By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers

Fascism/National Socialism

From 1920 to 1923, Hitler allied himself with  a conspiratorial voelkisch German/White Émigré association headquartered in Munich, titled Wirtschaftspolitische Vereinigung für den Osten frequently also referred to as Aufbau.

While Tsar Nikolai II lost his throne in the face of leftist revolutionary forces in 1917, in Imperial Germany, Kaiser Wilhelm II managed to hold on to power for one year longer. Despite his manifest weaknesses as a military leader, the Kaiser weathered not only revolutionary pressures from the left (at least for a while), but also "national opposition" intrigues from the right, most notably those stemming from Heinrich Class' Alldeutscher Verband “Pan-German League” and the Deutsche Vaterlandspartei “German Fatherland Party” under Wolfgang Kapp.

Kapp served as the General Countryside Director organization of East Prussia.(1) The “German Fatherland Party” sought to collect nationalist forces into a powerful behind-the-scenes force, following the secret plan of placing Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz as a "strong man" at the head of a nationalist German government with Kapp as his advisor.(2)

In order to obtain further support for his conspiratorial alliance. Kapp, who valued the activities of Class' Pan-German League, asked Class to serve on the German Fatherland Party's Advisory Committee. Class agreed.

By this time, membership in Class' Pan-German League had increased to 37.000, including Voelkisch theorist Houston Stewart Chamberlain, who had been granted German citizenship in August 1916.

Kapp, Class, and Chamberlain, among others, began collaborating on the editorial staff of a voelkisch newspaper in 1917, “Germany's Renewal: Monthly for the German People”, which provided a theoretical underpinning for the “German Fatherland Party.”

In addition to receiving assistance from Class and Chamberlain. Kapp gained support from Ludwig Mueller von Hausen, the leader of the Association against Jewish Presumption. Hausen had curtailed his political activities during World War I, concentrating on his duties as an artillery captain on both the Eastern and Western Fronts ,receiving the Iron Cross, First Class for his efforts. He had remained in correspondence with General Erich von Ludendorff, the Chief of the Army General Staff, however, serving him in an advisory capacity.

Ludendorff, not only Germany's most valuable military strategist but himself a voelkisch thinker who went on to ally himself closely with Hitler, approved of Kapp's “German Fatherland Party” as a means of strengthening the German will to bring the war to a triumphant conclusion.'' He also followed the activities of Class' “Pan-German League” with considerable interest and admired the groupling's determination to fight on until final victory. 

Continuing in the vein of what he termed "national opposition," Class visited Ludendorff at Army Headquarters in October 1917 with the backing of both the German Fatherland Party and the Pan-German League in an attempt to convince him to seize dictatorial powers.

Class stressed that since the Kaiser had long since lost the trust of the people while the Army High Command enjoyed widespread popular support, Ludendorff needed to inaugurate a military dictatorship if the war was to be won. Ludendorff replied that this plan was not realistic, since he was fully occupied with directing military affairs and could not run the country politically as well. Class and Kapp's collaboration proved short-lived in the face of this setback. as frictions developed between them. leading Kapp to jettison the Advisory Committee of the German Fatherland Party in which Class played a prominent role at the end of 1917. The German Kaiser was spared being removed in a putsch from the right and instead fled to the Netherlands under the pressure of revolution from the left in November 1918.

"Conservative revolutionaries" in Imperial Germany and Russia established detailed anti-Western, anti-Semitic ideologies in the pcmod leading up to the Bolshevik Revolution. The largely internally-orientated voelkisch model focused on alleged Germanic racial and spiritual superiority through a heightened capacity to negate the will heroically, whereas the more externally- fixated Russian version offered apocalyptic visions of concrete political struggle between Russians at the head of all Slavs and perceived Jewish world-conspirators.

While members of the "Black Hundred" movement in Imperial Russia managed to spread their ideology to a broader audience than their voelkisch German counterparts, far night movements in both Imperial Germany and the Russian Empire failed to achieve their political aspirations.

The Russian far right. fervently loyal to the Tsar, managed to achieve mass support far greater than anything comparable in Imperial Germany, but its influence declined dramatically after initial moderate successes so that it failed utterly at thwarting the Bolshevik seizure of power. In Germany, numerically slight voelkisch elements grouped around Wolfgang Kapp and Heinrich Class ultimately concluded that a military dictatorship represented a superior option to the rule of the ineffectual Kaiser. but they could not bring this about.

