Following the murder of President Anwar Sadat by Islamists, and in the early 1990's, the Egyptian government launched a major offensive against Islamist opposition groups. By 1997, thousands of Islamic activists had been killed, imprisoned or driven underground. Many had also escaped to join forces with AI-Qaeda in Afghanistan. The government's tactics during this period were brutal. It made extensive use of the security services to detain and kill suspected militants, and relied upon the military court system to prosecute cases. Since then, President Hosni Mubarak has taken a more moderate line, but Islamic groups have continued their campaigns sporadically, being responsible for deadly attacks that have often targeted tourists and resort areas.

The Mubarak regime also took advantage of the state's control of the mass media and the official religious establishment to discredit the Islamist opposition and to counter their religious critique. The extreme measures that the regime employed reflected their belief that the Islamists were an existential threat to their continued role. Western governments similarly feared the repercussions that would attend a 'fundamentalist' takeover, and turned a blind eye to the human rights abuses and other 'emergency' tactics which the government used to win its war against Islamic extremism. Although the government' s offensive succeeded in removing the militants as an immanent threat, it did little to lessen the significance of religion in Egyptian public life. On the contrary, a conservative interpretation of Islam became further entrenched in Egypt's religious and political institutions during this period. This was evident in a series of high profile assaults on minority populations and upon intellectual and artistic freedoms throughout the 1990's. Apostasy cases were brought against secular intellectuals, and books were banned even as the militant threat receced. The government's complicity in these attacks, moreover, raised questions about the regime's commitment to a pluralist and tolerant conception of social order. It also generated concern about Egypt's future. While one would assume that the political victors would be able to define the new "rules of the game, "in this instance, the Islamist challenge-even in defeat-was able to reshape the vernacular of political discourse.1

 

Why Had This Occurred?

The explanation of this anomalous dynamic can be found in the centrality of the state in Egyptian politics, and its reliance upon Islam as a source of ideological legitimacy. A legacy of the Nasser era, Egypt's centralized state dominates the political and economic life of the country.

While the current regime has sought to liberalize the economy, politically it continues to dominate all facets of public life. Political opposition is tightly controlled, and the use of extra-legal means to limit dissent is not uncommon.

Similarly, elections are regularly manipulated, and elements of civil society that engage in political activism run the risk of arrest and government harassments State elites have also sought to control ideological dis course through censorship and. control of the mass media. To this end, the Egyptian government has used its control over religious institutions at all levels of society to promote Islam as a means of cultivating political quiescence and obedience to authority.

State actors in Egypt appeal to Islam in order to situate their rule within a broader framework of moral order, and to tie the Egyptian public to its political leaders in a web of rights and duties defined by religious obligation. The significance, and viability, of this approach is based upon the majority population's continuing identification with, and belief in, Islam. Despite the perceived 'secular' quality of the Egyptian state and its leaders, it has never, in fact, broken with its religious moorings, preferring instead a time honored use of 'official Islam' to sanction political authority. Even during Gamal Abd' al-Nasser's rule (case study above), the modernizing state never sought to eradicate religious belief. Rather, the regime appealed to a more modernist interpretation of Islam in order to challenge traditional elites and to sanctify its socialist program of development.

The use of Islam for political ends was even more important for Nasser's successors-Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak-who lacked bis charisma and the early optimism of the post-independence era. The policies of the Sadat regime, however, represented a significant break with his predecessor. Sadat embraced a more conservative Islam in an effort to redefine the direction of Egyptian politics. As part of this transformation, Sadat allied with the Muslim Brotherhood, the Saudi Royal family and other traditional elites in opposition to bis Communist and Nasserist rivals on the left.

For their part, during the cold war the Muslim Brotherhood followed the general guidelines of the Wahabis, but since it was not in control of a government (like it is now to some degree in Egypt), it developed a different strategy. While the Saudis had the luxury to use the powers of others, mainly the United States, the Ikhwan preferred to use the powers of the community they wanted to mobilize. The group's dense and complex writings over half a century focused on infiltrating the group's home countries, starting with the Arab and Muslim societies, so that they could be in full control of their destinies. The Brotherhood was extremely careful so as not to engage the regimes before reaching full capability. Their military and subversive doctrine was amazingly fluid and adaptable to circumstances. Their ideal shortcut was to infiltrate the ranks of the military and proceed with a coup d'etat against the government. Their next choice was to "advise" the ruler and influence him instead. This approach would start from the bottom-up and then reverse into a top-down mechanism. Hence, the Brotherhood would be interested in spreading through the elites, converting them patiently into the Salafi doctrine, and only then enlisting them in the organization. The Muslim Brotherhood often created front groups, both inside the Arab world and within emigre communities. Known to be very patient, the members distinguished themselves in smart deception.

