It was widely assumed
that politics was breaking away from religion and that as societies became more
industrialized religious belief and practice would be restricted to private thoughts
and activities. The decline in the social and political importance of religion
in the West was grounded in the social scientific traditions flowing from the
commanding figures and the religious sociology of for example Emil Durkheim Durkheim and Max Weber, who insisted in different ways that
secularization was integral to modernization.
The processes of
modern industrialism which Weber saw as being characterized by depersonalized
functional relationships and increasing bureaucratization were leading, if not
to the final 'death of God', at the least to the 'disenchantment of the world'.
The numinous forces that had underpinned the medieval cosmos would be
psychologized, subjectivized, and demythologized. on the face of it, the 1979
revolution in Iran seriously dented conventional wisdom. Here was a revolt
deploying a repertoire of religious symbols that brought down a modernizing
government and placed political power in the hands of a religious establishment
steeped in medieval theology and jurisprudence. Moreover this was clearly an
urban, not a rural, phenomenon-a response, perhaps, to 'over-rapid' or'uneven' development, but not in any sense a movement
such as the counter-revolutionary movements in the Vende
or the peasant jacqueries that challenged the secular project of the French
Revolution.
Some commentators
even argued that the mix of politics an religion that
came huition in Iran was peculiarly Islamic, or even
uniquely Shitii Islam, it was said, unlike
Christianity, had a built-in political agenda: the Prophet Muhammad had
combined the role of revelator with that of state-builder, and that all who
sought to follow his path must sooner or later be drawn into the political
game. Shiism was a counter-cultural variation on this theme. Originally a
protest movement against the worldly Umayyads who took over Muhammad's empire,
it developed into a tradition of radical dissent, one that oscillated over the
centuries between quietism and activism, withdrawal and revolt. The Khomeinist
revolution-like the rise of the Shii Hezbollah in
Lebanon-represented the swing of the Shii pendulum
towards activism, after decades of sullen acquiescence in 'unrighteous'
government.
By the early 1980’s,
however, it was becoming clear that religious activism was very far from being
confined to the Islamic world and that newly politicized movements were
occurring in virtually every major religious tradition. In America the New
Christian Right (NCR) challenged and temporarily checked the boundaries of
church-state separation that had steadily been moving in a secular direction.
Commenting on the growth of evangelical and fundamentalist churches in America
at the expense of the liberal 'mainstream', Peter Berger, doyen of Weberian
sociologists, was forced to admit that 'serious intellectual difficulties' had
been created 'for those who thought them.
But the compliment
post-modernism payd to religion is back-handed and
treacherous. By proclaiming the end of positivism and the ideology of progress,
which was supposed to have replaced or overtaken religion, postmodernism opens
up public space for religion-but at the price of relativizing its claims to
absolute truth. By saying, in effect, 'Your story is as good as mine, or his,
or hers', post-modernism allows religious voices to have their say while
denying their right to silence others, as religions have tended to do
throughout history. For the true fundamentalist, the 'post-' prefixed to
modernism is a catch, perhaps even a fraud, because modernity, in Anthony
Gidden's formulation, is founded on the 'institutionalisation
of doubt'. Far from 'de-institutionalizing' doubt, however, the pluralism
implicit in a post-modernist outlook sanctifies it by opening the doors of
choice, which is the enemy of certainty.
Like religious communities,
the nations are collectivities that transcend the sum of their individual
parts; like religious communities nations bear witness to the idea that human
blood must be shed in their defence: the war
memorials, cenotaphs, and Tombs to the Unknown Warrior that grace our cities
attest to transcendental demands the nation makes of its citizens. Such
demands, as I pointed pointed out in my 1999 seminar
on related subjects (see further down this website), are made on the basis of
faith rather than empirical evidence. For nationalists, the nation, whatever
the acts committed in its name, is essentially and ultimately good, as the
future will reveal; the conviction of its virtue is not a matter of empirical
evidence, but of faith.
However heologically, fundamentalists must reject choice because
they know there is only one truth that has been revealed to them by the 'supraempirical spiritual entity' most of them call God. But
the contemporary situation under which this deity (or in some cases deities)
makes demands on them are utterly different from those that prevailed in
pre-modern times when most people were exposed to a single religious tradition
within a cultural milieu largely formed by that tradition.
The situation facing
Muslims living in the West illustrates dilemmas that can be applied, with
suitable modifications, to be lievers in other faith
traditions who may feel ghettoized, or to those living as minorities in a
globalized, predominantly secular culture conditioned by technologies
originating in the post-Enlightenment West. Islamic websites such as
www.islam-qa.com, in which sheikhs based in Saudi Arabia advise young Muslim
females living in America to submit to abusive parents or (implicitly) to avoid
calling in the 'unbelieving' authorities even when raped by their fathers, are
operating within a wholly different context from the 'traditional' milieu where
Islam was dominant, where the Islamic judges would have had knowledge of the
individuals concerned in particular cases. in the old city of Fez in Morocco
the law books which guided the scholars were supplemented by their personal and
community knowledge. Far from being the agents of 'blind justice', the Islamic
judge was expected to have 'knowledge of men' (ilm
al-rijal). Similarly, the formalistic 'do's and
don'ts' of Islam as contained in a popular compendium published by the
fundamentalist Sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi reveals the
skeleton of Islarnically correct behaviour
without showing the flesh-and-blood context in which the Islamic system of values
used to operate. In a pluralistic world where Muslims are obliged to live
cheek-by-jowel with non-Muslim neighbours,
where almost everyone has access to televised images of what used to be called
the domain of war or unbelief (dar al-harb or dar al-kuft), the modalities of everyday living acquire a
significance they did not have before.
Under modern
conditions an open question-what is the proper way to behave, is replaced by a
much narrower one: how should Muslims (or followers of other faith traditions)
behave under modern conditions, the implication being that for Muslims nowadays
the whole world has become dar al-harb
because even in Muslim majority areas ways of living differently from the
'straight path' prescribed by Islam are ever-present alternatives. In
precolonial times, during the era of what might be called the classical Islamic
hegemony, the possibility of alternative non-Islamic lifestyles simply did not
arise for the majority of people. Where pork is not available, no one has to
make a decision about whether to eat hot-dogs.
Where wine was the
preserve of a privileged elite who drank it in the privacy of their palaces,
the permissibility of alcohol consumption was not a burning social question. In
a 'homosocial' society where women were strictly segregated, lesbian and gay
relationships (though formally prohibited) were rarely seen as threatening to
the social order. Under pressures from outside forces all these issues,
especially those involving sexual appearance and behaviour,
have acquired iconic significance as marking boundaries between the insiders
and outsiders, the community of salvation and the 'unsaved' people who live
beyond its boundaries. Thus in an archetypically Western milieu such as the
American high school, Muslim identity defaults to gender segregation, with
veiled Muslim coeds holding all-female 'proms' in order to avoid breaking the
taboo on sexual mixing. Their evangelical Christian counterparts hold
assemblies of 'promise-keepers', who proclaim their commitment to chastity
before marriage and fidelity afterwards. In a pluralistic environment such as
America, all religious groups will use behavioural
restrictions as a way of marking the boundaries between believers and
nonbelievers, between 'us' (the saved) and'them' (the
damned). Mormons abstain from tea and coffee as well as alcoholso
they are distinguishable from orthodox evangelicals who are mostly teetotal. Jehova's Witnesses avoid blood transfusions (and military
service), Christian Scientists avoid conventional medicine (because Christ is
the only Healer), and some Hasidic Jews (like some ultra-orthodox Muslims)
exhibit behaviour bordering on incivility by refusing
to shake hands with non-believers.
Such behaviour is often described by those whom it is designed
to exclude as 'fundamentalist'. One of the 'family resemblances' exb ibited by movements in this
book is the concern or even obsession with the drawing of boundaries that will
set the group apart from the wider society by deliberately choosing beliefs or
modes of behaviour which proclaim who they are and
how they would like to be seen.
In this respect
fundamentalisms are distinctly modern phenomena: like the New Religious
Movements that have sprouted in some of the post industrialized parts of the
world (notably South-East Asia and North America) they feed on contemporary
alienation or anomie by offering solutions to contemporary dilemmas,
buttressing the loss of identities sustained by many people (especially young
people today) at times of rapid social change, high social and geographic
mobility, and other stress-inducing factors. As two well-known American
observers put it: 'Fundamentalism is a truly modern phenomenon-modern in the
sense that the movement is always seeking original solutions to new, pressing problems.
Leaders are not merely Constructing more rigid orthodoxies in the name of
defending old mythical orthodoxies. In the process of undertaking
"restoration" within contemporary demographic/technological centers,
new social orders are actually being promulgated.’
The born-again
Christian finds comfort and support, not just by internalizing the iconic
figure of Jesus as a personal super-ego, but also by accessing the support of
fellow believers. Islamist organizations such as Hamas are not just involved in
armed resistance to the Israeli occupation of their land but dispose of a
considerable range of welfare activities. As well as being places of worship,
churches, mosques, and synagogues are the focus of social networks. The
intensive religiosity exhibited by fundamentalists in all traditions may
strengthen the support and increase the social opportunities the individual
receives from such networks, though there are perils here as well: in the
absence of disciplined hierarchies disputes about the interpretation of texts
makes fundamentalists vulnerable to the splits that afflict many radical
movements.
Nationalist rhetoric
everywhere is suffused with religious symbolism and purpose. To give but one
example, let me cite some extracts from the address by the Irish patriot
Padraic Pearse, architect of the 1916 rebellion against Britain, at the
graveside of an earlier nationalist, the Fenian Jeremiah O'Donovan Rossa in
August 1915: Pearse declares that he is speaking 'on behalf of a new generation
that has been re-baptised in the Fenian faith, and
that has accepted the responsibility of carrying out the Fenian programme'. He goes on to propose 'that, here by the grave
of this unrepentant Fenian, we renew our baptismal vows ... We stand at Rossa's
grave not in sadness but rather in exaltation of spirit that it has been given
to us to come thus into so close a communion with that brave and splendid Gael.
Splendid and holy causes are served by men who are themselves splendid and holy.'The language is the language of religion ('baptism',
'exaltation', 'communion', 'holy', 'spirit'), not the empirical language of
politics.
For example the
biblical story of Exodus exercised a powerful influence on the construction of
American identities, from the Pilgrim Fathers to the New Zions (Nauvoo,
Illinois, and Salt Lake City, Utah) founded by the Mormon Prophet Joseph Smith
and his successor Brigham Young ('The American Moses') in The Israeli example
is instructive. As members of a First World, industrial society accustomed to
Western lifestyles with swimming pools, flush-toilets, and other modem
conveniences, the Israeli settlers are greedy for water, a scarce resource in
Palestine.
According to recent
accounts, Israeli settlers are now using 80 per cent of the water available to
farmers in Palestine. When religious language is used, the illegal and
disproportionate use of water is translated into a God-given grant of land and
water-rights to Abraham. In the biblical rhetoric of the settlers, the Jews are
God's special people; the Arab Palestinians are identified with the Amalekites,
a Caananite tribe whom the ancient Hebrews were
commanded to annihilate totally, with their women, children, and flocks. Where
good and evil, God and the Devil, are ranged in opposite camps, who would
deliberately choose the latter? Far from being its ideological competitor, the
religious 'fundamentalism' in Israel-Palestine, Chechnya, Kashmir, Sri Lanka,
and many other of the world's most troubled regions is best understood as an
intensification or deepening of nationalism by way of religion's mobilizing
potential.
South Asian religious
fundamentalisms provide a good illustration of this argument. If one looks at
fundamentalism in terms of its primary Protestant meaning as defending the
'fundamentals' or orthodoxy of a religious tradition, there is a case for
saying that the T-word' should not be applied to movements such as the RSS in
India and its political offshoots, the BJP currently leading the governing
coalition in Delhi, the VHP (Vishva Hindu Parishad,
'World Hindu Society'), the Sikh Akali Dal Party in the Punjab, and the
Sinhalese nationalist party ruling in mainly Buddhist Sri Lanka.
The sociologist Steve
Bruce produces three arguments for excluding these South Asian movements from
his definition of fundamentalism. First, he says, with reference to the B J P
and VH P, they have been 'provoked more by the threat of Islam than by a
decline in religious observance by Hindus'. Second, they are directed more
towards expelling or subordinating 'foreigners' (as they see most Muslims) than
to revitalizing and purifying the Hindu faithful: 'there is no decline in
orthodoxy to redress, because there is no orthodoxy.' Third, they are only
tangentially a reaction to secularization. For these and other reasons Bruce
concludes that 'the monotheistic religions of Judaism, Christianity and Islam
offer much more fertile soil for fundamentalism than Hinduism and Buddhism.
On the face of it the
three Abrahamic monotheisms might seem more susceptible to political
exploitation of the kind we have been describing than Hindu polytheism or
Buddhism, because of the absence in these traditions of an orthodoxy based on a
single scriptural tradition. As Bruce argues, 'Hinduism might be better
described not as a religion but as a loose collection of religions-that ofthe Shaivites, the Vaishnavas, the Shaktas,
the Smartas and others-that share some common themes
but that tolerate a huge variety of expressions of those themes.
Unlike the Abrahamic
traditions, each of which has a canonical scripture that can function as a
rallying point for defence, the Hindu tradition
contains such an abundance of scriptures, laws, and philosophies that 'it
becomes very difficult to single out any one specific item' as being basic or'fundamental'.
Despite this
important difference, however, there are compelling parallels that Bruce
overlooks. Like its Islamic counterpart, Hindu revivalism with its nationalist
or fundamentalist offshoots is rooted in a reformist religious tradition more than
a century old.
The original movement
was not in the first instance anti-Muslim but anti-colonial, stimulated by the
British administration's pigeonholing of India's religious communities into
identifiable and hence manageable groups according to the principle of 'divide
and rule'. From the 1871 census the British defined their Indian subjects
according to religion. With the introduction of democratic institutions at
local level, starting in igog, religious groupings
were organized into separate electorates, with a number of constituencies
reserved for Muslims in each province, and similar arrangements for Christians
in Madras and Sikhs in the Punjab. For the educated Hindu elite the need to
cultivate their own constituencies meant 'delineating a broad-based communal identity'beyond the old caste system. The creation of a new
'Hindu' identity inevitably generated reciprocal responses amongst Muslims and
Sikhs (as well as from the smaller Jain and Parsee communities whose separate
identities were acknowledged), with all of the three main groups competing
against each other for a 'privileged position in colonial society’.
The reformist
movements within 'Hinduism' (a term invented by Europeans) bear some 'family
resemblances' to the Islamic salafi movement that
originated in colonial Egypt towards the end of the nineteenth century. Swami
Dayananda Sarasvati (1824-83), founder of Arya Samajthe
Society of Aryas-is one of the spiritual and
intellectual progenitors of the RSS and its offshoot the BJP. In some respects
he resembles Afghani in his rejection of tradition and the search he undertook
for a modernized, more rational religion that would regenerate his society. A
Brahman from a well-to-do Shaivite family in Gujarat, he was profoundly
affected, aged 14, by watching a mouse consume (and pollute) offerings of food
made to the statue of Shiva during an all-night vigil when other members of his
family had dozed off According to his autobiography Dayananda felt it
impossible 'to reconcile the idea of an omnipotent, living god with this idol
which allows the mice to run over his body and thus suffers his image to be
polluted without the slightest protest'. After wandering around India for
thirteen years as a holy man (a conventional apprenticeship for an aspiring guru)
Dayananda found a teacher who persuaded him to preach his reformist doctrines
in Hindi (the popular vernacular) rather than in learned Sanskrit.
Some of Dayananda's
ideas reveal an affinity with the 'fundamentalisms' to be found in the
Abrahamic traditions. He believed that the Indian scriptures-the Vedaswere the highest revelations ever vouchsafed to
humanity, and contained all knowledge, scientific as well as spiritual. 'All
the knowledge that is extant in the world' he would claim 'originated in Aryavarta'-the Land of Arya, his name for ancient India, a
mythical realm whose kings ruled over all the earth and taught wisdom to all
their peoples. Through their vast knowledge the ancient Indians were able to
produce the weapons of war described in the great epics such as the
Mahabharata. 'Since the knowledge of the Vedas is of general applicability, all
references to kings and battles are in fact political or military directives. '
The sentiment is identical to that of the Islamists who recall the age of the
'Rightly Guided Caliphs' as an era of justice and prosperity (although in
actual fact, three of the first four caliphs were brutally murdered). His point
about military directives is strikingly similar to an argument employed by the
Islamist writer Sayyid Qutb in Milestones, the tract
he wrote while in prison in Egypt before his execution in 1966. Muhammad's
Companions, according to Qutb, used the Koran not
just for aesthetic or even moral guidance, but as a manual for action 'as a
soldier on the battlefield' reads his daily bulletin .
Dayananda's ideas
first took root among Hindus in the Punjab, which has large Muslim and Sikh
populations, and it was Punjabi leaders of the Arya Samaj
who founded the Punjab Hindu Provincial Sabha (council), the first politically
oriented Hindu group, in igog. By 1921 it had become
the All-India Hindu Mahasabha (great council), gone
of the best-known institutions of Hindu reaction' . The council actively
fostered the growth of the RS S, Now a highly professional organization with
25,000 branches throughout the country, the RS S has lent its organizational
skills to two political parties, the Jana Sangh and its de facto successor, the
BJP. Both L. K. Advani, president of the BJP, and the Indian Prime Minister A.
B. Vajpayee started their careers as RSS organizers.
The parallels with
the Muslim Brotherhood founded in British-dominated Egypt in 1928, just three
years after the RSS, are compelling. Both movements adopted something of the
style of their colonial masters: the Muslim Brotherhood had affinities with the
Boy Scout Movement and Young Men's Christian Association (YMCA) organizations
that stressed the importance of physical activity, with paramilitary overtones.
The khaki shorts worn by RSS volunteers during their drills were modelled on
the uniform of the British Indian police. Both organizations discouraged
democratic dissent under an authoritarian style of leadership. Both
organizations encouraged male bonding by excluding women (though both allowed
the creation of smaller all-female organizations). Both opposed the mixing of
sexes within the organization as contrary to religious norms.
Like the Muslim
Brothers, members of the RSS are organized into groups that transcend or
substitute for family ties. Hasan al-Banna, founder
of the Muslim Brotherhood, grouped his followers into 'families and
battalions'; young Palestinians who today volunteer for suicide missions are
organized into 'friendship packs' who may act as family substitutes, while
holding them to their decision. The organizers of the RSS model themselves on
Hindu renunciates. 'Dedicated to a higher goal [they] are supposed to abandon
family ties and material wealth.' Like the Palestinian and Lebanese volunteers
belonging to the Shia Hezbollah, they are generally young, unmarried men in
their twenties. They wear Indian-style dress and are expected to lead an
exemplary, ascetic existence, although some may marry and have families after a
period of service. Organizers serve without salary, but their material needs
are taken care of Some volunteers are provided with motor scooters for getting
around town. Both the Brotherhood and the RSS consciously blend elements of
modernity with aspects of tradition. Al-Banna sought
to infuse his organization with some of the spiritual values of Sufism (Islamic
mysticism) without its devotional excesses. As leader he called himself the
murshid, or guide, a title usually reserved for the leaders of Sufi orders; his
favourite reading, al-Ghazali's Revitalization of the
religious sciences, is strongly informed by Sufi mysticism. In a similar manner
the RSS leaders blended the prestige of secular learning with spiritual
knowledge. The founder K. B. Hedgewarwho ranthe organization from 1925 to 1940 was known to his
followers by the honorific Doctoji. His successor, M.
S. Golwalkar (1940-73), was called Guruji. Both the Muslim Brotherhood and the
RSS blended indigenous ideas of spiritual leadership with organizational
techniques borrowed from Western bureaucracy.
The Hindu movement's leading
intellectual was V. D. Savarkar (1883-1966), who held the presidency of the
Hindu Mahasabha from 1937 to 1942. Like Sayyid Qutb
he wrote his most influential work, Hindutva, 'Hindu-ness', in prison, where he
spent many years after his detention by the British in 1910. Hindutva is a
manifesto for religious nationalism. As Daniel Gold explains, Savarkar's 'idea
of Hindu Nation stands in contrast to the idea of a composite, territorially
defined political entity that developed among the secular nationalists and
would be enshrined in the Indian constitution. The modern western idea of
nation, according to Savarkar, does not do justice to the ancient glory of the
Hindu people, the indigenous and numerically dominant population of the
subcontinent. The people whose culture grew up and developed in greater Indiafrom the Himalayas to the southern seas, by some
accounts from Iran to Singapore-this, for Savarkar was the Hindu Nation. The
subcontinent is their motherland, and Hinduness is
the quality of their national culture. ' Hindutva is not the same as Hindu
religious orthodoxy because, according to Savarkar, its spirit is manifest in
other South Asian religions, including Jainism, Sikhism, and Indian Buddhism.
Muslims and Christians, by con trast, are seen as
foreign elements in the subcontinent, which rightly belongs to Hindus. 'Hindus
should actively reject any alien dominance: they have done so in the past and
should renew their struggle valiantly whenever necessary.' For Savarkar India
is both 'Fatherland' and 'Holyland': as Gold points
out, this definition deliberately excludes Muslims and Christians for whom
India is not a holy land. 'From the viewpoint of Hindu cultural nationalism,
Savarkar's formulation effectively isolates the perceived other.
Golwalkar, like his
Indian contemporary, the Islamist ideologue Mawdudi,
expressed his admiration for the Nazis in Germany, who held similar ideas about
national purity. 'Germany has shocked the world by purging the country of the sernitic races-the Jews,' he wrote in 1939 before the full
horror of Nazi atrocities had taken place. 'Race pride at its highest has been
manifested here. Germany has also shown how well-nigh impossible it is for
Races [sic] and cultures, having differences going to the root, to be
assimilated into one united whole, a good lesson for us in Hindusthan
to learn and profit by.'
