By using Islam as a basis of nationalist legitimacy, both Sadat and Mubarak abandoned the earlier eommitments to seeular modernity that marked the Nasser era. It also ereated an opportunity for conservative activists to promote their vision of Islam in public life. While the ruling party-the National Democratie Party-advocates a modernist ideology of development, both the Mubarak and Sadat regimes consistently sought to situate their authority within a framework linked to Islamie tradition. More importantly, the active promotion of Islam through state-run media and the official religious establishment has been a key factor in explaining the resurgence of eonservative Islamic polities. Not only did this contribute to the re-emergence of the long-standing debates over the nature of Egypt's social order, but it helps to explain the partieular outcome. By attempting to appear more culturally authentie than its religious opposition, state actors contributed greatly to the construetion of an Islamie social order defined by exclusive eonceptions of national identity and conservative interpretations of religion.1

This role of state actors in promoting eonservative Islam helps to explain, then, two key anomalies in contemporary Egyptian polities. The first was the emerging dominance of Islamist polities in the aftermath of the government's victory over its militant opposition in the 1990's. While the militants failed to dislodge the regime, the Islamist critique had nonetheless taken hold and the vernacular of political discourse was fundamentally transformed. This raised the inevitable question: ''why had this occurred?" Why weren't the victors able to defme the new 'rules of the game'?

Related to this was a second anomaly: why did the regime tolerate a religious establishment that was, outspoken and moving "closer to the Islamists ideas and further away from the official line?" 2

While conventional wisdom tends to attribute the resurgence of Islam to popular unrest or an inherent religiosity among the population, the approach defined here emphasizes the important role of the state in creating an environment where Islamist politics flourished. The state politicized not just the ulema, but the discourse of conservative Islam. It even went so far as to support some of the groups that would later emerge as its prlmary opponents. In this way, the government' s politicization of religion helped to validate the ideas and organizations associated with the Islamist movement, and ushered in a new era of religious politics.

The implications of this instrumental manipulation of religion have been significant.
Not only has it contributed to greater communalization of the polity, but it has helped to create an environment where the persecution of Coptic Christians, secular intellectuals and those with dissenting religious opinions has occurred with regularity (and often with state complicity). The most significant victim of the ideological battles of the last thirty years, then, has been the conception of Egypt as a plural society. The right to differ, either intellectually or politically, has been stigmatized and often equated with either heresy or treason. But by relying upon coercive state structures to constrain dissent, and by using Islam to promote political quiescence, the state continues to exclude large segments of the population from public life, and undercuts the possibility of developing a truly open society. Minority rights, political development, civil society and regional stability will all remain problematic issues for the near future.

The Islamic discourse that now dominates in Egypt has demonstrated intolerant and exclusive tendencies, and as such does not provide the kind of pluralist basis for a what is in fact a diverse society. How this affects Egypt's future remains to be seen, though it is likely that the two opposing elements of Egyptian culture-the secular intellectual and conservative Islamic-will continue to clash. If the state is able to improve economic well-being, increase political participation or otherwise generate alternative sources of legitimacy, its dependency upon religious politics may diminish, and the influence of conservative Islam may lessen. The irony, of course, is that any effort to genuinely open the political arena will seriously threaten the existence of the regime, since free elections would likely benefit the Islamist opposition. In other words, the state has limited its options by embracing conservative Islam as a source of legitimacy.

Increased radicalism of the Islamic networks, led Sadat to give a speech in 1979 where he denounced the student groups by name, and argued that  „those who wish to practice Islam can go to the mosques, and those who wish to engage in politics may do so through legal institutions." 3

Sadat next, reversed his steps toward political liberalization in order to reign in the Islamic movement which he had helped create.4

But by then, religious politics had taken on a life of their own. Islamist groups had emerged as the dominant opposition to the state, a movement ironically facilitated by Sadat's own policies and Saudi money. And with his assassination in 1981 by members of al-Jihad, "the genie bad struck him down." 5

Interresting, the message of both establishment Islam and the Islamist opposition was becoming increasingly similar throughout this period. Moreover, they all sought a common goal of "bring[ing] Egyptian society back to Islam." 6

Unlike Ataturk's Turkey by then (1970), Sadat's Egypt now had become firmly rooted in its Islamic heritage. In fact the assassination of Anwar Sadat, was meant to spark a popular rebellion coordinated by the militant group al-Jihad, but a breakdown in communication prevented many ofthe cells around the eountry from being activated. Members of al-Jihad planned to eapture the radio and television building in central Cairo, and begin broadcasting news of the uprising. This would give other members of the organization a signal that the plan was in effect. The failure, however, to capture the building kept many of the cell leaders in the dark, and out of the fight. The government responded by rounding up thousands of suspeeted militants and supporters, 300 of whom were eharged with murder and conspiracy to overthrow the government.

Sentences ranged from 3 years to life (plus more than eighty were excecuted), but those that were acquitted left the courthouse chanting "the Islamic Revolution is coming," a clear indication of conflict to come.7

The Mubarak regime's policies reflected those ofthe Sadat era: tolerating (though constraining) the Muslim Brotherhood, while using the official religious establishment to promote a more obedient Islam. Unlike Sadat, however, Mubarak would rely to a much greater degree upon the security services to deal with the militants, which, in the 1980's and 90's, mounted a significant challenge to the regime.