In contrast to recent more radical organizations such as al Qaeda and its allies, the Brotherhood has made sure to camouflage its literature. The group seldom called for a direct confrontation with the ruler (al haakem), which was a recourse of last resort if he stopped abiding by the rule of Sharia or if he became obstructionist. The Brotherhood wanted full legitimacy on its side and projected an image of being the "aggressed," not the aggressors. Members acted as hardworking militants transforming the society in which they live into a gruyere. Their ideal plan is to make ideological reversal impossible. Educational and media institutions are the ideal tools for their campaigns. Their impact will be felt across the school system and in many cases within the media web. This trait was omnipresent in the audiotapes I examined as the government's expert in one particular terror case. The speaker, a Salafi cleric from Egypt whose words reached as far as Detroit, said clearly: "We need to preach jihad in schools; the culture of jihad must become the first nature of our youth."

Indeed, the Brotherhood's ideology is clear and self-explanatory. The path to power resembles a pyramid, from the community up to the governing bodies. The Ikhwan's jihad is more flexible politically than that of the Wahabis, although they are equivalent ideologically. The Brotherhood has accepted, for example, the need to participate in the political process, including legislative elections. Although inconsistent with their Islamic fundamentalist vision, which does not accept the concepts of republic, democracy, secularism, nonreligious courts, and so on, the Brotherhood and related organizations practiced the "political path." In Jordan, the group has an official presence in parliament. It has accommodated to the political structure in the hope of achieving further inroads. Will elections eliminate the struggle for the caliphate? Many westerners thought they would, but they have not understood the very long-term strategy of the Muslim Brotherhood. In 1991 the Front de Salut Islamique (FSI), an offshoot of the Ikhwan, ran for election in Algeria and won more than 51 percent of the seats. Many citizens frustrated with the previous totalitarian government voted for the FSI, despite the fact that it signaled openly that it would transform the republic into an "Islamist state" with all that entails: elimination of political parties that disagree with a new constitution and ultimately elimination of pluralism and the basic institutions of the republic. The Muslim Brotherhood invented "political jihad," which means using democracy to come to power so that one can destroy democracy. Most western analyses, particularly academic research, overlooked this dimension of jihadism. American and European scholars imagined that any step toward some democratic practices was a slow concession toward liberalization. The western apologists could not comprehend the overarching global goals of the modern jihadists; and they made the same analytical mistake with regard to jihadi violence.

A general tactic in their speeches are to make a distinction between the violent and the nonviolent Islamists. But the ten years in Algeria were a hell waged by the Muslim Brotherhood Salafis against seculars; more than 150,000 were killed for example. Many scholars in the United States and western Europe seriously misunderstood the Muslim Brotherhood jihadists. In fact there were and are distinctions, but these are drawn by the fundamentalists themselves. They can chose to be violent or nonviolent at their discretion-not at the discretion of western experts.

Sadat used the mechanisms of the state-particularly its control over education, media, and the official religious institutions--to actively promote religion in the public sphere, also supported Islamic student groups on Egypt's campuses, many of whom would later form the basis of Egypt's militant groups.

While the current regime has sought to liberalize the economy, politically it continues to dominate all facets of public life. Political opposition is tightly controlled, and the use of extra-legal means to limit dissent is not uncommon.

Similarly, elections are regularly manipulated, and elements of civil society that engage in political activism run the risk of arrest and government harassments. State elites have also sought to control ideological dis course through censorship and. control of the mass media. To this end, the Egyptian government has used its control over religious institutions at all levels of society to promote Islam as a means of cultivating political quiescence and obedience to authority.