As suggested by me
(see also my earlier seminar transcript of ‘Reformed Aryans, in East and West,
P.1’ next on this website), there is a 'fundamentalistic' element in
Dayananda's elevation of the Vedas to the surnmum of
human knowledge along with his myth of the golden age of Aryavartic
kings. But the predominant tone, and its consequences, are nationalist.
Hindutva secularizes Hinduism by sacralizing the nation, bringing the cosmic
whole within the realm of human organization. As Gold astutely observes, 'If
personal religion entails among other things the identification of the
individual with some larger whole, then the Hindu Nation may appear as a whole
more immediately visible and attainable than the ritual cosmos of traditional Hinduisrn.' The problem, of course, is that such a
sacralization of nationality is explicitly antipluralistic.
Both Arya Samaj and the RSS define their religion in
contradistinction to other groups. The 'Hinduization` of Indian nationalism
generated a reciprocal response among Muslims that led to the traumatic
partition of the subcontinent in 1947, with many thousands killed or maimed in
communal rioting. The shock of the sainted Mahatma Gandhi's assassination by an
RSS member in January 1948 allowed Nehru to ban the RSS and its affiliates,
enabling Congress to foist upon India a secular Constitution that lies
'squarely in the best Western tradition'. As Sunil Khilnani
observes, 'Constitutional democracy based on universal suffrage did not emerge
from popular pressures for it within Indian society, it was not wrested by the
people from the state; it was given to them by the political choice of an
intellectual elite.'
The sacralization of
Indian identity would remain a potent, corrosive force in the body politic, a
sleeping giant that could all too easily be woken by politicians willing to
play the communal card. job reservations or affirmative action programmes aimed at protecting 'scheduled castes' (the
former Untouchables), could be presented as clashing with the rights or
aspirations of the majority. In the words British, who in recognition of their
help against the great rebellion or'Mutiny'of 1857
recruited Sikhs into the army, allowing them to keep their long hair, turbans,
and other marks of distinction. 'Building upon the tradition emanating from the
sixth and tenth gurus, the British helped in shaping the notion of the Sikhs as
a martial race and indeed as a distinct and separate nation.'35 Like other
fundamentalist leaders Bhindranwale strongly resisted
the pressures towards assimilation, whether Hinduistic
or secular Western. In his preaching he called for a return to the original
teachings of the ten gurus and strict adherence to their codes of moral
conduct. Like fundamentalist preachers in other traditions he paid more
attention to politics and social behaviour than to
the cosmological questions the religion addresses.
In defending his
community against the perceived cultural encroachments of Hindu Punjabis, Bhindranwale unleashed a campaign of terror that cost
hundreds of innocent Hindu lives. To the symbolic or latent militancy of
Sikhism represented by beard, dagger, and sword he added two new items: the
revolver and the motorcycle. Towards the end of 1983, fearing arrest, Bhindranwale and dozens of armed supporters installed
themselves in the compound surrounding the Golden Temple at Amritsar, the
holiest shrine of Sikhism, an area constantly thronged with visitors, pilgrims,
priests, and auxiliary helpers. By taking refuge in the temple area, he
challenged the government to defile the sanctuary-using the pilgrims and others
as human shields, while permitting his followers to desecrate it. There are
parallels here with the seizure of the sanctuary in Mecca, Islam's holiest
shrine, by the Saudi rebel Juhaiman al-Utaibi in November 1979. Operation Blue Star, the Indian
Army's attack on the Golden Temple in June 1984, resulted in more than a
thousand deaths (including Bhindranwale's), many of
them innocent pilgrims. Shortly afterwards Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, who
authorized the attack, was murdered by her trusted Sikh bodyguards. Nearly
three thousand Sikhs lost their lives in the ensuing rioting in Delhi and other
cities. In a retaliatory attack, Sikh terrorists may have been responsible for
the crash of an Air India jumbo jet off the Irish coast in June 1985, killing
all 32 9 people on board.
The second major
challenge to India's secular constitution took place seven years later, in
1992, when a gang of Hindu militants destroyed the Babri Masjid (mosque of
Babur) in the town of Ayodhya, south-east of Delhi. Ayodhya is the mythical birthplace of Lord Rama, hero of
the Rayama, one of the great Indian epics, and an
incarnation of the great god Vishnu. The Kingdom of Ayodhya
over which Rama rules with his beautiful consort Sita after his exile and
travails in the forest, epitomizes the golden age of Aryavarta
as described by Dayananda. Rama's alleged birthplace, however, became the site
of a mosque said to have been constructed on the orders of Babur, the first
Moghul emperor, after a visit to the city in 1528. In 1949, two years after
independence, local worshippers eported the
miraculous appearance of Rama's image in the building. (Muslims, more sceptically, believed it had been put there by local Hindu
activists.) An outbreak of communal rioting persuaded the local magistrate to
close the building-but he allowed Hindu worshippers to visit it once a year on
the anniversary of the image's appearance. The build-up to the crisis started
in earnest in 1986 when a local court allowed the building to be opened for
Hindu worship. in the ensuing riots bombs were set off, shops were burned, and
at least twenty people died.
By 1989 the confrontation
had became a major national issue, with an all-India
campaign by Hindu activists to construct a new temple at the site. Small
donations were sought from millions of ordinary people; villagers from all over
India collaborated in making bricks for the temple's construction. Tensions
escalated throughout the summer, with increasing communal rioting taking place
as the elections approached. The government's efforts at mediation were
unsuccessful, and in November the Congress faction led by Indira's son Rajiv
Gandhi was defeated at the polls. His successor proved no more successful at
defusing the tension. In December 1992, in defiance of the courts and their own
religious leaders, a group of Hindu hotheads demolished the mosque during a
ceremony for the dedication of the new temple, many of them using their bare
hands. In an action that infuriated India's Muslims (and would have wide
repercussions in Pakistan) the 13,000 police and militiamen who had been
drafted to protect
the site failed to
intervene. The subsequent riots in Bombay and other cities were the worst since
India's independence in 1947. In a series of pogroms thousands of innocent
Muslims lost their lives: even in Bombay's affluent Colobar
district where real estate prices rival those of Tokyo and New York,
middle-class Muslims found it necessary to remove their names from lists of
residents on apartment blocks, fearing lynching by the mob.
Sri Lanka provides a
further example of South Asian religious nationalism. Here, in a situation that
bears a certain resemblance to Ireland, the demand for recognition of its
separate status by an island minority linked by religion and ethnicity to its
larger neighbour (in this case Hindu Tamils of
southern India) is perceived by members of the majority community-Sinhalese
Buddhists-as a threat to the nation's integrity. Like Irish Catholicism the
Theravada Buddhism of Sri Lanka has developed into a nationalist ideology in
which religion has become a marker of communal identity. The reasons are
largely historical. Sri Lankan Buddhists regard themselves as the survivors of
the great Buddhist empire founded in India by King Asoka in the third century
BCE. While in mainland India Buddhism eventually disappeared as society
relapsed into the multiform patterns of worship which came to be known as
Hinduism, the Sinhalese held to the Buddhist faith which eventually became
politicized. In Sri Lanka (as in Burma), Buddhism provided the stirrings of
anti-colonial sentiment by offering 'the only universally acceptable king who
rescued Buddhism and our nationalism from oblivion.'
In 1956, the year of
Britain's Suez debacle, S. W. R. D. Bandaranaike, leader of the opposition Sri
Lankan Freedom Party (SLFP), was able to win power on a proBuddhist,
pro-Sinhalese ticket, replacing the upper-class, English-educated liberals of
the United National Party who had governed the country since independence. The
SLFP benefited hugely from celebration of the 25ooth anniversary of the
Buddha's birth (Buddha Jayanti) the following year and from the previous
publication of a report detailing the suppression of Buddhism under the
British. The Jayanti enlarged upon and celebrated the national myth bonding the
Buddhist faith to the land and the Sinhalese nation which 'had come into being with
the blessing of the Buddha as a "chosen race" with a divine mission
to fulfil, and now stands on the threshold of a new era leading to its
"great destiny"'. The SLFP was aggressively supported by the United
Monks' Front, which rejected the concept of secular nationhood in terms very
similar to those that would be used by Ayatollah Khomeini in his famous Najaf
lectures.
The 'Buddhisization' of Sri Lankan politics had the inevitable
consequence of making non-Buddhists (Tamils and Muslims) feel excluded from the
nation, provoking demands by Tamil separatists for a state of their own. The
Tamil Tigers-as the activists called themselves-were concerned not only with
securing political rights, but more importantly with maintaining a cultural,
ethnic, and religious identity which had been suppressed or alienated as
Sinhalese nationalism became increasingly reliant on Buddhist symbols. More
than 60,000 people from both communities lost their lives in the ensuing civil
war that lasted nearly two decades. In the late ig8os the Tigers resorted
increasingly to the novel tactic-pioneered by the Shii
Hezbollah in Lebanon-of suicide bombing. More often than not the victims were
civilians. A steady campaign of assassinations (including that of the Indian
Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, in iggi, by a female
bomber) and indiscriminate murder was kept up through the 1990’s. In 1996, 91
people died, and 1,400 were wounded, in the suicide bombing of Colombo's
Central Bank; 18 were killed in the destruction of the twin-towered World Trade
Centre in Colombo in 1997; 16 died in the suicidal attack on a Buddhist shrine
in Kandy in 1998. Some, though not all, the Tigers were practising
Hindus, who dedicated themselves to Shiva before sacrificing themselves-and
others.
The example of Buddhism
in Sri Lanka clearly demonstrates that none of the major religious traditions
is immune from 'fundamentalism', to which violence is closely linked-though it
might be better in this, as in most other contexts, to describe the process as
the 'nationalization' or secularization of religion. Donald Swearer argues that
by 'homogenizing' the Buddhist tradition and reducing it to a simplified core
teaching along with a moralistic programme of right
living linked to Sinhalese Buddhist identity, Bandaranaike (and his later
successor President Jayawardine) 'ignored the polar
dynamic between the transmundane and the mundane, a distinction basic not only
to traditional Theravada Buddhism but to the other great historical religions
as well. The absolutism of fundamentalism stems from this basic transformation
of the religious worldview.' The narrowly ideological nature of
'fundamentalism', Swearer concludes, means that it is 'not religious in the
classical sense of that term but rather a variant of a secular faith couched in
religious language'. In this process traditional religious symbols are
'stripped of their symbolic power to evoke a multiplicity of meanings'. Like Juergensmeyer, Swearer sees nationalism as triumphing over
religion, rather than the reverse: 'Religions thus harnessed to nationalism are
often regarded as more pure and orthodox than the traditional forms they seek
to supplant; in turn nationalism readily takes on the character of a fervid,
absolutistic revival of religion. In the case of Sri Lanka, as elsewhere, the
search for national identity is prior and conditions the fundamentalism of the
religion(s) incorporated into nationalism.'
The heart of the
fundamentalist project, in line with this analysis, lies not in religion but in
the essentially modern agenda of extending or consolidating the power of the
national state-or, to use the term preferred by the Israeli sociologist S. N.
Eisenstadt, the revolutionary 'Jacobin' state that appeared with the French
Revolution and the movements that surfaced in its wake, including communism and
fascism (though he tactfully avoids mentioning Zionism). According to
Eisenstadt, the fundamentalists appropriated some of the 'central aspects of
the political program of modernity', including its 'participatory, totalistic
and egalitarian orientations' while reject of a former state director-general
of police and official of the VHP affiliated to the RSS: 'We feel that what we
are doing is good for the country. After all what is good for 82 per cent of
the country is good for the rest of the country, isn't it? The 'Fundamental
Rights' guaranteeing 'freedom of conscience and free profession, practice and
propagation or religion' under article 25 of the Constitution would remain
highly problematic in a society as religious as India's. As T. N. Madan points
out, 'secularism does not mean in India that religion is privatized: such an
idea is alien to the indigenous religious traditions, which are holistic in
character and do not recognize such dualistic categories as sacred versus
profane, religious versus secular, or public versus private.'
One of the severest
tests facing India's secular constitutional arrangements has come from the
'fundamentalist', or rather nationalist, movement within the minority Sikh
community. Space does not allow an adequate description of Sikh fundamentalism.
However T. N. Madan's account in Fundamentalisms Observed makes it abundantly
clear that the Sikh movement led by the charismatic preacher Jarnail Singh Bhindranwale
(1947-84) fits the pattern of movements in other religious traditions that have
turned to, or ended in, violence. A relatively young religion founded in the
Punjab during the sixteenth century, Sikhism constantly faced the possibility
of being reabsorbed into the Hindu mainstream from which it originally sprang.
Its distinctive identity was buttressed by the ing
the Enlightenment values embedded in Jacobinism, including the sovereignty and
autonomy of reason and the perfectibility of man.
'The basic structure
or phenomenology of their vision and action', he concludes, 'is in many crucial
and seemingly paradoxical ways a modern one, just as was the case with the
totalitarian movements of the twenties and thirties. These movements bear
within themselves the seeds of very intensive and virulent revolutionary
sectarian, utopian Jacobinism, seeds which can, under appropriate
circumstances, come to full-blown fruition.' Such movements have always had
violent repercussions: before developing its modern meaning of freelance or
irregular military action, the word 'terrorist' was applied to the Jacobin
revolutionaries in France who used the power of the state to inflict terror on
their enemies.
The use of violence,
whether by revolutionaries who seize control of the state, or by freelancers who
challenge the government, is neither arbitrary nor meaningless. Studies of
religious conflicts in Europe and South Asia reveal similar patterns of
violence. Examining religious riots in sixteenth-century France, Natalie Zemon Davis discovered 'rites of violence' that bore many
of the hallmarks of religious activity. 'Even extreme ways of defiling
corpses-dragging bodies through the streets and throwing them to the dogs,
dismembering genitalia and selling them in mock commerce-and desecrating
religious objects' had 'perverse connections' with such religious concepts as
'pollution and purification, heresy and blasphemy'. In his analysis of
religious violence in South Asia Stanley Tambiah
reaches similar conclusions. For example, in cases where innocent bystanders
were burned alive by the crowd, the defenceless and
terrified victims were murdered ritualistically in 'mock imitation of both the
self-immolation of (Buddhist] conscientious objectors and the terminal rite of
cremation'.
If there is a common
theme to the foregoing, as well as to the many more instances that must remain
unmentioned, it may be found in the way that religion has become secularized in
many parts of the world, even among people who claim to be resisting
secularism. The mythical images of cosmic struggle which form part of the
religious repertoire of the great traditions are being actualized or brought
down to earth. 'The cosmic struggle is understood to be occurring in this world
rather than in a mythical setting. Believers identify personally with the
struggle.' All religions affirm the primacy of meaning and order over chaos;
hence in treating of death and violence, religions strive to contain them
within an overarching, benign cosmic frame. In the Baghavad
Cita the god Krishna tells the warrior Arjuna that he
must submit to his destiny in fighting against his own kinsmen. in so doing, he
assents to the disorder of the world, although the contestants know that in the
grander sense, 'this disorder is corrected by a cosmic order that is beyond
killing and being killed'.
Similarly the Koran
contains many allusions to the Prophet Muhammad's battles, which are set in the
wider context of a moral order deemed to be upheld by an allseeing
benevolent God. For Christians, Jesus's heroism in allowing himself to endure
an excruciatingly painful death is seen as 'a monumental act of redemption for
humankind, tipping the balance of power and allowing the struggle for order to
succeed'.
Religious images and
texts provide ways in which violence, pain,. and death are overcome
symbolically. Human suffering is made more durable by the idea that death and
pain are not pointless, that lives are not wasted needlessly, but are part of a
grander scheme in which divinely constituted order reigns supreme above the
chaos and disorder of the world. In such a context the horrors and chaos of
wars, as described in the Mahabharata and the Book of Joshua, as debated in the
Baghavad Gita, as predicted in the Book of
Revelation, and as alluded to in the Koran, are subsumed within an order seen
to be meaningful and ultimately benign. The reading and recitation of such
texts, like the performance of ancient Greek tragedies, doubtless had a cartbartic function, purging people of anger and rage,
inducing pity and fear, reducing actual conflict, upholding social harmony. By
its rejection of symbolic interpretations fundamentalism (at least in its
politically militant versions) releases the violence contained in the text.
Fundamentalism is religion materialized, the word made flesh, as it were, with
the flesh rendered, all too often, into shattered body parts by the forces of
holy rage.
Fundamentalisms
differ from 'cults' or New Religious Movements by their commitment to textual
scripturalism. For example, the focus of the Rajneesh community in Oregon and
Poona was on the person of Baghwan Shree Rajneesh, a
charismatic 'cult' leader who drew eclectically on a wide variety of sources
from Hinduism, Buddhism, Christian, and Islamic mysticism, psychoanalysis, and
psychotherapy, as well as personal spiritual experience, in his teachings. A
Christian fundamentalist such as Jerry Falwell, by contrast, sticks closely to
the 'inerrant' text of the Bible in his sermons. This distinction, however,
should not be drawn too sharply. David Koresh, the 'prophet' of the Branch
Davidian sect of Seventh Day Adventism who perished along with dozens of his
followers at Waco Texas in April 1993, when his compound was attacked by US
federal agents, was a 'textual fundamentalist' as well as a charismatic leader
who availed himself of the sexual services of his female followers in order to
'spread his seed'. Far from being the result of 'brain-washing' or
'mind-control' techniques, the charismatic power he exercised over his
followers was the result of their conviction that he was a divinely inspired
interpreter of biblical passages (particularly the Book of Revelation) that are
central to the Seventh Day Adventist tradition. During the prolonged
negotiations preceding the federal attack on the Waco compound after a 5i-day
siege, the FBI negotiators dismissed Koresh's sermonizing as mere 'Bible
babble'. To his followers, however, his discourses on the Christian apocalypse
were both meaningful and pregnant with religious insight.
As these and many
other examples suggest, it is not just religious movements designated as
'fundamentalist' which have come to challenge the secularization thesis so
confidently proclaimed by Harvey Cox in the 1960's when he was professor of
Divinity at Harvard. According to Anson Shupe and Jeffrey Hadden, the forces of
secularization, rather than being unidirectional, are part of a dialectical
process: 'the economic and secular forces of socalled
"modernization" contain the very seeds of a reaction that brings
religion back into the heart of concerns about public policy. There is an
abundance of evidence to support this view in North America, where the New
Christian Right is actively engaged in Republican politics. The same
dialectical logic, however, also limits potential of fundamentalists to
transform society in the direction they want. As Steve Bruce has noted, in
order to maximize its electoral appeal the NCR has to compartmentalize its
approach and form alliances with other conservative religious groups such as
Mormons, Catholics, and conservative Jews. This not only dilutes the religious
aspect of the message, which is to convert non-believers; the very act of
compartmentalization-of separating the religious from the political-undermines
the fundamentalist agenda of 'bringing back God into politics'.
A similar logic
applies to television, the most conspicuous of the technologies used by
fundamentalists in America. By means of television, 'televangelists' such as
Pat Robertson seek to challenge the secular order, by 're-enchanting' the world
with divine interventions and supernatural events. Robertson and the late Oral
Roberts have performed healings on camera, even claiming to heal viewers
through their sets. In such programmes the sacred is
reaffirmed, after being banished from secular networks, or at best restricted
to the realm of fiction. The process of modernization described by Weber in his
famous phrase 'the disenchantment of the world' is reversed. Through television
the world is re-enchanted and resacralized.
At the same time the
counter-attack on secular values mounted through religious television may prove
subject to the law of diminishing returns. Through television the sacred and
supernatural are domesticated, and ultimately banalized. In the end,
disenchantment continues under the guise of the new religiosity. In the studio
the charismatic leader who speaks for God must put himself under the control of
the director and camera crew. Sacred words may disappear on the cutting-room
floor. The structure of authority becomes ambiguous.
Television, mixing
fact and fiction within a common format, collapses mythos and logos, especially
in cultures where the conventions of theatre and fiction have recently been
imported. In India movie stars who played divine beings in religious epics have
turned themselves into politicians. The Ayodhya
agitation referred to in Chapter 6 was boosted by television showings of the
Ramayana; in cdar fudlowecC,
ffmcfu and A/fusfirn
agitators stirred up mutual hostility by showing videos of their co-religionists
under attack. (In Brazil, actors, carrying drama into real life, have been
known to kill each other offstage.) But over-exposure on television can lead
God's spokespersons to become parodies of themselves. In America, where
television preachers are well into the second generation, Christian
broadcasting is also Christian'camp'.
In the 700 Club the
supernatural is not just appropriated: it is routinized and domesticated,
formatted into a regular 15-20-minute slots. In normal parlance a supernatural
event is by definition unpredictable and aweinspiring,
since natural laws have been suspended or superseded. Yet on the 700 Club
healings and other supernatural interventions, in which the divine is presumed
to have acted on matter by the invocation of the Holy Spirit through prayer,
occur so frequently as to be almost banal. To the outsider Walsh's remark about
the need for a miracle on her hair seems an outrageous put-down-both of the
healed woman's pain, and of her divinely arranged release from it. But the
studio audience-and, one suspects, the average 700 Club viewer-take it quite
differently. For those born-again Christians miracles are routine
occurrences-something to make in-group jokes about. in the community of the
saved, as exhibited on CBN, God routinely suspends natural laws and processes.
The miraculous is thus not so much a manifestation of the inexplicable Power of
the Almighty, as the ritual confirmation of a belief-system that challenges the
conventions of secular medical science. Like the Bible itself, the miraculous
acts as a shibboleth or totem, reinforcing the identity of the group.
