In September of 1918, Lawrence implemented a plan by which he and the Arabs fooled the Turks into thinking that he was going to attack Amman. They feigned the impression that they were advancing along a northeastern route, forced German commander Liman von Sanders to commit his troops to a British inland advance. Meanwhile the British army moved north along the Levantine coast, then wheeled inland and destroyed the Turkish army in Palestine.

Lawrence writes that at the time, "My head was working full speed in these minutes, on our joint behalf, to prevent the fatal first steps by which the unimaginative British, with the best will in the world, usually deprived the acquiescent native of the discipline of responsibility, and created a situation which called for years of agitation and successive reforms and rioting to mehd." Lawrence thus rode out to inform the incoming British commander that his troops would be the guests of the Arabs.

Except for over thirteen thousand Turkish soldiers who lay wounded or dying of disease in the city's barracks and hospitals, Damascus was taken without a fight as all others had left. Lawrence immediately set about piecing together an Arab Government to control the city, and by extension, a new Arab nation, with Feisal at its head.

Feisal felt his sorry duty next would be to rid himself of his war-friends, and replace them by the elements which had been most useful to the Turkish Government. Replacing the expansive Turkish Empire with Arab governance, combined with the imperial ambitions of both the British and French under the Sykes-Picot treaty, however unraveled any long-term self-determination that the Arabs were initially given. In the end, the Arab world was divided into mandates, with the British taking the territory comprising modern Israel, the Palestinian Territories, Jordan and Irag, while the French took control of Syria and Lebanon. The British and French insisted on these mandates to protect their economic interests, but also pushed the Arabs into the arms of a small minority controlling elite.

Shortly thereafter however the alliance against the jihadists fell apart, when the British attempted to seek support, to combat the Wahhabis in Arabia and the Qawasim on the seas.

When a half-century later these countries did gain their independence, they were released to the control of kings. These kingdoms, or the successive strongmen that overthrew them, remain in place today but so have the Wahhabis.

Published in the US but not yet in the UK  Robert Dreyfuss, is unclear about many of the facts presented in Devil’s Game, needing for example  archival research. Plus what could have been avoided, Dreyfuss also leaves out much of the research published already, by others. For example Christy Campbell in "The Maharajah's Box" (2000) did an excellent job unravelling the involvement of Djemal-ud-din(dubbed 'al-Afghani') a Freemason and  spiritual father of the Muslim Brotherhood in a plot to overtrow the British Empire. Dreyfuss however has "al-Afghani his entire adult life as an agent of British intelligence" something that is not true.

Nevertheless it is true, that in 1885, exactly one hundred years before officials  of the Reagan administration would made a secret initiative toward A K’s Iran, the peripatetic Persian activist Djemal-ud-din, met in London with British intelligence and foreign policy officials to put forward a controversial idea. Would Britain, he wondered, be interested in organizing a Pan-Islamic alliance among Egypt, Turkey, Persia and Afghanistan against Russia?

In 1885 when the force of the Mahdi killed General Gordon and captured Khartoum, Djemal-ud-din choose to maintain his Pan Islamic credentials but he opposed the Sudanes Mahdi behind the scenes. “I fear as all wise men fear that the dissemination of the doctrine(Mahdism) ,will harm England an anyone having rights in Egypt” wrote Afghani. In a separate piece titled “England on the shores of the Red Sea” Afghani argued that the followers of the Mahdi “were attracting the simple minded”.

In contrast, he would later tell the Russians exactly the opposite (and more likely the truth) that Djemal-ud-din in fact had the support of the 'Mahdi' plus, the leadership of the Ottoman Empire enticing the Russians to march into Afghanistan, which they did. By then the 'Mahdi' was dead, thus Djemal-ud-din proposed the leader of the Ottoman Empire become the new 'Mahdi'.

A Persian and thus not Sunni by birth Jamal al-Din sought to respond to European dominance by reinterpreting Islam for the modern era.  

His student Moh’ad Abduh (1849-1905) later served as Mufti of Egypt (Chief Judge of the Sharia Courts), and was a leading reformer within al-Azhar, the pre-eminent university and mosque complex in Egypt.  