Thus State actors in Egypt often appeal to Islam in order to situate their rule within a broader framework, and to tie the Egyptian public to its political leaders in a web of rights and duties defined by religious obligation. The significance, and viability, of this approach is based upon the majority population's continuing identification with, and belief in, Islam. Despite the perceived 'secular' quality of the Egyptian state and its leaders, it has never, in fact, broken with its religious moorings, preferring instead a time honored use of 'official Islam' to sanction political authority. Even during Gamal Abd' al-Nasser's rule (case study above), the modernizing state never sought to eradicate religious belief. Rather, the regime appealed to a more modernist interpretation of Islam in order to challenge traditional elites and to sanctify its socialist program of development. The use of Islam for political ends was even more important for Nasser's successors-Anwar Sadat and Hosni Mubarak-who lacked bis charisma and the early optimism of the post-independence era.

The policies of the Sadat regime, however, represented a significant break with his predecessor. Sadat embraced a more conservative Islam in an effort to redefine the direction of Egyptian politics. As part of this transformation, Sadat allied with the Muslim Brotherhood, the Saudi Royal family and other traditional elites in opposition to bis Communist and Nasserist rivals on the left. He also used the mechanisms of the state-particularly its control over education, media, and the official religious institutions—to actively promote religion in the public sphere. Sadat also supported Islamic student groups on Egypt's campuses, many of whom would later form the basis of Egypt's militant groups. Sadat' s inability to rein in the more extreme members of the Islamist movement, however, and bis ultimate assassination, demonstrated the failure of the regime to control either the forces or ideas that it bad set in motion.2

In fact the relationship between religion and politics in Egypt has a long history, though one that is neither as unified nor as unproblematic as many would argue. Religious and political authorities developed quite distinetly from one another within Sunni Islam, and generated a system of dual authority replicated throughout the Islamic world. The two elements of this system tended to cooperate because they needed each other: political rulers required legitimacy, while religious leaders needed temporal authorities to uphold Islamic law. The relationship between these two forms of authority, however, was not an easy one.

Political leaders actively sought to control the religious authorities-as well as the actual doctrine of Sunni Islam-to more ably pursue their temporal ends. They were also not above using force to attain such compliance. The ulema, on the other band, struggled to maintain their independence, with many recognizing the corrupting influence of political power both on themselves and upon Islamic doctrine. Imam Abu Hamid al-Ghazali summed up his suspicion of political rulers as such: "Three kinds of relations are possible with princes, governors, and oppressors. The first and worst is that you visit them. Somewhat better is the second whereby they visit you; but best of all is the third in which you keep your distance so that you neither see thein, nor they see you." 3

If the pre-modern era was characterized by a system of dual authority-with each attempting to gain the upper hand over the other-the early modem era is best characterized by the emerging dominance of the political. With the French occupation in 1798, Egypt was opened to the modernizing influences of European political, economic and ideological thought. The subsequent transformation of Egypt's social and political life was undertaken in the 19th century by Muhamad Ali (1805-1863) and, later, by his successor the Khedive Ismail (1863-79). A key element of their program was the elimination of the previously dominant Mamluk leadership, as well as the curtailment of the other major center of power: the traditional religious elite. Reining in the ulema entailed, above all, separating them from their source of economic livelihood [tax farms and 'religiously endowed properties' (awaqaj)], as well as minimizing their control over education and the law. The first of these two steps were designed to make the ulema dependent upon the ruler, and paved the way for subsequent step, the introduction of western-style education and legal codes.4

In 1882, when Egypt was on the verge of defaulting on its debt held largely by British investors, the British took over the country and set up a mechanism for repayment. The precipitating crisis was the Urabi revolt.

Egypt gained formal independence from England in 1922, though was effectively controlled by British influence until 1952. The British rote in Egypt, however, dates back to the end of the Napoleonic era, when they sunk much of the French fleet in Alexandria harbor. Their influence was also felt throughout the 1911. But the corresponding social revolution helped to establish the dominance of a secular elite in areas traditionally controlled by religious scholars, and left to the latter only a very limited (and re-conceived) realm of religion.

The era of Mohammad Ali, then, was a defining moment in the modernization of Egypt, and was characterized by the diminished influence of the ecclesiastic caste within Egyptian political life. This program of secular modernization was an integral part of the process of state formation, and was driven by adesire to emulate European development.

