighbouring district of Holbeck on the outskirts of Leeds. Beeston, a densely-populated working-class neighbourhood in Leeds, is also one of the more culturally diverse districts of the city. Described as a “deprived” area, Beeston has a relatively high rate of unemployment, lying at 7,8 % (vis-à-vis 3.3 % in Leeds at large). About a third of the population receives the British equivalent of welfare.30 Khan, Tanweer, and Hussain, however, were not poor by the standards of the area; Tanweer certainly not. Tanweer, who received a red Mercedes from his father as a present, was well-off by local standards. Indeed, the personal background of the four London bombers, like that of most suicide bombers, provides remarkably little clues about possible motivations to sacrifice their lives while killing others. What is more likely at the root of the problem that generated suicide bombers like Tanweer, Khan, Hussein, and Lindsay is not necessarily unemployment or poverty, but rather a crisis of identity. Young, second- or third-generation Muslims in England, as well as in other European countries, report that they do not quite know where they belong. The expectation that they should adapt to the Western lifestyle clashes head on with the more traditional upbringing of their parents’ generation, which often leads to a clash with their parents’ generation. Many have tried to adopt a British identity, but in many working-class neighborhoods, this attempt has often been synonymous with sexual promiscuity, drinking of alcohol and drug usage.31 Many have adopted martial arts and boxing in these neighborhoods. Youth divide into gangs. One young Muslim from Beeston said that unlike their parents, the youth today are not passive, but they will fight for their rights.32 In the context of Beeston, youngsters told a New York Times reporter, Islam saved them from Britain.33

A more interesting, and perhaps revealing angle, is an examination of how the suicide bombers justified their actions, and how the larger community of Salafi-Jihadists views the world around them and its own place in it. Two of the bombers, Mohammed Siddique Khan and Shehzad Tanweer, recorded their wills on tapes, which were published along with footage featuring Ayman al-Zawahiri, Al Qaeda’s deputy leader. Their words, and statements by other Salafi-Jihadists residing in the UK, paint a picture of the mental universe of the bombers.

The London bombers regard themselves first and foremost as Muslims, and they claim to act in the name of, and in the interest of, their religion. In the words of Tanweer, in an audiotape released on the first anniversary of the London bombings, “We are 100% committed to the cause of Islam.”34 However, a closer look at the statements of the bombers reveals that their beliefs are more closely aligned to Salafi-Jihadist ideology than to Islam per se. Khan and Tanweer, in their video statements, reflect nearly all central tenets of Salafi-Jihadism. First and foremost, they perceive Islam to be under attack from the West, and they believe that it is their duty to defend their religion against this onslaught for the sake of protecting the Muslim community, but also in order to avenge the perceived atrocities by the West. According to Khan, “Your democratically elected governments continuously perpetuate atrocities against my people all over the world. And your support of them makes you directly responsible, just as I am directly responsible for protecting and avenging my Muslim brothers and sisters. Until we feel security, you will be our targets.”35

The London bombers accuse the West of a long list of atrocities against Muslims. Tanweer, for example, accuses non-Muslim UK citizens of being those who have voted in your government, who in turn have, and still continue to this day, continue to oppress our mothers, children, brothers and sisters, from the east to the west, in Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq, and Chechnya. Your government has openly supported the genocide of over 150,000 innocent Muslims in Falluja … You have offered financial and military support to the U.S. and Israel, in the massacre of our children in Palestine. You are directly responsible for the problems in Palestine, Afghanistan, and Iraq to this day. You have openly declared war on Islam, and are the forerunners in the crusade against the Muslims.36

The bombers want the West, in this case UK citizens, to have a taste of its own medicine. Khan thus warns that “until you stop the bombing, gassing, imprisonment and torture of my people we will not stop this fight. We are at war and I am a soldier. Now you too will taste the reality of this situation.”37
In a videotape message published on July 6, 2006 on Al Jazeera, Tanweer similarly justified his actions in part with the ongoing British military involvement in Afghanistan and Iraq, as well as British support of the United States and Israel. He also warned that similar attacks would follow: “What you have witnessed now is only the beginning of a string of attacks that will continue and become stronger until you pull your forces out of Afghanistan and Iraq and until you stop your financial and military support to America and Israel.”See our above introductory case study plus,38.

Whether British involvement in Iraq is a cause, a motivation, or an excuse for the London bombings is difficult to establish. Certainly, however, Britain’s participation has not reduced its risk of suffering terrorist attacks, and likely heightened it, at least in the short term. Two key reports published in 2005 confirmed that the war in Iraq helped radicalize British Muslims. In April 2005, a report by the British Joint Intelligence Committee stated that “Iraq is likely to be an important motivating factor for some time to come in the radicalization of British Muslims and for those extremists who view attacks against the UK as legitimate.” The report further warned that the Iraq war had “reinforced the determination of terrorists who were already committed to attacking the West and motivated others who were not.” The report, titled ‘International Terrorism: Impact of Iraq’ further stated that “Iraq has re-energised and refocused a wide range of networks in the UK.”39 In July 2005, the influential Royal Institute of International Affairs (commonly known as Chatham House) made a similar conclusion in its own report, namely that Britain’s participation in the war in Iraq and its supporting stance of U.S. foreign policy had increased the risk of falling victim to a terrorist attack.40

Hatred for the West’s perceived atrocities is coupled with a complete rejection of all that is Western, made possible by the Salafi-Jihadists’ tendency to view the West as a conspiratorial super-entity which is decadent and threatens to defile Muslims. The consequence is the framing of the struggle of Islam against the West as a cosmic war between good and evil, whereby the evil of the West encompasses every aspect, from the government to the economy to the military to the press. Khan, for example, says that “I’m sure by now the media’s painted a suitable picture of me, this predictable propaganda machine will naturally try to put a spin on things to suit the government and to scare the masses into conforming to their power and wealth-obsessed agendas.”41