Influenced by both the Iranian revolution in 1979, and the Afghan war against the Soviets, political Islam emerged as an ideology capable of challenging existing patterns of domination. Political tracts by writers such as al-Banna, Qutb, and Mawlana Mawdudi found a new generation receptive to their message. The subsequent resurgence of a politicized Islam combined the rejectionist ideas of these early writers with the anti Western sentiments that bad informed Nasser's Arab Nationalism. Along with their political and economic critique of the status quo, the Islamists offered a positive message that drew from the cultural and religious tradition of the people. This alternative was detined by a fear that Islam was under attack from the West (and Westemized elites), and that the vulnerability of the umma (community) to such an assault was due to its having strayed from the true path of Islam.

The prescription, then, to such ills was a "return to Islam," an amorphous slogan that entailed a reordering social and political life in accordance with the religious teachings of the Prophet, the Qur'an and the Sunna. (The example of the Prophet Mohamed as it is relayed through Islamic tradition).

Although the specifies remained vague, the Islamists believed it promised a more authentic society, and, as such, represented an indigenous alternative to Western models of development. It also resonated strongly with a dispossessed population, the majority of which were preeluded from any real opportunity for advaneement. As such, Islam became a "potent ideology of popular dissent." 8

The initial goal was not to destroy Islamie activism, but to temper the extremists and co-opt the moderates, at least long enough for economic reforms to improve living standards. There was never any intention of allowing the Islamist groups into the political arena, or to otherwise share power with them; rather, the state tolerated their existence as long as they did not challenge the regime's right to rule. While Mubarak created space in the religious and cultural spheres for those willing to cooperate with the state-and allowed groups like the Muslim Brothers to continue providing social services-the regime retained full control over what it perceived to be the core issues of economic and foreign poliey.

The official ulema subsequently worked with the regime by offering theological responses and critiques of the militants, and, in particular, their use of violence against fellow Muslims. The ulema continued these efforts throughout the 1990's in part to preserve their institutional interests, and, in part, to continue their propagation of Islam. In return for its cooperation, the Mubarak government provided significant resourees and a degree of independence to AI-Azhar and the Ministry of Religious Endowments.9

The Muslim Brotherhood also worked with the Mubarek government in the 1980's, serving as an intermediary between the state and the Islamic militants. By accepting state authority, the Brotherhood thus was allowed to operate and published a newspaper, al-Da 'wa (the Call), for a short period, and continued to provide social seryices throughout Egypt. In tbe 1980's, young activists were able to bring their experience in university politics to the realm of the professional syndicates.10

They made early gains in the Engineering Syndicate in the mid-1980's, and by 1987 had won amajority of seats on that board. They made similar imoads into the doctor's and pharmacists associations, and in 1992 they gained control of the board of the lawyer's syndicate. Thus poliey of "mutual accommodation" benefited the Brotherhood in its effort to re-establish itself as the leading Islamic organization in Egyptian society.11

While the early 1980' s were relatively quiet in Egypt, sporadic violence began in the mid to late-1980's. The violence began with a senes of attacks on Coptic Christians in upper Egypt. Militant groups targeted Copts for the money that could be raised by robbing their shops, and also to strike at the historically cosmopolitan fabric of Egyptian society. The state was slow to respond to these attacks, even as they contributed to the communal tensions that had been increasing since the Sadat era. In the late 1980's, the tactics of the militants shifted, as al-Jihad began targeting government officials, particularly, those involved in the security services. In 1987, there were four assassination attempts on government officials, ostensibly undertaken by Islamic Jihad.

In 1989, the Minister oflnterior, Zaki Bar, was targeted by al-Gama'a AI-Islamiyya (the Islamic group), Egypt's second major militant organization. Several months later, in 1990, the speaker of the Egyptian Parliament, Refaat EI Mahgoub, was assassinated. In 1992, Farag Foda, a leading secular critic ofthe Islamists was shot to death outside his home in Cairo. In that same year, other militant groups struck at foreign tourists, a leading source of foreign exchange for the government. When bombs exploded in Cairo, it was dear that the violence of upper Egypt had penetrated the urban life of the capital.

The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, and the subsequent war, had an enormous impact upon the capability and direction of these groups. The United States and Saudi Arabia provided significant funding and training for the Mujahadeen forces fighting the Soviet occupation. Working with the Inter-Service Intelligence (ISI) agency of Pakistan, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency provided upwards of$6 billion in arms, equipment and training over the course of ten years. Moreover this was matched "dollar for dollar" by the Saudi government.12

For its part, the Egyptian government-like other Arab governments-actively encouraged its young men to join the Jihad against the godless communism. Many who bad been jailed for their role in the events of 1981, left for Afghanistan immediately upon their release. This included among others, Ayman al-Zawahiri, the leader of Islamic Jihad and future advisor to Osama Bin Laden. Omar Abdel Rahman, spiritual head of al-Gamaa commonly known as the 'Blind Sheikh' was another participant in the broader effort. The Afghan war was also an important moment in the development of an international financial network for "Jihadi" groups. Fundraising organizations were created with branches in Western capitals as weIl as in the Middle East to funnel money into Islamic militancy. When the war ended, these networks and groups continued to operate, and began redirecting their focus to other venues including Kashmir, Chechnya, Algeria and Egypt.13

Estimates regarding the number of Egyptians who joined the fight range from several hundred to several thousand, although all agree that they were coordinated largely by Islamist organizations. A number of the militant groups, particularly al-Jihad, saw this as an opportunity to rebuild their organizations after the repression stemming from Sadat's assassination. The Afghan war subsequently contributed to a new level of conflict between the Egyptian militants and the state. The capacity of both Islamic Jihad and al-Gama 'a, as well as the regularity ofviolence, increased dramatically with the return of the mujahedin (holy warriors). These returnees had been trained in explosives and guerriIla tactics and many of them had honed their skills in combat. Their expertise was now being turned on the regime in a manner similar to that occurrlng in neighboring countries such as Algeria.