The reformers' approach was both political as well as religious. Theologically, they sought to reinterpret Islam within a modem context, and to demonstrate that Islam could viably challenge Western modes of modernization. Underlying this was a recognition of the importance of science and reason for material progress, and the corresponding dangers of a religious tradition defined by 'unquestioning imitation' (taqlid), yet would become a model for Islamic activists in years to come.  

Rashid Rida, Abduh's disciple, took a more conservative interpretation of Islamic tradition, despite his embrace of Abduh's general approach. He led what was known as the Salafiyya movement, which represented the primary opposition to the secularism of the 1920's and 30's. Hasan al-Banna, who founded the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, was deeply influenced by Rida and the Salafiyya movement. While they both differed with Abduh on some issues, they shared with the reformist movement an emphasis on religious reinterpretation and political activism. They also shared a common animosity to Western dominance and continued influence in Egypt. To this end, the early Islamists believed, as did the ruling liberal parties, that Egypt was a unique nation-state, and deserved independence. While all of these groups were committed to an amorphous Egyptian nationalism, they differed greatly over what this entailed.  

While the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafiyyas interpreted Egyptian nationalism in Islamic terms, the liberal parties advocated a more secular and cosmopolitan conception of the nation. This divide marked the contemporary origins of the debate over Egypt's social order, as well as the beginnings ofthe 're-traditionalization of Islam.' (See Denis Sullivan and Sana Abed-Kotob, Islam in Contemporary Egypt: CMI Society, 1999).  

In fact Abdu and Rida’s concerns grew out of the same intellectual debate that revolved around the reconciliation of Islamic heritage with modernity. They blamed the weakness of the ulama, social injustice, and blind imitation of the past (taqlid) for Islam’s relative stagnation. Their Salafism also came in response to burgeoning pan-Arab nationalism, which in itself was an attempt to reconcile Islam with modernity. (*Like we pointed out in early 2003 in his two part essay on various radical groups, the intellectual roots and historical precedents of today's Islamic revival can be traced back to Sayyid Jamâl al-Din, called al-Afghani. And entail a closeted form of the Western modernism that it so publicly claims to oppose. This included also the Deoband movement that emerged from central India in the wake of the ill-fated revolt against the British in 1857. Founded by Mohammed Zasim Nanautawi (1833-77) and Rashid Ahmed Gangohi (1829-1905), it set up madrassas in India, Afghanistan, and Pakistan.)  

Early Salafis such as Abdu and Rida were more liberal than many contemporary Salafis because of their belief that the stagnation of the Ottoman caliphate, and that of Islam in general, could be alleviated by a return to the true principles of Islam with an interpretation suited to modern realities. The original Salafis were not opposed to modernization, but instead admired Europe’s technological innovations and social advancements and sought to reconcile modernity with Islam. The aftermath of World War I and the ensuing colonization of much of the Middle East by Britain and France changed the Salafi scenery. With the fall of the Ottoman Empire after World War I, reform within that caliphate, which had been the concern of the early Salafis, made way to a new priority, the struggle against colonialism as a way to recreate the caliphate. These competing elements, reforming Islam on the one hand, and fighting colonialism on the other, were reflected in the establishment of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna. The Muslim Brotherhood’s strategy was a novel one as it aimed to create a popular movement that would rely on reforming Islam to create a social revolution. During the 1930s and 1940s the brotherhood’s idea of generating a broad Islamic political and social movement began to dominate the Islamic discourse revolving around the desire to rebuild the caliphate, increasingly sidelining those voices who advocated a nationalist strategy based on reforming Arab states independently. The new strategy entailed the indoctrination of younger generations, but also the decision to find a modus vivendi with the existing political order of Arab states. (Trevor Stanley, "Understanding the Origins of Wahhabism and Salafism," Terrorism Monitor 3, no. 14, 15 July 2005).  