Khan’s statements also reflect his internalization of another central tenet of Salafi-Jihadism, namely tawhid, the strict and absolute unity of God, which dictates the entire life of the‘true’ Muslim. “Our religion is Islam,” he says, “obedience to the one true God, Allah, and following the footsteps of the final prophet and messenger Muhammad, may peace be upon him. This is how our ethical stances are dictated.” Adherence to the notion of tawhid requires that Muslims reject all man-made laws, since only God’s laws are relevant. This, too, is reflected in Khan’s statement, when he decries that “Our so called scholars today are content with their Toyotas and semi-detached houses. They seem to think their responsibilities lie in pleasing the kufar [i.e., the heretic] instead of Allah so they tell us ludicrous things like you must obey the law of the land… How on earth did we conquer land in the past if we were to obey by this law? By Allah, these fellows will be brought to account…”42 As a Salafi-Jihadist, Khan also accepts the centrality of jihad within Islam, and asserts that if Muslims are deserting the holy jihad, which he describes as “fighting in Allah’s cause,” then as a result “Allah will cover you with humiliation, and it will not be removed until you turn back to your religion.”43 Khan describes jihad as an individual duty for every Muslim, a key factor distinguishing Salafi-Jihadists from non-violent mainstream Salafis. In this regard, Khan says that “jihad is an obligation on every single one of us, men and women…,” whereas “turning your backs on jihad … is a major sin…”44 Like all Salafi-Jihadists, Khan then elevates the status of jihad to that of the five core pillars of Islam. He also calls for the restoration of the caliphate, a declared goal of Al Qaeda, warning that “You’re not safe, nor in the East or the West and you’ll never have peace until Allah’s Sharia reigns supreme over these lands…”45

Salafi-Jihadism extols martyrdom as the most honorable way to fight jihad, and Khan’s and Tanweer’s statements are filled with calls upon their Muslim brethren to emulate them and seek martyrdom, lest they will go to hell. Khan, for example, urges his coreligionists, “Muslims all over the world I strongly advise you to sacrifice this life for the hereafter. Save yourselves from the fire and torment,”46 while Tanweer repeats the Salafi-Jihadist mantra, “We love death the way you love life.”47 It is easy to dismiss statements such as these as mere propaganda. However, a close watching of the footage of the London bombers, who were caught on CCTV on the day of the attacks, appears to strengthen Tanweer’s insistence that indeed the suicide bombers were looking forward to their deaths. When the four bombers arrived at King’s Cross station at around 8.30 am on July 7, 2005, a camera captured them hugging each other. According to the authors of the House of Commons report into the bombings, they appeared “happy, even euphoric.”48

 

Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement

Apart from the statements and wills left behind by two of the London bombers, which, beyond a shred of doubt, reveal an intense adherence to the central tenets of Salafi-Jihadism, it is worthwhile to examine the factors that appear to have helped the bombers to morally disengage from the act of dying and killing.49

These mechanism include the building of in-groups and out-groups, such as between true Muslims on the one hand, and heretics on the other hand. This mechanism is often combined with the dehumanization of the out-group, another prominent means of moral disengagement. Taped by an undercover reporter of the Sunday Times, for instance, Omar Bakri Mohammed, the leader of the Al Muhajiroun, said after the London bombings that “The toe of the Muslim brothers is better than all the kuffar on the earth.”50 A member of the Savior Sect, an offshoot of Al-Muhajiroun, who identified himself as Zachariah said that “they’re kuffar. They’re not people who are innocent. The people who are innocent are the people who are with us or those who are living under the Islamic state.”51 Use of the terms kuffar, or “dirty kuffar,” are widely used terms in Salafi-Jihadist popular culture, such as jihadist rap videos.The London bombers are known to have immersed themselves in footage showing the killing of Muslims at the hands of Israelis and Americans.52 Such viewing is likely to have enhanced a process known as advantageous comparison, in which one’s own actions are seen as relatively moderate when compared to the actions of the out-group, which are perceived as far more vicious. This process of advantageous comparison seems to have set root not only among the London bombers, but also among members of the larger community condoning the activities of the bombers, or at least voicing understanding for their deeds. Thus, one youngster in Beeston who sympathized with the London bomber’s asked a reporter, “Why should we care about the London bombings when thousands of innocent Muslims are being killed in Iraq?”53

Conspiracy theories, which are widespread among Salafi-Jihadists, but also among many ordinary Muslims, serve a similar purpose in that they further intensify anger and thus radicalize potential jihadists. An undercover Sunday Times reporter spent six weeks in Beeston and reported that conspiracy theories pervaded the local Muslim community. Several people he met were convinced that the four London bombers were not involved in the attack. Some family members too were in denial. Hasib Hussein’s father Mahmoud, for instance, did not believe his son was capable of blowing himself up, saying that “no-one has shown me any evidence that he did it.”54

A few additional elements must be added to the complex mix of motivations that may have led the London attacks to perpetrate a suicide attack. The first is the promise of benefits in paradise, which was mentioned by both bombers who left behind wills. Tanweer, for example, recites a passage from the Quran, from Surat Al-Touba: “Oh you who believe, what is the matter with you, that when you are asked to march forth in His cause, you cling heavily to the earth. Are you pleased with the life of this world rather than the Hereafter? But little is the enjoyment of this world as compared to the Hereafter.”55 Khan was even clearer, and in his statement to the video camera, he invoked the promised benefits of paradise several times, saying: “By preparing ourselves for this work [i.e., jihad and martyrdom], we are guaranteeing ourselves paradise and gaining the good pleasure of Allah… and by turning our backs on this work, we are guaranteeing ourselves humiliation and anger of Allah…”56 He concluded his statement by saying that “With this I leave you to make up your own minds and I ask you to make dawa to Allah almighty to accept the work from me and my brothers and enter us into gardens of paradise.”57

Secondly, the obvious element of vengeance that was a clear motive of the London bombers was supplanted by the belief that becoming a martyr confirms and strengthens one’s honor and manliness. This element is, again, evident from statements by both Khan and Tanweer. Khan, for example, castigates “so called scholars” of Islam who “fear the British government more than they fear Allah.” He calls upon his brethren to oppose these fake Muslims from giving lectures and issuing fatwas, and suggests that these so-called scholars “need to stay at home…and leave the job to the real men, the true inheritors of the Prophet’s…” Eventually, he calls upon them: “Come back to your religion and bring back your honor.”58 This appeal to one’s honor appears to be widespread among Salafi-Jihadists in London, and probably beyond. Omar Brooks more commonly known as Abu Izzedine), a convert to Islam and member of the group Al-Ghurabaa, a successor organization to the Salafi-Jihadist Al-Mujahiroun,59 said at a meeting of  the group on July 3, 2005, that he did not want die “like an old woman… I want to be blown into pieces with my hands in one place and my feet in another.”60

 

Indoctrination and Radicalization.

