The nationalist movement that had grown up in the inter-war period-and which opposed both the British and the Monarchy-reflected the diversity of Egyptian society at the time: the Muslim Brotherhood on the right, the Communists on the left, and the liberal party in the middle. All of these parties agreed on the twin goals of economic development and independence from foreign rule, but differed over the means of achieving them. Many in the military-the only stable institution in Egyptian society-saw the politicians as unable to accomplish either of these goals, and, in 1952, a small group of them overthrew the government of King Farouk and sent him into exile.

The 1952 revolution, however as we have seen in the case study at the end of P.1, was little more than a coup. Nasser and the Free Officers did not lead a mass movement, nor did they espouse a clear ideology. What did separate them from their rival claimants was their control of the armed forces. This provided them the ability to take power, and to institute some degree of order. The failings of the ancien regime, moreover, and its inability to improve life for ordinary Egyptians, disposed the population favorably toward the young officers of modest origins. While there remained skepticism that the new rulers would be any different from the old, there was some reason for hope. The dissolution of the monarchy and the departure of British troops in 1954 marked the end of Ottoman and European control of Egyptian politics. As such, it was "the fust time in over two thousand years . . . [that] Egypt was ruled by Egyptians." 1

Egypt's first President, General Muhammed Naguib, was a leading advocate of the return to parliamentary mle, but was deposed by Nasser and placed under hause arrest in 1954. It was only after the coup, then, that the struggle to define the revolution began in earnest. Initially, this entailed a concerted effort to expand state control of Egyptian society, and to restructure economic and social relations along socialist and secular lines. It also entailed a concerted effort to build a populist-and nationalist-basis of support.

These two features of the Nasser period would come to define the post-1952 era: the emphasis on a strong, centralized state, and the continuing struggle to cultivate popular acceptance and support for military rule. We early on when this website started already mentioned that, many German military officers and Nazi party officials were granted sanctuary in Middle Eastern countries, most notably Egypt and Syria, where they helped develop the militaries and intelligences agencies of those countries.

 

See Case Study P.2:

 

Nasser and the Free Officers saw the state as the vehicle for modernizing and transforming Egyptian society. Basing its policies upon both the Nazi and the Soviet model, the regime created a one-party state whose influence spread into all areas of Egyptian life. While there was a split within the ruling elite over whether or not to return to constitutional rule, this ended with the marginalization of its advocates and the emerging dominance of Nasser. The core institutions of the new state, then, remained the armed forces, the newly expanded security services (the mukhabarat), and the single party. These were initially directed by the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), though later came under control of the office of the president. The Nasser regime also sought to eliminate its potential rivals by banning the political parties that bad been controlled by the landed elite and which had dominated Egyptian politics in the inter-war years. While the Muslim Brotherhood was allowed to continue its activities in return for its support of the revolution, this ended in 1954.

Economically, the regime promoted major initiatives on land reform and state-led development. This reflected a commitment to socio-economic reform and a more equitable distribution of wealth. It was also indicative of Nasser's political strategy. The land reform, in particular, was intended to dis-empower traditional elites-both the landowners and religious leaders-who opposed the regime's policies. It was also designed to generate support among the peasantry. who were the major beneficiaries of the policy. State-promoted industrialization was also intended 10 provide jobs 10 urban workers, a major constituency of the new regime. Moreover. Nasser mobilized these "subordinate classes against landed elites and private business elites." 2

By emphasizing the class divisions of society. Nasser was able to cultivate popular support for his policies. and to stigmatize the 'feudal elements' and 'reactionaries' who opposed the regime. The rapid expansion of the public sector. and the nationalization of various industries, also created a new class whose interests were tied closely to those of the state.

These efforts to centralize political and economic control of the country went hand in hand with the effort to construct a new basis of state authority. In order to mobilize popular support, the regime undertook a number of public speaking toms and used the mass media to communicate directly to the masses, bypassing traditional political channels. The dissolution of political parties and the subsequent development of a single mass party was a central part ofthis strategy. By removing the mechanisms by which alternative political interests could be organized, the regime was better able to control opposition groups.