Everywhere religious
programming is becoming more self-conscious as religious leaders try to get
their messages across to increasingly sophisticated audiences. A study of
Syrian broadcasts during the holy month of Ramadan in 1995 and 1996 shows that
like Christmas in Western countries, Ramadan is a time when families get
together and watch a considerable amount of television, much of it
entertainment. The religious broadcasts, according to the scholar Andreas Christmann, subtly interweave Ramadan hymns and prayers
with images that would seem 'to contradict the rather sparse and iconoclastic
visual language of orthodox Islam', with the traditional repertoire of hymns
and prayers accompanied by images of prayer halls, minarets, calligraphies,
meditating Muslims, and 'romanticised pictures of the
Syrian landscape as well as pages from the Quran, slotted in as graphic cards'.
The overall effect presents Islam as a national religion, rather as the BBC's
Songs of Praise-where professionally sung hymns are accompanied by shots that
pay homage to the beauties of Britain's landscape and its magnificent
cathedrals-celebrates the glories of Britain's national Church (with space, of
course, given to non-Anglican communions). After a thorough viewing of two
seasons' Ramadan programmes it became clear to Christmann that they 'attempt to reinforce the notion of
belonging to one nation regardless of denomination, ethnicity, class and
gender. With strong appeal to the unification of the national community, the
main appeal of the televisual message is to harmonize divergent interests and
orientations.'
In contrast to
Robertson, who seeks to restore the God who intervenes supernaturally by means
of the airwaves, Syrian television seeks to integrate popular religiosity with
the modernist reformism of the Salafi tradition, with the media canalizing
'popular spirituality away from mystical pantheism into more monotheistic
spiritual forms'. The invocations played during the popular Iftar programmes transmitted during the fast-breaking meal at
sundown contain no references to the guardian spirits or to the efficacy of
amulets and talismans, or to visits to the tombs of local saints or leaders of
mystical orders. By conceiving God as non-manipulative and more abstract,
television has brought popular religion into closer conformity with Islam's
official monotheistic ideals.' Sufi dances, when shown, are rather stiff and
low-key. Nothing is shown on television that is suggestive of 'excess,
exaggeration or trance'.
The increase in
religious militancy, occurring in many traditions in defiance of the
secularization thesis, may be related to the increasing power and accessibility
of audiovisual media, but the long-term consequences are ambiguous. In the
first instance the fundamentalist impulse in many traditions has been a
reaction to the invasive quality of film and television, which exposes 'sacred
areas' like sexual relations to public gaze, transgressive images bringing them
into the home. During the Islamist campaign in Algeria technicians had their
throats slit for fitting satellite dishes that would bring into Muslim homes
images of the 'satanic West', including semi-pornographic material from Italy
and the Netherlands as well as factual news channels. In America
'televangelists' such as Falwell and Robertson 'fought back' against the
perceived secularization of the culture by creating their own religious programmes and television networks. With the development of
satellite networks such as the al-jazeera channel
based in Qatar, state-funded broadcasting monopolies are losing their ability
to impose censorship and control information. In the least-developed regions
even more radical forces for change are at work, as the audio-visual revolution
undercuts the authority of the literate elites. Societies such as Iran and
India where levels of literacy have been low have moved from the oral to the
audio-visual era without experiencing the revolution in literacy that generated
both Protestantism and the Enlightenment in Europe.
Clearly the
revolution in communications has a bearing on the failure of the secularization
thesis as promulgated by Berger, Cox, and others. Where levels of literacy are
low the audio and video cassette have enabled charismatic religious figures
such as Sheikh Kishk in Egypt and the late Ayatollah
Khomeini to acquire massive followings. Osama bin Laden's carefully crafted
videos disseminated by al-Jazeera have contributed to
his image as the archetypical Islamic hero. Audio-visual technologies restore
the power of word and gesture-traditional province of religion-to a new type of
leader, undercutting the hegemony of bureaucrats and the traditional religious
professionals whose source of information and power was the written word. When
relayed on tape or television, the power of orality and the languages of ritual
and gesture retain their potency. 'Insult'-perceived through claims made on
television rather than in The Satanic Versestriggered
the anti-Rushdie agitation in Britain and South Asia.
The Ayodhya dispute, which had festered in the courts for
decades, only became a national issue in India when everyone could see what was
happening. With television the processes whereby village- or family-based
identities break down are accelerated, leaving an emotional vacuum to be filled
by iconic, charismatic figures such as Bin Laden. Literacy has ceased to be the
prerequisite for entering the political realm as it was in the past.
Fundamentalisms have
benefited from the revolution in communications in two ways. First, radio
broadcasts and television images, which are now accessible to the majority of
people on this planet, make people much more aware of issues with which they
can identify than was the case in the past. They increase the political
temperature and add to perceptions of cultural conflict. An obvious example is
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, with viewers throughout the Muslim world
enraged by the sight of Israeli soldiers killing and humiliating Palestinians,
while viewers in the West, shocked and dismayed by the carnage inflicted by
suicide bombers, are liable to have anti-Arab or anti-Muslim prejudices
confirmed. As numerous media theorists have pointed out, television is not the
same as propaganda. It does not have a unidirectional or homogenizing impact on
viewers. Most viewers bring pre-existing knowledge to what they see and hear on
television, 'decoding images' according to their prejudices. In the Muslim
world images of Israeli oppression may be reinforced by perceived differences
in lifestyles.
For example the
explicit sexual interactions to be seen on Tel Aviv beach may add to Islamist
perceptions that Palestinians are facing not just a 'racist' enemy that
discriminates against them, but one that is wholly evil because of its 'pagan' Yahili) social attitudes. Secondly, as explained already,
fundamentalists benefit from the 'para-personal', electronically amplified
relationships between charismatic leaders and their audiences. Nasser and
Hitler were both beneficiaries of the new medium of radio; both Khomeini and
Bin Laden were iconically impressive figures able to
convey the solemnity, gravitas, nobility, and asceticism Muslims associate with
the aniconic image of the Prophet Muhammad.
But if fundamentalist
movements benefit from the media revolution, they are also liable to be among
its casualties. The development of satellite television and increasing access
to the Internet is bringing an end to the information monopolies on which
fundamentalists-like other authoritarian movements-depend. In certain contexts,
such as Israel- Palestine and Iraq after the AngloAmerican
invasion, armed resistance to an externally imposed authority, publicized by
the media, is regarded as legitimate by a significant number of people. Under
such circumstances (which usually fit the category of religious nationalism,
rather than 'pure' fundamentalism) the terrorists or martyrs may become heroes.
But where religious radicals have tried to impose their will by violence, as in
Egypt, the publicity they court by indulging in the 'propaganda of the deed'
may result in popular revulsion, especially in the pious middle-class
constituencies on which they depend for support. After an exhaustive analysis
of modern Islamist movements from Morocco to Indonesia the French political
analyst Gilles Kepel has concluded that terrorism is
really a sign of failure, deployed when political mobilization has failed.
The recurrent
violence of the 1990's, the attacks on tourists in Egypt, the Taliban takeover
in Afghanistan, the war in Chechnya, the violence in France, the attacks on US
targets in Saudi Arabia, Yemen, and East Africa culminating in '9/11' is 'above
all a reflection of the movement's structural weakness, not its growing
strength'.-o The decline in the movement's capacity for political mobilization
explains why 'such spectacular and devastating new forms of terrorism' were
visited on America itself. Kepel's book was published
before Islamist parties took power in Pakistan's North-West Frontier Province
following elections imposed by Washington on the Musharraf government. Rumours of the death of Islamism in this area are certainly
premature. On a broader canvas, Kepel's analysis may
still hold good, but there are frightening dangers along the way. Where
Islamists have succeeded in taking power, as in Iran, satellite technology
tells against them, since it becomes impossible for them to sustain their
monopoly over the religious discourse. Religious texts such as the Koran have
endured because they transcend ideologies, speaking to the human condition in
language that is always open to alternative interpretations.
Recently Iranian
opposition forces, with explicit verbal support from the American president,
where demonstrating against the clerical leadership whom they accuse of
blocking the reformist agenda of President Khatami and the parliament. The
demonstrators have been sustained by satellite channels run by Iranian exiles
in the United States. Mindful of the fate of the Baathist regime in Iraq and
the Taliban in Afghanistan, the Iranian regime appears to be succumbing to
international pressure, backed by the United States, to open up its nuclear programme to United Nations weapons inspectors. Libya, once
a pariah state, has announced that it is abandoning weapons of mass
destruction, a policy aimed at the lifting of United Nations sanctions.
The future is nonetheless
precarious. Soon two Islamist regimes, Iran and Pakistan, could be armed with
nuclear weapons, a prospect made more dangerous by the strand of apocalyptic
fantasy that excites and inspires the children of Abraham. In Israel-Palestine
Jewish fundamentalists, backed by the Israeli army and with support from the Falwellites and other Protestant extremists in America
resist US pressure to relinquish control of occupied Palestine, in ironic
collusion with the Islamist militants of Harnas and
Islamic Jihad. Within three years, at this writing, an Iranian regime with
nuclear capacity could be supporting the Palestinians in the next round of the
intifada against Israel. Since the latter already has its nuclear weapons, the
stage will be set for the Armageddon predicted and welcomed by premilliennialists as the necessary prelude to the return
of Christ.
The gloomy prognosis
might be applied, a fortiori, to Pakistan, an economic and social disaster zone
when compared with its rival, the 'polytheist' or 'pagan' India. More ominously
even than in Israel- Palestine, the apocalyptic mood in Pakistan centres on the 'Islamic bomb', to which there are now
flower-decked shrines in major cities. Like the attacks on New York and
Washington, which like other cities in the Satanic West face the prospect of
terrorist attacks with 'dirty bombs' (conventional explosives containing
radioactive materials capable of spreading radiation over a large area),
Pakistani bomb-worship may be a manifestation of nihilistic theological despair.
'Polytheist' India flourishes compared with rightly-guided Pakistan. So do
infidel places by adding 'scientific creationism' to the curriculum. They
inconvenience some women-especially poor women with limited access to travel-by
making abortion illegal in certain states. On a planetary level they are
selfish, greedy, and stupid, damaging the environment by the excessive use of
energy and lobbying against environmental controls. What is the point of saving
the planet, they argue, if Jesus is arriving tomorrow?
American
fundamentalists are a headache, a thorn in flesh of the bien-pensant liberals,
the subject of bemused concern to 'Old Europeans' who have experienced too many
real catastrophes to yearn for Armageddon. Given that premillennialism and its
associated theologies are significant components of American policy, especially
under Republican administrations, it seems fair to state that Protestant
fundamentalism is a dangerous religion. Whatever spiritual benefits individuals
may have gained by taking Jesus as their 'personal saviour'
the apocalyptic fantasies harboured by born-again
Christians have a negative impact on public policy. Because of its impact on
the environment and its baleful role in the Middle East, America's religiosity
is a problem.
But the solution is
also American. The constitutional separation of church and state is as
fundamental to American democracy as the Bible is to fundamentalists. The hard
line preached by televangelists such as Falwell and Robertson is protected by
the First Amendment, but it is also limited by it. Though fundamentalists can
influence policy, they cannot control it. The same considerations apply, by and
large, to fundamentalists in Israel, Sri Lanka, and India, who are constrained
by the pluralistic and democratic political systems in which they operate.
The Islamic situation
is different, because for historical and sociological reasons too complex to
explain in this book, very few Muslim political cultures have developed along
democratic lines. In their ruthless drive to power, Islamists have succeeded in
taking control of the state temporarily in Sudan, Pakistan, and Afghanistan and
permanently in Saudi Arabia and (under different sectarian colours)
in Iran. Where the Islamist tide has receded or been checked (as in Pakistan,
Egypt, and Algeria) it has been ruthless action by the military rather than the
constraints of democratic institutions that have protected secular government.
The association of religious pluralism and secularism with militarism (as in
Syria, Pakistan, and Turkey) rather than with democracy has been an important
element in the Islamist rhetorical armory.
Where the military
governs along secular lines, as in Algeria or in Turkey during periods of army
intervention, Islamists can plausibly appeal to democratic feelings. But where
Islamists actually hold power, as in Iran, they resist democratic change as
being contrary to the will of God. There are ways out of this vicious spiral,
but they require fine political tuning. One example is offered by Turkey, where
in order to win democratically Islamists have had to abandon their more
strident demands for 're-islamizing' society. Another
is offered by Jordan, which allows Islam ists; to win
parliamentary seats, exposing them to the cut and thrust of political debate.
Despite these very
real problems, the call for freedom, even when polluted by the suspicion that
it is being exploited by commercial interests, still runs with the grain of
popular aspirations. Islamism, like other fundamentalisms, works best in
opposition. In power it proves no less susceptible to corruption or
manipulation than the ideologies and systems it seeks to supplant. For the
foreseeable future Muslim nationalists will doubtless continue to resist
American global hegemony, along with Russian imperialism in Transcaucasia and
the Israeli subjugation of Palestine. But in other respects the power of modern
technology may be working in America's direction. In the age of satellite
broadcasting and the internet, pluralism and diversity of choice are no longer
aspirations. They are dynamic realities.
Religious/Political
Economy
Although many
religious activists (especially the evengelical
movements within Christianity and Islam) believe they have a universal mission
to transform or convert the world, all religious traditions must face the
problematic of their parochial origins, the embarrassing fact that saviours and prophets uttered divine words in particular
languages to relatively small groups of people at particular historical junctures.
Although both
Hindutva and Islamic resurgence provide total alternatives in political terms,
religious resurgence fits nicely into the neoliberal worldview. The presumed
weakness or failure of the state legitimates resurgence and its call for inverting
modernization. Hindu nationalists found few noticeable difficulties cuddling up
to neoliberalism, although the lure of state power admittedly may have been an
important enticement, given India's changing relation to the global political
economy.
The attitude of
Islamists toward neoliberalism in Pakistan remains untested, but the actual
practice of reliance on a market-based civil society in the areas of self-help,
welfare, education, and banking suggests few political contradictions between
Islamism and neoliberalism there. For the most part, contestation lies in the
cultural domain: in ideals and practices of the family, the regulation of
sexual relations, and Westernization. Here, too, a changed attitude is
conspicuous. The ideal family now is not the communalized institution of
extended blood ties but is increasingly a nuclear arrangement liberated from
larger societal curbs . This shift in the idealized nature of the family is
more patriarchal than its historical predecessor in Muslim society. It is
inherently bourgeois in a lumpen sense-privatized and vulnerable to masculine
whim. Veiling and segregation become more explicable within (lumpen) bourgeois
notions of family and private property than as cultural pathologies of a
traditional society.
The relation between
religious resurgence and Westernization is more complicated. The former has no
trouble embracing the technical and instrumental aspects of Western modernity.
Their rejection of the West is confined mainly to its cultural expressions, a
phenomenon not uncommon to relations of exchange under conditions of
differential power. Furthermore, and especially in view of cultural hierarchies
drawn by language and privi
ideologies of
Marxist-Leninism, National Socialism, and anti-colonialism as the principal
challenge to a world order based on the hegemonic power of the liberal
capitalist West. Just as the contradictions within liberalism (between, for
example, the universal rights of man and the pursuit of imperial trade) gave
rise to the anti-colonial movements of the post-Second World War era, so the
earliest shoots of fundamentalism (semantically, if not as an age-old
phenomenon) came to fruition in the United States-in the very heart of the
capitalist West.
Since 9/11 one year
after I first presented part 1 and 2 of the term Fundamentalism has been
frequently used for groups that in some cases are even New Religious
Movements (NMRs in academic jargon) and in others should really be called
“Reform Movements” as I did in part one. For the sake of a general
understanding and since this is an improved transcript placed on the
internet end 2003, we will term them “Modernist Religions”. In contrast the
word ‘Fundamentalism” was coined more then two
centuries ago in context of a Protestant setting.
For example Islamic
scholars argue that since all observant Muslims believe the Koran-the divine
text of Islam-to be the unmediated Word of God, all are committed to a doctrine
of scriptural inerrancy, whereas for Protestants biblical inerrancy is one of
the hallmarks that distinguishes fundamentalists from liberals. If all believing
Muslims are `fundamentalists' in this sense of the word, then the term is
meaningless, because it fails to distinguish between the hard-edged militant
who seeks to `Islamize' his society and the quietist who avoids politics
completely. `Higher criticism of the Bible' based on close textual study-the
original cause of the Protestant fundamentalist revolt against liberalism and
modernism challenged traditional teachings by claiming, for example, that the
Book of Isaiah has more than one author and that the Pentateuch-the first five
books of the Old Testament-was not authored by Moses himself. `Higher
criticism' of the Koran, by contrast, which would challenge the belief that every
word contained in the text was dictated to Muhammad by God through the agency
of the Angel Gabriel, has not been a major issue in the Muslim world to date,
though it may become so in due course, as literary critical theories gain
ground in academic circles. The concerns of most Muslim `fundamentalists'
especially following 9/11 are largely of a different order: the removal
of governments deemed corrupt or too pro-Western and the replacement of laws
imported from the West by the indigenous Sharia code derived from the Koran and
the sunna (custom) of the Prophet Muhammad.
Parallel concerns may
be found among the 'fundamentalist' New Religious Movements (NRMs) in Japan,
where the Allied Occupation in 1945 imposed comprehensive and far-reaching
changes in the country's civil code. On slightly different grounds scholars of
Judaism point out that `fundamentalist' is much too broad a term when applied
both to ultra-orthodox groups known as Haredim (some of which still refuse to
recognize the legitimacy of the State of Israel) and the religious settlers of
Gush Emunim (the Bloc of the Faithful) who place more
emphasis on holding onto the Land of Israel than on observing the Halakha
(Jewish law).
`Fundamentalism',
according to its critics, is just a dirty fourteen-letter word. It is a term of
abuse levelled by liberals and Enlightenment rationalists against any group,
not just to the rational mind, with fundamentalists exposing what one
anthropologist calls `the hubris of reason's pretence
in trying to take over religion's role'.'
Words have a life and
energy of their own that will usually defy the exacting demands of scholars.
The F-word has long since escaped from the Protestant closet in which it began
its semantic career around the turn of the twentieth century.
The applications or
meanings attached to words cannot be confined to the context in which they
originate: if one limits `fundamentalism' to its original meaning one might as
well do the same for words like `nationalism' and `secularization' which also
appeared in the post Enlightenment West before being applied to movements or
processes in non-Western societies. Applying the same restrictive logic, ore
should not speak of Judaism or Christianity as `religions' because that
originally Latin word is found in neither Old nor New Testaments.
'Fundamentalism' may indeed be a `Western linguistic encroachment' on other
traditions, but the phenomenon (or rather, the phenomena) it describes exists,
although no single definition will ever be uncontested. Put at its broadest, it
may be described as a `religious way of being' that manifests itself in a
strategy by which beleaguered believers attempt to preserve their distinctive
identity as a people or group in the face of modernity and secularization.
Bruce Lawrence, a
scholar who does, believes that the F-word can be extended beyond its original
Protestant matrix, sees its connection with modernity as crucial: 'Fundamentalism
is a multifocal phenomenon precisely because the modernist hegemony, though
originating in some parts of the West, was not limited to Protestant
Christianity' (emphasis added). The Enlightenment influenced significant
numbers of Jews, and because of the colonization of much of Africa and Asia in
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, it touched the lives and
destinies of many Muslims.- According to this view the `modernist hegemony' did
not end with the attainment of political independence by so-called Third World
countries. Indeed, given the far-reaching consequences of the scientific
revolution that flowed from the Enlightenment, the modern predicament against
which fundamentalists everywhere are reacting has been extended to cover
virtually every corner of the planet.
Rather than quibbling
about the usefulness of 'fundamentalism' as an analytic term, I propose in this
book to explore its ambiguities, to unpack some of its meanings. The term may
be less than wholly satisfactory, but the phenomena it encompasses deserve to
be analysed. Whether or not we like the phrase,
fundamentalist or fundamentalist-like movements appear to be erupting in many
parts of the world, from the Americas to South-East Asia. No one would claim
that these movements, which occur in most of the world's great religious
traditions, are identical. But all of them exhibit what the philosopher Ludwig
Wittgenstein called `family resemblances'. In explaining his analogy
Wittgenstein took the example of games-board-games, card-games, ball-games,
Olympic Games, and so forth. Instead of assuming that all must have a single,
defining feature because of the common name applied to them, games should be
examined for similarities and relationships. Such an examination, said
Wittgenstein, would reveal 'a complicated network of similarities overlapping
and criss-crossing: sometimes overall similarities,
sometimes similarities of detail' such as one finds in different members of the
same family, in which 'build, features, colour of
eyes, gait, temperament et cetera overlap and criss-cross
in the same way'.
Before proceeding to
explore these resemblances, it would be useful to recapitulate the history of
the word and its burgeoning semantic career. Its origins are quite revealing.
Although the wordhas acquired negative connotations
in much of the world, it did not begin as a term of abuse or even criticism. It
appeared early in the twentieth century not, as might be expected, in the
'Bible Belt' of the Old South, but in southern California, one of America's
most rapidly developing regions (in the same area and at about the same time
that one of fundamentalism's principal bugbears, the Hollywood film industry,
made its appearance). Milton and Lyman Stewart, two devout Christian
brothers who had made their fortune in the California oil business, embarked on
a five-year programme of sponsorship for a series of
pamphlets which were sent free of charge to 'English-speaking Protestant
pastors, evangelists, missionaries, theological professors, theological
students, YMCA secretaries, Sunday School superintendents, religious lay workers,
and editors of religious publications throughout the world'. Entitled The
Fundamentals: A Testimony of Truth, the tracts, written by a number of leading
conservative American and British theologians, were aimed at stopping the
erosion of what the brothers and their editors considered to be the
`fundamental' beliefs of Protestantism: the inerrancy of the Bible; the direct
creation of the world, and humanity, ex nihilo by God (in contrast to Darwinian
evolution); the authenticity of miracles; the virgin birth of Jesus, his
Crucifixion and bodily resurrection; the substitutionary atonement (the
doctrine that Christ died to redeem the sins of humanity); and (for some but
not all believers) his imminent return to judge and rule over the world.