Beginning in the 1950s, a new phase began for the Muslim Brotherhood when the movement clashed head on with Arab governments in places like Jordan, Egypt, and later Syria, countries that had come under the influence of Gamal abd-el Nasser’s hybrid form of socialism and pan-Arabism. Sayyed Qutb was the predominant ideologue against the Baathist and Nasserite form of Arab socialism. In his writings, which focused on social injustice, Qutb’s ideas marginalized the pure reformist Salafiyyah, on which al-Banna grew up. Following the violent crackdown of the Muslim Brotherhood under Nasser, the remnants of the movement found refuge in Saudi Arabia under King Faisal. In Saudi Arabia, the Muslim Brotherhood’s remnants were led by Muhammad Qutb, Sayyed’s brother. They quickly established a foothold in Saudi Islamic universities in the 1960s. By the 1970s, the Saudi education system was filled with Muslim Brothers and other Salafis, who managed to spread their books across the larger Muslim world. The Muslim Brotherhood’s remnants, who established themselves in Saudi Arabia, introduced a politically oriented agenda to the existing Salafi movement in Saudi Arabia. There, they also encountered the more traditional, apolitical Saudi Wahhabi scholars, an encounter that created a new, more militant form of Salafism. Wahhabism, a doctrine related to Salafism, originated in Saudi Arabia in the course of the 19th century. Both Wahhabism and Salafism advocate the immediate, ‘fundamentalist’ interpretation of Islamic teachings. The two movements differ, however, in their original doctrine, in that Wahhabism rejected all traces of modernity, while Salafism, at least initially, attempted to reconcile Islam with modernity. Wahhabism centers around a group of sheikhs who studied in Wahhabi learning centers, mostly in Saudi Arabia and Gulf States. Wahhabis continue to extend their influence through fatwas, and are frequently speaking at conferences and giving lectures. Their doctrine is also spread through the Internet, television, and Wahhabi publications. Although Wahhabism originated in Saudi Arabia and is still strongest in the Arabian peninsula, Wahhabism has spread to other countries, and Wahhabi sheikhs are conveying their message to younger generations of Wahhabi students.

As Bin Laden was doubtless aware when he moved there for four years starting with 1994, Sudan had been the first nation in the world to overthrow a European-backed government and establish an Islamic state. Here Hassan at-Turabi (a Sudanese Mahdist with a PhD from the Sorbonne in Paris) became bin Laden's mentor, profoundly influencing his ideology, helping to construct al-Qaeda as the terrorist organization it would become. Bin Laden left the Sudan for Afghanistan in 1998, a very different man from the one who had arrived there: his pronouncements in some cases match those of the Mahdi almost word for word. (M.Asher, Khartoum,2005,p.407.)

Bin-Laden also took Afghani’s idea a step further by not only preaching for the reestablishment of the Caliphate but, it will then wage Jihad against the remainder of the non-Muslim world with the aim of conquering it… (see, Bruce Lawrence,ed, Messages to the World: The Statements of Osama Bin Laden, 2005.)

While Afghani offered his services in serial fashion, to the British, to the French, and to the Russians, and served as an agent for all three, his followers-Abduh especially- became increasingly dependant on the British. On returning to Cairo, Abduh forged a partnership with Lord Cromer, who was the symbol of British imperialism in Egypt, and in 1899, two years after Afghani's death, Abduh was named mufti of Egypt. As mufti, he was the supreme interpreter of the canon law of Islam.

In the end however, Lord Cromer soon concluded that the pan-Islam of al-Afghani and Abduh needed revision. Its Masonic tingled universalism modernism didn’t sit well with the orthodox Muslim clergy. But the journalist Rashid Rida preserved the ideas of Afghani trough The Lighthouse, the publication that brought Afghani’s ideas to the Egyptian Sallaffiya and the Muslim Brotherhood. The Lighthouse and its followers merged in the “Peoples Party” (created with British money, welcoming British power in Egypt) and  also welcomed the growth of Saudi Power. The Lighthouse explained that a new star of hope has appeared with the rise of the Wahhabi dynasty of Ihn Saud in Arabia.

Iraq, Jordan, and Saudi Arabia were kingdoms ruled by monarchies installed by London. The first contact was made in 1865, and British subsidies started to flow into the coffers of the Saudi family, in ever growing quantity.