It also helped to exclude supportive interests, such as students and unions, from real power. Aseries" of political organizations were subsequently created, which included the Liberation Rally (1953), the National Union (1956), and, finally, the Arab Socialist Union (1962). While the first two parties floundered, either for organizational reasons or for lack of an agenda, the Arab Socialist Union proved more effective.

Like we suggested in the above Case Study P.2, it cannot be said that Islamists promoted a fascist concept of state. However, especially after the visit by Baldur von Schirach (as leader of German youth) to the Midlle-East in 1937, paramili­tary youth organizations became a popular phenomenon. These authoritarian structure, fascist slogans, and contacts with Germans and Italians, and their presence in NSDAP rallies (together with politicians) in Nuremberg were in fact a source of anxiety for the British and the French. British government also sent a special commission headed by Earl Peel to investigate the matter. In its report of 1937, the commission proposed termination of the mandate and partition of Palestine (one-fifth of the land to go as a Jewish state, an Arab state in the rest of the country, and minor areas remaining under British mandate, in addition to Transjordan.

But as Jeffry Bale recently formulated it for the Encyclopedia of World Fascism, “Nasir's Harakat al-Dubbat al-Ahrar (Free Officers' Movement] in Egypt), is arguably more akin to the pan-European ("Nation Europa") notions promoted by many post­war neofascist movements. Indeed, neofascist activists in Europe have periodically offered support, and not only rhetorically, to their comrades." 3

In fact Nasser's approach to dealing with the Egyptian left also reflected that of the Islamists, and fluctuated between repression and limited cooperation. After an initial suppression of the communist party and the labor movement in the early 1950's, aperiod of rehabilition and collaboration was begun in 1961, reflecting the regime's closer ties to the Soviet Union.4

What Nasser sought from these various mass parties was not a vehicle for participation, but, rather, a mechanism for building consent. In developing these new political organizations, Nasser was able to expand the social base of the regime to the lower classes who had previously been excluded from political life. This marked a new era of politics, defined by populist appeals and mass mobilization. It also reflected a new social contract. The peasantry and the working c1asses accepted the authoritarianism of a new 'military-bureaucratic elite' in exchange for the promise of higher living standards and economic opportunity. Thus, "by destroying the party system and replacing parliamentary democracy with the referendum, [Nasser] brought the Egyptian (and Arab) masses into play [ushering in a new era of Egyptian politics]." 5

Arab socialism one should mention, was not intended to replicate the Soviet system-particularly its hostility to religion-but, rather, to adapt it to an Arab context. The more defining feature of Nasser era, though, was Arab Nationalism, the basis of which was a belief that the Arab peoples-defined by language, history and culture-were a 'nation' and ought therefore to be politically unified. This was an important element in developing an inclusive Arab identity not based on religious affiliation.

Rather, it was a secular ideology that embraced Arab Christians as well as Muslims, and placed each on an equal footing. Plus there was a strong anti-imperialist sentiment to Arab nationalism, which saw the European powers as a primary obstacle to Arab development. Despite a failed political union with Syria (1958-61), and animosity from the Gulf monarchies, Nasser's continued advocacy of this ideal emphasized the international focus of the regime and made him a hero among the Arab masses.

The Suez crisis of 1956, the appeal of third world nationalism, and a failed attempt on Nasser's life all heightened the charismatic quality of the new leader. The capacity of the state to monitor and control its perceived enemies also grew in these early years with the expansion of the state security forces. The adoption of a series of constitutions between 1956 and 1964 continued this trend.

These provided for a greater concentration of power within the office of the presidency, and, at least in the 1964 constitution, a new system of security courts to try political cases. What ultimately emerged was a strong centralized state that was able to mobilize popular sentiment behind the ideology of Arab nationalism. As one commentator phrased it, "identification with the people in a ritualized cult of symbolic relationships went hand in hand with the development of the control function of the nation-state, the formation of an elite of army officers, and the use of rubber stamp organizations and assemblies." 6

The primary ideological challenge to the Nasser regime throughout its tenure however, remained three residual elements of the old order: (1) the loyalties of the establishment ulema (religious scholars) to the landowning c1ass, (2) the popularity of the Muslim Brotherhood, and (3) the grip of traditional Islam on the population.