Like many
conservative American Protestants, who are technically known as premillennial
dispensationalists, the Stewart brothers believed that the End Times prophesies
contained in the scriptures, notably the Old Testament books of Ezekiel and
Daniel, and the last book of the New Testament, the Revelation of St John,
referred to real (not symbolic) events that were shortly due to happen on the
plane of human history. Drawing on a tradition of prophecy interpretation
developed by an English clergyman, John Nelson Darby (18oo-8a), they argued
that since many Old Testament prophecies about the coming Messiah were
fulfilled with the coming of Christ as documented in the New Testament, other
predictions, concerning the End Times, would soon come to pass. Expecting the
world to end at any moment they saw it as their duty to save as many people as
possible before the coming catastrophe when sinners would perish horribly and
the saved would be 'raptured' into the presence of Christ.
Being successful
businessmen, the Stewarts wanted, and expected, results. As Lyman wrote to
Milton after learning that the American Tobacco Company was spending millions
of dollars distributing free cigarettes in order to give people a taste for
them: `Christians should learn from the wisdom of the world.'
Theological motives
were complemented by business competition. Lyman's 'organizing principle' in
the oil business was fighting his rival John D. Rockefeller's attempts to
monopolize the industry. It may or may not be coincidental that one of the
first preachers he hired came to his attention after preaching against
`something that one of those infidel professors in Chicago University had
published'. Chicago Divinity School, a hotbed of liberalism, had been founded
and endowed by John D. Rockefeller.
Some three million
copies of The Fundamentals were circulated, on both sides of the Atlantic. The
-ist was added in 192o by Curtis Lee Laws, a
conservative Baptist editor: `Fundamentalists', he declared, `were those who
were ready to do battle royal for The Fundamentals.' The previous year William
B. Riley, a leader of the militant dispensationalist premillennialist party
among the Northern Baptists, had organized the non-denominational World
Christian Fundamentals Association. Although premillennialist ideas do not
loom as large in The Fundamentals as they would in later fundamentalist
discourse, there is no doubt that the Stewart brothers approved. About half the
American contributors to The Fundamentals, including such leading lights as
Reuben Torrey and Cyrus Ignatius Scofield, were premillennialists. Before
endowing The Fundamentals, Lyman Stewart had been a major sponsor of Scofield's
reference Bible, first published in 1909, and still the preferred commentary of
American premillennialists.
The belief that Jesus
would return to rule over an earthly kingdom of the righteous after defeating
the Anti- christ dates back to the earliest phase of
Christianity, when the apostles lived in the daily expectation of his promised
return. Dismayed by its revolutionary potential, which challenged the renovated
imperial cults, common to both Eastern Orthodoxy and Western Catholicism, that
conferred divine legitimacy on the Holy Roman and Byzantine emperors, the
early church fathers, notably St Augustine (354-430) allegorized and
spiritualized the coming Kingdom of God. Christian apocalyptic became `part of
the everyday fabric of Christian life and belief, and to that extent reinforced
eschatological awareness by embedding it in liturgy and preaching' while
distancing Catholic thought from literalistic readings of prophesy and especially
notions of an earthly millennium.5 The seal on Augustine's teaching was set by
the Council of Ephesus in 431 which condemned millennialism and expurgated
works of earlier church fathers thought to be tainted with the doctrine. After
the Reformation loosened the Church's grip on Christian teaching, millennialist
ideas resurfaced in such apocalyptic movements as the Anabaptists of Munster in
Germany and Fifth Monarchy Men who took part in the English Revolution
(1649-60). Transplanted to America, where constitutional separation of church
and state encourages religious innovation, millennialist ideas took root in
fertile soil.
Belief in the coming
physical millennium lies at the basis of at least three of the new world
religions founded in the United States since 18oo-Mormonism, Seventh Day
Adventism, and.the Jehova's
Witnesses. The number of premillennialist Protestants (who believe that the
Second Coming will be followed by the thousand-year reign of Christ on earth)
has been estimated conservatively at eight million. Not all the early
fundamentalists were premillennialists. But it is interesting to note George W.
Dollar, a leading premillennialist, drew a sharp distinction between true
fundamentalism based only on scriptural interpretation and `orthodoxy', which
he considered based in the often syncretistic views of the church fathers and
the classic creeds. Noting that there was very little in The Fundamentals that
taught premillennialism, he concluded that they should really be `hailed as the
Fundamentals of Orthodoxy'.
The fundamentalist
myth of a golden age, whether set in the past or projected into the future,
will be explored in the next chapter. Here it is enough to point out that the
`F-word', however constructed, should never be taken at face value: even at its
origin, in The Fundamentals, its meaning was contested. In no tradition does
one find a complete consensus, even among conservatives, about what the `fundamentals'
of the faith really are. Fundamentalists are nothing if not selective about
the texts they use and their mode of interpretation. They are also much more
innovative in the way they interpret the texts they select than is often
supposed. In this respect they may be contrasted with traditionalists.
`Tradition', like
`fundamental', can also be understood in more than one way. Among Roman
Catholics, Anglicans, and other religious communities, the word conveys the
sense of a cumulative body of ritual, behaviour, and
thought that reaches back to the time of origins. In Catholicism especially,
tradition embodying the accumulated experience and knowledge of the Church is
seen as a source of authority equal to scripture. Tied to the exclusive
authority of the Church, tradition was affirmed at the Council of Trent in the
sixteenth century, the Church's official response to the challenge posed by the
sola scriptura doctrine of the Protestant reformers. In a sense Martin Luther,
John Calvin, and other Reformation leaders could be described as
`fundamentalists' many centuries before the term was coined, while the Council
of Trent can be seen as a `fundamentalist' or 'integralist' response.
In the Islamic
tradition similar considerations apply: tradition here means the accumulated
body of interpretation, law, and practice as developed over the centuries by
the ulama, the class of `learned men' who constitute Islam's professional
religionists or clerics. Throughout Islamic history there have been
`renovators' or reformers who, like Luther, challenged the authority of the
ulama on the basis of their readings of the Sources of Islam, namely the Koran
and the Hadiths (the latter, sometimes confusingly translated as `Traditions',
are canonized reports about Muhammad's deeds and teachings, based, it is supposed,
on the oral testimony of his contemporaries and passed down by word of mouth
before being collated into written collections). In this sense the medieval
scholar Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1326) who ended his life in
prison for challenging the authority of the ulama and rulers of his day was a
`fundamentalist'. Significantly his writings are extremely popular among
today's Islamist militants.
A less specialized
meaning of `tradition', however, is also relevant here. In a broader context,
tradition is simply what occurs unselfconsciously as part of the natural order
of things, an unreflective or unconsidered Weltanschauung (world view). In the
words of Martin Marty, `most people who live in a traditional culture do not
know they are traditionalists'.5 Tradition, in this sense, consists in not
being aware that how one believes or behaves is 'traditional', because
alternative ways of thinking or living are simply not taken into consideration.
In `traditional' societies, including the mainly rural communities that
formerly constituted the American Bible Belt, the Bible was seen as
comprehensively true, a source of universal wisdom, knowledge, and authority
deemed to have been transmitted to humanity by God through the prophets,
patriarchs, and apostles who wrote the Bible. The latter was not thought of as
a `scientific textbook'; but nor did the ordinary pastor or worshipper consider
it `unscientific'. For most of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries the
Bible was considered compatible with reason, or at least with that version of
reason conveyed by the 'commonsense' philosophy which spread to North America
from Scotland, along with Calvinist theology and more or less democratic forms
of church governance.
When Higher Criticism,
originating in Germany, began to challenge the received understandings of the
Bible, for example by using sophisticated methods of textual analysis to argue
that books attributed to Moses or Isaiah show evidence of editorial changes,
textual accumulations, and multiple authorship, or that the doctrine of the
virgin birth of Christ depended on a mistranslation of the original Greek text,
unreflective tradition (the `received knowledge' of generations) was converted
into reactive defensiveness. From this perspective fundamentalism may be
defined as `tradition made self-aware and consequently defensive'. In Samuel
Heilman's words, `traditionalism is not fundamentalism, but a necessary
correlate to it'.
In all religions, but
especially in Protestantism, the active defence of
tradition demands selectivity, since the text of the Bible is too vast and
complex to be defended in all its details. Like any military commander, the
fundamentalist had to choose the ground on which to do `battle royal' with the forces
of liberalism and Higher Criticism. The Fundamentals was part of the process
that galvanized this reaction. Hence in America especially it cut across the
more democratically organized denominations, including Presbyterians, Baptists,
Lutherans, and Methodists. In most of the American denominations it represented
the grass roots reaction to the elitism of the seminaries, perceived as being
out of touch with the culture and beliefs of ordinary believers. Yet, as Marty
and Appleby point out, the very idea behind the project revealed the distance
that had already been travelled along the path of secularity: `Designating
fundamentalisms automatically places the designator at great remove from the
time when religion thrived as a whole way of life. To identify any one thing or
set of beliefs or practices as essential is to diminish other elements of what
was once an organic whole.'?
The most famous of
the `battles royal' which tore many American churches apart in the first half
of the twentieth century was the `Monkey Trial' in Dayton Tennessee in 1925. As
Garry Wills, one of America's best-known commentators has explained, the trial
was something of a `put-up job' engineered, in effect, by the American Civil
Liberties Union (ACLU) to challenge an obscure and little used Tennessee state
law banning the teaching of evolution in schools.
Many southern states
had such laws early in the twentieth century. A biology teacher, John Scopes
(who subsequently admitted that he had missed teaching the classes dealing with
evolution), `claimed (rather shakily) to have broken the law'.
It was `one of the
best early examples of what would later be known as a "media event"
', in which the coverage itself was more important than what actually occurred
in court. Hundreds of journalists attended, including the most famous reporter
of the day, H. L. Mencken of the Baltimore Sun. Radio lines were brought into
the courtroom, and the judge held up proceedings to allow photographers; to get
their shots. The fundamentalist defenders of the state law won the trial on
points. With a fundamentalist jury, three members of which testified that they
read nothing but the Bible, the verdict was a foregone conclusion. The state
law was upheld but Scopes had his conviction quashed on appeal, which prevented
the ACLU from pursuing its original aim of bringing the case to a higher
Federal court. He went on to become a geologist after winning a scholarship to
the University of Chicago.
Culturally the media
battle was a devastating defeat for fundamentalism. In a famous
cross-examination before the trial judge William Jennings Bryan, former
Secretary of State and three times Democratic candidate for the presidency,
suffered public humiliation at the hands of Clarence Darrow, the ACLU lawyer.
Cleverly drawing on literalistic interpretations of the Bible approved of by
conservatives, Darrow showed that Bryan's knowledge of scripture and
fundamentalist principles of interpretation was fatally flawed. Afflicted with
diabetes, Bryan died shortly after the trial, a broken man. In the media
treatment sight was lost of the moral issues that had been his primary concern.
As a Democrat and
populist Bryan believed that German militarism, the ultimate cause of the First
World War, had been a by-product of Darwin's theory of natural selection
combined with Friedrich Nietzsche's ideas about the human Will to Power. Given
the way in which ideas of Social Darwinism were subsequently put to use by the
Nazis, he deserves more credit than he has been given. Shortly before the
Second World War, Adolf Hitler would state in one of his speeches: `[Anyone]
who has pondered on the order of this world realizes that its meaning lies in
the warlike survival of the fittest.
Antievolution laws
remained on the statue books of several American states, and indeed were
extended in some cases. But for the American public at large fundamentalists
were exposed as rural ignoramuses, countryside `hillbillies' out of touch with
modern thought. One of the major cultural events of twentieth-century America,
the `Monkey Trial', precipitated what might be called the `withdrawal phase' of
American fundamentalism-a retreat into the enclaves of churches and private
educational institutions, such as Bob Jones University. In the mainstream academies,
seminaries, and denominations, liberal theology which accepted evolution as
`God's way of doing things' swept the board.
`In their theories,
story lines, plots, and images, the nation's scholars, journalists, novelists,
playwrights, and filmmakers most explicitly articulated modern America as a
world in which Fundamentalists figured as stigmatized outsiders. The terms of
secular modernity were also written into a wide array of laws, court decisions,
government policies, decrees, and regulations, codes of etiquette, customs,
practices, and commonsense presuppositions that structured national public
discourses.'
that `at the national
level signs of religious partisanship were voluntarily suppressed' though it
remained for the most part `incomplete, fragile, and, at times and places,
seriously contested'.- Thereafter the `modern secular hegemony' held sway for
several decades.
The triumph of
liberalism in the mainstream churches was at first tacitly endorsed by the
fundamentalists who, for the most part, opted for the strategy of `separation'
from the world. Logically premillennialist Christians should not care if `the
world' goes from bad to worse, though they are charitably enjoined to rescue as
many souls as they can. According to the Book of Revelation the reign of the
Antichrist preceding the Second Coming will be accompanied by all sorts of
portents and signs of evil. As the `saved remnant' of humanity, true Christians
(i.e fundamentalists) should even welcome these signs
as proof that salvation is imminent. `The darker the night gets, the lighter my
heart gets', wrote Reuben Torrey, one of the editors of The Fundamentals.
The contempt to which
fundamentalists were exposed in the popular media after the Scopes trial
reinforced the correctness of this view. This does not mean, however, that
American fundamentalism remained static. Despite its exclusion from the
mainstream, the half-century from 1930 to 1980 saw a steady institutional
growth, with numerous (mainly Baptist) churches seceding from national
denominations in order to create an impressive national infrastructure of
`pastoral networks, parachurch organisations and superchurches, schools and colleges, book and magazine
publishing industries, radio, television and direct-mail operations' that built
on older institutions created during the nineteenth-century revivals, such as
the famous Moody Bible Institute in Chicago. Whilst main.s=e=
America, abetted by an increasingly centralized ambitions, American
fundamentalists are constrained by this wall which, for historical reasons,
they are more likely than not to accept. As refugees from what they conceived
to be the `religious tyrannies' of the Old World, the Protestant colonists who
founded the United States in 1776 and won its independence from Britain were
opposed to any alliance between state power and religious authority. Churches
should be self-governing, autonomous institutions free from taxation and
government interference. Nevertheless since all of the Founding Fathers were
Protestants, modern fundamentalists can reasonably argue that the United States
was founded as a Christian-i.e. Protestant-nation. For them the `wall of
separation' does not mean that the state is atheist or even secular in the
fullest sense of the word: merely that it maintains a posture of neutrality
towards the different churches or religious denominations. With waves of
Catholic migrants from Ireland arriving from the 183os and Jewish immigration
from Eastern and Central Europe from the latter part of the nineteenth century,
denominational pluralism was extended beyond what many people (though not
Jefferson, who believed in religious freedom `for the infidel of every
denomination') would have imagined during the 1780s.
A landmark Supreme
Court decision in 1961 extended to `secular humanists' (i.e. non-believers) the
legal protection accorded to followers of religious faiths. Ironically this is
the decision which fundamentalists now use in order to argue that `secular
humanism' qualifies as a religion, for example when values associated with it
appear in school curricula. It should therefore be curbed by the state, whose
responsibility it is to maintain the `wall of separation'. American
fundamentalists are therefore constrained by the pluralistic religious culture
in which they must operate. Rather than forming a religious party aimed at
taking over the government, they lobby for power and influence within the
Republican Party. Legislative successes at state level have included the
reinstitution of daily prayers in some public schools, `equal time' rules for
the teaching of evolution and creation, and the overturning by a dozen or more
states of the 1973 Supreme Court Roe v. Wade judgement repealing state bans on
abortion. At the local level fundamentalists have lobbied for the banning of
books deemed irrelibious from public school libraries
or Hawthorne's The Scarlet Letter, William Golding's Lord of the Flies, and
books by Mark Twain, Joseph Conrad, and John Steinbeck, all of which have been
seen as promoting the `religion' of secular humanism by questioning faith in
God or portraying religion negatively. These successes, however, have often
been reversed by the courts after actions by organizations such as the ACLU and
PAW (People for the American Way, a liberal lobby group. At the national level
fundamentalism is further constrained by the need to find conservative partners
from beyond the ranks of Protestant fundamentalists.
On single issues such
as abortion or ERA (the proposed Equal Rights Amendment for women),
fundamentalist lobbying can be efficacious. In the wider political domain,
however, American fundamentalists are faced with a dilemma. To collaborate with
other conservative groups they must suppress or even abandon their theological
objections. As Steve Bruce explains: `In the world-view which creates the
particular reasons conservative Protestants have for resisting modernism,
Catholics and Jews are not Christians, and Mormonism is a dangerous cult. But
legislative and electoral success requires that fundamentalists work in
alliance with such groups and with secular conservatives. Outside the
pro-Life (anti-abortion) and anti-ERA campaigns, which raise gender issues to
which all conservative religionists are particularly sensitive, fundamentalists
have found little support. Given that religious pluralism is the primary enemy
of fundamentalist certainty, this is hardly surprising. In the United States
the Constitution, the first in the world to make religious pluralism a central
article of faith, is the reef on which the aspirations of `pure' Protestant
fundamentalism seem destined to founder.
But as Steve Bruce
in The Rise and Fall of the New Christian Right ( 1988,p 171),
mentioned, in a letter written in May 1937 by Sir Reader Bullard, British Minister
in Jeddah, it already stated that King Abd al-Aziz Ibn Saud `has been
coming out strong as a fundamentalist' by condemning women who mix with men
`under the cloak of progress'. Bruce Lawrence next suggested that
the term “Islamic fundamentalism” was `coined' by H. A. R. Gibb, the well-known
orientalist, in his book Mohammedanism (later retitled Islam) with reference to
Jamal al-Din al-Afghani, the pan Islamic reformer ‘Egyptian Rite’ Freemason ,
plus political activist.
Afghani (who traveled
to India the same month as Colonel Olcott and Madame Blavatsky as I described
in The Matrix of Modernist Religions and Nationalism P.21), was a masterful
conspirator, polemicist, and political activist, can in the current context
thus also be seen as the founder of ‘Islamic`fundamentalism'.
Far from
unequivocally opposing the Enlightenment (one of the family traits ascribed to
most fundamentalist movements) however, Afghani's attitude to modernity was
thoroughly ambiguous. Hating imperialism, he nevertheless acknowledged the need
for wholescale reforms of the `Muslim religion', which he saw as decadent,
decayed, and corrupt. Thus this spirit is much closer to that of Martin Luther
than to, say, a contemporary scriptural literalist such as Jerry Falwell, hence
I called it a “Religious Reform Movement” in p.1.
A journal which
Afghani founded in Paris with his disciple Muhammad Abduh, was the leading
reformist journal of its time. Despite its short duration, it remained an
abiding influence on the modernist movement in Islam. The inclusion of Afghani
under the 'fundamentalist' label therefore expands our definition not just
because Islam is different from Christianity but because what is `fundamental'
to both faiths has been construed differently. Islamic fundamentalism or
Islamism, to use an English word that corresponds more closely to the term
adopted by contemporary Muslim activists, thus is not countermodernist
in the way that fundamentalist Christianity has been described as being. Far
from challenging the basic premisses of the
Enlightenment, the movement launched by Afghani and Abduh in the 1870s, known
as the Salafiyya, after the `pious ancestors' or
Prophet's Companions, absorbed the modernist spirit to the point where Abduh
broke with Afghani and collaborated with the British power in Egypt to further
his reformist agenda. Unlike Christian fundamentalism, Salafism cannot be
described as anti-modernist, although the word salafi
is sometimes used for `fundamentalist' in Arabic. An alternative Arabic term, usuli from usul (roots),
corresponds more closely to the F-word in English.
A complicating factor
here, however, is the specific usage it has acquired in the religious history of
Shiism, the minority tradition in Islam which, like Catholicism, balances
adherence to scripture with an emphasis on religious leadership. In the
nineteenth century the Shii ulama divided into two
major schools, the usulis and the akhbaris.
Though described in
the Western media as a `fundamentalist', the leader of the 1979 Iranian
revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, belonged to the usuli
school and upheld its tenets against those of his more conservative or
`fundamentalism', akhbari rivals. Though presenting
himself as the defender of Islamic `fundamentalism', Khomeini was a radical
innovator in Shii religious and political thought.
Despite his frequent denunciations of Marxism, he incorporated a good deal of
Marxist thinking into his discourse.
The problems of
definition are compounded when socalled Jewish
fundamentalism is taken into account. As with Arabic there is no indigenous
Hebrew word for `fundamentalism'. The term usually employed for Jewish
extremists by the Israeli media is yamina dati, the 'religious right'.
Far from rejecting
modernity, fundamentalists of the religious right such as Gush Emunim (GE), the Bloc of the Faithful, are religious
innovators. Whereas the traditionalist or orthodox groups known as the Haredim
regarded the establishment of Israel as an impious pre-empting of the Messiah's
role, Gush Emunim and other right-wing religious
Zionists see the secular state as a `stage' towards Redemption. For them the
whole Land of Palestine (including the territories captured in the 1967 Arab-Israel
war) belongs to the Jewish people and must be held in trust for the coming
Messiah. The Haredi groups such as Neturei Karta
(NK), the `Guardians of the City', are much more strict in their adherence to
the Halakha, Jewish religious law, than Gush Emunim.
The most orthodox or `fundamentalist' among them do not even recognize the
State of Israel: for them the condition of exile is an existential one,
fundamental to the very concept of Jewishness. If Jewish `fundamentalism' can
embrace such divergent alternatives as NK and GE, can the term be meaningful or
useful?