The suicide attacks in London, like those elsewhere, have been used first and foremost for their tactical value as a cheap, effective, highly lethal, and extremely shocking modus operandi that leaves a long-lasting psychological impact on the target audience.61 The very nature of the attacks would add an additional element of surprise, given the relative dearth of suicide attacks in Europe.Responsibility for the attacks was initially claimed by two groups, the first by the hitherto unknown Secret Group of Al-Qaeda of Jihad Organization in Europe, and the second by the Abu Hafs al-Masri Brigades. Experts deemed the claim of the former more credible.62 In a video statement released by Al Qaeda after the bombings, Ayman al-Zawahiri took credit for the operation, saying that “London’s blessed raid is one of the raids which Jama’at Qa’idat al-Jihad was honored to launch… In the Wills of the hero brothers, the knights of monotheism—may God have mercy on them, make paradise their final abode and accept their good deeds.”63 Investigators were also aware that Khan and Tanweer visited Pakistan between November 19, 2004, and until February 8, 2005. Who the would-be-bombers have met in Pakistan was unknown a year after the bombing, but the authors of the Official Report into the bombings ordered by the House of Commons thought it “likely that they had some contact with Al Qaida figures,” and that Khan had recorded his farewell video during that visit. Khan was also believed to have had “some relevant training” on the Pakistani side of the Pakistani-Afghan border during a brief visit in the summer of 2003. The report’s authors were unable to determine whether Khan had met significant Al Qaida figures during this or other visits to Pakistan, but assumed that the visit had “at least a motivational impact.”64 They concluded that as of May 2006, there was “no firm evidence to corroborate this claim [Al Qaeda’s involvement] or the nature of Al Qaida support, if there was any. But, the target and mode of attack of the 7 July bombings are typical of Al Qaida and those inspired by its ideologies.”65

About a year after the bombings, however, additional signs emerged suggesting closer links between Al Qaeda and the bombings than had initially been assumed. Already in September 2005, a video that featured Khan had lent strong support to the claim that at a minimum, the London bombers were inspired to great extent by Al Qaeda’s ideology. In his statements, Khan declared his gratitude to Allah for having been raised “amongst those whom I love like the prophets, the messengers, the martyrs and today's heroes like our beloved Sheikh Osama Bin Laden, Dr Ayman al-Zawahiri and Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, and all the other brothers and sisters that are fighting in Allah’s … cause.66 Peter Bergen noted that one of the key pieces of evidence overlooked in the British government report was that Khan’s statements, which had been interspersed with statements by Al Qaeda’s alleged no. 2, Ayman al-Zawahiri, were made on a videotape that bore the distinctive logo of Al-Sahab (lit., ‘The Clouds’), Al Qaeda’s television production arm. Bergen also argued that Khan’s appearance on the videotape strongly suggested that he met up with members of Al Qaeda’s media team based on the Afghan-Pakistan border.67

This led Bergen to conclude that “the more you delve into the London bombings, the more they look like a classic al-Qaeda plot.”68 In early July, the BBC reported that Pakistani intelligence suggested that Khan and Tanweer met with Zawahiri in Pakistan’s tribal areas in January 2005. In the three months that led up to the bombing, the bombers were in contact with one or several individuals in Pakistan and may have obtained advice from them. The methods used in the communication, according to the BBC, were designed to make it difficult to identify the individuals.69 Bergen’s assertion and the alleged Pakistani intelligence report were further corroborated when on the first anniversary of the London attacks, another videotape of a second London bomber appeared. This tape featured Shehzad Tanweer alongside segments showing Ayman al-Zawahiri and Adam Gadahn, an American member of Al Qaeda known by his nom de guerre, Azzam al-Am’riki, or Azzam the American. While the three were not shown together on the tape, the tape made evident that Al Qaeda invested much into the sophisticated production of the tape. While Tanweer’s appearance on an Al Qaeda videotape does not by itself prove that the London attacks were organized by Al Qaeda, other aspects of the attacks seem to suggest at least some professional involvement by Al Qaeda in the bombings. For instance, the attacks were financed by methods that would arouse little suspicion and, as the Official Account into the attacks concluded, “the group showed good security awareness and planning discipline…”70 This, in itself, again does not prove an Al Qaeda involvement, but it is not unreasonable to assume that the clique had some professional guidance in the planning process of the attacks. Furthermore, Tanweer’s statements were closely aligned to some of the goals Al Qaeda had long claimed to pursue. Moreover, Tanweer’s statements have, probably intentionally, helped advance some of Al Qaeda’s tactical goals, namely to instill fear among a large audience, while attempting to rally Muslims to Jihad by presenting Al Qaeda as the vanguard of a global Islamic insurrection that aims to liberate all Muslims from the perceived yoke of the Crusader-Zionist alliance. Tanweer warned that what you have witnessed now is only the beginning of a series of attacks, which, inshallah, will intensify and continue, until you pull all your troops out of Afghanistan and Iraq, until you stop all financial and military support to the U.S. and Israel, and until you release all Muslim prisoners from Belmarsh, and your other concentration camps. And know that if you fail to comply with this, then know that this war will never stop and that we are ready to give our lives, one hundred times over, for the cause of Islam. You will never experience peace, until our children in Palestine, our mothers and sisters in Kashmir, and our brothers in Afghanistan and Iraq feel peace.71 Whether or not Al Qaeda is responsible for the London attacks, it is in its interest to claim direct or indirect responsibility for the London bombings. Successful attacks such as the London bombings are likely to generate pride among many young Muslims who accept Al Qaeda’s narrative that Islam is under siege, and hence required to defend itself. By using suicide bombings, the most shocking and awe-inspiring tactic available in its arsenal, Al Qaeda is able to present itself as fearless, determined, and omnipotent. These characteristics help Al Qaeda fortify its role as the vanguard of a resurrected and self-confident Islamist movement that strikes back at its attackers with the only means left at its disposal—its willingness to sacrifice its own members’ bodies in an act that, they argue, pleases God and helps redeem Muslims at large. Al Qaeda firmly counts on the attraction that this act, which is portrayed as an act of heroism, bestows upon the Muslim who has no other means to establish his honor other than by creating a balance of terror. This explains why bin Laden, Zawahiri, and other members of Al Qaeda keep repeating the perceived grievances and sufferings of Muslims, and the need to avenge these injustices through the total devotion to jihad, manifested in its ultimate form, through martyrdom operations.

