In the same year that
General Kitchener was battling the Mahdi in the upper reaches of the Nile
River, Sayyid Muhammad bin Abdullah Hassan, began a holy war to oust all
infidels from Somaliland. The Mullah began as a mystic from the militant Salihiya branch of Sufi Islam and tried to spread his
spiritual message. In fact the Mullah began as a peacemaker, and developed a
cordial relationship with the British Vice-Counsel at Berbera. (See I.M. Lewis,
A Modern History of the Somali: Nation and State in the Horn of Africa, Oxford,
2002, p. 63-70.)
Then, rumors began to
circulate that he was in fact building a large cache of weapons to launch a
jihad against the British and the neighboring Abyssinians. Before a shot was
ever fired between the jihadists and the British, the Mullah spent several
months gathering support. Due to the strength of clan ties, when the Mullah
attempted to elicit support from the Habar Yunis
clan, a portion of the Dulbahante clan deserted their
newfound leader and attempted a treaty with the British. When the Mullah
attempted to assassinate the leader of the breakaway faction, most of the rest
of the Dulbahante clan deserted his cause. To refill
his ranks, the Mullah withdrew to his paternal clan, the Ogaden. He married an Ogaden
woman to secure support from a distant portion of the clan, but was only viewed
as an outside threat by yet another faction, who plotted to have her killed.
The Mullah discovered the plot and had the ringleaders murdered
before leaving the area to avoid an Abyssinian military expedition sent against
him. Unable to locate the Mullah, the Abyssinians foolishly looted local
camels and livestock, enflaming the remainder of the Ogaden
who rallied to the Mullah's cause to seek revenge against the infidels
and raiders. In March of 1900, the Mullah led six thousand men against the
Abyssinians and, three months later the Mullah led his forces against the rival
Isaq clan, looting 2,000 camels from his Muslim
co-religionists.
Like the tribal ties
in Iraq today, this episode demonstrates that tribal and clan loyalties are
often as important as religious passions in many of the cultures with whom we
are currently engaged. Douglas Jardine, British Secretary to the Administration
in Somaliland from 1916 to 1921, wrote that the Mullah apparently attributed
the (initial) lack of success which attended his religious mission to the political
conditions existing in Somaliland. He came to the conclusion that, in order to
achieve his religious object it was necessary to add a political plank to his
platform, namely, the substitution of his temporal authority for that of the
tribal leaders and their infidel overlord. He persuaded himself that allegiance
to a non-Mohammedan (non-Muslim) power was a definite barrier to the religious
progress of his fellow countrymen; and that the irksome doctrines of Mohammed
Salih could only be imposed upon the skeptical tribesmen by fire and sword, a
course to which an infidel and pacific Government would inevitably take the
strongest exception. One established as the temporal head of all the Somalis he
would, he argued, by methods of which he was the diabolical master, find little
difficulty in constituting himself their spiritual leader to guide them aright
in the path of true religion and virtue. Such was the nature of the motive when
induced him to raise the flag of political revolt. (Lewis, 2002, p. 70-2.)
In November of 1900,
Lieutenant Colonel E. J. E. Swayne arrived in Somaliland and formed a British
expeditionary force against the Mullah. The formation of the force included
sending Major A. Hanbury Tracy to coordinate with forces in neighboring Abyssinia.
While en route to confront the Mullah's forces, the
expedition destroyed the Mullah's birthplace at Kob Faradod, sparing the mosques so as not to in flame Muslim sentiment. In the first battle with the
Mullah's forces, the British used withering machine gun fire to devastate
the charging jihadists. After the raut, the British
pursued the Mullah's entourage day and night, but failed to capture him. This
attack, retreat, and pursuit pattern in fact would be repeated time and again
over the next three years.