Moreover, the Egyptian military was largely unprepared to deal with this new level of expertise and commitment. Unlike those who bad never left Egypt, these men knew what they were doing. The attempted assassination of Interior Minister Zaki Badr in 1989, for example, demonstrated what the security services now faced. Although the attack failed, the use of explosives detonated by remote control demonstrated a level of sophistication that had not existed earlier in the decade. Of equal concern was the international funders and operatives which gave these groups significant support, a situation created ironically by U.S., Saudi and Pakistani intelligence agencies.

The events leading up to new confrontations between the state and the militants began in early 1990, with a senes of provocations by Islamic activists. While some actions were non-violent-including a peaceful march by the Gama'a al-Islamiyya through one of Cairo' s slums-others were more aggressive, including a number of anti-Christian riots and attacks on churches in upper Egypt. The government responded by going on the offensive; it assassinated the spokesman of tbe Gama'a on the streets of Cairo, and sent its spiritual leader, Sheikh Mubammad Abdel Rahman, into exile.  The Gama ' a retaliated by assassinating Rifaat Mahgoub, the Speaker of the National Assembly. Abdel Rahman eventually received a visa to the United States and set up operations in Jersey City, NI. He was also the 'blind Sheikh' who was later convicted in a U.S. court for bis involvement in the first attack on the World Trade Towers in the early 1990s.

And after a year and a half of relative quiet-during which time the Gulf War occurred, the Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), was about win-Islamic violence once again escalated. There was a slaughter of 13 Christians in tbe Spring of 1992 by a small faction in upper Egypt, followed by Farag Foda's assassination in June of that year.14

While these events did little to provoke the government, it was the subsequent attack on foreign tourists the following Fall-and the Gama'a's announcement of a concerted campaign against Western tourism-that prompted the government to strike back. (It is estimated that the tourist industry brought into Egypt $3.3 Billion annually at this time).

Thousands of people were arrested or detained without charge during these sweeps, with many being tortured and killed in police custody. Despite govemment gains. however, both the Gama 'a and Islamic Jihad continued their operations. These included several assassination attempts on leading state figures, as well as on local police and security officers. Coptic Christians were also targeted for attack. Some of the more high profile attacks included a failed attempt on the life of Interior Minister Hassan al Alfi, and a similar attempt on the Prime Minster Atef Sedky. The latter attempt proved somewhat disastrous for the militants, since the attack claimed only the life of a local schoolgirl, which state media covered extensively. Nonetheless, the violence was escalating, and a government victory was far from assured.15

Many were held without trial for several years, while those who did face charges were tried in military courts. The govemment also passed a law barring political activity of groups that were not registered political parties, and actively cracked down on the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood.

As long as the militants limited their attacks to govemment officials and police-who bad little if any popular support-the population was behind them. When the Gama'a shifted tacticst and started targeting foreign tourists and Egyptian civilians (even Copts), popular support rapidly fell.

This occurred for two reasons. On the one band, the decline in tourism seriously impacted the livelihood of ordinary Egyptians, particularly in upper Egypt, and created economic hardship for those whom the militants were ostensibly meant to support. On the other band, popu1ar opinion just did not perceive as legitimate the killing of fellow Muslims.

By late 1994 the govemment's beavy handed tactics were beginning to pay off. By 1995, the fighting bad been effectively isolated to the remote areas of central and upper Egypt, where the conflict "degenerated into the timeless politics of vengeance and vendettas, an endless cycle of killings and reprisals." 16

Militant activity continued, though, with two attacks in September and November 1997, the latter of which was a gruesome attack on tourists in Luxor that left 60 dead. Far from demonstrating a resurgence of militancy, however, this attacked marked the end of the conflict. Imprisoned members of the Gama'a subsequently called for a ceasefire.

But while the state proved able to deal with the security threat posed by the militants, the ideological challenge proved more difficult to address.  When the ulema defended government policies in the 1960's and 70's, they were pereeived as puppets of thecregime. Many of members of the ulema, refused to sanction this role, which ereated a split within AI-Azhar between the leadership and those sympathetie to the Islamist cause. WhiIe the Iatter may have opposed the militant's use of violence, they agreed with the Islamist eritique of the regime, and shared the Islamist vision of social order. These internal divisions also prodded the leadership into a more antagonistie relationship with the regime. Consequently, when the Mubarek govemment enlisted the ulema in its battIe with the militants in the earIy 1990's, it had the unintended consequenee of empowering (and emboldening) both the centrist leadership and the conservative ulema alike.17

The government also provided a forum for these religious leaders to comment on political events, yet they used it in a way that did not always benefit the regime. In April 1993, for example, a group of ulema alled upon the government to "release the Islamist prisoners and to negotiate with the members of radical Islam." 18

Similarly, in 1994, Gad al-Haq attributed the rise of Islamic extremism to the state's manipulation and control of religious affairs, and implicitly argued for a fteer hand in religious interpretation. He also became less willing to issue blanket condemnations of attacks upon tourists and Copts, and focused instead on issues of public morality. In taking these steps, the ulema were presenting themselves as an alternative to both Islamic extremists and the state. This allowed the ulema to develop an agenda of its own, and were calling for "a return to religion." 19

While there were limits, AI-Azhar's leverage over the regime grew more significant as the violence became more intense. The tactics of the regime undermined its legitimacy, and made it increasingly reliant upon whatever allies it could get. As a result, a wide-spectrum of conservative ulema were promoted a moderate Islamist worldview through radio, television.20

Thus, although the Mubarak regime bad previously supported many of the secular intellectua1s who were subsequently targeted-and provided space for them to challenge the Islamists-the regime did little to defend them when such support became a liability. The state's compromise with conservative religion, then, privileged a communalist interpretation of the Egyptian nation and national identity, and demonstrated that the tirst victim in the struggle to maintain power was Egypt' s historical commitment to secular and cosmopolitan norms.