 

Target Selection

In the mindset of Salafi-Jihadists, Britain is part and parcel of the Crusader-Zionist entity that has subjugated Islam. In the case of Britain, the perceived sins it committed against Muslims reach even farther back into history than the sins committed by Americans and ‘Zionists,’ and they include Britain’s alleged responsibility for the demise of the Mughal empire in India in the early 18th century. Britain is also blamed for colonizing large swaths of the Middle East after World War I, including Egypt, Iraq, and Palestine, and of exploiting their natural riches. Britain is held responsible for cheating the Arabs of their chance to create a single Arab homeland. These accusations and others, some of which contain elements of truth, and others that seem grossly exaggerated, are constantly referred to in the statements of bin Laden, Zawahiri, and other key members of Al Qaeda. In 2000, bin Laden accused the British of being responsible for destroying the caliphate system in 1924, and for creating the problems in Kashmir and Palestine, as a result of which many Muslims died. He blamed Britain for establishing an arms embargo on the Muslims of Bosnia, and which led to the alleged killing of 2 million Muslims. Britain is also
blamed for “starving the Iraqi children” when it embargoed Iraq under Saddam Hussein, and for its continuous bombings and killings of innocent children in Iraq as the primary ally of the United States in the war in Iraq. The London bombings were likely carried out as part of a string of campaigns announced
by Ayman al-Zawahiri in September 2002. At the time, Al Qaeda’s deputy leader warned that countries that would assist the United States in a future attack in Iraq would suffer the consequences. “The Mujahed youth had already sent messages to Germany and France,” he warned then. “However, if these doses are not enough, we are prepared with the help of Allah to inject further doses.”72 As Michael Scheuer, former head of the CIA’s Bin Laden Unit put it after the London bombings, “as always for Al Qaeda, a threat made yields an attack executed.”73

On September 1, 2005, in his first statements after the London bombings, which also featured, for the first time in Al Qaeda’s history, English subtitles, Zawahiri again stated that Islam is under attack by the West. He said that the attacks in London were designed as vengeance for Western occupation, and aimed at carrying the battle onto the enemy’s turf. He called the attacks a “slap in the face to the conceited crusader British arrogance,” which made Britain “drink from the same cup from which it had long made the Muslims drink. This blessed raid, like its glorious predecessors in New York, Washington, and Madrid, brought the battle to the enemy's soil…” Zawahiri also blamed Britain for not only ignoring Al Qaeda’s previous offer of a truce, but rejecting Al Qaeda’s offer with contempt, thus laying the blame for the London attacks on the British government: Didn't the Lion of Islam, the mujaheed Sheikh Osama bin Laden, may Allah protect him, offer you a truce, so you would leave the lands of Islam? But you were obstinate and your arrogance has led you to crime, and your Foreign Secretary Jack Straw said that these proposals should be treated ‘with the contempt which they deserve.’ So taste the consequence of your governments' arrogance. Blair brought calamities upon his people in the heart of their capital, and he will bring more, Allah willing, because he continues to exploit his people's heedlessness, and stubbornly insists on treating them like uncomprehending idiots. He keeps reiterating to them that what happened in London has nothing to do with the crimes he perpetrated in Palestine, Afghanistan, and Iraq.74 Zawahiri also justified the targeting of all Britons, including specifically civilians, arguing that whoever elects and pays taxes to his government cannot be absolved from responsibility of that government’s actions. Indeed, Zawahiri argues that even those who did not elect the government, yet who abide by the man-made laws that punishes those who disobey the authorities are fair game.We say to them that these civilians are the ones who pay taxes to Bush and Blair, so they can equip their armies and give aid to Israel, and they are the ones who serve in their armies and security services. They are the ones who elected them, and even those who did not vote for them consider them legitimate rulers who have the right to give them orders and must be obeyed, and who also have the right to order strikes against us, killing our sons and daughters, and to wage war in their name, and to kill Muslims on their behalf. Moreover, they consider disobeying their orders a crime punishable by law.75 Finally, Zawahiri warns of future attacks should the West not cease its aggression against innocent Muslims. He warns that anybody who participates in any kind of aggression against Muslims, be it in Iraq, Afghanistan, or Palestine, will be repaid in kind.76

Given Al Qaeda’s portrayal of Muslim’s struggle against the ‘Crusader-Zionist alliance’as a cosmic war of epic proportions, a war of good against evil, it cannot be ruled out that the London bombers, who at the very least were profoundly inspired by Al Qaeda’s Salafi-Jihadist ideology, chose the particular targets in London also for their symbolic significance. Thus, it may not be a coincidence that it was King’s Cross station which served as the epicenter of the attacks on London’s transportation system. In a video released in July 2006 by Al Sahab, the narrator said that “The knights of London continued to train and plan for the operation, and the targets were identified with precision, so much so that even the names of the targeted stations held symbolic meaning and spiritual significance for the Crusader West. And after completing their training and preparation, the knights departed for the field of operation.”77

 

The Importance of Friendship Ties

Zawahiri’s words leave little doubt that for Al Qaeda, taking responsibility through a video statement is a great opportunity to recruit additional jihadis by portraying shaheeds such as Tanweer as modern day Robin Hoods who are redeeming the Muslim nation through their selfless acts of devotion to God and the entire Muslim umma. Thus, Zawahiri says, What made Shehzad join the camps of Qaeda Al-Jihad was the oppression carried out by the British in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Palestine. He would often talk about Palestine, about the British support of the Jews, and about their clear injustice against the Muslims… That is why Shehzad joined the camps of Qaeda Al-Jihad, where he spent some time, along with Muhammad Al-Siddiq [i.e., Khan]. Both of them were striving for martyrdom, and were hoping to carry out a martyrdom operation. Both of them were very resolute in this. If the brothers discussed some other issue, they would not pay any attention, because their goal, for which they came to the camps of Qaeda Al-Jihad, was to carry out a martyrdom operation. They were bonded by a great love, for the sake of Allah. Together, they formed a great team, even though each excelled at different things. The love of martyrdom for the sake of Allah was not motivated by poverty, unemployment, and emptiness, as some mercenary media outlets try to portray to us. It was motivated by the love of Allah and His messenger. A person who is about to carry out this act has complete conviction that this act of his is one of the best acts in the eyes of Allah. Whoever looks at the life of the martyr Shehzad can see this with absolute clarity. Shehzad Tanweer, Allah’s mercy upon him, was well read, loved sports, and kept physically fit, and that is why he studied physical education at university. He had a passion for boxing. Even though his family was well off, his clothes and look did not disclose this. Allah’s mercy upon him, he used to pray all night long, and loved reading the Koran. While his brothers spent their time reading the Hadith, he would spend his time reading the Koran. He would contemplate what he read in the Koran, and often he would stop at a specific verse and say to his brothers: “Look, this is exactly what is happening today.” 78