Thus Nasser, undertook a well-publicized pilgrimage (Haj) to Mecca in 1954, fulfilling one of the primary commandments of Islam. Similarly, the government sought to gain greater control over the mosques throughout the country (both public and private) by placing them under the direct supervision of the Ministry of Religious Endowments. Thus between 1952 and 1962, the government built or helped fund upwards of 1500 mosques, and virtually doubled the personnel levels in government mosques.7

But while the previously mentioned‚ Muslim Brotherhood’ was initially supportive of the Free Officers, their relationship was a complicated one. It had long standing ties with many of the Free Officers, including relations with both Nasser and Sadat who some believe had previously been members.8

Moreover, its initial support of the revolution was important for the Free Officers in both challenging the secular Wafd party and in providing a religious sanction for the military takeover (what the Brotherhood referred to originally as the "Blessed Movement''). The Brotherhood had been a major force in Egyptian politics throughout the 1930's and 40's, and, despite repression under the old regime, it retained an extensive grass roots network as well as a militant wing and  long-standing opposition to the Monarchy and the British also gave the organization a great deal of legitimacy, which the Free Officers initially sought to co-opt.9

Relations between the two groups, however, broke down fairly quickly. This was due, to the fact that the Brotherhood had hoped that their support for the new government would translate into a genuine power sharing arrangement. This, however, did not materialize, and instead a competition between both the Brotherhood and the Free Officers over the same constituency (urban laborers, rural peasalits and the lower middle classes) ensuid.

The question of power sharing was complicated by the fact that there were sharp divisions between the Free Officers and the Brotherhood over Egypt's future. While the Free Officers, and Nasser in particular, sought to modernize Egypt along secular and socialist lines, the Brotherhood advocated a more central role of religion in public life-defined as are turn to tradition-as apre-requisite for are surgent Egypt. In essence, the divide hinged upon the compatibility of Islam with the secular mission of the modernizing state. While members of the Muslim Brotherhood argued for a religious state as apre-requisite for an Islamic community, many of the Free Officers did not believe that such an alternative was either necessary or beneficial.

The debate over these competing visions was reflected in two books that were published during this, period. The first of these was Khalid Muhammad Khalid's Min Huna Nabda (From Here We Start, published in 1950). It echoed that true Islam has little to say about the nature of political or social order, and thus the type of State structure to be adopted was entirely open. According to this interpretation, there was nothing inconsistent between. Islam and a secular state, as long as certain minimal prohibitions were upheld. Moreover, secularism would in fact be preferable given the danger of linking religious and political power too closely. As Khalid argued in the book, a religious state would binder Egypt's development since the unification of religious and political authority would be corrupting on both sides, and would more likely undermine the development of liberty and justice than create it. What was truly needed, he argued, was a social revolution, an alternative that would be hindered by a ''priesthood" that "colluded with tyrants," and-in their pursuit of power-used religion to "keep the people poor and ignorant." 10

Shaykh Muhammad al-Ghazzali represented the Muslim Brotherhood's position in this debate, and articulated it in a text written to rebut Khalid's book entitled Min Huna Na'lam (Dur Beginning in Wisdom), though more literally From Here We Learn, published in 1950. It argued that Islam is a "comprehensive program" meant to regulate all facets of human existence, not least of which the political and social. To preclude Islam from a central role in governing the state would, therefore, be a violation of God's revelation. In terms of the structure of an Islamic state he  was somewhat vague; al-Ghazali simply argued that ''the duties of the state are clearly and precisely outlined in the Qur'an and the Sunna (tradition)...'' 11

The need for an Islamic state, he argued, nonetheless remained clear. The return to Islam was a pre-requisite for a revived Muslim community, and this was all the more important given the imminent threat to Islam posed by a 'hostile, Christian West.'