The question, of
course, is theoretical. By now it should be clear that the meanings, or
possible applications, of the F-word have strayed far beyond the umbrella of
the 'Abrahamic' monotheisms (Judaism, Christianity, and Islam). Sikh
`fundamentalists' took control of the Golden Temple of Amritsar, and when
Indira Gandhi sent the troops in, they murdered her in revenge. Hindu 'fundamentalists'
demolished the Babri Masjid Mosque at Ayodhya in 1992,
believing it to be the site of the birthplace of the deity Rama, setting off
communal rioting that led to thousands of deaths. Buddhist monks in Sri Lanka
have taken up arms against Tamil separatists, breaking with centuries of
pacifism. For their part the Tamils, who pioneered the suicide bomb a decade
before Lebanese squads to take an oath to the Hindu god Shiva.
So if
`Fundamentalism' it encompasses many types of activity, not all of them
religious. The wing of the Scottish National Party least disposed to cooperate
with other parties in the Scottish parliament has been described as
`fundamentalist' by its oponents. ane
Kelsey a New market policies adopted by the Labour
government in the late 1980s and named after the Minister of Finance, Roger Douglas,
as `Economic Fundamentalism'. `The "fundamentals" of the programme'-market liberalization and free trade, limited
government, a narrow monetarist policy, a deregulated labour
market and fiscal restraint were systematically embedded against change'. Like
holy writ they were assumed to be `givens', based on common sense and
consensus, and beyond challenge.
In Germany members of
the Green Party who supported Joskha Fischer in
joining Gerhard Schroeder's 'Red-Green coalition' are described as 'realos' (realists),
in contrast to the 'fundis' (fundamentalists) who
hold true to the party's ideology of pacifism, opposition to nuclear power, and
radical `Green' environmentalisms. The tension between the two wings was
brought to breaking-point when Fischer, as Germany's foreign minister,
supported the NATO bombing of Serbia in 1999 while his Green Party colleague,
environment minister Jurgen Trittin, was pressured
into abandoning a scheme to make auto manufacturers pay for the cost of
recycling old cars, and forced to make painful compromises in his plans for
phasing out nuclear power'?
Similar tensions
between ideological purists who stick to the `fundamentals' of their cause
without compromising their principles, and the political realists who argue
that real gains can be achieved through bargaining and compromise, exist in all
political and cultural movements; indeed they are the very stuff of democratic
politics: the energy of political life is released most often when the ideals
of party activists are pitted against the realities of power. Virtually every
movement, from animal rights to feminism, will embrace a spectrum ranging from
uncompromising radicalism or `extremism' to pragmatic accommodationism.
For feminist ultras
such as Andrea Dworkin, all penetrative sex is deemed to be rape. For some
animal liberationists, every abbattoir, however
humane its procedures, is an extermination camp, while in the rhetoric of
radical prolifers such as Pat Robertson, the 43
million foetuses `murdered' since Roev.
Wade are an abomination comparable to the Nazi Holocaust.
At the borders of the
semantic field it now occupies, the word fundamentalism strays into
`extremism', 'sectarian ism', `ideological purism'. It seems doubtful, however,
if these non-religious uses of the word are analytically useful. There may be
some similarities in political and social psychology between, say,
anti=abortionists, animal rightists, Green Party activists, Islamist agitators,
and the Six ~1116j
imply kinship. The
genetic bond that defines fundamentalism in its more central, and useful,
meaning-the 'fundamentalist DNA', as it were-is sharper and more distinctive
than `extremism'. The original `Protestant' use of the word anchors it in the
responses of individual or collective selfhoods, of personal and group
identities, to the scandal or `shock of the Other'.
Although many
religious activists (especially the evangelical movements within Christianity
and Islam) believe they have a universal mission to transform or convert the
world, all religious traditions must face the problematic of their parochial
origins, the embarrassing fact that saviours and
prophets uttered divine words in particular languages to relatively small
groups of people at particular historical junctures.
The
Matrix of Al-Quada
Firsth Three major influences: August 26, 1941, Mawlana Mawdudi founds the Islamist party Jam'at-I
Islami (Islamic Party) and in 1928 already Hassan al-Banna founded the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. Both where a
reaction to Colonialism, and both in fact as I explained in part one, A/B. This
second part now will gives for the first time a complete overview of various
Islamic groups in a way that can be quickly comprehended without first reading
several dozens of book in order to start puzzling these facts together. With
every group I give however a recommended reading list for those who want to
read more details.
The best book about
JI only came out in 2003 written by CNN correspondent Maria A. Ressa,
Terror: An Eyewitness
Account of Al-Qaeda Newest Center of Operations in Southeast
In fact the Jemaah Islamlyah (Islamic Community) (JI) is Indonesia's leading
Islamic extremist group. Abdullah Sungkar and Abu
Bakar Bashir founded the JI in 1973. Their intent was to build as an Islamic
self-governing commune to advance their goal for a strict Islamic society. Sungkar was always political leader while Bashir provide
ideological and religious doctrine. Although they started out with only 30
students, activities soon attracted the attention ( authorities of the
repressive Suharto regime, and both Sungkar and
Bashir were arrested 1978, and they spent nearly four yea jail for passing
literature advocating a lamic state for Indonesia. In
1985, Sur and Bashir fled Indonesia and set up in Malaysia. Malaysia was by
this time a self-styled Islamic state, so the Islamiyah prospered. Sungkar and B were able to recruit younger Islamic leaders
such as the Afghan veteran Hambali.
These new leaders
were sent to Afghanistan for military training and to fight the Soviet Union.
By the mid-1990s the organizational structure of the JI was complete, with
operations controlled by a leadership headed by Hambali
and five division chiefs reporting to him.
The goal of the Jernaah Islamiyah was theocratic Islamic state to include Indonesia,
Brunei, Malaysia, Singapore, and the southern Philippine island of Mindanao.
Because of this goal,
leaders of the JI formed working alliances with Islamic groups the Malaysia
Mujahideen Group (KM the Moro Islamic Liberation Front and so on.
In 1998, Sungkar and Bashir move Jernaah
Islamiyah's main organizationback to Indonesia. The
fall of the Suharto regime gave the JI a chance to expand. Sungka
Bashir headed the group in Indonesia Hamball remained
in Malaysia. Hambal already developed closer ties
with Bin Laden. In 1999, Sungkar died, leaving Bashir
in complete control of JI. B recruited members at his religious school Ngruki village in Solo, Central Java.
JI is organized into
operation cells, and its cell leaders carry out operations independent of
central decision making, thus leaving its leaders deniability. Hambali always operated underground planning and directed
large-scale operations against non-Muslims. Training for JI operatives came
from a Qaeda training camp in Poso, Central Sulawesi,
Indonesia. Fruits of this training came in a bombing campaign against Christian
churches on December 24, 2000. Thirty churches throughout Indonesia were
bombed.
The bombing of the
Sari Club on Bali's Kuta Beach on October 12, 2002, directed international
attention to the Jemaah Islamiyah. Foreign tourists, mostly Australians, were
the targets, and 188 were killed and hundreds more wounded in the bombing. For
several years, foreign governments, especially the United States, had been
pressuring the Indonesian government of Megawati Sukarnoputri to act against
the JI. The Indonesian government had been reluctant, because a crackdown on
the JI might stir up Islamic opposition to the government. Other governments,
however, in Malaysia, the Philippines, and Singapore had arrested JI operatives
throughout 2001. Although Bashir continued to deny JI's involvement in the Bali
bombing, anti-terrorist experts around the world believed that Hambali and the JI were behind it. In October 2002, the
United Stated formally declared it a terrorist organization subject to
sanctions.
The Jemaah Islamiyah
has been hurt by the arrests of key leaders. Abu Bakar Bashir has been under
arrest since 2001, and a jury convicted him on September 4, 2003, of treasonous
activity but not that he headed the Jernaah Islamiyah
terrorist network. This verdict included a four-year jail term, but a December
2003 appeal reduced his sentence to three years. His imprisonment did not
prevent the JI from launching a suicide bombing attack on the Marriott Hotel in
Jakarta, Indonesia, in early August 2003. Increased publicity and police
investigations led to the arrest of Hambali on August
12, 2003, in Thailand. The loss of both the spiritual head, Bashir, and the
operations expert, Ham has seriously weakened the JI, but there still enough
activists left to undertake ter ist
operations. From his prison cell B warned in November 2003 that all Mu
countries with close ties to the United St were subject to attack. See also
Bashir,
Bakar; al-Ghozi, Fathur Rohman;
Ham (Riduan Isamuddin):
Sharon Behn, "C Warns Muslims Linked to the
U.S.," Washington, Times (November 17. 2003), John Bur "Islamic
Network 'Is on a Mission' Te Group," Financial
Times (London) (Oct. 2002), p. 12; Rohan Gunaratna, Inside Al Qada Global Network of Terror (New York: Colu University Press, 2002); Rohan Gunaratna, " Links
That Bind Terror Groups," Guardian ( dou)
(October 15, 2002), p. 1; Ellen Nakast and Alan Sipress, "Al Qaeda Figure Seize Thailand,"
Washington Post (August 15, 2003 p. A1.
Muslim Brotherhood
(al-lichwan al-Muslimun)
(Egypt) The Muslim Brotherhood has lo leading Islamic fundamentalist tion in Egypt. In 1928, Hassan a schoolteacher and a
follower school of Islam, founded th Brothers in Ismaila, Egypt. His tent was for this organization t(
leader in the anti-colonial against the British. From the beg leadership of the
Muslim Broth nounced both capitalism and N failures
and looked toward a re lam. This involvement in politic Muslim Brotherhood in
direct to the British. During World W cret
organization with the Mus ers, the Special Order, was
form out violent attacks against the thorities.
British authorities a Banna for anti-British
activities war, al-Banna launched a terr paign against what he consid enemies of Islam. On Decembe
the Egyptian government banne lim
Brotherhood. Leadership of t Brother retaliated with the assas
the Egyptian Prime Minister Fahmy el-Nokrashy Pasha
on 28, 1948. On February 12, 1949 tian secret police killed al-B-, Cairo
street. Despite the bann Muslim Brotherhood and the
as of al-Banna, the Egyptian gove
lowed the Muslim Brotherhood t tute itself because
King Farou advisors wanted to use it as a tween the
Egyptian nationalis Communists. Sheikh Hassan almoderate cleric, assumed the post of the Muslim Brotherho( chief rival, Saleh al-Ashmawy cleric, attracted
support from radical elements in the Muslim Brotherhood.
The leadership of the
Muslim Brotherhood supported the new government of Gamal Abdel Nasser until it
became apparent that he had no intention of founding an Islamic government.
Both Nasser and his chief assistant, Anwar Sadat, had made contact with the
Muslim Brotherhood before their seizure of power in July 1952. By the early
1950s, the Muslim Brotherhood had two million members scattered throughout the
Muslim world, but most of its political strength remained in Egypt. The
leadership formed a terrorist branch, the Secret Organ, to carry out
assassinations against political leaders opposing its policies. Nasser's
settlement in 1954 of a Suez Canal dispute caused the leaders of the Muslim
Brotherhood to attempt an assassination of Nasser in Alexandria, Egypt, on
October 26, 1954, but they failed. The Egyptian government arrested Hodeibi and other leaders. Several of the leaders of the
Muslim Brotherhood were executed and over 4,000 were arrested and imprisoned.
After the Nasser government banned the Muslim Brotherhood, both leaders and
members went underground. It was at this time that the influence of Sayyid Qutb became the dominant philosophy in the Muslim
Brotherhood. In his book, Signposts Along the Road, and other writings, he
declared perpetual religious war (iihad) against all
religions other than Islam and against the Nasser government. Quth and other leader, of the Muslim Brotherhood were
arrested tortured, and executed in 1965.
After Nasser's death
in 1970, the governement of Sadat was more tolerant
of the Muslim Brotherhood.
ligion
and politics. Members of group carried out Sadat's assassina
October 6, 1981, but the membershi Muslim Brotherhood
applauded the
The Muslim
Brotherhood has bee major opposition to the subsequen Mubarak government. Mubarak's gvernement
has been less oppressive than and the Muslim Brotherhood has p in this
environment. Financial supp( Saudi Arabia has allowed the Muslin erhood to provide medical clinics, so fare centers, and
clubs. These mosqt support services have been popular
the Egyptian lower middle class strength of the Muslim Brotherhood Egyptian
professional classes-doctors, lawyers, and journalists.
The most dynamic and
deadly offshoots of the Muslim Brotherhood is Hamas. Only after the outbreak of
the Intefada 1987 was the Muslim Brotherhood formed
into the political entity that carries out a terrorism war against Israel. At
the same time that Hamas was launching war with Israel it was also establishing
schools, hospitals, mosques, and other services in the Gaza Strip and in the
West Bank. Hamas's popularity among Palestians comes
from a combination of i ist
orientation, war against Israel, social services that it provides. See Banna, Hassan; Hamas (Haara Muqawama al-Islami) (Islamic Rev
Movement).
Suggested readings:
J. Bowyer Bell on the Nile. The World Trade Center a Terror (San Francisco:
Encounter Boot John L. Esposito, The Islamic Threat: Reality? (New York: Oxford
Univers 1992); Fereydoun Hoveyda,
The Broken The "Threat" of Militant Islamic Funda
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998); Richard Mitchell, The Society of the Muslim
Brothers (London: Oxford University Press, 1966); Harold Schneider,
"Fundamentalists Gain Small Voice in Egypt" Washington Post (December
7, 2000), p. A27.
Osama bin Laden
To escape persecution
by Saudi security forces, bin Laden and his family moved to Pakistan in April
1991. He then launched a campaign against the Saudi family by portraying them
as false Muslims. Then Hassan al-Turabi, the religious leader in Sudan, invited
bin Laden to Sudan. Bin Laden moved the bulk of al-Qaeda's membership and
assets to Sudan. There he established a series of businesses. Because bin Laden
was not a religious scholar, he formed a religious committee that could issue
religious rulings, or fatwas. These fatwas have given him authority to act.
Bin Laden's first
operation against the United States was in Somalia in the early 1990s. American
intervention resulted in unacceptable casualties brought by Somali forces under
the control of Arab Afghan
fighters. His role
was at the leadership level, and the victory in Somalia convinced him that the
United States could be driven out of Saudi Arabia and ultimately out of the
Middle East if pressure were placed on it. His experience in helping first the
Muslims in Bosnia and then the Albanian Muslims in Kosovo only reinforced this
belief.
By the mid-1990s, bin
Laden had enough prestige and influence in the Islamist world that he was able
to set up the al-Qaeda network of terrorist organizations. In 1994, bin Laden
moved to London, England, to coordinate activities there. On April 7, 1994, he
lost his Saudi citizenship and had his financial assets there frozen for
anti-Saudi activities. Because of the danger of arrest and extradition, bin
Laden returned to Khartoum, Sudan, and the protection of the Turabi government.
In a series of conferences in 1994 and 1995 in Tehran, Iran; Khartown; and Larnaca, Cyprus,
the leaders of the Islamist movement planned a coordinated terrorist campaign
against the United States, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab
states participating in Mideast peace initiatives. Bin Laden was not a
participant in all of these meetings, but by the end of 1995 he had become the
most powerful leader of the terrorist campaign.
Bin Laden opened his
campaign against the Saudi regime in November 1995. A car bomb exploded in
Riyadh on November 13, 1995, killing 5 Americans and 1 Saudi and wounding more
than 60. 'Vhe Armed Islamic Movement (AIM), a front
for bin Laden, claimed credit for the attack. It was his first blow to
overthrow the Saudi regime. Then on June 25, 1996, a bomb team exploded a truck
bomb at al-Khobar in Dhahran, killing 19 American servicemen and wounding
hundreds of others.
In May 1996, bin
Laden moved his operations from Sudan to Afghanistan. The Saudi government and
the United States placed pressure on the Sudanese government of General Omar
al-Bashir to expel bin Laden. Negotiations were in progress to deport him to
Saudi Arabia when bin Laden decided to move to Afghanistan. Afghanistan was a
natural haven, because of the Taliban in September 1996 soon became a safe
refuge for seeking asylum. Taliban lea bin Laden as a hero of the Mu Laden
responded by arran from the Arab world for th Then he
was allowed to es camp in the Jalalabad area o With the assistance of the Tali organized a series of training a cadre of terrorists
to carry worldwide. Al-Qaeda forc Taliban military
units fightin Alliance Army of General Masood.
The first major
operation were the bombings of the U.S Kenya and Tanzania. Ayman al-Z
operational commander, bu Sadiq Odeh was the on-site cobombs exploded on August 7, 1998, one in Nairobi, Kenya,
and the other in Dar-es-Salaam, Tanzania. Casualties at both embassies were
heavy, with about 250 deaths and more than 5,500 injured. Most of the victims
were Africans. The United States responded by a cruise attack on his base camps
in Afghanistan on August 20, 1998. This failed attack only reinforced bin
Laden's stature in the Muslim world. At the time that his political reputation
was growing, bin Laden's health began deteriorating. Reports surfaced that he
suffered from stomach and kidney troubles, and that he required a renal
dialysis machine. His close associate al-Zawahiri also served as his personal
doctor.
Bin Laden approved
the plans for the September 2001 attacks in the United States as a way to
cripple American economic, military, and political power. Targets were selected
for symbolic reasons-the Pentagon, the World Trade Center, and probably the
White House. Days before the September assault, two al-Qaeda operatives
assassinated the military commander of the Northern Alliance, Masood. Bin Laden
expected a vigorous American response to these attacks, and he counted on the
harshness of the response to mobilize Muslims worldwide against the United
States and the West. Instead, the response was worldwide sympathy for the
victims in the United States and the overthrow of the Taliban regime in
Afghanistan.
The fall of
Afghanistan to the Northern Alliance with ~he assistance of the U.S. military
was a major setback for bin Laden. The case of the Taliban's fall was
unexpected. Loss of key leaders, such as Mohammad Atef, was also a blow. Bin
Laden retreated into the Tora Bora complex, where he stayed until early
December. Bin Laden, his family, and around 1,000 fighters escaped into
Pakistan. Efforts by U.S. intelligence have been unable to locate his
whereabouts. Most observers believe that he is being protected in the remote
areas of northwest Pakistan outside of the reach of the Pakistani government.
Even with a low profile, bin Laden is considered a hero to many Muslims because
he stood up to the United States.
Constantly cited by
radical Muslim Groups is that June 5-10, 1967, Israel conducts preemptive war
against Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. April 15, 1968 Palestinc
Liberation Organization (PLO) selects Yasser Arafat to become chair of the
Executive Committtee. And July 28 of the same year
First aircraft highjacking by the Popular Front for
the
(P LP) Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP)
From here I will list
in alphabetical order other major players in the current “ Matrix of
‘Al-Qaeda’.
Abu Nidal
Organization (ANO) (Middle East)
The most notorious
terrorist group in the Middle East in the period from 1974 until the early
1990s. Sabri al-Banna founded the group on November
22, 1974, and he assumed the name Abu Nidal (Father of the Revolution). His
purpose was to protest the involvement of Syrian forces in the Lebanese civil
war. For a time, the group had the name Black June to commemorate the uprising
of the Palestinians against the Jordanians in June 1974. He modeled the ANO on
the strategy and tactics of the Jewish terrorist group the Stern Gang. His
opposition to Syrian intervention in Lebanon moderated, and he turned his
attention to Israeli targets.
Abu Nidal had success
in recruiting activists, and soon the Abu Nidal, group had several hundred
hard-core in members ready to carry out operations. His hit team consisted of
three or four members who were to study and then attack a designated target.
From 1974 to 1990 the ANO carried out operations in 20 countries, and it killed
or injured nearly 900 persons. One such example was the bombing of a Gulf Air
aircraft on September 23, 1983, near Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates, that
killed 111 passengers and crew. During its heyday, the ANO's headquarters was
in Baghdad, Iraq, but most of its operations came out of Lebanon. With an
operation base in Lebanon, Abu Nidal was able to recruit from the Palestinian
refugee camps. Many of the ANO's operations targeted the Palestine Liberation
Organization and its head, Yasser Arafat. A blood feud developed between Abu
Nidal and Arafat that continued to Abu Nidal's death.
Since 1990, the Abu
Nidal Organization has deteriorated and has become almost inactive. In the
1980s, terrorist experts classified ANO as one of the most active and dangerous
terrorist groups operating. Political pressure from Western and Middle Eastern
governments, internal dissention, and the health of Abu Nidal have all played
roles in weakening the ANO. Political pressure on Iraq (1983), Syria (1987),
Libya (1999), and Egypt (1999) caused the ANO to move its operations to
Baghdad, Iraq.
Another major factor
in the eclipse of the group was a purge of members of the ANO by Abu Nidal in
1989. Abu Nidal became fearful of dissidents in the ANO at his training camps
in Libya. He purged 150 of his 800 followers and had them executed. This action
caused two leaders of the ANO, Atef Abu Baker and Abdel Rahman Issa, to break
with Abu Nidal in November 1989. In addition, news of the executions hurt the
ability of ANO to recruit, and membership has lagged since the purge. Much of
ANO's financial support has also dried up because of its lack of support from
patron states. Barry Rubin reported in The Jerusalem Post in 2002 that Abu Nidal
and his supporters are reported to have killed 300 people and wounded more than
650 others in a wide variety of attacks, most of them in Western Europe.