Al Qaeda’s ‘strategic indoctrination’ through such statements increases the possible pool of young Muslims who are attracted to Al Qaeda’s ideology and motivates some to seek ways in which they can link up to the Jihad. Friendship, and at times kinship ties, play an important role in the radicalization process of the group and its efforts to link up to global jihad. In his seminal book Understanding Terror Networks, Marc Sageman discusses the importance of friendship and kinship bonds for the radicalization of today’s jihadis at length. Sageman collected biographical detail of nearly 200 members of what he terms the “global Salafi jihad” for his book, and found that unlike in hierarchically structured terrorist organizations, where recruitment tends to be top-down, the global Salafi jihad is characterized by bottom-up recruitment. In the recruitment to the global jihad movement, friendship among individuals is formed prior to the joining of the movement. Once that friendship is forged, rhetorical extremism escalates, and the condemnation of the West readies the small circle of friends to join the jihad. Sageman believes that in this process, a strong desire for adventure combines with religious and political motives. 79 “Formal affiliation with the jihad … seems to have been a group phenomenon. Friends decided to join the jihad as a group rather than as isolated individuals.”80 Hence, rather than being recruited by Al Qaeda, many of the young men in Sageman’s sample are volunteering to join the organization themselves, given the absence of traditional recruiters. The encounter with a link to jihad is necessary to join the movement lest the small group will remain isolated. Persons with which the small group has ‘weak ties,’ and who are sometimes highly visible and have prestige, can be of crucial importance.81 Sometimes, the encounter with the link to the jihad happened by pure chance.

Based on Sageman’s sample of members of the ‘global Salafi jihad,’ pre-existing friendship bonds “played an important role in the formal affiliation of 68 percent of mujahideen on whom there was adequate information. Most of them joined the jihad in small clusters of friends.” In 14 % of the cases, kinship played a strong role. Several examples of the importance of friendship ties are cited in the radicalization of suicide bombers, including the 9/11 attacks, the foiled Paris embassy plot,82 and the Casablanca bombers.83 At times, the bonds are even tighter because the suicide bombers are linked through kinship. This was the case in the 2002 Bali attacks, where four of the plot participants belonged to the same family and another was a next door neighbour from childhood.84 Combining kinship and social ties and eliminating the overlap, Sageman finds that about 75% of the mujahideen had preexisting social bonds to members who were already involved in the global jihad or decided to join the jihad as a group with friends or relatives.85

Sageman summarizes the process of joining the jihad in three steps. First, social affiliation with the jihad is accomplished through friendship and kinship ties; second, a progressive intensification of beliefs and faith, leading to acceptance of the global Salafi jihad ideology; and third, the formal acceptance to the jihad through the encounter of a link to jihad. Nowhere is this phenomenon of friendship and kinship ties preceding a formal joining of the jihad more evident than in the case of the four London bombers. As described at length in the House of Commons report into the London bombings, the mutual friendship and bonds among the London bombers, which grew over time, seems to have generated an internal dynamic of intense self-radicalization. From the report, it appears that Khan, the probable ringleader of the clique, used places such as gyms, youth clubs, and an Islamic bookshop to identify suitable candidates for future terrorist attacks. Subsequent indoctrination of the group, which may have been a group process rather than a one-way process, took place in less public spaces, such as private apartments, in order to avoid detection.86 In the months before the bombings, Khan, Tanweer, and Hussain spent a large amount of time together, and some of their activities included camping, canoeing, white-water rafting, paintballing and similar outdoor activities that help create strong personal bonds among a group of individuals. The activities were oftentimes arranged by Khan and other young Muslims who frequented the youth centre and bookshop. Some of these trips are likely to have served as opportunities to identify candidates for indoctrination, and perhaps for operational training and planning. Although other people took part in these trips, there is no evidence that other individuals in Britain were involved in the plot, although the group had some contact with other extremists in the UK.87

The Official Account into the bombings concludes that “the process of indoctrinating these men appears principally to have been through personal contact and group bonding,” and further, that “their indoctrination appears to have taken place away from places with known links to extremism.”88 Hence, the most frightening aspects of the London attacks was the relative lack of outward signs that the clique was highly radicalized. Apart from Lindsay, none of the London bombers came from problematic backgrounds that would seem to render them particularly vulnerable to radicalization. The speed with which the clique radicalized is additional cause for concern. Although the precise date at which the plans of the attacks were originally concocted remains unknown, the period of radicalization seems to have occurred in the year prior to the attack.

 

Salafi-Jihadism in Britian.

Since the 19th century, Britain has served as a refuge and centre for dissidents from the Middle East. The connection between the United Kingdom and Al Qaeda dates back to the 1980s. During the Afghan war against the Soviet Union, between 300 and 600 British Muslims are believed to have trained in Afghan training camps,89 and a sizable share of them are likely to have returned to the United Kingdom after the Soviet Army’s retreat from Afghanistan. Osama bin Laden first established a foothold in London around the mid-1990s. Shortly before, the Saudi government clamped down on a number of Saudi dissidents whose criticism of Riyadh was deemed a threat to the Saudi regime. When a number of these Saudis moved to London to continue their verbal attacks against the ruling family of Saudi Arabia, bin Laden did not want to be left out and opened an office in the North London suburb of Dollis Hill. The office bore the name ‘Advice and Reform Committee’ and was led by Khalid Fawwaz, who became bin Laden’s first local lieutenant. Years later, Fawwaz was arrested in connection with the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.90 Other members of Al Qaeda also lived in the UK during the 1990s, including Anas al-Liby, an Al Qaeda computer expert who was also implicated in the embassy bombings, who resided in Manchester. Al Qaeda’s Salafi-Jihadist ideology has further been propagated in the United Kingdom through a number of radical clerics who have openly called upon their listeners to adopt the doctrine of jihad. Among these radical preachers, who can be thought of as the strategic indoctrinators of jihad, are men like Abdullah al-Faisal, a Jamaican-born cleric who called upon his followers to kill infidels using guns and chemical weapons. He is said to have had a strong influence on Jermaine Lindsay, the Jamaican-born member of the London bombing cell. Another radical cleric is Omar Mahmoud Uthman abu Omar, better known as Abu Qatada, who has been described in court documents as the spiritual leader of Al Qaeda in Europe, and whose sermons have inspired, inter alia, lead September 11 hijacker Muhammad Atta.