At the heart of the Islamist challenge in Egypt has been the continuing debate over how to defme the nation. At issue, is a conflict between those who advocate a society based upon a salafiyya (or Islamist) vision of social order-detined by the establishment of an Islamic state and the full application of Sharia-and those who embrace some notion of secular modernity. While the former argue that the answer to Egypt's social ills is areturn to tradition, the latter holds that it is the continuing influence of a stagnant tradition that has been the source of Egypt's economic and political decline.

In the 19th century, this debate was dominated by the reform movement of alAfghani, Abdhuh and others. Challenged by European imperialism, members of this movement advocated the embrace of science and reason as a means of social revitalization. Among the more liberal elements of this movement, religion was to be relegated to the private sphere, while the institutions of state and society were reformed along western lines. The premise behind this emulation of Europe was two-fold. First, developments in science and technology were perceived to be an important element in transforming the material conditions of Western societies, and Islamic societies, it was believed, ought to follow suit. Second, many believed that the unquestioning obedience to religious authority, and the lack of critical thinking associated with it, had severely hindered the development of Arab society. Only by embracing science and reason, then, could Arab societies compete economically and politically with the West.

The more culturally conservative elements in Egyptian society, however, rejected this reasoning, and saw the European influence as an intrusion in traditional Egyptian life. Such conservative elites perceived European values and ideas-particularly those that emphasize individual self-interest over the interests of the community-as largely inconsistent with those of Islam. The basic dichotomy between Egypt's Islamists and secular intellectua1s has changed little since this era.

This was evident in the 1990's when-in the midst of the militant violence-the debate re-emerged over whether Egypt ought to have an Islamic or secular state. The secular argument generally took one of two approaches. On the one.

A debate on this issue between Islamist and secular intellectuals occurred during a meeting of the Cairo Book Fair in 1992, the proceedings of which can be found in Misr Bayn al Daw/a al Diniya wa al Madaniya.21 Representing the Islamists were Muhammad Imara, Mamoun al-Hodeiby, the spokesman for the Muslim Brotherhood, and Shekh Muhammad al Ghazzali of AI-Azhar. On the other side were two renowned secular intellectuals, Farag Foda, the founder of al-Tanwir, and Muhammad Ahrned Khanafa. The debate was significant for a nurnber of reasons, including the fact that it was the first and last debate on such a sensitive topic to be hosted by a govemment institution in such a public forum. Moreover, it was shortly after this debate that Farag Foda was gunned down by Islamic militants outside his home in Cairo. He argued that nowhere in the Qur' an does it specify a particular form of government, and thus a secular government is consistent with Islam.22

It was not that the early Wafdists were necessarily hostile to religion. Rather, they were concemed about the politicization of ecclesiastic authorities, and the manipulation of religion by political actors (particularly by the monarchy). If this first approach is wary of religion's influence upon politics, the second approach is concemed with the effect of politics upon religion. Authors such as Mohammad Said al-Ashmawy are deeply disturbed over the politicization of Islam. Though he explicitly eschews the label of secularist, Ashmawy's position is premised upon the belief that religion (and specifically Islam) deals fundamentally with human spirituality, not with politics.23

Other concerns raised by secular and liberal intellectua1s deal with the ambiguity of what an Islamic state would entail. For example, the demand for the application of shari'a, despite its apparent simplicity, is rather misleading because there is no single interpretation of Islamic law. Rather, there are several schools of Islarnic jurisprudence-the Hanafi, Malaki, Hanbali, and Shafi'i-which, while similar in most matters, do differ on various issues. Second, the secularists fear the abuse that would be inherent in an Islamic state. 139 Once shari 'a was established, any opposition could be equated with heresy, and dissent would "become an insolence in the face of God' s law ..that has to be punished by applying the appropriate hadd (Quranic punishment)."The proponents of an Islamic state-a group often referred to as 'integralists ' -reject these arguments, and believe that a elose affiliation between religion and politics is not just preferable, but essential. The core of their argument lies in the assertion that Islam has never known a distinction between public and private realms, and that all aspects ofhuman existence are meant to be regulated by God's will as defined in the Qur'an, the Sunna (example of the Prophet) and the Shari'a. The basic assumption within this claim is that without religion, there can be no normative basis to political life and, hence, no morality. Moreover, secularism is understood from this perspective as either a matter of unbelief (kufr) or of active hostility to religion. The alternative to an Islamic state, then, "is not a civil state, but rather an irreligious [one]." 24

By promoting conservative Islam for its own ends, state elites have helped to validate the integralist (and Islamist) vision of social order, and moved the salaflya interpretation of Islam into the ideological mainstream. This also contributed greatly to the communalization of Egyptian politics, with dire results for the Christian minority.