Much like with
Iranian and Syrian assistance to Iraqi insurgents, and Pakistani tribaI assistance to al-Qaeda and Taliban forces in eastern
Afghanistan, the Mijjertein clan in Italian
Somaliland was accused of aiding the Mullah's forces. Lt Col. Swayne requested
permission to pursue Mijjertein forces into Italian
Somaliland, but was denied and Mijjertein assistance
to the Mullah persisted. Thus between 1900 and 1904, over the course of four
British expeditions, both sides sustained heavy losses. This included a British
defeat at the battle of Gumburu Hill in April of
1903, when they lost 9 officers and 189 men.
And although in 1905,
the Mullah stopped fighting for a while, in 1908, he was back, and in April of
1909, the British sent General Sir Reginald Wingate, Governor-General of the
Sudan, along with the Austrian soldier of fortune and prisoner of the Mahdi mentioned before, now General Rudolf Slatin,
from the Sudan to Somaliland.
At this juncture, the
British could have used the Mullah's brutal tactics, and the divisiveness of
the clans, against him. Instead, with no British government backing that would
have allowed for another campaign against the Mullah, General Wingate advised
that the British should arm their Isaq allies and
withdraw to the coast. What followed was an inter-clan bloodbath that made
Somalia of the 1990’s (when that time US Pres. Clinton felled compelled to
withdraw American troops) look like a civil society. In a period of four years,
a third of the British Protectorate's population was killed, and the carnage
destroyed most of the livestock and farmland. To this day, this period in
Somali history is referred to as "The Time of eating filth."
(Lewis,2002,p. 72-7.)
By the end of 1912,
the British realized the devastation their policy was causing to the Somali
populace. The Administration organized a local mounted camel constabulary under
the command of Richard Corfield. He quickly reestablished order in the west and
center of the Protectorate, but was ordered not to attack the Mullah's forces
in the east. With the Mullah's men constantly raiding villages under
constabulary control, the order proved impossible. After yet another raid in
August of 1913, Corfield's constabulary with 100 men, pursued a large
force of jihadists and engaged them at the battle of Dul
Madoba. When they met the rush of thousands of the
Mullah's footmen and cavalry, Corfield was killed along with thirty-five of his
constabulary, while nearly four hundred jihadists were slain.
While the vast
majority of British forces were occupied during WWI in Europe, the British navy
managed to maintain a blockade of the East African coastline, severely reducing
the Mullah's supply of arms and ammunition, and where able to take one of the
Mullah's key forts at Shimber Berris.
Once the Great War
behind them, in early 1920, the British decided to launch a land, sea, and air
attack against the Mullah's strongholds throughout western Somaliland. To
maintain secrecy, the British disseminated word that a huge oil project was
about to be undertaken in the region. The military planning officers came to
Berbera disguised as oil personnel, and were able to conduct reconnaissance and
planning without arousing the suspicion of the locals. When finally British
ground forces moved out to engage the Mullah's masses. The expedition's divided
columns took fort after fort in pitched battles throughout the MuIlah's territory, plus pursued the Mullah as he
fled south toward the relative safety of Abyssinia. In the end however, the
Mullah managed to avoid capture by breaking off with just his eldest son and
three bodyguards into Abyssinia. ln reading Jardine's commentary on the
Mullah's escape in fact, one could easily believe reading about Osama Bin
Laden's escape into Pakistan, during the American invasion of Afghanistan.
Hiding in the lawless
Ogaden region of eastern Abyssinia, the Mullah
attacked Isag herders near the Abyssinian border,
leading to a massive, British sanctioned, Isag tribal
assault. In October of 1920, the Isaq routed the
Mullah's forces, and he fled west, deeper into Abyssinian territory. Then, in
November, famine and influenza descended on the Mullah's camp and on November
23, 1920, he died, and his movement dissolved.
The first overriding
lesson the British East African experience can teach, is that over the years,
political involvement with Somali tribes and "mission creep" took the
British ever deeper into the Somali interior as they battled the Mullah's
forces. By way of contrast, the French did not respond to the initial tribal
battles between the Mullah's forces and rival tribes in their own protectorate
in Somaliland. As a result, the French were not drawn into a protracted war
that bore little consequence to their strategic objectives.