Among the most venomous Islamic preachers residing in London is Omar Bakri Mohammed, founder of the radical Salafi-Jihadist group Al-Muhajiroun which, in late October 2004, split into two groups, the Savior Sect and Al-Ghuraaba. Bakri’s admiration for bin Laden dates back at least to 1999, the year that Bakri published an open letter to bin Laden on his group’s website, offering his service to the Al Qaeda leader. A year earlier, bin Laden sent a fax to Bakri in which he guided the preacher on how to conduct a jihad against the United States.91 Since 2003, the Syrian-born preacher regularly urged young British Muslims to volunteer to fight the jihad in Iraq. His lectures in Islamic law were reportedly attended by two young Britons who in April 2003 went to Israel to conduct a suicide attack at Tel Aviv’s Mike’s Place pub, which will be described in more detail below.92 In December 2004, Omar Bakri Mohammed warned in a sermon in central London attended by over 500 people that if the West failed to change its policies in the Middle East, Muslims would give them “a 9/11, day after day after day.”93 The most prominent among the London-based Salafi-Jihadist clerics is Abu Hamza al- Masri, an Egyptian veteran of the Afghan-Soviet war who preached at London’s notorious Finsbury Park mosque, which was frequented by London bombers Khan, Tanweer, and Lindsay. Known for his incitement to violence, Al-Masri has frequently called for violence against ‘infidels.’ He urged his listeners to get an infidel and “crush his head in your arms, so you can wring his throat. Forget wasting a bullet, cut him in half!”94 Among the individuals he helped radicalize during his tenure as the mosque’s imam are Zacarias Moussaoui, who was convicted of conspiring to kill Americans as part of the September 11 attacks, as well as convicted ‘shoe bomber’ Richard Reid, who attempted to ignite an explosive device hidden in his shoe during an American Airlines flight from Paris to Miami on December 22, 2001.95 Saajid Badat, another attempted shoe bomber who was supposed to detonate an explosive device on board an airliner from Amsterdam to the United States but who had apparently changed his mind and was subsequently arrested, also worshipped at the Finsbury Park mosque.96 Under al-Mazri’s tenure, the North London Central Mosque, as the Finsbury Park mosque is officially called, also stocked an arsenal for deadly weapons. In 2003, a raid on the mosque discovered a cache of equipment for chemical warfare, chemical warfare protection suits, three pistols, a stun gun, CS spray, gas masks, handcuffs, and hunting knives.97

Radical Muslim clerics have substantially contributed to a radical Islamist atmosphere that produced a growing number of terrorists and insurgents with links to the United Kingdom. In no small part, they have helped turn ‘Londonistan’ into a destination and crossroads for potential terrorists who used the city as a base from which to conduct fundraising and recruitment of terrorists.98

These include Omar Saeed Sheikh, a British citizen educated at the London School of Economics who was arrested in 2002 in connection with the murder of Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl. London was also the target of several high-profile terrorist plots. In January 2003, Scotland Yard arrested 12 men and charged them with making traces of ricin in North London apparently planned for use in an attack on the Heathrow Express train. All but one of them, however, were released due to lack of evidence.

This atmosphere gave rise to several British individuals linked to suicide attacks long before the 7/7 bombings. Several individuals involved in the planning and execution of the U.S. embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania in August 1998, as well as the bombings in Casablanca in 2003, had links to the United Kingdom. A plot to conduct a suicide attack against the U.S. Embassy in Paris was carried out by a group with ties to Al Qaeda, two members of which lived in Britain.99

The July 2005 bombings in London were not the first attacks on British targets. On November 20, 2003, a dual suicide truck bombing targeted the HSBC Bank and the British Consulate in Istanbul, killing thirty people and wounding 400 others. Most of the victims were Turks, but the attacks also killed several Britons, including among them Roger Short, the consul general of Britain in Turkey. British citizens were also among the victims of the attacks of September 11, the Bali attacks of October 2002, and the Madrid attacks of March 2004. Two young British Muslims made history as the first British citizens who intended to conduct a SA. On April 30, 2003, 21 year-old Asif Muhammad Hanif and 27 year-old Omar Khan Sharif approached the Mike’s Place pub in Tel Aviv, a popular bar on the beach front adjacent to the U.S. embassy. After being denied entry into the pub, Hanif blew himself up at the entrance to Mike’s Place, killing three civilians and wounding 50. Sharif, a married resident of Derby, however, failed to detonate his device, fled the scene, and later drowned in the Mediterranean. His body washed ashore on the Tel Aviv beach front two weeks later. Hanif and his family were from the suburb of Hounslow in West London, where they lived in a modest row house in a mostly Asian neighborhood. Hanif’s brother, Taz Hanif, said that his brother, whom he described as “a big teddy bear,” had traveled to Syria to study Arabic. He studied business at college, worked part-time at Heathrow Airport, and grew increasingly religious. 100 Sharif’s background was somewhat different. His family was relatively affluent and came from the English Midlands town of Derby. According to neighbors, he came from a Westernized family, was educated in a private school, and enjoyed playing football and skateboarding. 101 After spending a few years in university in London, Sharif became more religious, and his wife dressed in a burka.102

British jihadists also went to Iraq, where a British brigade of an estimated 150 radicals is believed to have joined the insurgency against coalition forces in Iraq. 103 According to a Whitehall document, Al Qaeda had plans to recruit many more of the estimated 1.8 million Muslims to its cause. A joint Home Office and Foreign Office dossier titled ‘Young Muslims and Extremism’ prepared for Prime Minister Tony Blair in 2004 said that Britain may be harbouring thousands of Al Qaeda sympathizers, and that Al Qaeda was secretly recruiting affluent, middleclass Muslims in British universities and colleges to carry out terrorist attacks in the UK.104 By 2006, the search for British recruits for suicide operations had reportedly also reached foreign countries. In April 2006, an Iranian-based group, the Committee for the Commemoration of Martyrs of the Global Islamic Campaign, said it was targeting potential recruits in Britain because they faced fewer restrictions in entering Israel.105

In the year after the July 7 bombings, the terrorist threat in the United Kingdom remained high. On August 12, 2006, John Reid, Britain's highest-ranking law enforcement official, disclosed that some 24 terrorist conspiracies were still under surveillance in the United Kingdom.He added that since the 7/7 attacks, British security services had foiled what he described as four other major conspiracies.106

Among the major plots foiled was an alleged conspiracy to detonate a number of airliners in mid-air, in a plan strikingly similar to the 1994/1995 Bojinka plot concocted by Ramzi Youssef and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.107 On August 10, 2006, over twenty people, most of them British citizens of Pakistani extraction, but also including at least two converts, were arrested. They were suspected of playing a role in the SA plot that, had it been successfully executed, could have rivaled the 9/11 attacks in its fatality and destruction. The plot reportedly involved the attempted detonation of at least a dozen American and British aircraft flying from the United Kingdom to various destinations in the United States. The would-be-hijackers allegedly intended to use sophisticated and highly effective liquid explosives, to be carried in the conspirators’ hand luggage, possibly disguised in soda bottles. They also planned to use electronic equipment as detonators.108

Thus we can say that the  bombings of London were the first successful Islamist terrorist attacks in the UK and were all the more shocking to Britons because for the first time, it was British citizens who perpetrated SAs on British soil. The London attacks also shocked the entire European continent.