In making his arguments, al-Ghazzali appealed to the communal sentiments of a religious population and called upon them to defend their tradition. Not only was Islam ''threatened with extermination ''-- but those such as Khalid who argued for a secular political authority were betraying their faith and were, in bis words, "puppets of the enemies of Islam." And those such as Khalid who argued for a secular political authority were betraying their faith and were, in bis words, "puppets of the enemies of Islam." 12

This conflict between the Brotherhood and the Free Officers came to a head in 1954. The Brotherhood bad been deeply divided over how to deal with Nasser' s intransigence on their core issues of creating an Islamic state and sharing power. One faction, which included Hasan al-Banna's successor, Hasan al-Hodeibi, sought to work with Nasser and "persuade [him] to turn toward Islam." Another faction, led by Sayyid Qutb, pressed for a more forceful confrontation that would entail Nasser's overthrow. Hodeibi was arrested in the Fall of 1954, and shortly afterwards an assassination attempt was made on Nasser's life, reputedly by a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. Seven thousand members of the Brotherhood were subsequently arrested in a concerted effort to eradicate their influence within the military, the police and other areas of Egyptian society. A military tribunal subsequently convicted 800 members of the Brotherhood on charges of conspiring to overthrow the state, and six of its leaders were executed.13

The detining issue was whether or not Islam is compatible with secular principles, and whether the Egyptian state ought to be more explicitly Islamic. But as in other places, these debates also have been influenced by the struggle for political power.

But as the political violence of the 1990' s escalated-and the structural crises that facilitated this violence worsened-the now, Mubarak regime became more dependent upon a discourse of conservative Islam to sanction its continued rule. This increased the government's reliance upon the official ulema (religious scholars) of Al-Azhar (a mosque university complex headed by the Sheikh of Al-Azhar).' the Dar al-Ifta (House of Fatwas, headed by the Grand Mufti) and other elements of the official religious establishment.

While the official ulema may have opposed the militants' use of violence, they generally shared the vision of society advocated by the Islamist movement. What subsequently emerged in the early to mid-1990's, then, was adynamic whereby the struggle for political power between the Islamist opposition groups and the ruling government was not defined by competing visions of social order, but, rather, by competing claims of religious authenticity. As a result, the regime ceded much of the cultural and religious ground to the Islamist tendencies in an effort to depict itself as the authentic defender of Islam.

It also helped to create an environment where the persecution of religious minorities (particularly Coptic Christians) and attacks upon secular intellectuals occurred without official opposition, and often with its complicity. Thus, even though the state was able to defeat the militants in the field, its embrace of conservative Islam validated the Islamist critique and helped to transform Egyptian public life. The end result was that the government's own efforts to co-opt conservative Islam greatly undermined the development of an inclusive basis of national identity, and the corresponding "rights [to] participation and equal citizenship.14

Nasser earlier however had already abolished the sharia courts which had operated as a parallel court system since the 19th century, and merged them into the national judiciary. While the stated goal was to unify a fragmented judiciary, it had the effect ofbringing this alternate court system under the direct control of the state. In 1961 also, Nasser passed a law that re-organized AI-Azhar university, and placed it under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Religious Endowments. This entailed the introduction or the first time, of modern courses of learning into the university's curriculum, including medicine and engineering.15

Previously, the court and educational systems in Egypt had been divided between the private, Islamic and national systems. Both the reform of the sharia courts and of AI-Azhar were designed to end this separation, and unify both systems under the control of the state.16

Nevertheless, while the Nasserist state was defined by a program of modernization-and derived much of its authority from the idea of Arab nationalism-it found ample justification for its mission in the fatwas (religious rulings) of the religious establishment. The regime also established the Supreme Council on Islamic affairs whose primary purpose was to demonstrate a connection between the state and Islam.17

Not surprising, Saudi Arabia initially was deeply troubled by, the populist rhetoric and policies of the Egyptian regime. Nasser, on the other hand, perceived Saudi Arabia as a bastion of conservative reaction actively working against his interests. Both the Saudis and the Egyptians subsequently sought to offset the other's influence in the region by setting up competing Islamic institutions to promote their respective agendas. The culmination of this, was the outbreak of war with Yemen in 1962.18

Not unlike the Nazi’s before (or at least in contrast to the Soviet system), Nasser believed that creating a state-controlled monopoly on religion would be useful in supporting his regime against both internal and external enemies. Moreover, the strength and popularity of Islam throughout Egypt precluded the Nasserists from attempting to suppress it in the way that Ataturk had done in Turkey thirty years before.