The Islamic fundamentalist movement that Ibn Saud rode to power was essential to the origin of Saudi Arabia. He utilized Islam to break down tribal loyalties and replace those loyalties with adherence to the Wahhabi cult. At the same time, they encouraged the Hashemites of Mecca, a second Arabian family with a spurious claim to he descended from the original prophet of Islam.

At this point urged by WWI, British intelligence reinvigorated Afghani’s earlier plans, and London posthumously took up Afghani and Abduh's proposal to mobilize Muslims for a new caliphate, one that could at once undermine the crumbling Turkish empire.

The emergence of Saudi-Arabia, gave the British a foothold in the center of Islam, Mecca and Medina. For Britain, and then the United States, Saudi Arabia would serve as an anchor for its ambitions throughout the 20th century. Also the seeds planted by Afghani and Abduh were watered and carefully tended by Saudi Arabia's Wahhabis and the British intelligence service, a new Islamist force was about to arise. From the 1920’s on, the new Saudi state merged its Wahhabi orthodoxy with the Salafiyya, now organized into the Muslim Brotherhood-and the resurgence of Islam was under way. Particularly the Hashemites in Arabia, encouraged the activities of the Brotherhood, seeing it as a force to counterbalance communist, leftist, and, later, Nasserist Nationalism.

Initially Saudi Arabia supplied the Muslim Brotherhood with money only, but after 1954, the country itself became a chief base for its operations. The Brothers settled in Jeddah where they went into business, and Riyad Mecca and Medina where they radicalize Wahhabi movement. Wahhabi-style ultra-orthodoxy to the pan-Islamic ideals of Jamal Eddine al-Afghani -with Saudi funding. Dedicated to create a worldwide caliphate based Islamic state, the seeds planted by Afghani and Abduh were watered and carefully tended by Saudi Arabia's Wahhabis.

The Brotherhood and its allies in the Gulf next, quietly helped to spawn a new generation of Islamists, including the forerunners of Al Qaeda. A new Islamist force was about to arise in the form of Islam's radical right, concentrated in the Muslim World League, a leading exponent of Saudi Wahhabi orthodoxy. Thus, the pan-Islamic ideals of Jamal Eddine al-Afghani-with Saudi funding-created the global enterprise that spawned Islam's radical right.

On June 25th, 1996, nineteen American servicemen were killed when Saudi Islamists exploded a truck bomb in front of their barracks, and on October 12th, 2000, seventeen American sailors were killed as Islamists blew up their small boat beside the USS Cole.

As the American presence has grown, the House of Saud, rulers of Arabia for over 100 years now, is facing a crisis. The royals rely on the West as its primary consumer of natural resources, and Western experts are crucial in keeping the oil flowing. On the other hand, the general population resents Western influence and the presence of Western workers on the most holy soil in the Muslim faith. In addition the Saudi royal family lives in constant fear of a mass uprising from its Shi'ite population and the destabilization of its oil industry. The Saudi royal family has maintained power because Wahhabi clerics do not preach too strenuously against them in the mosques. In return, the Wahhabis stay comfortably entrenched in Saudi Arabia with monetary support from the government. This same Wahhabi (Sunni) influence has been the front of recruitment and funding for jihad groups like Al Qaeda. Plus American support of the Shi'ite controlled government in Iraq not to speak of Shi'ite Iran, will undoubtedly lead to turmoil between the Saudi government and Shi'ite communities on the eastern edge of the peninsula. Any serious fighting or sabotage would led to disruptions of the economically vital oil shipments.

In fact the Wall Street Journal on this link (subscription only however), wrote Febr.14, 2006: Iraq's most prominent Shiite religious leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, maintained close ties with Tehran during Saddam Hussein's rule and today channels millions of dollars monthly into Islamic research centers and theological schools in Iran, according to his Web site, demonstrating the growing convergence of Iran's and Iraq's religious elite.

There are approximately one hundred thousand Western expatriates in Saudi Arabia. But any time the situation worsens it could lead to a mass exodus and in turn hurt the technical proficiency of the Saudi oil industry.