Abu Nidal had
periodic health problems, including a heart condition, and he was in virtual
retirement in Baghdad, Iraq. He retained control over the Abu Nidal
Organization, but its last major operation was the assassination of a Jordanian
diplomat in 1994. Nidal had some form of skin cancer, and he was receiving
medical attention in Baghdad until August 2002. On August 14, 2002, Iraqi
intelligence agents of the Mukhabarat surrounded the villa where Abu Nidal was
living and attacked it. Abu Nidal was either shot or he shot himself to evade
arrest. He died in a local hospital later the same day. The Abu Nidal
Organization died with him. See also Arafat, Mohammed Yasser; Nidal, Abu;
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).
Suggested readings:
Marie Colvin and Sonya Murad, "Executed," Sunday Times (London)
(August 25, 2002), p. 13; Con Coughlin, "He Who Lives by Terrorism,"
Sunday Telegraph (London) (August 25, 2002), p. 19; Kenneth Labich,
James 0. Goldsborough, and Tony Clifton, "War among the Terrorists,"
Newsweek (August 14, 1978),p. 25; Yossi Melman, The
Master Terrorist: The True Story behind Abu Nidal (New York: Adama Books, 1986); Barry Rubin, "A Man Who Showed
That Terrorism Pays," Jerusalem Post (August 28, 2002), p. 7; Patrick
Seale, Abu Nidal: A Gun for Hire (New York: Random House, 1992).
Abu Sayyaf Group
(Bearer of the Sword) (ASG) (Philippines)
The Abu Sayyaf Group
(ASG), founded by Ustadz Abdurajak
Abubakar Janjalani (Abu Sayyaf), Amilhussin
Jumaani, and Wahab Akbar, is one of the leading
Muslim separatist groups in the Philippines. This group tion
to the prospect of freeing the Burnhams. This effort
received a setback when Philippine government troops engaged the Abu Sayyaf in Sirawal town on June 7, 2002, resulting in the deaths of
Martin Burnham and Deborah Yap and the wounding of Gracia
Burnham.
The increased
American aid has allowed Philippine forces to harass the Abu Sayyaf. American
troops are not allowed to conduct military operations, but advisors can give
oral assistance and train Philippine forces. Military pressure has caused the
Abu Sayyaf to split into three independent groups. Khadafy janjalani
continues to lead one group and'its goal remains to
establish an Islamic fundamentalist state. Another group, more interested in
banditry, is under the leadership of Hamsiraji Sall. Leadership of the third group is unknown, but it was
still active in the winter of 2003. Continuous military pressure is making it
difficult for the Abu Sayyaf to continue operations, but it is still able to
stage a terrorist attack or a kidnapping.
Suggested readings:
Phar Kim Beng, "Abu Sayyaf s Tactical Game for
Moro Loyalty," Straits Times (Singapore) (June 5, 2000), p. 50; Penny
Crisp, "A Religious War Comes to Paradise," Asiaweek
(May 5, 2000), p. 20; Miriam Donohoe, "Filipino Officials Allege Gang,
Army in Collusion," Irish Times (February 16, 2002), p. 10; Rohan
Gunaratna, "The Evolution and Tactics of the Abu Sayyaf Group, Jane's
Intelligence Review 13, no. 7 (July 1, 2001); Richard Lloyd Parry,
"Treasure Island," Independent (London) (March 4, 2001), p. 18; Ilene
R. Prusher and Simon Montlake, "Across Southeast
Asia, Ripple Effect of Attacks on US," Christian Science Monitor
(September 18, 2001), p. 7; Maria A. Ressa, Seeds of
Terror: An Eyewitness Account of Al-Qaeda's Newest Center of Operations in
Southeast Asia (New York: Free Press, 2003); Marites D. Vitug
and Tony Clifton, "A Rebellion with a Cause," Newsweek (May 15,
2000), p. 47.
Afghan Arabs (Middle
East)
The unintended consequence
of the Afghanistan-Soviet War in the 1980s, was the formation of a cadre of
Afghan Arabs willing to carry on a war with the West. Among fundamentalist
Muslims, the war against the atheistic Soviets was a j1had, or holy war.
Volunteers had come from all over the Muslim world to fight in this holy cause.
These volunteers started arriving in 1986, partly stimulated by Saudi Arabian
Airlines giving a 75 percent discount on flights to Peshawar, Pakistan, for
those joining the mujahideen. Religious support came from Pakistan and other
Arab states, but weaponry and supplies came from the United States. Pakistani
security authorities kept the Americans away from the Afghanistan fighters. At
least 25 countries had natives fighting in the Afghanistan War. Estimates of
the number of Afghan Arabs that fought in Afghanistan range from the CIA
estimate of 17,000 to the British intelligence source of Jane's Intelligence
Review's 14,000. Jane's also broke down the totals by nationality-5,000 Saudis,
3,000 Yemenis, 2,800 Algerians, 2,000 Egyptians, 400 Tunisians, 370 Iraqis, 200
Libyans, and a score of other nationalities. One observer noted that, for the
Afghan Arabs, "Afghanistan was like a university which introduced a new
ideology and school of thought." After the war, most of these Afghan Arabs
returned to their native lands full of devotion to the Islamist cause. Other
Afghan Arabs moved to western cities, especially London and Frankfurt, because
they were unwelcome in their native lands.
In the past decade, whenever
an opportunity arose to advance the Islamist cause, Afghan Arabs appeared on
the scene. Algerian Afghan Arabs provided the military leaders and fighters for
the Armed Islamic Group and the Islamic Salvation Front in the Algerian civil
war in the 1990s. Next, Afghan Arabs appeared in Albania to train the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA) and then to fight in Kosovo. Another group appeared in
the Philippines to form the Abu Sayyaf terrorist group. Afghan Arabs have also
been active in Chechnya fighting Russian military forces. Many Afghan Arabs
also returned to Afghanistan and fought for the Taliban.
A number of leaders
emerged among the Afghan Arabs. Most notable among these Osama bin Laden and
Ayman al-Zawahiri. It is from the ~adre of Afghan
Arabs that bin Laden has been able to recruit members for his network.
Suggested readings:
Mark Huband, Warriors of the Prophet: The Struggle
for Islam (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1999); Roland jacquard, In the Name of
Osama Bin Laden: Global Terrorism and the Bin Laden Brotherhood (Durham, NC:
Duke University Press, 2002); Elizabeth Shogren and
Douglas Frantz, "U.S. Aid to Afghan Rebels Proves a Deadly
Boomerang," Los Angeles Times (August 2, 1993), p. Al.
Albanian Macedonian
National Liberation Army (NLA) (Macedonia)
Ali Ahmeti (1959- ) is the leader of the Albanian Macedonian
National Liberation Army (NLA). He was born on January 4, 1959, into an
Albanian Muslim family in Kicevo, Macedonia. His
early life was spent in the village of Zajas near Kicevo. He studied philosophy at the University of Pristina
in Kosovo (then in Yugoslavia). Yugoslavian authorities imprisoned him for two
months for his activities in the 1981 uprising of Albanian students at the
University of Pristina. After his release from prison, Ahmeti
fled to Switzerland. In Switzerland, Ahmeti joined
the Movement for an Albanian Socialist Republic in Yugoslavia. His political
views at this time were those of an Albanian nationalist with a strong
Marxist-Leninist orientation.
Ahmeti
decided in the early 1990s to return to the Balkans and organize forces against
Yugoslavia and Macedonia. By 1993, he was back in Macedonia organizing
guerrilla groups. During the Kosovo War, he became affiliated with the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA) and fought beside the KLA in that war. After the success
of the KLA in Kosovo, Ahmeti decided to adopt the
same guerrilla strategy in Macedonia. This strategy was to initiate open
guerrilla warfare followed by a willingness to negotiate to attract the Western
powers to intervene on his side against the Macedonian government. He also had
an experienced army because many of the military leaders and fighters in the
National Liberation Army had fought in Kosovo and they brought their weapons
with them. The National Liberation Army launched its offensive in February
2001. This strategy of inviting outside powers was successful, with the Western
powers intervening in the civil war on the side of the Albanian minority and
ensuring a political settlement. Ahmeti continued to
claim that constitutional and political guarantees were his only goals, and in
early June 2002, he established a new political party. This party, the
Democratic Union for Integration, is the personal creation of Ahmed, and he
used his reputation as an Albanian military leader to challenge the Macedonian
government in the September 2002 elections. This gamble was successful, as his
party is now one of the two coalition parties heading the government. Ahmeti has made the transition from guerrilla leader to
politician, but his inclusion on the Bush administration's list of outlawed
Albanian terrorists still leaves his status questionable.
Suggested readings:
Timothy Garton Ash, "Is There a Good Terrorist?" New York Review of
Books XLVIII, no. 19 (November 29, 2001); Ian Fisher, "Shadowy Rebel
Assures Macedonia That He Seeks Peace," New York Times (August 17, 2001),
p. A3; Ashley Fantz, "Yesterday's Terrorist,
Today's Peacemaker," http://salon.com/ (accessed September 17, 2002);
Richard Mertens, "Once a Rebel, Now a Reformer," Christian Science
Monitor (July 18, 2002), p. 6; Alissa J. Rubin, "Rebel Leader No Longer
Persona Non Grata," Los Angeles Times (August 20, 2001), p. A5; Daniel
Simpson, "An Uphill Fight in Macedonia to Fend Off Chaos," New York
Times (June 14, 2002), p. A6; R. Jeffrey Smith, "Birth of New Rebel
Army," Washington Post (March 30, 2001), p. Al; Nicholas Wood,
"Macedonian Rebel Chief Calls Off War," Guardian (London) (September
28, 2001), p. 18.
Arnal
(Lebanon)
Amal is a Lebanese
Shi'ite group that has resorted to terrorism. Musa al-Sadr founded the
political party Harakat al-Mahrumin (Movement of the
Deprived) in 1974 to represent the interests of the Shi'ite population in
Lebanon. In July 1975, he formed the militia wing Amal (Harakat Amal) (Movement
of Hope). Amal comes from the acronym AMAL, from Afwaj
al-Muqawama al Lubnaniya
(Lebanese Resistance Detachment). Al-Sadr used Amal as a fighting force to
protect the Shi'ites in southern Lebanon. At first, al-Sadr had Amal cooperate
with Kamal al-jumblatt's Lebanese National Movement,
but he found jumblatt's role in the Lebanese civil
war in 1975 unsatisfactory. The Amal found itself caught in the middle of the
civil war and sometimes had to fight on one side or the other. The presence of
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) complicated the situation. Caught
in the middle of the struggle between the PLO and Israel, Amal forces found
that they had difficulties with both sides. The Israeli invasion of Lebanon in
1978 caused even more chaos. AI-Sadr's disappearance and probable murder during
a visit in Muarnmar Qaddafi's Libya in August 1978
produced a change of leadership in Amal.
The loss of al-Sadr
changed the orientation of Amal. His prestige as a religious leader could not
be matched. Husain al-Husami, a Shi'ite parliamentary
leader, replaced al-Sadr, but he proved to be ineffective as a leader. Nabih Berri, a lawyer who had studied at the Sorbonne
University in Paris, reptaced at Husaim
in 1980. In the interval, the Iranian Revolution of 1979 had changed the
political landscape for Shi'ites. Ayatollah Khomeini's fundamentalist Islamic
regime in Iran revitalized Lebanon's Shi'ites. Membership in Amal had always
been small, but the number of sympathizers had been large. Much of its
financial support came from urban Shi'ites, but they did little of the
fighting. Relations between Amal and the leaders of Syria have always been
good, and in the 1980s, Syrian president Hafiz al-Asad
counted on its support during the Syrian intervention in eastern Lebanon.
Amal's Syrian ties
and opposition to PLO activities in southern Lebanon led to fighting between
Amal and the PLO in 1982. Amal leaders were uncertain about the Israeli
invasion in 1982 until it became apparent that the Israelis wanted to occupy
southern Lebanon. Amal has had an anti-Israel orientation, but its bad
relationship with the PLO had deteriorated to the point that its defeat was
watched with some satisfaction. Israeli efforts to incorporate the Amal into a
militia group to support Israeli occupation failed, and hostilities opened
between the Amal and Israeli military forces.
Berri's leadership of
Amal has had to withstand several serious challenges. Husain Musawi, a member of Amal's Command Council, broke with Amal
in the summer of 1982. He wanted to recast Amal as a proKhomeini
group and found a Shl'ite Islamic state. After
leaving Amal, Musawi founded the Islamic Amal
Movement. Another challenger was the Shi'ite religious leader Mufti Muhammad
Mahdi Shams al-Din. He led the religious wing of Amal in a revolt against
Berri, but in early 1983, he left Amal to engage in Shi'ite politics on the
national level. Berri has been able to withstand these challenges, but he
remains first among equals, and much of his energy is devoted to persuasion
rather than the giving of orders.
The most serious
threat to Amal has come from the Iran-sponsored Hezbollah. Whereas most of the
leadership of Amal is secular, the leadership of Hezbollah is clerical. These
fundamentalist Shi'ite clerics called for a Shi'ite Islamic state modeled after
Ayatollah Khomeini's regime in Iran and attracted significant support from
militant Shi'ites, taking members away from Amal. These differences led to a
civil war between Amal and Hezbollah that broke out in May 1988. Syrian President
Hafiz al-Asad distrusted Hezbollah because of its
close ties to Iran. This civil war only lasted until January 1989, when the
Damascus Agreement was signed under the auspices of Syria. Both groups then
turned their attention to the fight against Israel.
Gradually the
leadership of Amal has turned away from military operations against Israel to a
greater involvement in Lebanese politics. Hezbollah's leaders have attacked
Berri for being too moderate and as an enemy of an Islamic revolution in
Lebanon. These attacks led Berri to adopt more militant tactics in the late
1980s, but his entry into mainstream Lebanese politics in the 1990s reduced his
interest in the war against watched with some satisfaction. Israeli efforts to
incorporate the Amal into a militia group to support Israeli occupation failed,
and hostilities opened between the Amal and Israeli military forces.
Berri's leadership of
Amal has had to withstand several serious challenges. Husain Musawi, a member of Amal's Command Council, broke with Amal
in the summer of 1982. He wanted to recast Amal as a proKhomeini
group and found a Shl'ite Islamic state. After
leaving Amal, Musawi founded the Islamic Amal
Movement. Another challenger was the Shi'ite religious leader Mufti Muhammad
Mahdi Shams al-Din. He led the religious wing of Amal in a revolt against
Berri, but in early 1983, he left Amal to engage in Shi'ite politics on the
national level. Berri has been able to withstand these challenges, but he
remains first among equals, and much of his energy is devoted to persuasion
rather than the giving of orders.
The most serious
threat to Amal has come from the Iran-sponsored Hezbollah. Whereas most of the
leadership of Amal is secular, the leadership of Hezbollah is clerical. These
fundamentalist Shi'ite clerics called for a Shi'ite Islamic state modeled after
Ayatollah Khomeini's regime in Iran and attracted significant support from
militant Shi'ites, taking members away from Amal. These differences led to a
civil war between Amal and Hezbollah that broke out in May 1988. Syrian
President Hafiz al-Asad distrusted Hezbollah because
of its close ties to Iran. This civil war only lasted until January 1989, when
the Damascus Agreement was signed under the auspices of Syria. Both groups then
turned their attention to the fight against Israel.
Gradually the
leadership of Amal has turned away from military operations against Israel to a
greater involvement in Lebanese politics. Hezbollah's leaders have attacked
Berri for being too moderate and as an enemy of an Islamic revolution in
Lebanon. These attacks led Berri to adopt more militant tactics in the late
1980s, but his entry into mainstream Lebanese politics in the 1990s reduced his
interest in the war against
Israel. Berri's
election as president of the Lebanese parliament on November 20, 1992, is an
indication of his more moderate image. See also Hezbollah (Party of God);
al-Sadr, Musa.
Suggested readings:
Fouad Ajarm, The Vanisbed
Imam: Musa al Sadr and the Shia of Lebanon (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
1986); Hala jaber,
Hezbollah: Born witb a Vengeance (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1997); Augustus Richard Norton, Amal and the Sbi'a: Struggle for the Soul of Lebanon (Austin, TX:
University of Texas Press, 1987); Robin Wright, Sacred Rage: The Wrath of
Militant Islam (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1985).
Al-Aqsa lntifada (Palestine)
Al-Aqsa Intifada is
the latest Palestinian uprising in the occupied territories of Gaza and the
West Bank. This uprising started on September 28, 2000, in response to the
visit to the Temple Mount, or as the Arabs called it "Haram
at-Sharif," in Jerusalem of the Likud political leader Ariel Sharon.
Tensions had been building among Palestinians over the failure of the
implementation of the Oslo Peace Accords of 1993. Palestinians had received a
measure of self-government in the accords with the Palestinian Authority (PA),
but the failure of negotiations for the evacuation of Israeli military and
settlers from what the Palestinians perceived as their territory was the
catalyst for the uprising. The collapse of the Camp David talks in 1998 also
frustrated of the Palestinians.
The Aqsa Intifada
differed from the 1987 Intifada in both motivation and intensity. In 1987, an
accident in the Gaza Strip resulted in a spontaneous uprising against the
Israelis. In contrast, a symbolic event in Jerusalem led to an organized
uprising. Two factors are important to an understanding of this Intifada: the
frustration of younger elements in the Palestinian nationalist movement with the
old guard around Yasser Arafat and the Palestinian Authority (PA) and the
inability of the Arafat's forces to control the Islamists of Hamas and Islamic
Jihad. Soon after the outbreak of violence, younger elements within the
Palestinian Authority (PA) organized groups to carry out urban guerrilla
tactics against the Israelis. Then, in October 2000, al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades
appeared to fight against the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). Seven members of
Arafat's al-Fatah came together and formed the new group. While this group
claimed allegiance to Arafat, the leaders maintained no ties with him.
Anti-Israeli activity by the Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades joined with Hamas and
the Islamic Jihad to carry the battle to the Israelis. A major tactic has been
suicide bombings within Israel, but these operations have not been as frequent
as those of Hamas. The most serious was on June 19, 2002, when an Aqsa Martyrs
Brigades suicide bomber detonated a bomb at a bus stop in Jerusalem that killed
6 persons and wounded 43 others.
The Israelis
responded with an emphasis on coercive measures, such as military occupations
of refugee camps and major Palestinian urban sites. Economic sanctions against
Palestinians have been harsh, including sealing off Israel frorm
the territories. -'\lass arrests of suspected terrorist leaders have become
routine. Finally, Israel has resorted to extrajudicial killings of Palestinian
leaders. None of these measures has been effective in ending the Intifada.
Palestinians have been fighting the battle for international public opinion
almost as much as the war against Israel.
The impact of the
Aqsa Intifada has been the almost total breakdown of the Palestinian economy
and social life in the occupied territories and the weakening of the Israeli
economy. Economic life has ceased to exist for most Palestinians. Frequent
military interventions into the occupied territories of Gaza nd the West Bank have stopped any attempts to reestablish a
functioning economy. Schools and universities have been closed. Suicide strikes
and loss of Palestinian labor has also impacted the Israeli economy. Failure of
leadership on both the Israeli and Palestinian sides have allowed the Aqsa
Intifada to continue long after its political message had been received. The
inability of Israel to deal with the settlement problem and the inability of
Palestinians to control terrorism have made any attempt to end the Aqsa
Intifada futile. See also Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades; Hamas (Haarakat
al-Muqawama al-Islami)
(Islamic Resistance Movement); Intifada; Islamic jihad.
Suggested readings:
Ghassan Andoni, "A Comparative Study of Intifada
1987 and Intifada 2000," in Roane Carey (ed.), The New Intifada: Resisting
Israel's Apartheid (London: Verso, 2001); Kirsten E. Schulze, "Camp David
and the Al-Aqsa Intifada: An Assessment of the State of the IsraeliPalestinian
Peace Process, July-December 2000)," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 24,
no. 3 (MayJune 2001); Joshua Sinai, "Why Israel
Can't Resolve the New Palestinian Intifada," Journal of Counterterrorism
& Security International 7, no. 3 (Spring, 2001); Khalil Shikaki, "Palestinians Divided," Foreign Affairs
(January 2002/February 2002), p. 89; Khaled Abu Toameh,
"Anatomy of Rage," Jerusalem Report (March 26, 2001), p. 22.
Al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades
(Kataib Shuhada Al-Aqsa) (Palestine)
Al-Aqsa Martyrs'
Brigades has been one of the leading terrorist groups operating during the Palestinian
Aqsa Intifada. Shortly after the outbreak of the al-Aqsa Intifada on September
28, 2000, seven veterans of Yasser Arafat's al-Fatah met at the Balata Refugee
Camp near Nablus on the West Bank and decided to form al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades
to carry the war to Israel. This meeting was held in October 2000 at Nablus's
Balata refugee camp. Among the founders were Nasser Awais,
Yasser Badawi, Maged Masri,
and Raed Karmi. They named
the group after alAqsa Mosque in Jerusalem. The
leaders have maintained their loyalty to Arafat, but they have had reservations
about the leadership in the Palestinian Authority (PA). They claim that the
group is independent from Arafat and the Palestinian Authority (PA). They also
have strong ties to Marwan Barghouthi, the head of
al-Fatah's militia, Tanzim.
Members of al-Aqsa
Martyrs' Brigades are not as intransigent as those in Islamic Jihad or Hamas,
but they are willing to conduct a guerrilla war against Israel until Israeli
troops withdraw from the occupied territories and a Palestinian state exists.
At first, most of the operations were against Israeli soldiers and Jewish
settlers on the West Bank, but this changed after the violence escalated, and
they became willing to use any tactics, including suicide bombers to achieve
this goal. Initially, most of the suicide bombers were men, but since 2002 most
have been women. These attacks threatened Israeli security so Israeli
authorities targeted the leadership of al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades for
assassination. Raed Karmi
and Mahmoud Titi have been killed, and Awais and Masri were captured by the Israelis. Despite these losses,
the at-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades have still initiated operations in Israel.