Discrimination against the Coptic Christians-which comprise the largest minority in the country-is evident in a variety of issues ranging from the official count of the population, l to biring procedures that exclude Christians from holding positions of authority. There are no Christian govemors or mayors in Egypt, for example, or Cabinet level officials. Members of the Coptic community are also unrepresented in the upper ranks of the security services. Similarly, Cbristians are largely absent in the realm of academia. Of Egypt' s 15 state universities, none have a Coptic Christian in a key administrative post-either Dean or President-and only a very few Christians hold teaching positions. Similarly, Christian students are not allowed to attend AI-Azhar University despite its public funding. As one of Egypt's pre-eminent universities, this type of discrimination has long-term implications for future job prospects in such fields as medicine, law and engineering. There is some dispute as to the actual nwnbers of the Coptic population as weIl. Govemment figures place the number at 6 million, or roughly 5 percent ofthe population. Coptic activists claim a much higher figure, around 10 million. while external sources place it at 7 to 8 million.

Other forms of discrimination can be found in the treatment of minorities on matters of religious freedom and marriage. While a Christian may convert to Islam, Muslims who convert to Christianity have been subject to harassment by local law enforcement. While such conversions are not specifically prohibited by law, neither are hey recognized. Similarly, a Muslim woman is legally prohibited from marrying a Christian man, though a Muslim man may marry a Christian woman. There have also been numerous reports of Coptic girls being abducted and forcibly converted to Islam (meaning included in a harem) by Muslim men. While there are no reports of government involvement in such abductions, the local police and government officials have harassed Christian families seeking redress, and the government has clearly failed "to uphold the law in such instances." Plus there is a law prohibiting Churching construction (and repair) absent a presidential decree remains in force, even while the government uses public funds for mosque construction and support.25

On New Years Eve 1999, violenee in the southem city of AI-Kosheh led to two days of rioting. During this period, Muslims burned and looted Coptic stores, and killed 20 Christians. The violenee reflected long simmering tensions between wealthy Christians and less weIl-off Muslims, though was very much intertwined with the communalization of polities. When two Christians had been killed in the previous year, the government rounded up 1,000 Copts-torturing many-convinced that Christians were behind the killings.26

The government's response to the 1999-2000 violence reflected a similar unwillingness to address the real issues. The initial trial indicted 96 defendants-58 Muslims and 38 Copts-but acquitted 92 of them. The remaining four were convieted of only minor crimes. According to one analyst at the time, "the verdiets were intentionally light in order to avoid fanning the flames of sectarian strife." 27

While the Egyptian government refuses to recognize the Coptic community as a minority-and argues that the Egyptian nation is entirely of one 'ethnic' fabric-the government has nonetheless refused to allow for equal treatment of the Christian population. This is refleeted in the common pereeption among members of the Coptic eommunity that they are second class eitizens, and, thus, not 'fully Egyptian.' 28

Moreover, the large amounts of daily television and radio time dedicated to Islamic programming has in the past either demeaned Christianity or emphasized the benefits of conversion to Islam. Similarly, Islamist newspapers, commonly denigrate Christianity and the Coptic community, as do the sermons at Friday prayers in mosques around the country. Each of these trends contributes to the further communalization of public life, and has increased Coptic alienation.

These issues were also resurrected in 2001 when an Arabic language weekly, al Nabaa, published a lengthy story-with numerous pictures-of a defrocked priest having sex with women at a revered monastery. A major protest erupted among the Coptic community that included several days of demonstrations in Cairo. While the immediate cause of the protest was the publication of the article, these unprecedented street protests were driven largely by the community' s sense of continued persecution. The protestor' s grievances reflected long-standing frustration with the Mubarak regime's unwillingness to protect minority rights, and ineluded a variety of critieisms of both the Government and the Church leadership.

While the Mubarak regime has sought to promote interfaith dialogue and other means to ease tensions between the communities, the state' s promotion of communalism has had a lasting impact upon Coptic as weIl as Muslim identity. This has not been helped by the tendency of state actors to take community issues up with the Coptic Church, and not with secular representatives. And while there remain numerous Muslims and Christians willing to reach out to one another, they frequently face opposition within their own communities over such issues as inter-communal dialogue and the advocacy of reform. This is especially evident in the internal divisions that exist within the Coptic community over how to respond to both the state and the sectarian tensions. Expatriate Coptic groups often differ with local groups over how to approach many of the issues raised by their minority status. Similarly, the communalism fostered by the state has constrained those in both groups who try to promote religious tolerance and mutual understanding.

Elsewhere Farag Foda, a leading secular writer, was assassinated in 1992. He had participated in the 1992 Cairo Book Fair forum, during which he bad he had insulted Muhammad al-Ghazali, a leading member of Al-Azhar. The Front subsequently issued afatwa designating Foda a kafir (beretic), the punishment for which is death. During the murder trial, Sheikh al-Ghazali testified to the fact that "anyone opposing the full implementation of the sharia, as Foda did, was guilty of apostasy, and that anyone killing such a person was not liable for punishment under Islamic law." 29

The assassination of Foda was a galvanizing event, as was the attack two years later on writer Naguib Mahfouz, Egypt's famed Nobel Laureate. In both cases, the efforts by establishment clerics to ban their books or otherwise identify them as apostates provided a warrant for their subsequent attacks by the more radical militant groups. And although wi1ling to support secular thinkers in their criticisms of Islamic militancy, the Egyptian regime was less willing to aid such intellectuals when challenged by members of the religious establishment.