Thus, with
considerably less military effort than their British counterparts to the south,
the small French colony of Djibouti became one of the most profitable colonies
on the African continent. (Lewis, 2002, p.79-80.) Also, had the British been
able to relieve Gordon (see p.1) prior to the Mahdi's death, the khalifas would likely have come to terms with the British,
and Kitchener's subsequent expedition would not have been necessary. In the
case of the Mullah, when he died, so did his organization. These examples
demonstrate the effectiveness of targeting the leadership of adversarial
jihadist groups.
Lebanon
On October 23rd,
1983, an Islamic militant drove a bomb-Iaden truck
into the V.S. military compound in Beirut, Lebanon, killing 283 U.S. Marines.
Shortly thereafter, the U.S. pulled out of its peacekeeping mission in Lebanon.
Investigations following the deadly barracks attack concluded that the suicide
bombing was the work of Hezbollah guerrillas. Hezbollah is an Arabic word
meaning the Party of God. Hezbollah's bombing of the Marine barracks was one of
three devastating suicide attacks that they carried out that year in Beirut.
Suicide bombers killed 63 people at the U.S. embassy on April eighteenth, and
58 French paratroopers on October 23rd; the same day they struck the Marine
barracks. After successfully ousting the United States from Lebanon, Hezbollah
continued a guerrilla war against the Israeli occupation of the southern part
of the country. The group also conducted scattered terrorist actions against
Western military, political and cultural threats to an Islamic-style republic
in Lebanon. Hezbollah's incessant guerrilla war against the renowned Israeli
military paid off as Israel eventually withdrew from the vast majority of its
security zone in southern Lebanon. The Hezbollah militants became heroes.
Most recently
described in Lebanon 1860-1960: A Century of Myth and Politics (2005),
initially the British fought along side the Ottoman
Turks against Napoleon's armies. In 1807 however, a British fleet sailed to
Egypt to support the Mameluke government in their revolt against the Turkish
Caliphate. In 1826, the British sunk the Turkish fleet to support the Greek
independence movement. Fearing increased Russian influence in the affairs
of the Ottoman Empire, in the early to mid nineteenth
century, the British continued to involve themselves in diplomatic wrangling
between the Ottomans and the Semitic tribes of the Levant (Palestine and
Lebanon). The British brokered talks during the First and Second Turko Egyptian Wars in 1832-3 and 1839-41. The British then
supported an Arab revolt against Egyptian control of Syria. While this
intervention prevented the Ottomans from the need for further military
commitments to the region, it left them strategically worse off in maintaining
control of the colonial Arab provinces.
In 1900, Ottoman
Sultan Abdul Hamid, began the construction of a railroad network connecting his
Arabian provinces to the provincial capital in Damascus. At the outset of the
First World War, this slow and steady railroad construction south to Medina and
southeast toward Basra, combined with the build-up of Turkish and German troops
in Asia Minor, led the British to fear for the safety of its Asian possessions.
The British began to fortify Egypt, and by March of 1916, there were 275,000
British soldiers stationed in the region. During the long campaigns that
followed, both sides variously attempted to incite the Arab tribes with calls
to jihad. The further use of Arab nationalism on the part of the British,
namely a young officer by the name of T.E. Lawrence, provides an additional
example of the ever-changing motivations of resistance groups.
Once England and
France brought Russia into the fold against German expansion, the Ottomans had
little choice but to turn to Germany in its effort to halt Russian territorial
ambitions. The resulting friendship seemed to suit the Turks since the Germans
tended to overlook the brutal Turkish treatment of the Arabs and its other
subject peoples, a topic the British always seemed indignant about.
When at the start of
WWI, the Turks called for jihad against the Allies, few in the Arab world
responded. The failure of the Sherif of Mecca to
enforce the Turkish call to jihad, the Arabs' physical and psychological
distance from the war itself, and generations of Turkish oppression, allied to
a general Arab disinterest in the conflict. One of the few groups that did
respond to the Sultan's call to war was the Senussi tribe living in the deserts
west of Egypt in modern day Libya.