Efforts by the
Palestinian Authority to bring al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades under control have
been unsuccessful. Militants in leadership positions have refused to heed the
calls from al-Fatah to cease terrorist attacks. They believe that the moderate
policies of Arafat and the Palestinian Authority will not force the Israelis to
come to the bargaining table. The arrest oi Barghouthi
by the Israelis has been a blow because he had considerable prestige among the
rank-and-file of al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades. In the middle of 2003, a stalemate
began between the leadership of al-Aqsa Martyrs' Brigades on one side and
Arafat and the Palestinian Authority on the other side that will not be broken
until one or the other concedes. See also Al-Aqsa Intifada; Arafat, Mohammed
Yasser; Barghouthi, Marwan bin Khatib.
Suggested readings:
Ferry Biedermann, "Secular and Deadly: The Rise
of the Martyrs' Brigades," http://Salon.com/ (accessed March 19, 2002);
Peter Hermann, "Palestinian Dissension Confounds a 'Martyr,"'
Baltimore Sun (January 9, 2003), p. 1A; Michael Tierney, "Yo and Ready to Kill," Herald (Glasgow 2002), p. 8;
Tracy Wilkinson, "End for a 'Martyr,"' Los Angeles Times (D 2002), p.
1.
Armed Islamic Group (Groupes Islamiques Armes) (GIA) (Algeria)
The Armed Islamic
Group (GIA) is the most active terrorist group in Algeria. This group was
formed shortly after the Algerian military seized control of the Algerian
government in 1992. Members of the GIA advocate an Islamist state and are
willing to use unrestricted terror to achieve this end. Djaffar
Alghani, an early leader, conducted a campaign against
the Algerian intelligentsia, killing administrators, teachers, and journalists.
Over 40 journalists have been assassinated in almost a decade. The GIA has also
targeted foreigners, including Christian priests and tourists. This campaign by
the GIA has contributed to the bulk of the more than 70,00 people killed in
this religious civil war against the Algerian state.
The Armed Islamic
Group had good relations with the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS) until its
violence alienated the FIS leadership. By the mid-1990s, however, hostilities
had broken out between the two groups. Even the moderates in the GIA, Mohammed
Said and Abderazak Redjam,
were executed by the more externe GIA leader, Djamel Zitouni, in 1994. Algerian authorities killed a number of
the GIAs leaders as well, including its military leaders Mourad Sid Ahmed and Antar Zouabri. New leaders
emerged and carried out terrorist operations against both the Algerian
government and civilian targets. By the beginning of the 2000s so much
bloodshed had taken place that even the most radical GIA leaders began to have
reservations about continuing the campaign of terror. Isolated incidents of
terrorism have continued, but the prospect of the Algerian government becoming
more accommodating to the demands of the Islamic fundamentalists has led to a
decrease in agitation by them.
Suggested readings:
Ed Blanche, "Death Toll Mounts in Algerian Bloodbath," Jane's
Intelligence Review 9, no.1 (March 1, 1997), p. 119; Elie Chalala,
"Killing Fields," In These Times (January 10, 1999), p. 12; James Ciment, "The Battle of Algiers," In These Times
22 (December 28, 1997) p. 19; William B. Quandt,
Between Ballots and Bullets: Algeria's Transition from Authoritarianism
(Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 1998); Milton Viorst,
"Algeria's Long Night," Foreign Affairs (November-December 1997), p.
86; Michael Willis, The Islamist Cballenge in
Algeria: A Political History (Washington Square: New York University Press,
1996).
Bakr, Yasin Abu
(1930- ) (Trinidad)
Born in 1930 in
Trinidad, Yasin Abu Bakr is the spiritual leader of the Trinidad Islamist group
jamaat al-Muslimeen (Society of Muslims). His first career was as a policeman.
After Bakr became attracted to the American Black Muslim movement and its brand
of Islam, he founded the jamaat al-Muslimeen in 1969 with only 12 members.
After establishing a religious oommunity, Bakr
developed close ties to Libya's President Muarnmar
Qaddafi and made frequent trips to Libya to consult with him. Over the years,
the Libyan government has subsidized the growth of Bakr's group. By 2001, the
jamaat alMuslimeen had between 6,000 and 7,000
members.
Bakr was a minor
religious leader in Trinidad until the jamaat at-Mustimeen
attempted a coup against the Trinidad government in 1990. He and followers had
been angered over delays in resolving a land dispute with the government. Bakr
gathered 114 members of the jamaat a]-Muslimeen for a coup attempt against the
government in Port of Spain on July 27, 1990. Their first action was to bomb the
police headquarters building. Next, Bakr led his supporters armed with AK-47s
to seize the parliament building, known as the Red House, and occupy the
Trinidad and Tobago Television (TTT) station. After seizing the building, Bakr
held government officials, including Prime Minister Arthur Robinson, hostage.Bakr and the jamaat al-Muslimeen held the hostages
for six days while hostage negotiations proceeded. An acting prime minister
signed an amnesty for the hostage-takers, and the hostages were freed on August
1, 1990. Soldiers arrested Bakr and his 114 compatriots and threw them into
jail, but lawyers for Bakr and his supporters appealed their arrest. After the
Port of Spain courts finally accepted the amnesty, all of the hostage-takers
were released from prison in 1992. They also won nearly $1 million from the
government for wrongful destruction and occupation of jamaat al-Muslimeen
property. This amnesty and the financial settlement outraged many in Trinidad
because 24 people had been killed during the coup attempt.
Bakr and his jamaat
al-Muslimeen remain controversial. Government officials remain nervous about
Bakr's political ambitions. His contacts with Qaddaft
have kept him in the spotlight as a potential terrorist. The arrest of a man in
Florida with an affiliation with the jamaat at-Muslimeen in late 2001 for
attempting to buy assault rifles and machine guns has created further
uncertainty. Bakr has made efforts to keep a low political profile while at the
same time posing as the champion of the lower classes. Despite fears that he
had contacts with terrorists, Bakr condemned the terrorist attacks in the
United States on September 11, 2001, and he has refused to participate-in
anti-American demonstrations. See also Qaddafi, Muammar.
Suggested readings:
David Gonzalez, "Failed Rebel's Boast: At Least He Rules the Street,"
New York Times (January 9, 2002), p. A4; Angela Potter, "After Terrorist
Attacks, Trinidad Puts Muslim Rebel Group under Renewed Scrutiny,"
Associated Press Worldstream (October 28, 2001), p.
1; Peter Richards, "Radical -Muslim Group Focus of Trinidad and Tobago
Poll," Inter Press Ser vice (October 4, 2002), p.1; Scott Wheeler,
"Trinidad and Tobago-Terrorists Develop Island Operations," Insight
(December 24, 2002), p. 1.
Black September (Palestine)
Black September was
the terrorist wing of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Palestinian
camps had been set up in Jordan in the aftermath of the Arab defeat in the 1967
Arab-Israeli War. Adherents of Yasser Arafat's a]-Fatah used these base camps
to launch military operations against Israel. On March 21, 1968, Israeli forces
invaded Jordan to attack the Karameh Base camp. A battle ensued during which
the Palestinians, with the help of Jordanian army units, were able to fight the
Israelis to a stalemate. Palestinian commandos from both al-Fatah and the
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) started treating Jordanian
territory as part of a Palestinian state. Affairs deteriorated so much that
King Hussein of Jordan unleashed his army against the Palestinian commandos on
September 10, 1970. Thousands of al-Fatah and PFLP fighters were killed in the
fighting. Subsequently, the leadership of al-Fatah moved its operations to Leba tary operations were curtail
1971, Arafat and the central Fatah allowed the militant separate terrorist
group to September. Salah Khalaf (als lyad), a former schoolteacher Fatah, became the operation
September. His chief assi Youssef. The purpose of the
g and implement special operat leaders were all officers
who to carry out secret missions.
Black September
carried spectacular terrorist acts. A si ist squad assassinated Wasf
minister of Jordan, on the ste Hotel in Cairo, Egypt,
on No to avenge his role in the su Palestinians in
September 19 minor operations, four Black tives, two
men and two wo Sabena Flight 517 from Bru Tel Aviv, Israel. After the pla Airport in Israel, an Israeli a the hostages, killed
the two n the two women.
The most notorious ope September was the massac
Olympic Team at the 1972 pics. A hit team attacked th
team at the Olympic Village 1972, and the final casualti
lis and 5 Palestinians. Plarm
tion knew that the coverage would ensure worldwide
bloody operation horrified t Arabs considered it a triurr
bers of the Black September Embassy in Bangkok, Thai ber 28, 1972, but this opera out the violence of the
Violence associated with BI the Munich operation and I of three diplomats, includi bassador to Sudan Cleo A.
2, 1973, in Khartoum, Su type of operations counterp Palestinian cause. Palestine nization
leaders decided in erations of Black September. Later
in 1981, leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organization reconstituted Black
September briefly to counter the anti-PLO atrocities of Abu Nidal and the Abu
Nidal Organization.
The Israeli
government formed a special unit to avenge the Munich Olympics massacre.
Mossad, the Israeli intelligence service, created a special group under the
name Wrath of God (MlVtzan Elohim) to seek out and
kill those responsible for the massacre. During 1972 and 1973, this group
assassinated those key Palestinian terrorist leaders that the Israelis believed
responsible for Munich. The Wrath of God killed at least six leaders of Black
September. All Hasan Salameh was a special target because the Israelis blamed
him for Munich. Operations of the Wrath of God came to a sudden end in July
1975 when an Israeli hit team in a case of mistaken identity assassinated a
Moroccan waiter on July 21, 1975, in Lillehammer, Norway. Israeli agents
thought the waiter was Ali Hasan Salameh. In the aftermath of this bungled
affair the Israelis closed down the Wrath of God. This closure did not mean
that the Israeli intelligence services gave up on hunting down and killing
Salameh. An Israeli hit team blew Salameh up with a car bomb in Beirut, Lebanon
on January 22, 1979. See also Abu Nidal Organization (ANO); Arafat, Mohammed
Yasser; Nidal, Abu; Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO).
Suggested readings:
Christopher Dobson, Black September: Its Short, Violent History (New York:
Macmillan, 1974); Christopher Dobson and Ronald Payne, The Terrorists: Their
Weapons, Leaders and Tactics, rev. ed. (New York: Facts on File, 1982); Serge Groussard, The Blood of Israel: The Massacre of the Israeli
Athletes: The Olympics 1972 (New York: Morrow, 1975).
Jemaah Islamiyah (Islamic Community, or JI)Indonesia
Abu Bakar Bashir
(1937 or 1938-)is the head of terrorist operations for the Indonesian Islamic
extremist group Jemaah Islamiyah. He was born on April 4, 1964, in the village
of Sukamanah, West Java. He was the eldest of 13
children from a poor Muslim family of religious teachers. He attended local
Islamic schools at Ciganjur. Hamball
became an opponent of the Indonesian dictator Suharto, and in 1985 he went into
exile in Malaysia. It was in Malaysia that Hambali
met Abu Bakar Bashir, and he became one of Bashir's followers. In 1987, Hamball volunteered to fight in Afghanistan. He returned to
Malaysia in 1990, where he married a local Malaysian-Chinese woman. By this
time, he had become one of the leaders of the jemaah
Islamiyah.
After the collapse of
the Suharto regime in 1998, Hambali stayed in
Malaysia for a while before returning to Indonesia. His Afghanistan military
training helped him in the planning for terrorist operations. He was the
mastermind behind the jemaah Islamiyah's
anti-Christian bombing campaign in December 2000. In April 2001, Hambali became the operations chief of jemaah
Islamiyah responsible for operations in Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and
Singapore. He succeeded Mahamad lqbal
B. R. Rahman, an Indonesian cleric, who had been arrested by Malaysian
authorities. Hamball has always operated in the
background, but his involvement in other terrorist activities is suspected. He
is now wanted in both Malaysia and Singapore for his terrorist activities. His
name surfaced immediately after the'Bali, bombing on
October 12, 2002, as a chief suspect. The arrests of Amrozi,
an East Javanese car repairman and a participant in the Bali bombing, and Imam
Samudra, a computer engineer, confirmed the involvement of Hambali
in planning the bombing.
In February 2003, Hambah realized his high profile made him a target and he
resigned as operations chief of Jemaah Islamiyah.
The manhunt for Hambali intensified after the bombing of the Marriot Hotel
in Jakarta, Indonesia, in early August 2003.
Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin (1947-) (Afghanistan)
Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
is a fundamentalist Afghan political leader and a rival of the Taliban. He was
born in 1947 in Imam Saheb in the northern province of Kunduz, Afghanistan,
into a Ghilzai Pushtun family. His initial education
was at the Kabul military cadet school of Mahtabqila,
but his political activities there caused him to leave school. He returned to
Kunduz and attended the Shirkhan High School. He is by
training an engineer, but he never received his engineering degree from Kabul
University. While at the university, he was instrumental in the founding of the
radical Islamist Muslim Youth Organization of Afghanistan. Despite the lack of
a degree, Hekmatyar taught engineering at the Kabul University for several
years. In 1972, he was accused of killing a Maoist student, and the government
of Sardar Muhammad Da'ud imprisoned him for this
murder.
Hekmatyar's
imprisonment and later his flight to Pakistan in 1973 led him to devote the
rest of his life to Afghan politics. He founded the Islamic fundamental group Hizb-i Islami-i Afghanistan in
1974. Ahmed Rashid,,a Pakistani journalist,
characterized his party as a "secretive, highly centralized, political
organization whose cadres were drawn from educated urban Pashtuns." His
goal for his party was to form a purified Islamic state in Afghanistan.
Hekmatyar directed his group in resistance to the Afghanistan Communists in the
late 1970s and against the Soviet forces in the 1980s.
Hekmatyar was a
favorite of the Pakistani government because the Pakistani security agencies believed
that they could control him. Part of the Pakistani Inter-Services Intelligence
(ISI) agency's strategy was to send foreign aid to militant Islamic groups that
were anti-American. As a result, Hekmatyar's forces of nearly 30,000 troops
received nearly 70 percent of their assistance in their fight against the
Soviet army from the ISI.
Hekmatyar also
established a relationship with militant Islamist leader Sheikh Omar Abdul
Rahman because they shared a passion for a holy war against the Soviets and for
the spread of their version of the Islamic religion. After the withdrawal of
Soviet forces in 1992, Hekmatyar challenged other muJahideen
leaders for political power in Afghanistan. His rivalry with Ahmed Shah Masood,
the military leader of the jamaiat-i Islami (Islamic Society) was particularly anti-American. As
a result, Hekmatyar's forces of nearly 30,000 troops received nearly 70 percent
of their assistance in their fight against the Soviet army from the ISI.
Hekmatyar also
established a relationship with militant Islamist leader Sheikh Omar Abdul
Rahman because they shared a passion for a holy war against the Soviets and for
the spread of their version of the Islamic religion. After the withdrawal of
Soviet forces in 1992, Hekmatyar challenged other muJahideen
leaders for political power in Afghanistan. His rivalry with Ahmed Shah Masood,
the military leader of the jamaiat-i Islami (Islamic Society) was particularly fierce. In August
1987, Hekmatyar was nearly killed by a car bomb in Peshawar, Pakistan. It was
never proven who carried out the attempt.
In 1992, he became
prime minister of the Afghanistan government, but his continuous fighting with
other mujahideen groups led to a breakdown in civil order. Even during the war
with the Soviets, the other mujahideen leaders never trusted him because of his
open ambition. His staunchly anti-American posture made sure that no American
political backing came to him. Much of Hekmatyar's support continued to come
from the ISI. Pakistan ended their special relationship in late 1992 because he
had refused to end the feuding with other mujahideen leaders. He became
unpopular in Afghanistan because of the casualties caused by the bombardment of
Kabul by forces under' his command. In June 1996, Hekmatyar was briefly prime
minister of another Afghan government shortly before the Taliban seized Kabul.
After failing to reach an understanding with the Taliban, he fled to Iran and
lived in Tehran. In an interview with a news correspondent in September 2001,
Hekmatyar continued to be critical of the Uruted
States and to oppose without reservation the restoration of the exiled former
Afghan monarch Zahir Shah. In February 2002,
Hekmatyar returned to western Afghanistan and began plotting against the Hamid
Karzai government. He made contact with senior Tallban
and al-Qaeda leaders in an effort to conclude an alliance. Hekmatyar has become
such a threat that an American rocket attack targeted him in May 2002, but he
escaped harm. Since this attack Hekmatyar has become a growing threat to the
security of the Karzal government in Afghanistan. In
early December 2003, he issued a call for a holy war against coalition forces
in Afghanistan in a 22minute speech contained in a compact disc. See also
Abdel-Rachman, Sheikh Omar; Taliban (Students of
Religious Schools).
Suggested readings: Maziar Bahari, "Warlord-in
-Waiting," Newsweek (September 28, 2001), p. 35; Gerald Bourke,
"Weary Kabul Expects the Worst," Guardian (London) (July 5, 1996), p.
17; James Dao, "Afghan Warlord May Team Up with Al Qaeda and
Taliban," New York Times (May 30, 2002), p. A12; M. J. Goharil
The Taliban: Ascent to Power (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999); Robert D.
Kaplan, Soldiers of God: With Islamic Warriors in Afghanistan and Pakistan (New
York: Vintage Books, 200i-)-,Ralph H. Magnus and Eden Nasby, Afghanistan:
Mullah, Marx, and Mujahid (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2000); Alexander
Nicoll, and Farhan Bokhari, "Pakistan PM Cools towards Hekmatyar,"
Financial Times (London) (August 17, 1992), p. 3; Ahmed Rashid, Taliban:
Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central Asia (New Haven, CT: Yale
University 1992
Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic
Liberation Party) (HT) (Central Asia)
The Hizb ut-Tahrir al-Islami (Islamic Liberation Party) is a radical Islamic
movement that advocates the uniting of the Muslim world under the rule of a
caliphate modeled after the Rashid Caliphate (A.D. 632-A.D. 661). Sheikh Taqiuddin an-Nabhani Filastym, a Palestinian schoolteacher and Islamic judge,
founded the HT in 1953 in Hebron. In his book The Islamic State (1962) he
described the world of the prophet Muhammad and the spread of Islam as a model
for the modern world. He advocated winning mass support to convert Muslim
regimes rather than revolutionary action to overthrow them. He proposed an
Islamic council that would elect a caliph who would have dictatorial powers and
a highly centralized administrative structure to control political life and
foreign policy. Islamic law (Sharia) would be implemented to govern Muslim society.
The role of women would be restricted exclusively to the family. Once the
Muslim world is united under the caliphate, then the expansion of Islam into
the nonMuslim world would commence by means of a holy
war (jihad).
Many of the ideas of
the Hizb ut-Tahrir al Islami resemble those of the Wahhabi revival, but
differences exist. Both adherents of HT and the Wahhabis want to reestablish an
idealized Islamic state modeled on the one from the time of the prophet
Muhammad. They also consider the Shi'ites as heretics and would expel them from
Muslim states. Jews would suffer a similar fate. The major difference between
the two is over tactics. Leaders of the HT advocate a peaceful transition to
the purified Islamic state based on the view that all other Islamic movements
are in error because HT alone has found the true way~ They have found Wahhabism
too violent and counterproductive.
The Hizb ut-Tahrir at-Islami soon found itself in trouble with authorities in the
Muslim states in the Middle East. Governments felt threatened by HT and its
adherents were forced to go underground to avoid persecution. In 1974, members
of HT attempted to assassinate Egyptian President Anwar Sadat. Leaders moved to
Europe and established headquarters in Germany and in Great Britam. Sheikh
Zaloom, a Palestinian and former professor at Egypt's al-Azhar University, is
the current head with a location in Europe, he runs a secret organization that
raises funds and recruits followers.
Muslim students at
British universities have been attracted to the HT. These recruits return to
their native countries and establish secret cells of five to seven men. Only
the cell leader knows the next level of organization and receives instructions
from it. The growth of HT has been rapid, especially in Central Asia in the
former Soviet states of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan.
Authorities in these states have arrested and imprisoned those HT members whom
they can identify. Most of those arrested are educated young men from large cities.
Suggested readings:
Douglas Davis, "Islamic Fundamentalism with a Sugar Coating,"
Jerusalem Post (August 24, 1995), p. 7; David Harrison, "Battle for
Islam's Future," Observer (London) (August 13, 1995), p. 12; Ahmed Rashid,
Jibad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia
(New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002).
Intifada (Palestine)
The Intifada broke
out over a minor incident in Gaza. On December 7, 1987, an Israel Defense
Forces (IDF) truck ran into another truck, killing four Palestinians and
injuring seven others. Rumors spread among the Palestinians that the accident
had been deliberate. During the funeral of three of the dead at the jabalya refuge~ camp in Gaza, a mass demonstration formed.
Israeli troops intervened, but they were unable to disperse the rioters.
Demonstrations spread throughout Gaza and the West Bank. Confrontations between
the IDF and Palestinian youth became a daily occurrence. Palestinian leaders
then initiated a campaign of civil disobedience against Israel. Israeli authorities
responded by use of force, deportation of Intifada leaders, economic sanctions,
curfews, school closings, and finally political assassination. A Mossad hit
team assassinated PLO leader Khalil al-Wazir (Abu Jihad) in April 1987 in
Tunis, Tunisia. This assassination only further intensified the Intifada.
During the first year of the Intifada, the Israelis arrested more than 18,000
Palestinians. Slowly, the Israelis came to the realization that the Intifada
was a mass uprising and military force alone could not end it.