For example, Nasr Hamid Abu Zeid in 1993, a former professor at the University of Cairo, was a scholar of Islamic studies and Arabic literature. By attempting the application of hermeneutics to the interpretation of the Qur'an, several of his colleagues with whom he had long differed considered his analysis heresy, and coordinated with a group of Islamist lawyers to bring formal charges against him. While Abu Zeid argued his case on the grounds of freedom of thought and expression (a constitutional matter), those bringing the case invoked the rules of sharia (lslamic law), and focused on whether or not Abu Zeid's writings were a threat to the community of Muslims. The court then ordered Abu Zeid divorced from his wife, since "being married to an apostate from Islam was a violation of the rights of God." 30

Muhammad Said al-Ashmawy, the former Chief Justice of the Cairo High Court however, has found himself in a similar predicament to that of Abu Zeid. In 1992, the Islamic Research Academy recommended that a number of bis books be banned, and ordered the confiscation of five specific texts. In 1996, a similar order was given for a book he published concerning women and the veil in Islam. In this book he argued that there is nothing in the Quran or the Sunna that require woman to wear a veil, and that this is solely a matter of custom. The Islamic Research Academy subsequently ordered the confiscation of this book.

See also the interview on April 16, 2004 "Veils of Islam" (when a Muslim TV presenter was beaten by her husband).

Other leading scholars in Egypt were similarly targeted for attack, including author Said Mahmud al-Qumny, whose book The God of Time, was banned. The attack on The God of Time was part of a broader campaign against 196 books that al-Azhar deemed blasphemous. The case was submitted to the State Security court upon the request of Al-Azhar, where al-Qumny was subsequently charged with ''propagating ideas that denigrate Islam [under Article 198 of the Criminal Code]." 31

The underlying debate in each of these cases-the limits of free expression and the acceptability of questioning revealed religion-is not new. As noted above, there has long been a debate over the degree to which Islam is open to interpretation.

What is perhaps most significant, though, is the government's complicity in these attacks. The intolerance of dissenting opinions on religious matters has been legitimated by state policies which have been designed to encourage religious piety and political quiescence, while stigmatizing both extremism and Westernization as twin evils to be avoided. In doing so, however, it also helped redefine the moral order of Egyptian public life. As one writer recently commented, the emergence of "~ influential middle class with a [traditional] mentality as weIl as the politicization of Islam"  has created a new social environment, where the idea that society should be organized around religious principles is largely accepted and where assaults on 'deviance' by state institutions is now commonplace.

While rhetorically committed to a secular modernity, the regime has ceded the basic debate over religion and public life to conservative clerics. As such, the regime sought to appropriate the message of conservative Islam, not oppose it. Since the vast majority of the population are sympathetic to the concems raised by the Islamists, neither the regime nor the state-controlled media wished to defend secular principles or ideas. Moreover, the assaults on intellectual freedoms were perceived by the regime to be peripheral to their core economic and political concerns.32

Furthermore, aimed at constraining moderate Islamists was the reform of the Hisba laws in 1997, which had allow Islamists lawyers to bring cases of Islamic morality to court. The regime has also continued to ignore the complaints of Coptic Christians, secular intellectuals and Shi'a Muslims.

At the same time, the Mubarak government claims to support avision of modemity that promotes tolerance, pluralism and economic development. In short, the Mubarak regime is trying to serve as both an advocate of secular modemity and Islamic tradition at the same time.The inconsistency of these two trends has generated a 'superficial hybrid,' where the successful promotion of economic modemity would appear to entail the promotion of critical reasoning.

Successful modernization also requires at least some degree of independence for the realm of civil society, and a greater emphasis upon the rule of law and accountable government. Moreover, the success of the state in promoting a communalist vision of society-and of depicting conservative religious belief as culturally more authentic-has greatly affected the middle classes which have become increasingly conservative and overtly Islamic in the last twenty years.

Despite the government's success in replacing. top officials of the religious establishment, moreover, the Mubarak regime has been largely unable to eradicate the deeply entrenched conservatism that exists within these institutions. And it is here that the state's politicization of Islam over the last thirty years is most evident. By inviting Saudi influence and financing to eradicate the left-and, later, to counter the Islamists-both the Sadat and Mubarak regime helped to destroy the intellectual basis for a liberal modernist (or humanist) Islam and discredited the idea that religion was open to interpretation. These policies subsequently contributed to the demise of modernist Islam within Egypt. In its stead has been placed a conservative interpretation of Islamic tradition.

Moreover, by using the security services (and courts) to prosecute heterodox views, the Mubarak government has "repeatedly sent a clear message that religion is not a private matter and that any 'deviation ftom the true religion' will not be tolerated." 33

The influence of eonservative Islam in Egyptian public life was greatly abetted by the changing orientation ofstate elites that began in the 1970's. By using Islam as a basis of nationalist legitimacy, both, Sadat and Mubarak abandoned the earlier eommitments to seeular modernity that marked the Nasser era. It also ereated an opportunity for conservative activists to promote their vision of Islam in public life. While the ruling party-the National Democratie Party-advocates a modernist ideology of development, both the Mubarak and Sadat regimes consistently sought to situate their authority within a moral framework linked to Islamie tradition. More importantly, the active promotion of Islam through state-run media and the official religious establishment has been a key factor in explaining the resurgence of eonservative Islamic polities. Not only did this contribute to the re-emergenee of the long-standing debates over the nature of Egypt's social order, but it helps to explain the partieular outcome. By attempting to appear more culturally authentie than its religious opposition, state actors contributed greatly to the construetion of an Islamie social order defined by exclusive eonceptions of national identity and conservative interpretations of religion.