Early in the war, a
German trained Turkish officer of Iraqi Arab decent named Ja'far
Pasha began drilling the Senussi into military form. Unfortunately for him,
military form at that time meant the tight formations of soldiers that made
easy targets for machine guns and artillery. The presence of the Senussi west
of Egypt caused the British serious consternation over the possibility of
revolt within Egypt itself, and led the British to evacuate their positions on
the Mediterranean coast. In December of 1915, the Senussi advanced on Egypt.
After a few pitched battles in the desert, in February of 1916, the British
routed the Senussi and captured Ja'far. While the
Senussi offensive had the desired effect of distracting the British, it would
have likely achieved greater success had the tribal warriors been allowed to
fight in their Traditional loose, raider-like formations. This speculation is
supported by a much more successful use of Arab fighters on the part of the
British and a man named Thomas Edward Lawrence.
Another aspect to the
Near Eastern front of the First World War that proves instructive is the
various Arab secret societies that arose at this time. Ouring
the war, groups such as the Ahad in Mesopotamia (modern Iraq), and the Fetah in Syria, often infiltrated the Turkish army to
gather intelligence from within, commit sabotage, and eventually to lead Arab
mutinies against their Turkish overlords. Early in 1916, Jemal Pasha moved to
crush the secret societies in Syria. Suspected rebels were executed, Arab army
units were dispersed to other fronts in the war, and the Turkishgendarmerie
crushed the general Arab population. The gendarmerie succeeded in cowing the
Syrian Arabs into submission and they did not take part in the general Arab
uprising that was to come. Prince Feisal, son of the Sherif
of Mecca, was present in Syria at the time and witnessed these intense acts of
Turkish brutality. (T.E. Lawrence, Seven Pillars of Wisdom, Stockholm, 1950,
58-62.)
No doubt these images
remained with him when it was learned that additional Turkish forces were on
their way to the Sherifs seat of power in Mecca and
Medina. The much-anticipated Arab uprising could delay no longer. On June 5th,
1916, the Arabs revolted. Prior to the arrival of the British, the Arab
uprising was comprised of approximately fifty thousand men, and ten thousand
rifles that varied widely in both age and accuracy. The Arabs initially failed
to take Medina but succeeded in taking Mecca after Turkish artillery landed
near the sacred Ka'aba, infuriating the Muslim world.
On June 16th, with the assistance of British air bombardment, the Arabs took
the port city of Jiddah. This allowed for the
transfer of British weapons to the Arabs.
One of the reasons
the Arabs fell short of taking Medina is their poor attempts at sabotaging the
Turkish railway from Damascus to Medina. One episode in particular demonstrates
the gritty reality of the struggle that took place. (Lowell Thomas, With
Lawrence in Arabia, New York, 1967,54-61.)
In mid-1916, two
trains a week full of Turkish troops were arriving in Medina. Turkish efforts
to secure Medina were turned over to Fakhri Pasha, a ruthless Turkish commander
who organized an Arab massacre in the city of Adana in 1909. In late June of
1916, he ordered a military sortie into the Arab suburb putting up the most
resistance to Turkish occupation. The soldiers sacked and bumed
the district, massacring men, women and children alike. Witnesses reported that
the rampaging soldiers carried out mass rapes of Arab females, then threw them
alive into the burning buildings.
This episode is also example of the false notion of some overarching Muslim
nemesis that acts as one against the West. The majority of Turks and Arabs are
Sunni Muslim. Yet, there is no doubt that their hatred of one another was more
intense at this juncture in history than any animosity either ethnic group felt
towards Westerners.
The massacre at
Medina initially sent the Arab Uprising into disarray. The Turks should have
taken advantage of the chaos and sent what troops they had available to Mecca
to crush the budding movement one and for all. Unfortunately for the Turks,
they delayed moving on Mecca until additional reinforcements arrived, and their
momentum was lost.