Soon after the
outbreak of the Intifada, the Palestinians formed a coordinating committee in
the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU). This leadership group
had 15 rotating members drawn from five Palestiman
groups-al-Fatah, Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP),
Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP), the Palestine
Communist Party, and Islamic jihad. Each of these groups provided three members
to the UNLU. Each time a member of the UNLU was arrested, a- new member would
be appointed to replace him. The relationship between the UNLU and the PLO was
loose because of the difficulty of communications between Palestine and
Tunisia. The main mission of the UNLC was coordinating the activities of the
Intifada. A secondary mission was the neutralization of Palestinian
collaborators with Israel.
The Intifada lasted
for nearly three years. Israeli authorities found the cost and the intensity of
the Intifada unacceptable. Israeli forces always retained military supremacy,
but the Palestinians refused to accept it. The notion that the Israelis could
permanently occupy Palestinian territory proved illusory. It took negotiations
in Oslo between the Israeli government and the Palestine Liberation Organization
to end the Intifada. After the Oslo Accords were signed in September 1993,
peace was thought to be possible. This accord allowed autonomy for the
Palestinians in the West Bank and Gaza and it had the support of the
overwhelming majority of the Palestinians. However, this peace also proved to
be illusory, and by the late 1990s the Palestinians became convinced that the
peace process was dead. See also Arafat, Yasser; Al-Fatah; Islamic j1had;
Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO); Popular Front for the Liberation of
Palestine (PFLP).
Suggested readings:
Ghassan Andoni, "A Comparative Study of Intifada
1987 and Intifada 2000," in Roane Carey (ed.), The New Intifada: Resisting
Israel's Apartbeid (London: Verso, 2001); Don Peretz, Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1990); Ze'ev Schiff and Ehud Ya'ari,
Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising: Israel's Tbird
Front (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990); Khalil Shikaki,
"Palestinians Divided," Foreign Affairs (January-February 2002), P.
89.
Narnangani, Jurna (1969-2001)
(Uzbekistan) juma Namangani
was the military leader of the radical Islamist guerrilla group Movement of
Uzbekistan (IMU). born in 1969 in the village of Nama the Fergana Valley of
Uzbekistan. His name was jumabol Ahmadzha
Khojaev. In 1987, when he was 18, drafted into the
Soviet army. His caree Soviet army as a paratrooper
was su and he reached the rank of se Numangani was sent to Afghanistan the Soviet-Afghan war to
fight agai muiahideen. He
came to respect the 2 as fighters, and this admiration ma reexamine his Muslim
roots. After the army, Namangani became a folk Tahkir Abdoulialilovitch Yuldeshev, gious leader in
Namangan, and sha vision of an Islamic state in Uzbekis
first the Uzbekistan government to agitation from Islamic advocates, but it
cracked down on radical Islamist Namangani and Yuldeshev fled to ne ing
Tajikistan, where Namangam be guerrilla leader in the
Tajik civil war side of the Islamic Renaissance Part) He was a successful
military comman his reputation grew to almost mythic
portions.
Namangani settled down to be a farmer and businessman. He
purchased a large farm in the village of Hoit
northeast of Garin in Tajikistan. His wife and
daughter lived with him and he worked as a farmer. Later, Namangani
purchased several trucks and entered the transportation business. His
reputation soon attracted Islamic radicals, and they attempted to recruit him
as a military leader to fight against the Uzbekistan government. After Yuldeshev visited and conversed with him in Hoit in 1997, Namangani traveled
to Kabul, Afglaamstan, in the summer of 1998 for
further talks with Yuldeshev, Osama bin Laden, and
representatives of the Taliban government. As a result of these talks, Namangani and Yuldeshev founded
the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan with the goal to overthrow the Uzbekistan
government of Islam Karimov and establish an Islamic state.
Namangam returned to Tajikistan and began organizing a
guerrilla army. In August 1999, Namangani's forces
made a raid into Kyrgyzstan. Then, on August 25, 1999, the IMU declared a holy
war (jihad) against the Uzbekistan government. From a fortified base camp in
the Tavildara Valley of Tajikistan, Namangani launched a series of military operations against
Uzbekistan.
Aid came from bin
Laden and the government, but most of the monye comes
from IMU's growing involvement in ghan opium trade.
These sources of allowed Namangani to supply his with
modern weapons and pay them salaries of between $100
and $500.
Namangani had striking successe
military campaigns against Uzbekis til the American intervention into Asia in the aftermath of
September 2001. Namangani died in the fighting
against coalition forces on November 2001.
Suggested readings:
Christian Cary Hot Zone," Newsweek (October 8, 200 Lynne O'Donnell,
"Al-Qa'ida Military St Killed," Australian
(Sydney) (Nove 2001), p. 9; David Filipov,
"Battle-Tes mander,"
Boston Globe (October 26, A18; Ahmed Rashid, Jibad:
The Rise o Islam in Central Asia (New Haven, CT:
University Press, 2002); Doug Struck,Taliban Chief
Feared in Homeland," Washington Post (November 10, 2001), p. A17.
Nasrallah, Hassan (1960- ) (Lebanon)
Hassan Nasrallah is
the leader of Hezbollah (Party of God) in Lebanon. He was born in Beirut,
Lebanon. His father was a Shl'ite vegetable seller,
but his family traced its descent to the prophet Muhammad. He studied at the
Baalbek Theological School in the Bekka Valley. The
civil war in Beirut caused him to leave and travel in 1976 to the Iraqi holy
city of Najaf to study Shi'ite theology. After an expulsion from Iraq by Saddam
Hussein in 1978, Nasrallah traveled to Iran and met the Ayatollah Ruholla Khomeini. Returning to Lebanon, he joined the Amal,
a Shi'ite terrorist organization, and became a follower of the Amal leader
Abbas Musawi. His area of operation was in the Bekka valley of Lebanon.
Nasrallah joined the
Hezbollah soon after its founding in 1982. Musawi and
Sobhi Tufeili started the
Hezbollah with the blessing of Khomeini and Iran's intelligence services. Tufeili was the first leader of Hezbollah, but he was
replaced as its secretary-general in 1990. Nasrallah's mentor Musawi became the new chief of Hezbollah. Nasrallah acted
as the organization's military leader until an Israeli helicopter attack killed
Musawl, his family, and his bodyguards on February
16, 1992. Nasrallah whas on the 11-member ruling
council of the Hezbollah and this council elected him as secretary-general on
February 18, 1992. His main rival for leadership remained Tufeili.
Nasrallah's first
action was to launch military attacks against the Israeli occupation of
southern Lebanon. These attacks involved rocket attacks and later suicide
bombers. Military pressure by Hezbollah led to Israel withdrawing from southern
Lebanon in May 2000. This retreat made Nasrallah popular both among the
Shi'ites in Lebanon and in the Arab world.
Palestine Islamic
Jihad (PIJ) (Palestin The Palestine Islamic Jiliad is one of the n violent of the Palestinian groups
that engaged in terrorist acts against Israel. ; al-Husseini and other
activists from the C Strip formed the precursor of this grou
1964. They originally called their group Palestine Liberation Force before chan their name to the Palestine Islamic Ji This group
became the predominant Pale ian terrorist
organization in the Gaza S and it was often in opposition to Ya Arafat's al-Fatah. In 1971, Israeli police killed
al-Husseini and arrested most of followers. While in prison, members of the
Palestine Islamic j1had converted to the fundamentalist creed of the Islamists.
The Palestine Islamic
Jihad reestablished itself after most of its members were released from prison
in the early 1980s. In 1981, Fathi Shikaki, a Palestinian medical doctor, revived the
Palestine Islamic Jiliad and associated it with the
ideology of the Muslim Brotherhood. He was also able to recruit the
ex-prisoners when they returned to the Gaza Strip. Most of these members were
still hostile toward at-Fatah, but a truce was arranged between the two groups.
Shikaki was also able to recruit Sheikh Abdul al-Aziz
Odeh, a popular lecturer in Islamic law and a strong Islamist preacher, at a
large mosque in the Gaza Strip to the Palestine Islamic j1had. Shikaki's philosophy was to recruit a small group of
hard-core militants to carry out operations against Israel regardless of the
cost in lives and property. Because of Shikaki's
favorable impression of the Ayatollah Komeini's
regime, he sought and-received financial aid from the Iranian government.
Leaders of the Palestine
Islamic jihad spent the first three years organizing the group before launching
military operations against Israel. These operations commenced in late 1983.
Besides conducting terror attacks against Israeli targets, the group mobilized
Palestinian youth. In the early 1980s, the leadership of the Palestine Islamic
j1had turned its attention to recruiting promising students at Bit Zeit
University. Student recruits organized a series of student demonstrations.
During one of these demonstrations on April 13, 1987, Israeli forces opened
fire, killing a student and wounding several others. By the early 1990s, the
leadership decided to adopt the tactic of suicide bombing. Both Hamas and the
Palestine Islamic Jiliad have specialized in suicide
bombings, mostly inside Israel.
Israeli authorities
believed that the Palestine Islamic Jihad posed a serious threat to the
security of Israel and decided to repress it. Raids against the leadership of
the Palestine Islamic j1had resulted in more than 50 arrests.
Odeh was one of the arres was deported along with severa
leagues. These losses were ser Shikaki was able to
escape Israel until 1986, When he received a prison sentence for smuggling
Gaza. Rather than keep him Israeli authorities deported him to Lebanon August
1988. Shikaki's presence in Lebanon meant ties
between the Palestine Islamic Jihad and Hezbollah became closer. He then moved
to Damascus, Syria, in 1990 continued to provide leadership for th Islamic Jihad. Then on October 26 Israeli hit team
assassinated S Valetta on the island of Malta. Abdullah Shallah,
a former pr Middle Eastern politics at the Un South Florida, replaced him as
head of the Palestine Islamic Jihad.
Leaders of the Pan
Islamic Jihad have always had working relationship with the Palestinian
Authority (PA) than has Hamas. This relationship made it easier for the leaders
of the Palestine Islamic Jihad to accep with Israel
in the summer of 2003.
Suggested readings:
Mary Curtin of Islamic jihad Reported Slain," L Times (October 29,1995), p.
AI; Mich "Ex-USF Prof Leads jihad," Tampa Tj tober 31, 1995), p. 1; Richard
Harw Riddle of Islamic jihad," Washington tember 21, 1984), p. A27; Meir Hatina
Salvation in Palestine (Tel Aviv).
Thalib,
Jaffar Urnar (1961- ) (Indonesia)
Jaffar Umar Thalib is the leader of the Indonesian Islamic extremist
paramilitary Laskar Jihad (Militia of the Holy War).
He was born in 1961 in east Java. His father was a veteran of Indonesia's war
of independence and a religious scholar who ran a religious school. Thallb received his early education at his father's
religious school. At age 19, he moved to Jakarta where he studied Arabic. After
a disagreement with the teacher, Thalib left
Indonesia to study at a religious school in Lahore, Pakistan. The lure of the
war in Afghanistan caused him to neglect his religious studies, and, beginning
in 1987, he served with the mujahideen fighting the Soviet military forces. Thalib found the experience enlightening and at the same
time he learned how to conduct a guerrilla war that could defeat a superpower.
He also met Osama bin Laden at Peshawar, Pakistan, in 1987, but he found bin
Laden unimpressive and called him lightweight.
Thalib
returned to Indonesia and founded • network of religious schools. In these
schools, Thalib advanced the idea of an Islamic state
for Indonesia and strict adherence to Islamic law. He sat on an Islamic court
in 2001 that sentenced a man to death by stoning for adultery and then he made
certain that the sentence was carried out. This verdict was contrary to
Indonesian law, but, after a brief arrest, Thalib was
released. Thalib has always considered the United
States as the main enemy of Muslims because of its support for Israel. Although
Thalib has denied any association with al-Qacda, he has defended both the 1993 attack on the World
Trade Center and the events of Sept 2001, as legitimate operations a enemy of the Muslims. Thalib
has a faithful following of between 3,000 and 10,000.
In April 2000, he
founded the Laskar jihad to defend Muslims in a
religious w ar against Christians in the Moluccan
Islands this group to the Moluccan Island to intervene in fighting between
Christians and Muslims. In this bloody war, casualties numbered over 6,000 and
nearly 750,000 were displaced.
Despite this
intervention the Laskar jihad, the Indonesian governement was reluctant to arrest Thalib.
His followers are fanatical and the Indonesian wanted to avoid conflict with
the Islamists of Thalib. Indonesian police finally
him on May 4, 2002, after Muslim rioting in Ambon, Indonesia, killed 12 people.
Police reluctance to charge him changed after the October 12, 2003 bombing on
Ball that killed 188 and hundreds more. Because many of them were foreign
nationals, foreign governments placed pressure on the Indonesian government to
crack Islamist extremists.
The Indonesian court
acquitted Thalib of inciting attacks on Christians
and attacking the Indonesian government on Januari
30, 2003. Thalib has political ambitions for
Indonesia becoming an Islamic state, he has threatened to reestablish the Laska
in the event that Christians start persecuting Muslims in Indonesia.
Suggested readings:
Don Greenl Boss Cleared of Incitement,"
Australia (January 31, 2003), p. 7; Andrew Mar Threat of jaffar,"
New York Times (2002), sec. 6, p. 45; Simon Montlakc,
"Militant Group Threatens Indonesian Peace," Christian Science
Monitor (April 4, 2002), p. 7; Grace Nirang,
"Jihad Chief Held after Attacks in Indonesia," National Post (Canada)
(May 6, 2002), p. A16; Richard C. Paddock, "Indonesian Extremist Backs
Terror," Los Angeles Times (September 23, 2001), p. A4.
Al-Turabi, Abdallah Hassan (1932- ) (Sudan)
Hassan at-Turabi, is
Sudan's leading Islamic fundamentalist leader. He was born in 1932 in Kassala
in eastern Sudan into a merchant family. His father, a judge, was also a
scholar of Islam and trained him in Islamic studies. AlTurabi
attended EnglIsh-language schools in the Sudan before
entering the British-run Gordon College in Khartoum. In 1955, he graduated with
a degree in law. At the same time that he studied in Western schools, he became
a secret member of the Khartoum branch of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood. In
1955, he won a scholarship to the University of London, where he earned a
master's degree in law in 1957. In 1959, he won another scholarship and worked
on a dissertation in law at the Sorbonne in Paris. In 1961, al-Turabi traveled
to the United States, and he was disturbed by the racial prejudice he
encountered. After finishing his dissertation in 1964, al-Turabi traveled
extensively in Europe.
Al-Turabi returned to
Sudan in 1965 and entered Sudanese politics. He formed the Islamic Charter
Front JCF) as an umbrella group to permit a variety of Islamic fundamentalist
groups to influence politics. Winning a seat in the Sudanese parliament,
al-Turabi served as attorney general of Gaafar Nirneiri's government. When outside the government,
al-Turabi provided political opposition. From his writings and speeches, he
soon became one of the leading Islamic fundamentalist political thinkers. Al-Turabi
also converted the ICF into the National Islamic Front (NIF). His chance for
political power emerged after the June 30 tary coup
of General Omar aleral Bashir allowed al-Turabi
Islamic fundamentalist military In 1991, al-Turabi launched an program that
mandated the Isl the Sharia for Sudan.
After the Persian
Gulf War, outspoken anti -Americanism leader in the Muslim world. His that all
of the non-Islamic st Middle East were puppets of
States and should be destroy tempted with some success to and Shi'ite Muslims
into an inte lamiC
alliance. His efforts led to tion of the Armed
Islamic Move to carry out a new terrorist camp non-Islamic governments.
Among those enjoying
Sudan hospitality in the early 1990s were Osama bin Laden and his supporters.
In a conference in April 1991, at-Turabi assumed leadership of the Islamic Arab
People's Conference (IAPC). Members of this conference formed the Popular
International Organization (PIO) in Khartoum, Sudan, to coordinate the
activities of the Islamic liberation struggle. This organization soon became
affiliated with the Iranian government. Training camps to education and train
terrorists were established in Sudan. At-Turabi also had connections with
Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman and with the participants in the 1993 plot to bomb the
World Trade Center in New York City.
Al-Turabi's
relationship with bin Laden had positive benefits for Sudan. Sudan's
infrastructure of dams, roads, bridges, and ports needed building. Bin Laden's
construction expertise and his financial connections made it easy to start a
large public works program. This infrastructure upgrade was necessary because
the government's Islamic policies had provoked a military uprising in southern
Sudan from non-Muslims.
At-Turabi's
relationship with al-Bashir soured in the late 1990s. Sudan had become a haven
for terrorist groups with al-Turabi's blessings. In 1992, a dissident Sudanese
national assaulted him in Ottawa, Canada, and al-Turabi blamed the United
States for the assault. Pressure from the United States and the civil war in
southern Sudan persuaded alBashir to declare his
independence from alTurabi. Osama bin Laden had to
relocate to Afghanistan and the profile of other terrorist groups tolerated by
al-Turabi was lowered. Al-Turabi's influence has been reduced to that of a
figurehead and the government has placed him under house arrest at his home in
Khartoum in February 2001. The alBashir government
has been reluctant to bring him before a court on serious changes, because it
wants to avoid making him a martyr. President Bashir released Turabi from house
arrest on October 14, 2003. Turabi has used his freedom to attack the Bashir
government and its handling of the rebellion in southern Sudan. See also Bin
Laden, Osama; Islamic Fundamentalism.
Suggested readings:
Kamal Bakhit, "Turabi Released in
Khartoum," Mideast-Mirror [London] (October 14, 2003), p. 1; David Hirst,
"Behind the Veil of Sudan's Theocracy," Guardian (London) (May 27,
1997), p. 16; David Hirst, "Dark Times Loom for Visionary Sudan,"
Guardian (London) (May 26, 1997), p. 12; Fereydoun, Hoveyda,
The Broken Crescent; The "Threat" of Militant Islamic Fundamentalism
(Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998); Robert MacLaughlin, "Sudan the Coup de
Grace," Arabies Trends (May 1, 2001), p. 1;
Judith Miller, "Faces of Fundamentalism: Hassan al-Turabi and Muhammed Fadlallah," Foreign Affairs (November-December 1994),
p. 123; Jonathan C. Randal, "Sudan's Urbane Islamic Leader Sends Shivers
from Behind the Scenes," Washington Post (May 9, 1995), p. A14; Abdel Salarn Sidahmed, Politics and
Islam in Contemporary Sudan (Richmond, UK: Curzon Press, 1997); Al Venter,
"SudanSudan's Spymaster: Hassan al-Turabi,"
Jane's Intelligence Review 5, no. 7 (July 1, 1998), p. 6.
Uighurs Separatists (China)
Muslim Ulghurs from China's far western province of Xinjiang have
established groups to fight for an Islamist state. Uighurs have had a lengthy
history of independence going back to an independent state in A.D. 744. More
recently, there were Uighur states set up in 1933 and 1944, but both lasted
only a few years. First outlines of a new independence movement appeared in the
mid-1960s during Mao Tse-tung's Cultural Revolution.
Nearly 120,000 Uighurs were arrested for anti-Mao activities during the
Cultural Revolution. In response to this persecution, a small group of Uighur
militants formed the Eastern Turkestan People's Party to begin the process to
lead to an independent Uighur state. Later this party was renamed the Eastern
Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM).
Both the party and
political agitation among the Ulghurs remained
dormant until Chinese authorities decided to use the Muslim Uighurs to weaken
the Soviets in Afghanistan. In case of unintended consequences, the Chinese govermnent encouraged Uighurs to fight in Afghanistan
against the Soviet army. Ulghur recruits received
military training in mulahideen camps where they alco
recelved indoctrination in Islamic reliz1,_-dz -.cachings. These Uighur veterans renirncd
to China ready to fight for a Uighur separatist Islamic state in Xinjiang. This
militancy happened at the same time the Chinese government decided to promote
immigration of the ethnic Chinese Han population into Xinjiang. A clash of
cultures ensued, leading to the Baren uprising in April 1990. The two days of
rioting that took place in Baren resulted in the deaths of least 30 people, and
the government arrested almost 8,000 others. Throughout the 1990s attacks on
Chinese police and ethnic Hans resulted in a harsh crackdown by the government
on Uighurs in Xinjiang. Uighur militants retaliated with a terrorist campaign
of bombings of buildings and buses directed against Chinese officials and
Uighurs remaining loyal to the Chinese government.
The Eastern Turkestan
Islamic Movement remains the largest and most active of the Uighur separatists.
Hasan Mahsum is the current leader of the ETIM and he
fled China in 1997 after release from a Chinese reeducation through labor camp.
Mahsum directed ETIM operations first in Afghanistan,
but later he moved to Pakistan and other Central Asian states. ETIM's
relationship to Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda has been close with most of ETIM's
fighters receiving training at al-Qaeda training camps. ETIM leaders send
graduates of these camps to Xinjiang, China, to form terrorist groups for operations
there.
The Eastern Turkestan
Islamic Party had been a major participant in the terrorist campaign, but
several other Islami have also become active. These gro ate under various names, including Turkestan Islamic
Party of All Turkestan .
Most of the leaders
of the reside outside of Xinjiang. They organize, and plan operations from
other Muslim states in the region; Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Ky and Pakistan.
Germany.
Suggested readings: Chien-pen "China's 'War on Terror': Septemb Uighur Separatism," Foreign Affairs (J August,
2002), p. 8; Michael Dwye Shadow of the Han,"
Australian Finan (June 28, 2002), p. 40; Erik Eckhom, New York Times (September 13, 2002), p. A6; Rohan
Gunaratna, Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror (New York: Columbia University
Press, 2002); Mark O'Neill, "A Life in Forgotten Exile," South China
Morning Post (May 15, 200 1), p. 15; Craig S. Smith, "China, in Harsh
Crackdown, Executes Muslim Separatists," New York Times (December
16,2001), p. 1A; Russell Working, " China's Own Muslim Nationalists,"
Moscow Times (October 26, 2001), p. A.
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