The Russian far right only gained a certain drive and coherence that had been lacking of late after the Bolshevik Revolution, as the "Reds" provided a powerful political foe for "Whites" that seemed to fit earlier apocalyptic "Black Hundred" prophecies. Voe1kisch Germans, for their part, were spared the ignominy of the collapse of their fatherland until the end of 1918, and German prospects for victory in World War I improved considerably with the downfall of the Russian Empire. 

German troops were able to advance deep into Russian territory in 1918, setting the stage for the first largescale interaction of voelkisch German officers with their pro-German "Russian" far right.

The Next White Russian Army

German military personnel retreating from the Ukraine around the turn of the year 1918/19. took with them not only thousands of sympathetic White officers, including several who went on to serve the National Socialist cause in high-profile capacities. but a fateful copy of the anti-Semitic forgery The Protocols of the Elders of Zion. 

Once translated into German. the Protocols greatly influenced postwar voelkisch German circles in general and the fledgling National Socialist movement in particular. providing an important source of -evidence" of alleged conspiratorial Jewish strivings for world domination.

Despite dissenting voices, the German General Staff overall initially supported Vladimir Lenin and Lev Trotskis's Bolsheviks in order to weaken the Imperial Russian Army, its numerically largest military foe. This policy culminated in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, which was finally concluded on March 10, 1918. 

The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk allowed the Geeman General Staff to transfer approximately one million soldiers from the Eastern Front to the Westem Front.(3) Generals Hoffinann and Erich von Ludendorff had no sympathy for the Bolsheviks themselves, however, and they began cultivating ties with anti-"Red" Bolshevik forces known as "Whites" grouped in and just outside of the Ukraine in 1918.(4)

Ludendorff, the Chief of the Imperial German Army General Staff. agreed with Walther Nicolai, the head of the German Army High Command Intelligence Service, who went on to supply intelligence to the National Socialist Party, that Bolshevism now represented the true danger to Germany's Eastern security, with Lenin threatening to emerge as the "Napoleon of this epoch.(5)

General Hoffman, who maintained close relations with Wolfgang Kapp, the leader of the German Fatherland Party, sympathized with these views.(6)

Early in 1918, Ludendorff argued that if the Germans did not intercede more forcefully, the Bolsheviks would "beat the Ukraine to death. (7) Like Ludendorff Hoffmann sought to mobilize Ukrainian nationalists against the Bolsheviks, viewing the Ukraine as the "most vital element in Russia. (8) German troops along with their AustroHungarian allies officially marched into the Ukraine in early 1918 at the behest of the marginally independent Ukrainian governement’s plans for protection against advancing Bolshevik forces, but most historians write of a de facto Central Power occupation of the Ukraine.(9)

Bolshevik troops had captured Kiev, the Ukrainian capital, late In January 1918, receiving a warm welcome from the working-class Jewish population as a whole and acquiring many enthusiastic collaborators from among their ranks, a fact that inflamed later anti-Semitic resentments. With the advance of German and Austro-Hungarian forces. however. Bolshevik troops evacuated the city at the end of February 1918, and primanily German occupying forces took control there at the beginning of March 1918.(10)

The leaders of Army Group Elchhorn. as the German occupying force in the Ukraine was termed, soon took an interest in changing the existing Ukrainian government, the Rada, which they dismissed as a "debate club," in favor of a more reliable pro-German regime. (18) Army Group Eichhorn leadership rejected the Rada since it lacked authority with the people and, more importantly, proved too leftist and intellectual to win the support of the landowners and to collaborate smoothly with German occupying forces.(19)

A large conference of Central Power occupational authorities took place at the end of March 1918, and Poltavets-Ostranitsa received one million Marks to overthrow the Rada.(20)

Poltavets-Ostranitsa supported Skoropadskii's Party of the Ukrainian People's Union, an association which declared that Jewry strongly opposed the "Ukrainian idea," but that the Germans would "kill the parasitical tendencies of Jewry with their creative work."(21) At a congress that Poltavets-Ostranitsa helped to arrange at the end of April 1918 that included Cossacks loyal to him and members of Skoropadskii's Party of the Ukrainian People's Union, the assembly chose Poitavets-Ostranitsa to serve as "Cossack Chancellor of the Ukraine," while Skoropadskil was declared the Hetman of the Ukraine.(22)