“Nobody had anticipated perpetrators such as these,” German journalist Yassin Musharbash wrote in Der Spiegel. “They did not exist as a profile. Terrorists of the previous generations had joined jihad mostly in countries in which they were neither born, nor had lived over a longer period of time. Now, a “third generation” had struck in Europe, its supposed home: young Islamists whose radicalization had been completely underestimated.”109

As with other suicide attackers, motivations of the suicide bombers remain unclear, although several elements seem to come together to produce a deadly mix. The bombers seem to have suffered from a crisis of identity that appears to befall many children or grandchildren of immigrants to Europe, namely how to define themselves. Neither able to identify with their parents or grandparents’ home country, nor fully accepted in the UK, where nationalism is strong, xenophobia rampant, and opportunities for professional advancement scarce, it is possible that the bombers were searching for a new identity in a virtual community of Muslim believers. They chose to adopt Salafi-Jihadist ideology, which offers a simplistic worldview and offers solace and  sense of belonging to the globalized umma. They adopted this ideology together, as a group, while undergoing a process of intensive radicalization led by a highly charismatic leader, Mohammed Siddique Khan. These bonds provided emotional support to all members of the group, and encouraged the adoption of Salafi-Jihadism. Their bonds were strengthened by the secret pact that they held, which they had to keep until their death. As Sageman puts it, “it may be more accurate to blame global Salafi terrorist activity on in-group love than out-group hate.”110 Their social lives revolved mostly around a few select places, Islamic institutions, gyms, and outdoor activities.

The adoption of Salafi-Jihadist ideology also opened the gates for a gradual readying for the act of killing and dying, aided by various mechanisms of moral disengagement offered by the ideology. Perceiving Britain and the United States as the absolute evil on earth, and their citizens as kuffars [i.e., kufr, or heretics], the enemy was dehumanized in the bombers’ eyes, which arguably made it easier to mistreat them. They were also convinced them that what would await them after their act of martyrdom would be the pleasures of paradise. Whether this post-hummus benefit acted as a motivator in itself, as an added benefit, or as a mechanism to overcome the fear of death is impossible to know. What is likely, however, is that the bombers really believed that they would attain these benefits. The statements by Khan and Tanweer, and findings by the Home Office and the Royal Institute of International Affairs, strongly suggest that the Iraq war has itself served as a motivator. Once the bombers have accepted that they are acting on behalf of, and for the sake of, a globalized community of brethren, then the attacks against their brethren in Iraq, Chechnya, and Palestine became highly personalized. Attacks against their brethren were likely perceived as attacks against their most immediate family, and certainly as attacks against Islam, adding to an overwhelming sense of humiliation and frustration.

Apart from a new meaning of life, the expectation of posthumous benefits, and the desire for revenge for the perceived attacks against their fellow Muslim brothers and sisters, the bombers also appear to be driven by a desire to fulfill the role of men, as they see it. Both Khan and Tanweer stressed the heroism of their deeds, and labeled those who are ‘appeasing’ the West and fail to join the battle on the side of true Islam as people who are acting in an unmanly fashion. The London bombings also highlighted the inherent danger emanating from policies that are highly tolerant of indoctrination by preachers of hate.111

It is in large part due to Britain’s relative tolerant policies vis-à-vis these minorities that radical networks were allowed to flourish in Britain for years, leaving radical Islamist imams like Abu Hamza al-Masri and Omar Bakri Muhammad free reign to spread their radical propaganda.

 

1 On July 21, 2005, a set of four bombers, Muktar Said Ibrahim, Yasin Hassan Omar, Ramsi Mohammed, and Hussein Osman, apparently emulating the July 7 bombers, attempted to detonate bombs in the London transportation system. Their attempts failed. The focus of this chapter is exclusively on the July 5, 2005 bombers. In May 2006, the intelligence agencies of the United Kingdom reported that they currently had “no evidence of direct links between the 7 July attacks and those involved and the incidents on 21 July,” however, as of August 2006, investigations into possible connections between these two events continued.
See "Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005," (Intelligence and Security Committee, May 2006), 13.

2 "Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005," (House of Commons, 11 May 2006), 22.

3 The bomb-making process had a bleaching effect, and in fact, Tanweer and Hussein’s families noticed that Tanweer’s and Hussein’s hair was getting lighter in the weeks that led to the bombings.

4 "Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005," 23.

5 "London Bombers Staged 'Dummy Run'," BBC News, 20 September 2006.

6 "Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005," 24.

7 Ibid. 24.

8 Sudarsan Raghavan, "Friends Describe Bomber’s Political, Religious Evolution," Washington Post, 29 July 2005, A16.

9 Lizette Alvarez, "Lives of Three Men Offer Little to Explain Attacks," New York Times, 14 July 2005, 13.

10 Ibid.

11 Raghavan, "Friends Describe Bomber’s Political, Religious Evolution," A16.

12 Ibid.

13 "Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005," 15.

14 Gethin Chamberlain, "Attacker ‘Was Recruited’ at Terror Group’s Religious School," Scotsman, 14 July 2005, 2.

15 "Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005," 14.

16 Paul Tumelty, "An in-Depth Look at the London Bombers," Terrorism Monitor 3, no. 15 (28 July 2005).

17 "Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005," 13.

18 Ibid., 14.

19 Alvarez, "Lives of Three Men Offer Little to Explain Attacks," 13.

20 "Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005," 14.

21 Tumelty, "An in-Depth Look at the London Bombers,"

22 "Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005," 15. 27

23 Ibid. , 24.

24 Ibid. , 17.

25 Lizette Alvarez, "New Muslim at 15, Terror Suspect at 19," New York Times, 18 July 2005, 8.

26 Ibid.

27 "Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005," 18.

28 Ibid., 16.

29 "Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005," 13-14.

30 Amy Waldman, "Seething Unease Shaped British Bombers' Newfound Zeal," New York Times, 31 July 2005, 1.

31 Ibid., 1.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.

34 "Al-Qaeda Film on the First Anniversary of the London Bombings,"

35 "The Complete Al-Qaeda Video on the London July 7th Blast," . Transcript of Mohammed Siddique Khan’s statements by the author.

