By Eric Vandenbroeck and co-workers
Protesters wearing
pink and yellow armbands succeeded in ousting the regime of Kyrgyz President
Askar Akayev, overtaking the presidential palace in
Bishkek early March 24. Akayev and his family reportedly
fled by helicopter to Russia.
The fall of Akayev's pro-Russian regime, in what has been dubbed the
"Tulip Revolution," could be viewed as yet another blow for Moscow in
its near abroad, where a series of pro-Western "velvet" revolutions
have been steadily shrinking Russia's sphere of influence. Now, it is not clear
that what has occurred in Kyrgyzstan is indeed a pro-Western revolution. The
opposition is hardly a unified movement: Clan affiliations, ethnic divisions
and other internal demographics are all in play. And, as some have noted, the
fact that demonstrators have been unable to settle on a common color for their
armbands does not bode well for consensus on larger political matters.
Recognizing that a
forecast for political upheaval in Central Asia does not necessarily draw
screaming headlines, it is important to remember a few geographic facts.
Kyrgyzstan is nestled high in the Tien-Shan Mountains, bordering China on its
south and east. And, as a former part of the Soviet Union, it remains of
strategic interest to Russia. What makes all of this particularly interesting
is that both Russia and China have a tendency to view any upheaval in regions
where they take interest as part of a conspiracy orchestrated by the United
States in order to challenge their hegemony.
This might be
paranoid thinking. It might be prudent "worst-case scenario"
planning. Or it might be a rational appreciation of Washington's intentions.
Whichever it is, the simple fact is that both regional powers regard any instability
in any country in the area as being generated by the United States and intended
to harm them.
Because Kyrgyzstan is
part of the Muslim world, the United States certainly cannot afford to be
indifferent to anything that happens there. U.S. forces are still conducting
operations in Afghanistan and probing into Pakistan's northern provinces -- and
supplying its forces there from a logistics base in Kyrgyzstan. That base is
one of two interests Washington has in Kyrgyzstan; the other is making certain al
Qaeda or other radical Islamist groups don't increase their power in the
region. So it would stand to reason that Washington has no interest in
fostering instability in Kyrgyzstan.
The Russians are not
so sure. They see the United States turning its attention from al Qaeda to
other issues, and they don't buy the Bush administration's line that its
political involvement in the region -- specifically in Ukraine, where
Washington helped secure a win by pro-Western President Viktor Yushchenko late last year -- is simply about the American
love for free elections. They believe the United States sought to install a
pro-U.S. government in Kiev in order to bring Ukraine into NATO and undermine
Russian national security.
Russian leaders also
see the United States as locking down its power in Central Asia. The United
States, having exerted influence in the region initially for economic
development, had Russia's support when it introduced troops following the Sept.
11 attacks. Leaders in Moscow and elsewhere think the Americans now are using
these troops to create a strategic reality: denying Russia its sphere of
influence in the region. They think Kyrgyzstan is part of this strategy.
On the other side of
Asia is China. Its westernmost province, Xinjiang, is predominantly Muslim and
in rebellion against Beijing. Chinese leaders have never been comfortable with
the American position on Xinjiang -- which seemed to argue that the U.S. war
against al Qaeda was one thing, but that China's battle against Muslim separatists
in Xinjiang was quite another. Government officials occasionally have indicated
a belief that the Americans actually liked the Xinjiang insurrection because it
weakened China.
The Chinese are
concerned that instability in Central Asia will increase the flow of supplies
to Xinjiang militants. Therefore, they view events in Kyrgyzstan as part of
Washington's strategy to threaten China, at a time when Washington has
pressured Europe to back away from arms sales to Beijing. The Chinese don't
believe the United States is obsessed with al Qaeda any longer. They believe
the Americans are obsessed with China, and they see events in Kyrgyzstan as a
security threat.
Washington did not
engineer the Kyrgyzstan rising, but it can use the uprising to increase its
influence in Central Asia. The world has changed sufficiently that al Qaeda is
no longer the top story; relationships among great powers are.
Central
Asia: At-a-glance
After a
series of protests toppled Kyrgyzstan's government, the BBC's news website
takes a look at the political tensions across Central Asia.