The likelihood of fundamentalist sympathizers within the Saudi security service, much like the situation within Pakistan's ISI, would only exacerbates the success of militant attacks. Since ultimately, al-Qaeda's aim is to rehabilitate the Golden Age of the Islamic Caliphate and Al Qaeda's leaders would like to see the oil industry remain in place for use by this new Islamic Empire. See Case Study.

Al-Qaeda does not want a popular revolution in Saudi Arabia, because this may lead to a U.S. invasion to ensure the continued flow of oil. Thus, the group will continue to influence some members of the House of Saud, tribal sheikhs, high ranking members of the military, and key businessmen, in order to push a sympathetic government into power. At the same time, al-Qaeda will continue to disparage the royal family's image among the Saudi populace and will attempt to portray the government as inept and untrustworthy to its allies, especially the U.S.

Beginning in the eighteenth century, the Ottoman Empire, heir to the might of both the Turkish hordes from Asia and the Eastern Holy Roman Empire centered on Constantinople, began to disintegrate. The Arab Muslims of the Arabian Peninsula already viewed their Turkish overlords as poor caretakers of the Islamic faith. Eventually, brutal treatment, economic disparity, ethnic differences and disagreement over the tone of the Islamic faith led Arabs of the peninsula to seek a way of breaking the Ottoman hold which is where the Wahhabi’s stepped in, preaching a return to the kind of Islamic society that had existed in the time of ‘the Prophet’.

During the Egyptian War against the Wahhabis from 1811-8, several bloody battles were fought providing an example of the way an ally can be used to take on some of the heavy fighting. The key is that like the Egyptians, the ally must have, or perceive that they have, a serious stake in the matter.
As we have seen, in 1902, bin Faisal al-Saud returned to the Arabian Peninsula from Kuwait at the head of his tribai army. He conquered Riyadh and the rest of the Nejd territory, all the while gaining recruits from among the peninsula's numerous nomadic tribes. In 1913, Al-Saud's Ikhwan army conquered the eastern province of al-Ahsa, its oil wealth still buried beneath the sands. In 1917, he conquered the rival al Rashid tribe and took the city of Haii. By 1926, al-Saud controlled the Hijaz, Arabia's western province bordering the Red Sea. The Hijaz contained Islam's spiritual prizes, the cities of Mecca and Medina. Al Saud ousted Hussein Ibn Ali, the Sherif of Mecca and ally to the British. (Not properly mentioned in Dreyfuss/ Devil’s Game (2005).

After negotiating deals with the British puppet regimes in Transjordan and Iraq, al-Saud attempted to dis band his Ikhwan Army. Dissatisfied over the amount of war booty and failing to receive government positions, in 1929, two Ikhwan leaders, Ibn Bijad and Faisal al Duwish, led a rebellion against al-Saud and were defeated.

Osama Bin Laden faced a similar situation when he returned to Saudi Arabia in the late 1980s. He expected the government to recognize his fight against the Soviets in Afghanistan, but he was ignored and later forbidden from forming an army to fight against Saddam Hussein after his 1990 invasion of Kuwait. Just as the Ikhwan accused al Saud of conceding to the infidel British, bin Laden has leveled similar charges against the House of Saud and its cozy relationship with the United States. Like the Ikhwan of a century ago, if al Qaeda succeeds in ousting Westerners from the Arabian Peninsula, the movement will not just dissipate. The likely next phase would be a guerrilla style conflict inside the Kingdom. Al Qaeda would attempt to install a friendly government while trying to avoid full-scale U.S. intervention.

If a guerrilla war were to develop between the House of Saud and al-Qaeda, it is foreseeable that the United States could take on any role ranging from supplying military equipment to full-scale military assistance. Due to the sensitivities of maintaining "infidel" troops on the holiest soil in Islam, the U.S. would need to support the Sauds with as small a military footprint as possible. Something akin to the military advisors the US provided in the opening years of the Vietnam conflict and, in conjunction with a dominant and precision airpower, worked with a high level of success in routing the Taliban from Afghanistan. Working with the Saudi government against al-Qaeda style insurgents would put us on the opposite side of the military spectrum from the twentieth-century British and Arab fight against the Turks during the First World War.

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