36 "Al-Qaeda Film on the First Anniversary of the London Bombings," MEMRI, 6 July 2006.

37 "The Complete Al-Qaeda Video on the London July 7th Blast,"

38 "Al-Qaeda Film on the First Anniversary of the London Bombings," MEMRI, 6 July 2006.

39 Richard Norton-Taylor, "Iraq War 'Motivated London Bombers'," Guardian, 3 April 2006.

40 "Security, Terrorism, and the Uk," in ISP/NSC Briefing Paper 05/01 (London: Economic & Social Research Council, Chatham House, July 2005).

41 "The Complete Al-Qaeda Video on the London July 7th Blast," SITE Institute.

42 Ibid.SITE Institute.

43 Ibid.

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid.

47 "Al-Qaeda Film on the First Anniversary of the London Bombings," MEMRI, 6 July 2006.

48 "Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005," 4.

49 On mechanisms of moral disengagement, see the discussion in chapter 3. The theory was formulated in Bandura, "Mechanisms of Moral Disengagement," 161-91.

50 "Focus: Undercover in the Academy of Hatred," Sunday Times (UK), 7 August 2005Sunday Times, 7 August 2005.

51 Ibid.

52 Raghavan, "Friends Describe Bomber’s Political, Religious Evolution," A16.

53 Ibid.

54 Ali Hussain, "Focus: Undercover on Planet Beeston," Sunday Times, 2 July 2006.

55 "Al-Qaeda Film on the First Anniversary of the London Bombings," MEMRI, 6 July 2006.

56 "The Complete Al-Qaeda Video on the London July 7th Blast," SITE Institute.

57 Ibid.

58 Ibid.

59 Additional information on Al-Muhajiroun appears later in this chapter.

60 "Focus: Undercover in the Academy of Hatred," Sunday Times.

61 On the psychological effects of the London bombings, see especially "Report of the 7 July Review Committee," London: London Assembly, June 2006).

62 Tumelty, "An in-Depth Look at the London Bombers," Terrorism Monitor 3, no. 15.

63 "Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005," 21.

64 Ibid. , 20.

65 Ibid. , 21.

66 "The Complete Al-Qaeda Video on the London July 7th Blast," SITE Institute.

67 Peter Bergen, "Al-Qaeda, Still in Business," Washington Post, 2 July 2006, B1.

68 Ibid., B1.

69 Gordon Corera, "Were Bombers Linked to Al-Qaeda?," BBC News, 6 July 2006.

70 "Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005," 27.

71 "Al-Qaeda Film on the First Anniversary of the London Bombings," MEMRI, 6 July 2006.

72 Quoted in Michael Scheuer, "The London Bombings: For Al-Qaeda, Steady as She Goes," Terrorism Focus 2, no. 14 (22 July 2005).

73 Ibid.

74 "New Al-Jazeera Videos: London Suicide Bomber before 'Entering Gardens of Paradise,' and Ayman Al-Zawahiri's Threats of More Bombings in the West," MEMRI Special Dispatch Series No. 979 (3 September 2005).

75 Ibid.

76 Ibid.

77 "The First Anniversary of the Bombings in London - a Video Presentation by as-Sahab Featuring Speeches from Shehzad Tanweer, Azzam the American, and Al-Qaeda Leadership," SITE Institute, 7 July 2006.

78 "Al-Qaeda Film on the First Anniversary of the London Bombings," MEMRI, 6 July 2006.

79 Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks , 109.

80 Ibid., 110.

81 Ibid. , 169.

82 For details of the plot, see the Appendix underneath.

83 Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 111.

84 Ibid., 167.

85 Ibid., 113.

86 "Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005," 16.

87 "Report into the London Terrorist Attacks on 7 July 2005," 12.

88 "Report of the Official Account of the Bombings in London on 7th July 2005," 26.

89 Steve Coll and Susan B. Glasser, "In London, Islamic Radicals Found a Heaven," Washington Post, 10 July 2005, A1.

90 Ibid., A1.

91 Rita Katz and Michael Kern, "Center of the Jihadist World; They Call It Londonistan for a Reason," National Review Online, 11 July 2005.

92 Helen Gibson, "New Recruits; Why Did Quiet, Well-Liked British Men Travel to Israel to Become Suicide Bombers?," TIME Europe, 12 May 2003.

93 Elaine Sciolino and Don Van Natta Jr., "For a Decade, London Thrived as a Busy Crossroads of Terror," New York Times, 10 July 2005, A1.

94 Coll and Glasser, "In London, Islamic Radicals Found a Heaven," A1.

95 Sean O'Neill and Daniel McGrory, "Abu Hamza and the 7/7 Bombers," Times (London), 8 February 2006, A1.

96 Coll and Glasser, "In London, Islamic Radicals Found a Heaven," A1.

97 "Police Found Weapons at Finsbury Park Mosque," Times Online (UK), 7 February 2006.

98 The term ‘Londonistan’ was first coined by French officials dissatisfied with the British government’s inability to extradite an Algerian who had been charged in France with financing a series of attacks on the public transportation system in Paris in 1995. See Christopher Caldwell, "After Londonistan," New York
Times Magazine, 25 June 2006, 42.

99 Radu, "London 7/7 and Its Impact," FPRI E-Notes, July 2005.

100 Gibson, "New Recruits; Why Did Quiet, Well-Liked British Men Travel to Israel to Become Suicide Bombers?,"

101 Ibid.

102 Alan Cowell, "Zeal for Suicide Bombing Reaches British Midlands," New York Times, 2 May 2003, 6.

103 Caldwell, "After Londonistan," 42.

104 Robert Winnett and David Leppard, "Leaked No. 10 Dossier Reveals Al-Qaeda's British Recruits," Times (London), 10 July 2005.

105 Robert Tait and Ewen MacAskill, "Iranian Group Seeks British Suicide Bombers," Guardian, 19 April 2006, 1.

106 Alan Cowell, "Britain Says Two Dozen Major Terrorist Conspiracies Are under Investigation," New York Times, 14 August 2006, 8.

107 For more on the Bojinka plot, see National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, The 9/11 Commission Report; and Brzezinski, "Bust and Boom," W9.

108 "Q&A: Uk Aircraft Bombplot," BBC News, 12 August 2006. Available online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4778889.stm, last accessed 13 August 2006.

109 Yassin Musharbash, "Menetekel 7/7: Jahrestag Des London-Anschlags," Spiegel Online 2006.

110 Sageman, Understanding Terror Networks, 135.

111 Prior to the attack of September 11, 2001, Britain arrested or extradited relatively few radical Islamists, although it monitored many of them.

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