The political and social transformation of this era also set the stage for early nationalist period, and the liberal experiment of 1922-52. The nationalist revolution of 1919-which led to the formal withdrawal of British colonial rule in 1922 - and the idea of a state based upon national, not necessarily religious, loyalties defined the first half of the 20th century. The constitution adopted in 1923 reflected the intellectual ferment of this time, and embraced liberal secular principles that provided a basis of common citizenship not premised upon religion. It also placed control of education, law and justice in the bands
 of the secular and modernizing state, a sharp departure from earlier practice.

This period also marked the emergence of an Islamic reform movement led by Jamal al-Din al-Afghani (1838-1897), and his disciples, Moh’ad Abduh (18491905) and Rasbid Rida (1865-1935). A Persian and thus not Sunni by birth Jamal al-Din sought to respond to European dominance by reinterpreting Islam for the modem era.

His student Abduh later served as Mufti of Egypt (Chief Judge of the Sharia Courts), and was a leading reformer within al-Azhar, the pre-eminent university and mosque complex in Egypt.

The reformers' approach was both political as well as religious. Theologically, they sought to reinterpret Islam within a modem context, and to demonstrate that Islam could viably challenge Western modes of modernization. Underlying this was a recognition of the importance of science and reason for material progress, and the corresponding dangers of a religious tradition defined by 'unquestioning imitation' (taqlid), yet would become a model for Islamic activists in years to come.

Rashid Rida, Abduh's disciple, took a more conservative interpretation of Islamic tradition, despite his embrace of Abduh's general approach. He led what was known as the Salafiyya movement, which represented the primary opposition to the secularism of the 1920's and 30's. Hasan al-Banna, who founded the Muslim Brotherhood in 1928, was deeply influenced by Rida and the Salafiyya movement. While they both differed with Abduh on some issues, they shared with the reformist movement an emphasis on religious reinterpretation and political activism. They also shared a common animosity to Western dominance and continued influence in Egypt. To this end, the early Islamists believed, as did the ruling liberal parties, that Egypt was a unique nation-state, and deserved independence. While all of these groups were committed to an amorphous Egyptian nationalism, they differed greatly over what this entailed.

While the Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafiyyas interpreted Egyptian nationalism in Islamic terms, the liberal parties advocated a more secular and cosmopolitan conception of the nation. This divide marked the contemporary origins of the debate over Egypt's social order, as well as the beginnings of the 're-traditionalization of Islam.' 5

The early success of liberal nationalism in Egypt, however, was short-lived due to an absence of consensus about the basis of political life. Though the liberal nationalists had emerged as politically dominant in the aftermath of the 1919 revolt-benefiting from the deep animosity to British rule, and the fear that the Western powers were undermining Islam-their ideas of liberal secularism remained somewhat alien to the deeply religious population. Moreover, the inability of the constitutional government to deal with such core issues as socio-economic development, corruption and continuing British influence, discredited what little faith there was in the idea of democratic constitutionalism. Not surprisingly, alternative movements expanded to fill the ideological vacuum. These included the right wing nationalist Misr al-Fatat (Young Egypt) - modeled on the fascist parties of Italy and Germany - as well as the Muslim Brotherhood, and several left wing parties including the Communists and socialists. The communalist orientation of all these groups reflected the resurgence of such tendencies in Europe during the same time period (1930's and 40's).

Although the left-wing communalism of Nasser's Arab socialism and the right wing Islamic communalism of the Muslim Brotherhood differed over the basis of society, they shared a common rejection of the individualism inherent within the liberal democratic idea.

In the post-1952 Egypt context then Gamal Abd al-Nasser and the ‚Free Officers’ then sought to overthrow was dominated by a landed aristocracy, a corrupt monarch, and continuing British influence.

 

 

1 See Joel Migdal, Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in the Third World, Princeton University Press, 1988.

2 Nabil Abdel-Fattah. Veiled Violence: Islamic Fundamentalism in Egyptian Polities in the 1990’s, Cario, 1994, p. 19.

3 See Abu Hamid Al-Ghazali, Ihya' 'Ulam al-Din, Book 14: Kitab al-Halala wa al-Haram.

4 See Nabil Abdel Fatah, Quran and Sword: Stole-Religion Conflict in Egypt, Cairo, 1998.

5 See Denis Sullivan and Sana Abed-Kotob, Islam in Contemporary Egypt: CMI Society, 1999.

 

Case Study P.1:

 

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