Arabs as a people are
patient, and the Arabic language allows them the opportunity to be
exceptionally diplomatic.Thomas E. Lawrence
understood this, and he also understood that Arab fighters divided their time
between war and family. At times, one fighter would be part of a raiding party,
and the next day, the man would leave to be with his family while his brother
took his place in the ranks. Conversely, the Arab ability to mobilize quickly
is an offsetting benefit. We are witnessing this same part-time warrior mentality
being played out today among the insurgents in Iraq.
Another issue, then
and now, is that basest of human drive: profit. There is no doubt that had
Britain not been able to bring food, supplies, and money, into the ports at Jiddah and Rabegh, within months,
the Arab Revolt would have died in the desert sands. Since the beginning of the
current insurgent war in Iraq however, the large loose network of Arab ties has
mainly been utilized against the Coalition.
Much of this has to
do with the Arabs' fiercely independent spirit, but an equally important issue
is the Coalition's inability to provide for the material needs of the Iraqi
people. If the U.S. is to succeed in ultimately winning the peace in Iraq, they
must do a better job of tapping into the complex web of Iraqi relationships,
and provide the proper incentives for collaboration.
As the First World War
enshrouded the globe, T.E. Lawrence traveled from his map-making job in Cairo
to the Arabian Peninsula, tapped into this web of Arab relationships, and
co-opted the Arabs into backing the British cause in the war. This was no small
feat. Shortly after arriving in Arabia and meeting with the leadership of the
Arab Revolt, Lawrence learned that the Arabs blamed their suffering at the
hands of the Turks on Arab relations with Britain. After observing the Arab
troops, Lawrence assessed that there was strength in their unity amongst one
another, but their lack of a stake in the war would cause the Arabs to break
and disperse in any battle with serious casualties.
Lawrence therefore
surmised that the best way to utilize the Arab fighters was to give them light
machine guns and artillery support, while allowing them to fight as snipers in
irregular formations utilizing the harsh desert terrain. Arab support in the
war saved several months of time and tens of thousands of British and Indian
casualties. Additionally, the British were not forced to send an overwhelming
number of their British and Indian military units into Arabia; a move that
would have likely enflamed the global Muslim community.
Based on his early
experiences with Arabs, ‘Lawrence of Arabia’ devised his "Twenty Seven
Articles" on how Christian Europeans could best deal with Arab Muslims. A
list of the important articles for the sake of our historical discussion are
cited here:
1. A bad start is
difficult to atone for, and the Arabs form their judgments on externals that we
ignore . . .
2. .. . Get to know
their families, clans and tribes, friends and enemies, wells, hills and roads.
Do all this by listening . . Do not ask questions. Get to speak their dialect
of Arabic.
3. In matters of
business deal only with the commander . . .
4. Win and keep the
confidence of your leader. Strengthen his prestige at your expense before
others if you can. Never refuse or quash schemes he may put forward; but ensure
that they are put forward in the first instance privately to you. Always
approve them, and after praise modify them insensibly, causing the suggestions
to come from him, until they are in accord with your own opinion. When you
attain this point, hold him to it, keep a tight grip of his ideas, and push him
forward as firmly as possible, but secretly, so that no one but himself (and he
not too clearly) is aware of your pressure.
5. . . . When
stranger sheikhs come in for the first time to swear allegiance and offer
service, dear out of the tent. If their first impression is of foreigners in
the confidence of the Sherif, it will do the Arab
cause much harm . . .
7. ... Treat the
sub-chiefs of your force quite easily and lightly. In this way you hold
yourself above their level. Treat the leader, if a Sherif,
with respect. He will return your manner and you and he will then be alike, and
above the rest. Precedence is a serious matter among the Arabs and you must
attain it.
8. . . . you lose
prestige if you are associated with a tribe or dass.
. .