This role of state actors in promoting eonservative Islam helps to explain, then, two key anomalies in contemporary Egyptian polities. The first was the emerging dominance of Islamist polities in the aftermath of the government's victory over its militant opposition in the 1990's. While the militants failed to dislodge the Mubarek as the noted political commentator and fonner-Ambassdor Tahseen Basbir remarked, even though the Islamists were "checked in [their] bid for power, ... the Islamization of society gained ground." 34

The Islamist critique bad nonetheless taken hold and the vernacular of political discourse was fundamentally transformed. This raised the inevitable question: ''why had this occurred?" Why weren't the victors able to defme the new 'rules of the game'? Related to this was a second anomaly: why did the regime tolerate a religious establishment that was, at least from the early 1990's, extremely outspoken and moving "closer to the Islamists ideas and further away from the official line?" This was particularly perplexing given the state's complicity in high profile assaults upon intellectual freedom, and the regime's apparent absence in the debate over social order.

The answers to these questions are best found by moving away from a dichotomous understanding of Egyptian politics that emphasizes a secular state vying with an Islamist opposition-and recognizing instead the central role of official institutions in promoting conservative Islam. The focus of this research, then, is on the interaction of three sets of actors-the state elite, the religious establishment and the Islamist opposition-and the manner in which this dynamic facilitated an ideological transformation of Egyptian politics. While conventional wisdom tends to attribute the resurgence of Islam to popular unrest or an inherent religiosity among the population, the approach defined here emphasizes the important role of the state in creating an environment where Islamist politics tlourished. The state politicized not just the ulema, but the discourse of conservative Islam. It even went so far as to support some of the groups that would later emerge as its primary opponents. In this way, the government.35

Politicization of religion helped to validate the ideas and organizations associated with the Islamist movement, and ushered in a new era of religious politics. The implications of this instrumental manipulation of religion have been significant. Not only has it contributed to greater communalization of the polity, but it has helped to create an environment where the persecution of Coptic Christians, secular intellectuals and those with dissenting religious opinions has occurred with regularity (and often with state complicity). The most significant victim ofthe ideological battles ofthe last thirty years, then, has been the conception of Egypt as a plural society. The right to differ, either intellectually or politically, has been stigmatized and often equated with either heresy or treason. The takfir cases, for example, demonstrate the weakness of the, government in the face of a religious communalism of its own making; by failing to stand, up to chauvinistic tendencies within official institutions, the ruling regime has become complicit in their actions. Moreover, the failure to cultivate an inclusive basis of national identity-and a political culture of tolerance and compromise-has contributed to major divisions in society and continuing social tensions. In short, by relying upon coercive state structures to constrain dissent, and by using Islam to promote political quiescence, the state continues to exclude large segments of the population from public life, and undercuts the possibility of developing a truly open society.

These findings do not, however, imply the imminent downfall of the regime or an imminent Islamist takeover. What it does signify is that minority rights, political development, civil society and regional stability will all remain problematic issues for the near future. The Islamic discourse that now dominates in Egypt has demonstrated intolerant and exclusive tendencies, and as such does not provide the kind of pluralist basis for a what is in fact a diverse society. How this affects Egypt's future remains to be seen, though it is likely that the two opposing elements of Egyptian culture-the secular intellectual and conservative Islamic-will continue to clash. If the state is able to improve economic well-being, increase political participation or otherwise generate alternative sources of legitimacy, its dependency upon religious politics may diminish, and the influence of conservative Islam may lessen. The irony, of course, is that any effort to genuinely open the political arena will seriously threaten the existence of the regime, since free elections would likely benefit the Islamist opposition. In other words, the state has limited its options by embracing conservative Islam as a source of legitimacy.

As pointed out, the goal of the Muslim Brotherhood has always remained the same: to reestablish Sharia rule in Egypt and elsewhere, whether by peaceful or violent means. And now, despite the best efforts of the Mubarak regime (which, like the Nasser and Sadat regimes before it, has tried to keep the Ikhwan at bay with a combination of force and concessions) to limit its influence, it is gaining strength in Egypt. However the Islamist group has now won 76 seats -- more than five times the number it held in the outgoing chamber.

As for extremist attacks for one, the Sinai will remain a scene violence (mostly committed by Tawhid wa al-Jihad part of the jihadist -al Qaeda the movement) -- plus elsewhere in the country-- occasional violent attacks against tourist are also noticed in the map below.

In the aftermath of the Taba bombings, more than 3,000 individuals in Egypt were taken into custody and questioned, and following the July 22 2005, more than 2,000 were taken into custody. However, several more high-value suspects, remained on the loose inside the country.

And unless the Egyptian security forces are able to penetrate the source of these attacks, which requires more than carrying out shootouts against potential militants, these attacks will continue.

And in Egypt as a whole, the implications of instrumental manipulation of religion not only contributed to greater communalization of the polity, but it has helped to create an environment where the persecution of Coptic Christians, secular intellectua1s and those with dissenting religious opinions has occurred with regularity.

The most significant victim of the ideological battles ofthe last thirty years, then, has been the conception of Egypt as a plural society. The right to differ, either intellectually or politically, has been stigmatized and often equated with either heresy or treason. But by relying upon coercive state structures to constrain dissent, and by using Islam to promote political quiescence, the state continues to exclude large segments of the population from public life, and undercuts the possibility of developing a truly open society. Minority rights, political development, civil society and regional stability will all remain problematic issues for the near future.