KYRGYZSTAN
Askar Akayev became president in 1990. He was re-elected by
direct popular vote shortly after independence in 1991 and again in 1995 and
2000. In the early years of his presidency, Mr Akayev was widely regarded as the most liberal leader in
former Soviet Central Asia. But there was growing discontent with his
leadership, amid reports of political suppression, economic stagnation and
widespread corruption.
Analysts have
expressed surprised at how quickly institutions collapsed in Kyrgyzstan, and
the speed at which Mr Akayev
lost control of government. They say the fall of the regime is an indication of
its weakness, rather than the opposition's strength.
Observers says
Kyrgyzstan's political future depends on how well the opposition is able to
develop. At the moment, many personalities and interests are jostling for
power, and it is not entirely clear what they stand for.
KAZAKHSTAN
Kazakhstan is the
wealthiest and most stable country in Central Asia thanks to its oil reserves,
but the political system has become increasingly authoritarian, corruption is
widespread and rural areas are still very poor.
Political power is
concentrated in the hands of Nursultan Nazarbayev, who came to power in 1989 as
the communist leader of Soviet Socialist Republic and has been president since
1991. His party has a comfortable parliamentary majority, ensuring he maintains
tight control. Like some other Central Asian rulers, Mr
Nazarbayev has been keen to promote his relatives and allies.
Previous elections
have failed to meet international standards. Privately owned and opposition
media are subject to harassment and censorship.
Analysts say the
country is relatively stable in the short term. However, the small opposition
is increasingly active, and oil wealth has created a business class that is
interested in political power. Presidential elections are slated for 2006.
TAJIKISTAN
Tajikistan is the
only Central Asian country to have had a civil war since the break-up of the
Soviet Union. The five-year conflict, from 1992-1997, killed up to 50,000
people, and more than one-tenth of the population fled the country.
Emomali Rahmonov was
elected president in 1994. His People's Democratic Party occupies almost all of
the 63 seats in the lower house of parliament. Previous elections have failed
to meet international standards. Opposition Islamic and communist parties have
a handful of seats between them.
The main issues that
dog Central Asia - widespread poverty and repressive leadership - are of
concern here, too. While Mr Rahmonov has experienced
serious challenges to his rule, observers say the opposition is weak and
divided, and that the government is increasingly authoritarian.
Tajiks are still
"war-weary", one observer says, and unwilling to take risks. However,
the country's economy is increasingly reliant on revenues from its position as
a drugs route out of Afghanistan, and there continue to be simmering divisions
related to the civil war.
TURKMENISTAN
Turkmenistan is effectively
a one-party state, and the regime is considered highly authoritarian and
repressive. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, head of the Communist Party
Saparmyrat Niyazov was elected president in 1991, and
named president-for-life in 1999. Mr Niyazov has
nurtured a personality cult and likes to be known as Turkmenbashi,
or Father of All Turkmens.
There is no official
political opposition. There is no free press, and only a handful of opposition
demonstrations have been reported since independence. A small number of
fractured opposition groups exist in exile, but their influence is said to be
negligible.
Analysts are
concerned about the country's growing poverty - despite revenue from important
reserves of natural gas - and the absence of political institutions. The lack
of a clear line of succession after Mr Niyazov is a
potential cause of instability in the longer term.
UZBEKISTAN
The political
leadership has been dominated by Islam Karimov since 1989, when he became
Communist Party leader in then Soviet Uzbekistan. The
regime is unpopular. There is no real internal opposition and the media is
tightly controlled by the state. A UN report has documented the systematic use
of torture. There is widespread frustration about the country's low standards
of living.
A series of bomb
blasts in 1999 was blamed on Islamic extremists, who were accused by the regime
of seeking to destabilise the country. Mr Karimov has been accused of using the perceived threat
of Islamic militancy to justify his repressive style of leadership, and
observers say that has strengthened sympathy for militant groups.
The absence of a
legitimate means of expressing dissent could create fertile ground for violent
protest. Mr Karimov will be watching developments in
Kyrgyzstan very carefully, and is expected to intensify efforts to stifle any
potential spread of "people power".
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