9. . . . the only
hope of union in nomad Arabia is that the Ashraf be universally acknowledged as
the ruling dass...
11. The foreigner and
Christian is not a popular person in Arabic. . . Wave a Sherif
in front ofyou like a banner and hide your own mind
and person . . .
12. Cling tightly to
your sense of humour. . . A dry irony is the most
useful type . . .
13. Never lay hands
on an Arab; you degrade yourself . . .
14. ... The less
apparent your interference the more your influence. They are willing to follow
your advice . . . but they do not mean you or anyone else to be aware of that .
. .
15. Do not try to do
too much with your own hands. Better the Arabs do it tolerably than that you do
it perfectly. It is
their war, and you are to help them, not win it for them . . .
21. Religious
discussions will be frequent. Say what you like about your own side and avoid
criticism of theirs . . . Islam is so all-pervading an element that there is
little religiosity, little fervour, and no regard for
externals. Do not think that they are careless. Their conviction of the truth
of their faith, and its share in every act and thought and principle of their
daily life is so intimate and intense as to be unconscious, unless roused byopposition. Their religion is as much apart
of nature to them as sleep or food.
22. ... In familiar
conditions they fight weH, but strange events cause panies. Keep your unit small . '.' The more unorthodox your
proceedings, the more likely you are to have the Turks cold, for they lack
initiative and expect you to.
23. ... they dislike
concise expression. Their minds work just as ours do, but on different premises
. . .
24. ... Arab townsmen
and Arab tribesmen regard each other mutually as poor relations, and poor
relations are much more objectionable than poor strangers.
25. In spite of Arab
example, avoid too free talk about women. It is as difficult a subject as
religion, and their standards are so unlike our own that aremark,
harmless in English, may appear as unrestrained to them, as some of their
statements would look to us, if translated literally.
27. The beginning and
ending of the secret of handling Arabs is unremitting study of them. Keep
always on your guard; never say an unnecessary thing: Watch yourself, and your
companions all the time: Hear all that passes, search out what is going on
beneath the surface, read their characters, discover their tastes and
weaknesses and keep everything you find out to yourself . . . your success will
be proportioned to the amount of mental effort you devote wit.
In spite of tensions between the British and Arab leadership at times, the
future King Saudi Arabia, Feisal managed to open up a string of very needed
wells and a line of communication from Wejh, north to
the Syrian border. From here then, the Arabs could conduct raids against
the Turkish railroad from Syria south to Medina. These raids were just serious
enough to keep the Turks in Medina constantly off balance without causing them
to evacuate the city and focus their forces north in Syria, Damascus being the
strategic target of the British in this theatre. This subsequent growth of the
Arab Revolt is another example of how, especially in the Middle East, proven
power generates a following. The importance of victory and confidence cannot be
overstated.
In May of 1917,
Lawrence and a small party of Arab delegates rode north into Palestine and
Syria to gauge support for the Arab Revolt, and to assemble a northern army.
large enough to attaek Aqaba.
This Turkish held eity-fortress was nearly impervibus
to frontal attaek from the sea, but was vulnerable to
landward attaek from the rear. The Turks were not
expecting an attack from the land because it required the crossing of hundreds
of miles of wasteland and hills. After several weeks of reconnaissance and
negotiations with Arab tribes, Lawrence put together a force capable of
capturing Aqaba on July 6, 1917, inflicting nearly 1,200 Turkish casualties
while losing only two Arab fighters, achieving one of the most lopsided
victories in modern history.
In fact the Turks
were kept constantly wondering where the Arab Army would strike next, while
Lawrence was able to keep feuding tribes sufficiently separated to ensure that
the Arab Army stayed intact. In Lawrence' words, "We used the smallest
force in the quickest time at the farthest place . . . by using one district on
Monday, another on Tuesday, a third on Wednesday," over the next several
months. Named the Arab Northern Army in early 1918, they broke the very spirit
of the Turkish Army in Arabia and southern Palestine. Continued Tomorrow.
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