German occupying authorities officially adopted a neutral policy In the Ukrainian power struggle, but they secretly assisted Skoropadskil and Pollavets-Ostranitsa against the Rada.(23)

After the successful coup, Poltavets-Ostranitsa continued to strengthen his Ukrainian National Cossack League, which represented the only significant military basis of Skoropadskil's regime outside of occupying Central Power troops. He presented his program to the new hetman, calling for a close alliance with Germany and the "liberation" of the Caucasus region and its inclusion in a Black Sea League in which the Ukraine would play the leading role. Poltavets-Ostranitsa experienced increasing problems with his nominal superior Skoropadskii, who, doubting the Central Powers' prospects for victory, increasingly sided with the Entente in a clandestine manner.(24)  

The new Ukrainian outpost of "White" resistance to the "Red" Bolsheviks attracted monarchists fTom throughout the former Russian Empire, including Vladimir Purishkevich, the former leader of the "Black Hundred" Michael the Archangel Russian People's Union. After being released from prison in accord with a May 1, 1918 amnesty. Purishkevich traveled to the Ukraine, where he served as the leader of the Skoropadskii's Health Service.(25) He led a small yet active group that desired an autocratic Tsar for a reconstituted Russian state. He and his followers sympathized with Germany as a champion of order. (26)

Despite generally smooth relations between Skoropadskii's regime and German occupying authorities, German military leaders did not wish to arm Ukrainian forces. At the end of May 1918, however, German military authorities in the Ukraine finally agreed to implement a plan that the Rada had initially drafted to create an army composed of eight corps.(27) The Imperial German Army funded this force, and the soldiers of Skoropadskil's "Ukrainian Volunteer Army" wore old German officer uniforms.(28)

The Ukrainian Volunteer Army contained large numbers of Tsarist officers, including manN who had taken refuge in Kiev from the Bolsheviks farther north.(29)

General Vladimir Biskupskil, who went on to collaborate closely with Hitler in the context of the Aufbau Vereinigung in postwar Munich, played a leading role in the Ukrainian Volunteer Army. Biskupskii, a prince (kniaz), came from a noble Ukrainian family from the Kharkov region 30 and he himself possessed an estate outside of Kharkov. He had played an active role in the Union of the Russian People, claiming to have collaborated closely with Aleksandr Dubrovin, the leader of the "Black Hundred" organization. Biskupskii later proudly asserted that the Soiuz had represented the world's first manifestation of "Fascism/National Socialism."(31)
 

1) Letter from Wolfgang Kapp to Ruediger von der Goltz from August 28, 1917. GSAPK. Repositur 92, number 455, 3.

2) Schwarze. "Einleitung, Nachlass WaVkang Kapp. VII.

3) Letter from Max Hoffmann to his wife from August 15, 191 S. BAINIF.Nachlass 37. number 2, 23 1.

4) James Webb, The Occult Establishment (1976), 264.

5) Hans von Seekt. report from March 9. 1920, RGVA (TKhlDK),,/ond 1414, apis 1. delo 18. 539. DB report from May 15. 1923, RGVA (TKhIDK), fund 7, opts 1. delo 954. reel 1. 56. Walther Nicolai. Tagebuch. March 6. 19 18, RGVA (TKhIDK).j6nd 1414. opis 1. delo 16. 77.

6) Letter from Hoffmann to his wife from January 16, 1917, BXMF..Vachlass 37, number 2. 155.

7) Protocol of an RK conference on February 5, 1918, BA, Reich 43, number 2448/4. 130.

8) Hoffmann. War Diaries and Other Papers, vol. 2, trans. Eric Sutton (London: Martin Secker. 1929). 213. 214; protocol of an RKi conference on February 5, 1918. BA. Reich 43. number 24484. 111.