Cultivating a modernist Islam, while suppressing the more radical interpretations, was thus an essential element of Nasser's mass politics. Far from being hostile to religion, Islam became integrated into the state apparatus in order to provide it with ideological support. "Islam became, in effect, a creature of the regime." 19 Thus although channeled and controlled by the state, the use of religion within a nationalist discourse remained a key link between the modernizing state and its traditional population.

This however came to an end with Egypt's defeat by Israel in the six day war of June 1967. As Fouad Ajami notes, among those who wanted to get to the deep structure behind the defeat there was a consensus that the heroes of yesterday had made too many compromises, "The Arabs had tumed away from God, and God bad turned away from them." 20

Then Nasser died in September, 1970, and was succeeded by his vice­ President Anwar Sadat. Sadat's efforts were encouraged by members of the military and by influential people within the state ministries, all of whom shared a common distrust and antipathy for the Socialist party. The conflict between the two came to a head in May of 1971, when Socialist supporters were accused of conspiring to overthrow the government. This led to the arrest of ninety members of the Socialist party, and their removal from positions in the government. In the aftermath, Sadat undertook a major restructuring of the state that eliminated the 'alternate power centers.' This series of events came to be known as the 'Corrective Revolution.'

While the basic contours of the system remained the same-in terms of the centrality of a strong state, and the cultivation of a populist nationalism a socialist but also the secular vision of development, were abandoned.

Sadat's new direction also included a new set of alliances with economic and religious elites as a bulwark against the left, and a rapprochement with Saudi Arabia. And although also Nasser had used religion to provide legitimacy to his rule, Sadat embraced Islam with much greater fervor. His main concern was to provide a counterweight to the socialist ideas that continued to dominate Egyptian public life. In his speeches, Sadat emphasized (and often conflated) the ideas of religious morality and Egyptian nationalism in order to reinforce traditional patterns of authority and social order. For example he told the National Assembly; '' I want us to return to the village source, to our origin. .. I want the constitution to take this into account, not only for the sake of the villages, but so that the whole of Egypt should take shape in the way and become a single village." 21

Sadat's alliance with the Muslim Brotherhood thus was part of an effort to provide a grass roots basis to his rule, and to help him contain the left. According to several reports, the Brotherhood agreed to renounce the use of violence and promised not to engage in anti-regime activities in exchange for their freedom and the right to continue their peaceful advocacy of Islam.22

Leaders of the Brotherhood were also involved in drafting sections of the 1971 constitution, and were allowed to participate in parliamentary elections, although not as a registered party. During the period of Sadat's rule, the number of government controlled mosques more than doubled from 3000 to 7,000, while the total number of mosques grew from roughly 15,000 mosques in the mid-1960's to 27,000 mosques in 1980.23

Mohamed Heikal in addition reported that, "Knowing they had the support of higher [government] authority, Islamic students began to behave as if it was they who were running the universities. They decided what subjects were suitable to be taught, [Moreover] it was clear that the religious students were not simply tolerated by the authorities but actively encouraged by them." 24

The extent of the government's support however, remains a point of dispute. Muslim Brothers deny any overt support from the government, and leftist activists, recall that the security services actively supported the election of Islamic candidates to student union offices. There were also claims that security forces used to arm Islamists, and that the number of [Islamist] groups mushroomed runder the umbrella of state security.25

Save is to say that historicly during periods of good relations with Soviets, the Leftists were treated better, while during periods of Saudi influence, the Islamists were treated better. The repression which each leader visited on these groups was often a signal that their external relations were in trouble. Also, the liberalization of economic policies certainly allowed for a greater flow of funds from abroad, many of which benefited from the oil boom, and  helped  finance the Muslim Brotherhood during the earIy 1970's.The adoption of a new Constitution in 1971 was similarly meant to reflect a greater role of Islam in Egyptian politics. It designated Islam the official state religion, and the Sharia as "a principle source of legislation."