The Islamic discourse that now dominates in Egypt has demonstrated intolerant and exclusive tendencies, and as such does not provide the kind of pluralist basis for a what is in fact a diverse society. How this affects Egypt's future remains to be seen, though it is likely that the two opposing elements of Egyptian culture-the secular intellectual and conservative Islamic-will continue to clash. If the state is able to improve economic well-being, increase political participation or otherwise generate alternative sources of legitimacy, its dependency upon religious politics may diminish, and the influence of conservative Islam may lessen. The irony, of course, is that any effort to genuinely open the political arena will seriously threaten the existence of the regime, since free elections emediatly benefitted the Islamist opposition. In other words, the state has limited its options by embracing conservative Islam as a source of legitimacy.

Plus while Egypt is currently more concerned about Syria 's bid to restore its stature within the Levant, especially regarding the Lebanese and Palestinian conflicts, than with the rise of Iran. Al Qaeda's No. 2, Ayman al-Zawahiri, in a video marking the fifth anniversary of the Sept. 11 attacks, warned of attacks against oil targets in the Persian Gulf region. The first manifestation of this strategy came Sept. 15, 2006, when jihadists staged a failed attempt to strike at two separate energy facilities in Yemen. And as al Qaeda has maintained assets in the region it could become more active the next few months.

 

1 See also Fouad Ajami, "The Sorrows of Egypt," Foreign Affairs, September/October, 1995.

2 Dalacoura, Islam, Liberalism anti Human Rights, p. 126-7.

3 Hopwood, Egypt: State and Society, p. 117.

4 David Sagiv, Fundamentalism and Intellectuals in Egypt, 1973-1993, London, 1994, p. 60.

5 Fouad Ajami, The Dream Palaces of the Arabs: A Generation's Odyssey, 1998, p. 206.

6 Zeghal, "AI-Azhar and Radical Islam," p. 382.

7 SulIivan and Abed-Kotob, Islam in Contemporary Egypt, p. 81.

8 Muhammad Faour, The Arab World After Desert Storm (Washington: U.S. Institute of Peace Press, 1993, p. 55.

9 Skovgaaard-Peterson. Defining Islam for the Egyptian Stole, p. 220.

10 Gehad Auda, "Tbe Nonnalization of the Islamic Movement in Egypt from the 1970's to the Early 1990's", in Marty and Appleby, Fundamentalisms and the State, University of Chicago Press, 1994, p. 390.

11 See Geneive Abdo. No God but God: Egypt and the Triumph of Islam, Oxford University Press, 2000.

12 George Crile, "Charlie Did It," Financial Times, June 7-8, 2003.

13 Robert Oakley, former-Ambassador to Pakistan, referenced in Hibbard and Litte, Islamic Activism and US. Foreign Policy, p. 76.

14 This was reflected in a leaked U.S. National Intelligence Estimate reported in the London Sunday Times in February 1994 which stated that the Egyptian government was in danger of being overthrown. The report is referenced in Jon Alterman, "Egypt: Stable, but for How Long?" The Washington Quarterly, Autumn 2000, p. 108.

15 Lawyers Committee on Human Rights, Escalating Attactics on Human Rights Protection in Egypt, Washington: Lawyers Committee, 1995.

16 Ajami, The Dream Palaces ofthe Arabs, p. 202.

17 See Julie Taylor, "State-Clerical Relations in Egypt: A Case of Strategie Interaction," presented at the American Political Seience Association Annual Meeting in Washington, DC, September 2000.

18 See Steven Baraclough, "Al-Azhar: Between the Govemment and the Islamists," Middle East Journal, Vol. 52, No. 2, Spring 1998.

19 Zeghal, "Religion and Politics in Egypt," p. 382.

20 See Judith Miller, God has Ninety-Nine Names: Reporting from a Militant Middle East, 1996.

21 Egypt: A Religious or CM/ State? Cairo, 1992.

22 Fauzi M. Naiiar, "The Debate on Islam and Secularism in Egypt," Arab Studies Quarterly, Spring 1996, Vol. 18, No. 2, p. 21.

23 See Muhammad Said al-Ashmawy, Islam and the Political Order, Washington, DC: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy, 1994.

24 Farid Zakariyya, quoted in Alexander Flores, "Secularism, Integralism, and Political Islam: The Egyptian Debate," in Joel Beinin and Joe Stork, Political Islam: Essays from Middle East Report, Berkeley, 1997, p. 91.

25 International Religious Freedom Report 2001, Egypt, U.S. Department of State.

26 Alberto Fernandez. "In the Year ofthe Martyrs" Anti-Coptic Violence in Egypt, 1988-1993," Paper Presented at the Middle East Studies Association Annual Meeting, San Francisco, November 18-20, 2001.

27 Cited in Nadia About EI-Magd, "The Meanings of AI-Kosheh," AI-Ahram Weeldy, 3-9 February 2000.

28 See "International Religions Freedom Report, 2004" U.S. Department of State.

29 Abdo, No God but God, p. 68.

30 George N. Sfeir, "Basic Freedoms in a Fractured Legal Culture: Egypt and the Case of Nasr Hamid Abu Zayid," Middle East JoumaJ, Summer 1998, p. 406.

31 Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, Press Release, May 1, 1997.

32 See Judith Miller "The Challenge of Radical Islam," Foreign Affairs 72, no. 2,1993.

33 Hossam Bahgat, "AI-Azhar is wrong, but the state is the real culprit," The Dally Star, September 23, 2004.

34 Referenced in Fouad Ajami, "The Sorrows of Egypt," Foreign Affairs (September/October. 1995)

35 Dalacoura, Islam, Liberalism anti Human Rights, p. 126-7.

 

 

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