9) Wlodzimierz Medrzecki. "Bayerische Truppenteile in der Ukraine im Jahr 1918." Bayiern und Osteuropa: Aus der Geschichle der Beziehungen Bayerns, Frankens und Schwabens mit Russland. der Ukraine, und Wedsnissland, ed. Hermann Beyer-Thoma (Wiesbaden: Harrasso%kitz Verlag. 2000). 44 1.

10) DB report from March 6.1919. RGVA (TKhIDK),fond 198. opis 9. deio 4474, reel 1. 47.48.

11) Letter from Ivan Poltavets-Ostranitsa to Adolf Hitler ftom March 25. 1929. PKAH. RGVA (TKhIDK). fond 1355. opis 1. delo 3. 57; Poltavets-Ostranitsa’s 's 1926 curriculum vitae. RUE OEO, RGVA (TKhIDK)..tbnd 772, opts 1. delo 105b. 9.

12) DB report from August 11. 1933. RGVA (TKhIDK). fi)nd 7. opts 1. delo 954. reel 5.355.- R060 report from July 26.1926, RGVA (TKhIDK),fond 772. opis 1. delo 10 1. 5.

13) SGOD report from December 22, 1928. RGVA (TKhIDK)._fond 308. opts 7. delo 265. 5: PoltaveLsOstranitsa's 1926 curricidhim vitae, R060. RGVA (TKhIDK),Jbnd 772. opts 1. delo I 05b. 9.

14) RUOE0 report from July 26, 1926. RG V4 (TKUDK).fiond 772. opts 1. delo 101. 6.

15) Poltavets-Ostranitsa’s 1926 curricuelum vitae. R060. RGVA (TKhIDK).fond 772. opts 1. delo 105b. 9. 1926 memorandum on behalf of Poltavets-Ostranitsa.- RC'60, RGVA (TKhIDK),.fond 772. opts 1. deto
105b, 7.

16) Pavel Skopadskii. Erinneningen von Pavlo Skoropadsky auf eschrieben in Berlin in der Zeit von Januar bis Mai 1918. trans. Helene Ott-Skoropadskii (Berlin. 1918). IZG, Ms 584. 5 1.

17) Poltavets-Ostranitsa's 1926 curricultint vitae. R060, RGVA (TKhIDK).fond 772. opts 1, delo 105b. 9.

18) Wilhelm Groener report from March 23. 1918, BA/MF, Nachlass 46, number 172.4.

19) Interrogation of Ambassador Herbert von Dirksen from October 1945, IZG, The National Archives. No. 679. Records of the Department of State. Special Interrogation Mission to Germany. 194546. Roll 1, 411.

20)Poltavets-Ostranitsa’s 1926 cumcithim vitae. R060. RGVA (TKhIDK).fond 772. opis 1, delo 105a. 9.

21) Proclamation from Skoropadskii from April 20. 1918. BA/MF, Nachlass 46. number 172. 57.

22) 1926 memorandum on behalf of Poltavets-Ostranitsa. R650. RGVA (TKhIDK).- 16nd 772. opts 1. delo 105b. 7: letter from Poltavets-Ostranitsa to Hitler from March 25. 1929. PK4H. RGVA (TKhIDK).fond
1355. c1pis 1. delo 3. 57.

23) Poltavets-Ostranitsa’s 1926 curriculum vitae, R060. RGVA (TKhIDK),fond 772. opis 1. delo 105b. 9.

25 Stepanov, Chernata Solnia v Rossii. 329-

26) EMG report to the DB from October 22. 1919. RGVA (TKhIDK), fond 7. opis 1. delo 953, reel 4. 313.

27) Skoropadskii, Erinnerungen. IZG, Afs 584. 222.

28) DB report from March 6. 1919, RGVA (TKhIDK), 16nd 198. opts 9. delo 4474. reel 1, 47: interrogation of Ambassador Herbert von Dirksen from October 1945. IZG, The National Archives. No. 679. Records of' the Department of State. Special Interrogation Mission to Germany, 194546. Roll 1. 412.

29) DB report from March 6,1919, RGVA (TKhIDK), fond 198. opis 9. delo 4474. reel 1. 47.

30) LGPO report to the RUoeO from July 20. 192 1. RGVA (TKhIDK), fond 772. opis 3. delo 8 Ia. 19.

31) Vladimir Biskupskii's September 7. 1939 comments. AP.4. BA. J.S43. number 35. 49.

 

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