But while the Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic student groups were initially supportive of Sadat, these organizations proved to be unreliable allies. Particularly the Brotherhood was rebuilding its network and relied upon the goodwill of the regime to continue its work.26

The deference to the government ended with Sadat's trip to Israel, and Sadat's relations with the United States. The regime's reluctance to completely implement Islamic law remained another point of contention. The subsequent re-emergence of Islamic violence indicated that the state had set in motion something that it was not able to control.

 

1 AI-Sayyid Marsot, A Short History of Egypt, Cambridge University Press, 1998.

2 Maye Kassem, Egyptian Politics: The Dynamics of Authoritarian Rufe, 2004, p. 13.

3 World Fascism Vol.1, ed.Blamires/Jackson, 2006, p. 84.

4 Hamried Ansari, Egypt, The Stalled Society, University of New York, 1986, p. 92.

5 Ibrahim Ibrahim, "Religion and Polities under Nasser and Sadat," in Freyer Barbara Stowasser, ed., The Islamic Impulse, Washington: Center for Contemporary Studies, 1987, p. 125.

6 Michael Gilsenan, ''Popular Islam and the State in Contemporary Egypt," in Fred Halliday and Hamza Alavi, eds., State and ldeology in the Middle East and Pakistan, p. 171.

7 Anwar Alam, Religion and State: Egypt, Iran and Saudi Arabia, Delhi, 1998, p. 87.

8 Hamid Ansari, Egypt, The Stalled Society, American University in Cairo Press, 1986, p. 82.

9 See Barry Rubin, Islamic Fundamentalism in Egyptian Politics, 1990.

10 Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age: 1798-1938, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 353. The above debate is also discussed in Nadav Saftan, Egypt in Search of Political Community: An Analysis of The intellectual anti Political Evolution of Egypt 1804-1952 (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1961). See also Mullaney, The Role of Islam in the Hegemonie Strategy of Egypt's Military Rulers, p. 160-1. For more background on both Kalid and Abd al-Raziq see also Leonard Binder, Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development ldeologies (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).

11 Saftan, Egypt in Search of Political Community, p. 235.

12 Cited in Saftan, Egypt in Search of Political Community, pp. 236-37.

13 The above situations are discussed in Nadav Saftan, Egypt in Search of Political Community: An Analysis of The intellectual anti Political Evolution of Egypt 1804-1952 (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1961); Mullaney, The Role of Islam in the Hegemonie Strategy of Egypt's Military Rulers, p. 160-1. For more background on both Kalid and Abd al-Raziq see also Leonard Binder, Islamic Liberalism: A Critique of Development ldeologies (University of Chicago Press, 1988).

14 See Tamir Moustafa, "Conflict and Cooperation between the State and Religious Institutions in Contemporary Egypt," International Journal of Middle East Studies, 32, Feb. 2000.

15 Malika Zeghal, "Religion and Politics in Egypt: The Ulama of aI-Azhar, Radical Islam, and the State 1952-54," International Journal of Middle East Studies. 31, No. 3, August 1999, p. 314.

16 For more on this, see Jakob Skovgaaard-­Peterson, Defining lslam for the Egyptian State: Muftis and Fatwas ofthe Dar al-Ifta, 1991, p. 184.

17 Moustafa, Conflict and Cooperation between the State and Religions Institutions in Contemporary Egypt, p. 7.

18 See Malcolm Kerr, The Arab Cold War: Gamal Abd Al-Nosir and His Rivals. 1958-1970, Oxford University Press, 1971.

19 Katerina Dalacoura, Islam, liberalism and human rights, 1998, p. 119.

20 Ajami, The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice Since 1967, Cambridge University Press 1992, p. 74.

21 Aulas, "State and Ideology in Republican Egypt: 1952, p. 82.

22 See AIi Eshmawy, The Secret History of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement, Cairo, 1993.

23 See Carrie Rosefsky Wickharn, Mobilizing Islam: Religion, Activism and Politica/ Change in Egypt, Columbia University Press, 2003.

24 Heika, Autumn of Fury: The Assassination of Sadat, London, 1983, pp. 133-4.

25 See Heikal, Atumn of Fury, on these issues.

26 See also Patrick Gaffuey, The Prophet's Pulpit: lslamic Preaching in Contemporary Egypt, 1994.

 

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